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Abstract 
Despite remarkable progress in planning and management, the development of 
adaptive governance for urban settings is incomplete; particularly in the context of 
global change and uncertainty (Birkmann et al. 2010, Wilkinson 2012). Urban settings 
are characterised by complex institutions and power relations that tend to resist rather 
than adjust to change. Established interests are often prioritised; emergent ‘non-core’ 
interests can remain marginal, and can lose capacity during critical change (Jänicke 
1997). Given this situation, how does the governance of a ‘non-core’ policy arena 
adjust to change over time? 
Public administration and political science literatures examine the role of networks, 
policy instruments and institutions in changes to governance. The adaptive 
governance problem demands a better understanding of responsive change with 
respect to: institutions (Goodin 1996, Dovers and Hezri 2010); hybrid governance 
arrangements (Skelcher 2012); power relations (Evans 2011); and the role of the 
public in public governance (Sorenson and Torfing 2005).  As such, the investigation 
contributes towards a more critical application of resilience thinking to governance 
settings. This research develops an investigative framework from these literatures to 
examine the diverse responses of governance actors to change. 
Using a comparative case study approach, the investigative framework examines how 
policy instruments (i.e. formal structures), urban regimes (i.e. informal structures) and 
the broader institutional context (e.g. regional governance) interact to shape the types 
and extent of governance adjustments over time. The focus is the policy arena of urban 
ecological governance within two metropolitan areas of Brisbane (QLD) Australia and 
Portland (OR) USA. These cases show important aspects of responsive governance 
in urban settings that are not included within more normative recommendations for 
adaptive governance, such as advocacy, contention and multiple framings of 
governance. How or whether inter-actor responses are coordinated depend on these 
and other factors such as legitimacy and interaction between types of responses.  
The research concludes that rather than seeing resilient policy arenas as requiring the 
‘governance of adaptation’ through particular normative forums, structures or 
principles, it is more useful to focus on and potentially steer the supporting factors that 
underpin diverse inter-actor responses to change across a policy arena. This 
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‘governance and adaptation’ view recognises that in urban settings, actors and their 
agency are embedded within multiple structures. Many of these structures cannot be 
adapted, but critically, some realign as an adjustment to change and this potentially 
supports adaptation. Metagovernance is found to be critical, although in general it is 
partially decentred amongst a set of key actors. A ‘governance and adaptation’ 
framework builds a policy arena-wide explanation from empirical settings. The findings 
have significant implications for efforts to enhance responsive governance in urban 
settings and to better strengthen its resilience to future uncertainties.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I knew that their budgets would be tighter this year, but when the news came it was 
a real shock to me. Our funding was completely slashed. After ten years of partnering 
with the local government we had five organisations working with us on the project. 
Without the local government dollars, I didn’t know how we could keep it all going or 
what direction we could take it. The only thing I knew for sure was that every group 
involved would have a different version of what that direction should be.  
It was 2011, and after three years of rippling through market systems the ‘global financial 
crisis’ (GFC) crashed through municipal environmental budgets across most of the western 
world. In Portland (OR), USA and Brisbane (QLD), Australia, I heard local managers, both 
government and non-government, share their versions of this same scenario. The 
organisations involved needed to change their activities in order to respond to the funding 
cuts, and as a result their working relationships would be affected. These relationships were 
often a resource that brought opportunities, but for many of these tightly networked local 
groups, partnerships could also bring complicated constraints, which could be difficult to 
change. Metropolitan-wide planning and management was more complex again. Across the 
urban areas of Metro Portland and Brisbane, not all local networks and activities were 
connected; furthermore different networks, programs and priorities were affected in different 
ways. Compounding this was the problem of priorities. These government and non-
government managers were operating in the arena of ‘urban environmental resources’, in 
particular ‘urban biodiversity’.1 Environmental concerns were rarely near the top of 
metropolitan agendas when budgets were healthy. So although actors involved in ecological 
                                                            
1 Environmental resources and urban biodiversity of special prominence included: native vegetation; wetlands; 
riparian areas; iconic species; and associated ecosystem services. Specific to Brisbane were: coastal resources such as 
mangroves; diverse ecosystems such as sub-tropical rainforest, dry sclerophyll and wet sclerophyll forests; and iconic 
species such as the koala (Phascolarctos cinereus) and some glider species (e.g. Petaurus breviceps); Specific to 
Portland were: iconic species such as pacific salmon species (genus Oncorhynchus), migratory birds and North 
American beaver (Castor Canadensis); riparian resources such as ‘back channels’; and temperate ecosystems such as 
Douglas Fir forest, Broadleaf forest and Oak Woodlands.       
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planning and management needed to respond to the impacts of the GFC, they had no 
illusions that they would be ‘calling the shots’.  
This concern with responding to change has not been limited to urban environmental 
governance. In many arenas decision makers increasingly face problems that are complex, 
‘wicked’ and therefore difficult to predict (Rittel and Webber 1973). However, an interest in 
adaptive governance does not always sit comfortably with the dominant paradigm for 
planning and management, namely sustainable development (Brown 2011).  
The sustainable development discourse emerged from a series of international forums. The 
1992 Rio Earth Summit explicitly introduced the challenge of governance for sustainable 
development (Jordan 2008). In its wake governments began launching their national 
strategies.2  The central aim was for development decisions to balance a range of ‘bottom-
lines’ (i.e. economic, social and environmental) in order to meet current needs without 
constraining the ability of future generations to do likewise.   
Central to the sustainable development approach was the increased involvement of 
stakeholders in matters that affected them with a view to more inclusive decision making 
(WCED 1987). For planning and management, the sustainable development paradigm 
fostered a sub-discourse of ‘integration’ in both rural and urban settings (Pickett et al. 2004, 
Morrison 2006, Peterson et al. 2007). Decision makers pursued this goal using a range of 
strategies. Spatially focused strategies such as regional planning sought to integrate local 
interests and multiple actors at higher spatial scales (Cotugno and Seltzer 2011, Hall and 
Tewdwr-Jones 2011). Sector-focused strategies encouraged collaboration through, for 
example, funding streams and peak bodies. Strategies within government structures aimed 
to link ‘silos’ via ‘whole-of-government’ approaches and integrated planning (Margerum 
1997, Management Advisory Committee 2004, Morrison and Lane 2005). The terms 
‘integration’ and ‘sustainable development’ became virtually ubiquitous, but their definition 
was often unclear and their implementation remained at best, incomplete (Giddings et al. 
2002, Krueger and Gibbs 2007). 
Sustainable development plans and management strategies needed to establish 
compromise between diverse ‘bottom-lines’ and organisational interests (Campbell 1996, 
Conroy and Berke 2004). This process was often complex and resource intensive (Giddings 
et al. 2002, Jepson 2004). In linguistic terms both ‘sustainable development’ and ‘integration’ 
                                                            
2 For example:  Australian launched its National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development in 1992 
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remained ‘floating signifiers’ – i.e. the terms were virtually empty of meaning until interpreted 
by key actors for a particular situation (Mehlman 1972, Davidson 2010b). Consequently, 
these planning and management instruments, defined – whether explicitly or implicitly — 
what ‘integration’ for sustainability meant in a particular situation and therefore, when a 
specific ‘bottom-line’ or interest would be prioritised over others (van Kerkhoff and Lebel 
2006). Unsurprisingly, decision making became more complex and difficult to implement, let 
alone to adapt (Campbell 1996, Godschalk 2004). 
Nevertheless, in the face of contemporary ‘wicked’ problems, an interest in making 
governance more responsive has continued to grow. Developing within the environmental 
management literature (Holling 1978, Holling and Gunderson 2002) the concepts of 
‘adaptive governance’ and ‘resilience’ more recently came to prominence with respect to 
global environmental change, most notably, climate adaptation (Smith 1997, Pielke 1998, 
Engle and Lemos 2010). The adaptation meme has expanded from academia into the grey 
literature. Terms such as ‘adaptation’, ‘recovery’ and ‘resilience’ abound in recent national 
government and international publications. Several authors question whether adaptive 
resilience now rivals sustainable development as the dominant paradigm for planning and 
management (Davidson 2010a, Mazur 2013, Flood and Schechtman 2014).  
This chapter introduces the problem of responsive governance. That is the problem of 
responding to change through planning and management in a complex and often contested 
setting. The structures and dynamics of governance for a particular planning interest can be 
understood as a governance arena. A governance arena for a particular planning interest, 
is the set of diverse actors, instruments and their interactions. Actors in the governance 
arena participate in multiple instruments that have different types of embeddedness with 
other governance arenas and the institutional context. Furthermore, each instrument 
develops a political arena, a set of political processes and structures, on the basis of what 
participants hope to achieve (Lowi 1964; Hill and Plumlee 1984). The governance arena 
therefore, also consists of overlapping and interacting political arenas. Responding to 
change in this situation is not simple and rarely unitary. The remainder of Chapter 1 analyses 
key concepts that have emerged from scholars in the field of adaptive governance. I then 
show why this endeavour, in its current state, is problematic to apply to complex (i.e. urban) 
institutional settings, and consider why this is a significant problem for future efforts towards 
sustainability.  This work sets the scene for outlining a research strategy to respond to this 
problem and improve understandings of responsive governance in complex settings. I 
outline the primary aim, key questions and conclude by mapping the structure of the thesis.  
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1.1 Making the case for governance that adapts 
Those who advocate for governance that is responsive to change tend to gather under the 
broad banner of ‘resilience thinking’. It emerged in the 1980s from the environmental 
management literature when complex adaptive systems were used to understand problems 
of natural resource management (Holling 1978). The most familiar term used is ‘adaptive 
governance’, and although there is not a standard definition for the term, the argument for it 
includes a number of defining points. First, both social and environmental factors impact 
governance and they are linked in a dynamic manner. The dynamic nature of these links 
has been increasingly explored and is exemplified within approaches that model social and 
environmental factors as ‘coupled’ social-ecological systems3 (Holling and Gunderson 2002, 
Young et al. 2006). Second, these environmental and social dynamics involve complex 
adaptive change4 that may be non-linear. As uncertainty about future social-ecological 
conditions is high (Folke et al. 2002, Schneider 2004), governance arrangements adjust to 
these unpredictable social-ecological changes will be better equipped to endure changes, 
address vulnerability and harness opportunities that may arise. A main thrust behind 
adaptive governance is the reduction and management of social-ecological uncertainty. 
Third, learning processes and the development of new knowledge can extend 
understandings of the social-ecological system and assist in the development of reflexive 
capacity (Armitage et al. 2008, Pahl-Wostl 2009). These learning processes require 
participation from a broad range of actors who have a stake in the resource of concern. 
Finally, the evaluation, translation and application of learning outcomes form the basis of 
adaptive change (Keith et al. 2011).   
The central premise of this approach is that governance will become resilient by making 
planning and management more responsive to new information and changing demands. 
From this dynamic view, the ability to adjust is crucial to and at least as important as effective 
outcomes, arrangements or policy instruments at a particular point in time (Davis 2010). The 
logic behind the adaptive governance approach intuitively makes sense. The approach also 
                                                            
3 These approaches developed within the natural sciences and have been extended into social science research through 
concepts such as ‘coupled social-ecological systems’ and ‘resilience’ (Foxon et al. 2009). A coupled social-ecological 
system occurs where the dynamics of an ecological system and a social ‘system’ is intrinsically linked – i.e. the dynamics 
of each influences the other. These dynamic approaches often build on more static approaches such as cross-sectoral 
or triple bottom line sustainability frameworks along with some institutional property rights and governance 
arrangement studies (Folke et al. 2005, Davis, 2010).  
4 Complex adaptive systems view change and disturbance as the norm as systems move through cycles of consolidation, 
release and reorganisation. They involve feedback loops, interactions between slow and rapid cycles of change, multiple 
scales and multiple equilibria within which a system can potentially function. For further discussion of these and other 
aspects of complex adaptive and social-ecological systems see Holling and Gunderson (2002). 
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holds great potential for more effective integration of environmental systems into 
governance processes. There is strong support for this assertion in principle, but its meaning 
in practice is less clear. The research in this area has tended to develop normative principles 
from specific cases of governance (Folke et al. 2005). The resulting theory needs to be 
examined in a broad range of settings to test assumptions about adaptation, governance 
structures and the interactions of governance with its broader context. 
In the literature on adaptive governance, the expectations for responsive change amongst 
groups of diverse actors often seem optimistic. Collaborative learning is emphasised for 
problem solving (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007, Armitage et al. 2008). However, there is little 
mention or detail about how collaboration between actors will be managed, in particular with 
respect to uneven power relations (Evans 2011). The complexity of social-ecological 
systems is examined, but there is a risk that the complexity of problem solving amongst the 
group of governance actors is overlooked. For some time adaptive approaches have been 
critiqued for under-theorising conflict and contention; for example, the different 
commitments, capacities and interests that actors bring to a collaborative process (Lee 
1999). Contextual influences on decision making and their influence on responsive change 
also are rarely discussed. To be most effective, adaptive management and governance may 
require a highly controllable situation and a rational problem solving approach (Allen et al. 
2011). This requirement contrasts with the public administration literature which views public 
decision making as generally interest driven and often irrational (Simon 1957, Kingdon 1984, 
Rhodes and Marsh 1992).  
Furthermore, the term governance itself is rarely defined clearly or comprehensively in 
resilience literature. While unclear definitions of governance is a common issue in 
governance research (Jordan 2008), effectively this means the perspectives on adaptation 
discussed above, tend to drive the definition of governance, rather than first clarifying what 
governance is and examining the phenomenon for how it actually responds to change. For 
example, because collaborative learning is understood as a dominant driver of adaptive 
responses, governance settings that are conducive to this ‘driver’ are given special focus 
(Folke et al., 2005). In the short term, this has been productive, as evidenced by the use of 
the collaborative governance model for implementing adaptive governance - particularly in 
integrated water management (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007, Booher and Innes 2010, Fish et al. 
2010, Cosens and Williams 2012). However, many settings are not practically or politically 
conducive to collaborative adaptive governance, especially without a long period of 
institutional capacity building (Childs et al. 2013).  
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Urban settings are particularly difficult for collaborative and adaptive strategies to 
governance. Even in less complex non-urban settings the diversity of actors and instruments 
needs to be managed carefully if collaborative governance is to achieve significant 
outcomes (Camacho 2010). Urban areas, which are often more diverse than non-urban 
settings, are governed through a more extensive range of policy instruments, diverse actor 
responsibilities and involve higher levels of competition for resources. Hence it is difficult to 
design policy and governance that can adapt. Research on adaptive governance has been 
understood as often approaching this challenge from a normative and prescriptive position 
(Huitema et al. 2009). Rather than seeking the ideal adaptive model for implementation, 
there is a need for empirical studies of urban policy arenas to better understand how the 
governance arrangements in place for urban areas adjust to change over time.   
Urban ecological governance provides a useful opportunity for empirical study of urban 
policy arenas and adaptation. Explicit planning and management have been implemented 
since the early 1990s (e.g. BCC 1990, Metro 1992) the development of this governance has 
involved times of rapid change.  Furthermore, because this policy arena sits outside of core 
urban priorities, it is expected to be impacted more extensively when resources for urban 
governance are limited. Policy arenas that sit outside of core urban priorities are not 
dominant institutions. Unexpected events relegate these ‘non-core’ arenas to a lower 
priority, and in an uncertain future this relegation will occur more often. The governance of 
non-core arenas needs to respond to change more effectively than dominant arenas and far 
more effectively than at present. The following section outlines an approach for better 
analysis of responses to change in governance and the contributions that can be achieved.  
1.2 Researching responsive governance in an urban policy 
arena: aim, questions and contribution 
This section explains the main aim of the research, the research questions and the primary 
contributions of the research. Data were collected and analysed between 2009 and 2013 
using the metropolitan areas of Brisbane, Queensland, Australia and Portland, Oregon, USA 
as case studies. 
 
Aim 
The main aim of this research is to analyse how responsive change in governance occurs 
over time in urban policy arenas that are not traditional and dominant urban concerns (such 
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as transport, industry and housing). The policy arena - in this case, urban ecological 
governance – is conceptualised as formalised arrangements (such as government 
programs) and informal arrangements (such as networks). The study investigates how and 
in what respects responsive change occurs within this policy arena over time. The research 
broadens the understanding of adaptive responses in complex institutional settings and 
contributes to the discourse on resilience and governance. As previously discussed an 
improved understanding of adaptation and resilience in complex settings is critical for 
governing an uncertain future. 
 
Questions 
This research is focused on urban policy arenas, policy arena governance and responsive 
change. Urban policy arenas are complex settings that are embedded within an institutional 
context. Policy arena governance is the range of opportunities for actors to participate in 
planning and management. Responsive change is a networked phenomenon of interaction 
between diverse actors, their interests and prevailing power relations. Within this frame, the 
research accordingly addresses three main questions: (1) how do actors within a ‘non-core’ 
urban policy arena interact with the broader institutional context over time?; (2) how and in 
what respects does governance of this urban policy arena across the metropolitan area 
adjust to change over time?; and (3) what are the implications for enhancing how this 
governance adjusts to change? 
 
Contribution 
This research examines the range of actor responses that occur in a complex setting and 
the manner in which these diverse responses contribute to change at the governance level. 
It therefore contributes to the current discourse on complexity and adaptation. The research 
takes a strong social science grounded approach to build this contribution.  
Resilience literature tends to address collaborative learning as a primary vehicle for 
responsive change (Luthar et al. 2000). However, the social science literatures, which have 
been examining inter-actor decision-making for more than 50 years, have a broader view of 
the way actors respond to change (Sabatier 1988). This broader approach understands 
actor responses as guided mainly by their interests rather than by logic. Therefore group 
decision making tends at best to be characterised by strongly bounded rationality, and in 
general is an irrational process that is characterised by contention between actors. 
Collaboration is thought to occur only under particular circumstances (Huxham et al. 2000). 
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In many cases, an uneven distribution of power and responsibility can mean that neither 
collaboration nor open contention takes place. Instead a dominant, often state, organisation 
imposes its view on other governance actors (Mann 1986). The broader view of actor 
responses acknowledges that the dynamics between governance actors can be as complex 
as the social-ecological systems they are governing. A spectrum of actor responses from 
collaboration through to conflict need to be examined in order to consider the full range of 
group interactions. 
Similarly, in comparison with literature on adaptive governance, social science disciplines 
such as public administration, planning and political science have a more comprehensive 
and detailed view of governance. Adaptive governance theories focus on collaborative 
forums for governance. However, the public administration literature notes that there are 
multiple instruments in place within complex settings and governance issues need to be 
examined across this regime in order to understand a policy arena (Gunningham and 
Sinclair 1999, Howlett 2004). This more comprehensive view also supports a more 
sophisticated treatment of agency and structure within governance. This mainstream 
governance literature recognises, in addition to collaborative forms of governance, other 
forms of networked governance, hierarchies, and market-based arrangements (Meuleman 
2008). Furthermore, contemporary settings are recognised as a hybrid of these different 
modes. These hybrid settings emerge as a function of specific circumstances, policy 
problems and the context of a place (Skelcher et al. 2013). Governance then is the manner 
in which actors are structured in the planning and management of a particular resource – 
whether informal or formal. Urban ecological governance depends on a wide array of often 
non-collaborative policy instruments and their interplay across different governance 
arrangements and networks of actors (Paavola et al. 2009). A higher resolution view of 
governance is better suited for investigating empirical cases, particularly for complex urban 
settings. This research therefore contributes to the discourse on complexity and adaptation 
by showing how various governance structures within a policy arena adjust to change (and 
each other) over time. 
Public administration theory however, also emphasises the importance of external and 
macro factors for triggering the change that occurs in a particular governance setting 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). In studies of governance, the arrangements that are in 
place to govern the broader institutional context are particularly important macro structures. 
Public administration theorists show that the governance structures in place for the broader 
context are both external to, and intrinsically embedded within the governance of a particular 
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resource (Gerber and Gibson 2009). So institutions overlap and facilitate the interface 
between the governance of a policy arena and the governance of its broader context. 
Indeed, governance of a policy arena is embedded within broader institutional patterns, 
many of which cross the boundaries between the arena and its context. In this research, 
institutions are defined as enduring arrangements or patterns of behaviour between 
governance actors – whether they are formalised or remain informal (adapted from Goodin, 
1996). This research therefore contributes to the discourse on resilience and governance 
by showing how governance is embedded within its institutional context, and the implications 
this holds for enhancing the responsiveness of governance within policy arenas. 
1.3 Research approach  
A comparative case study approach is employed to examine existing governance 
arrangements and adaptation over time. While a number of papers have reviewed adaptive 
styles of governance and adaptive capacity of governance (e.g. Clark and Clarke 2011, 
Engle and Lemos 2010), few have done so in urban settings (exceptions include Thapa et 
al. 2008, Wilkinson et al. 2010, Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete 2011) and fewer have used a 
USA-Australia comparison. Furthermore, the minority of studies that focus on governance 
and adaptation tend not to analyse governance processes and structures in a systematic 
manner (e.g. Lebel et al. 2006). In particular there has been little examination of institutions 
and power. The findings from these studies have revealed the potential of collaborative 
learning as responsive change, but leave the role of contention virtually unexplored. The 
research approach also responds to identified needs within the resilience literature for 
greater flexibility within governance to manage future uncertainties (Folke 2006) and closer 
scrutiny of institutions with respect to adaptation and resilience (Dovers and Hezri 2010). 
This study orients its contributions into these gaps. Chapter 2 details the theory and the 
framework employed to do this.  
An empirical analysis of responsive governance was undertaken through a comparative 
case study of the urban ecological governance arena in Brisbane and Portland. A total of 
four months across two visits was spent collecting data in Portland, with further data 
gathered remotely. The remainder of the time was spent in Brisbane. Responses to change 
in urban ecological governance were investigated from 1991 to 2012. Data collection 
involved: semi-structured interviews with managers of organisations and activities involved 
in urban ecological planning and management; participant observation of urban watershed 
groups; unstructured key informant interviews; and review of organisational documents and 
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other relevant reports. Analysis examined the formation and change in actor networks and 
policy instruments. A ‘multiple frames of enquiry’ approach to interpretation was applied by 
using state-centric, cross-sector and society-centric governance theories (see section 2.1 
and Chapter 3). 
The development and application of an investigative framework (2.4) supported the research 
to explain how and in what respects responsive governance has occurred in this complex 
setting. The findings included structures of ‘governance for adaptation’ and also ‘adaptable 
elements of governance’. These structures were found to be connected across the policy 
arena and operating at different levels. Finally, the implications for enhancing responsive 
change and directions for further research were explored.  
1.4 Thesis structure 
This chapter introduced the problem of governance responsiveness in complex institutional 
settings and outlined the research aim and questions for engaging with this problem. The 
contributions to knowledge and practice from this study were outlined in relation to the 
literature. The overall thesis structure and the focus of each chapter in relation to the 
research questions are detailed in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 Research questions within the thesis chapters 
 
Primary Research Aim: To analyse how responsive change in governance occurs over 
time in urban policy arenas that are not traditional urban concerns 
  
(Cases of urban ecological governance in Portland (OR), USA and Brisbane (QLD), 
Australia, 1991–2012) 
 
Research Questions Indication of research questions by chapter 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1) How do actors in a ‘non-core’ 
urban policy arena interact with 
the broader institutional context 
over time? 
      


2) How and in what respects does 
governance of this urban policy 
arena adjust to change over 
time? 
      
3) What are the implications for 
enhancing the way this 
governance adjusts to change? 
      
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Chapter 2 reviews significant theory on governance perspectives focused on state, networks 
and society. Inter-actor responses to change are then investigated in relation to literature on 
policy change, institutions and social movements.  
Chapter 3 describes the research design for this study. It provides an orientation to the 
research method by developing a research framework, an investigative framework and 
outlining main stages. Further details on method can be found within each analytical chapter 
of this thesis. 
Chapter 4 outlines the important background information to the topic of urban ecological 
governance in general and the empirical cases of Brisbane and Portland in particular. 
Chapters 5 to 9 constitute the analytical body of the research. Chapter 5 is a journal paper 
developed during the period of candidature and submitted during this time. Chapters 6 to 9 
are presented in similar stand-alone fashion. In step with the unfolding structure of the 
research, each chapter contributes to the launch of the next. In this way the sections move 
from a primary concern with structure – i.e. the impacts of change and stability in the 
institutional context – to one of agency – i.e. the nature of responsive change and its 
coordination in an institutionally complex setting.  
Chapter 5 investigates the effects of broader shifts in environmental planning and policy on 
urban environmental governance. It explores the changing emphasis on urban 
environmental governance in response to regionalisation of management of urban growth 
and natural resources. The chapter focuses on one watershed, the Oxley Creek in Brisbane. 
The analysis uses the watershed management model in an urban setting as a critical case 
for examining questions of process, scale and administration in urban environmental 
governance. It examines the structures and the effects of new initiatives on environmental 
governance over time. The chapter concludes by exploring the wider implications of shifts 
in the institutional context for the governance of urban natural resources, with particular 
focus on urban local governments. 
Chapter 6 expands the scope to include a comparative case from Portland, Oregon, USA; 
while Chapter 5 focuses on the impact of changes in the institutional context — i.e. external 
to the governance arena — this chapter focuses on internal structures, dynamics and their 
interactions. The instruments and their political arenas are identified and examined. The 
chapter forms part one of an embeddedness analysis for Portland and Brisbane. 
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Chapter 7 presents part two of the embeddedness analysis. The linkages between 
ecological governance and its context are examined by investigating three contextual factors 
within the investigative framework: biophysical context, temporal context and institutional 
context. 
Chapter 8 provides a stronger focus on agency than earlier chapters by examining the 
relational structures of ecological governance in Brisbane and Portland. It asks “What does 
it mean to respond to changes and opportunities in a setting so strongly influenced by 
broader institutional structures?” It engages with the perennial social science debate of 
agency and structure, which is particularly pertinent for adaptation in institutionally complex 
settings. A conceptual lens is designed to analyse different facets of responsive change in 
urban environmental governance. Accordingly, a refined model of response to change within 
governance arenas is developed. The findings from earlier Chapters 3 and 4 inform the 
application and development of the model. They also add significant explanatory power.  
Chapter 9 addresses issues of agency directly by asking “How is responsive change 
coordinated across diverse networks and instruments in this complex institutional setting?” 
It uses the concept of ‘legitimacy’ to investigate meta-governance in critical cases of 
responsive change. The chapter uses the case of Portland as an established model of 
integrated environmental governance.  The analysis focuses on the interplay between urban 
biodiversity governance, and watershed management, open space planning and efforts to 
integrate biodiversity. It examines the nature of ‘coordination’, strategies used and factors 
significant for success. The implications of this for enhancing responsive change are 
discussed. 
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis by returning to the research questions to review, integrate 
and synthesise main findings from the preceding chapters. The implications for practice and 
theory are considered for enhancing the responsiveness of environmental governance in 
urban areas. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Planning, Managing and Responding to Change: 
Perspectives from the literature 
 
Chapter 1 explained the aim of this research, its significance and contributions, and the main 
research questions that were investigated. This chapter explains the underpinning theory 
for the study. It investigates perspectives on public governance and responding to change 
within policy arenas. Theory on public administration, political science and institutions are 
surveyed. The aim here is not to comprehensively review such a broad array of literatures, 
but instead to compare critical approaches for understanding responsive change and select 
aspects most suitable for addressing this research problem. Accordingly critical theory on 
public governance is presented from literatures on governance of political systems, 
government and networks. Perspectives on governance differ in their concerns, the actors 
involved and processes of response to change. Theory on multi-actor responses to change 
is presented from literatures on social movements, institutions and policy change. Each 
places a different emphasis on agency and structure (as per Giddens 1986). The common 
challenge of multi-theoretical approaches is to draw from a broad theoretical base in a 
focused manner in order to maintain explanatory power. This challenge is further 
exacerbated by the multi-faceted nature of governance itself. 
…if it is viewed primarily as a mass of complex and interactive layers and 
applications, governance risks losing its conceptual and operational effectiveness as 
an organising concept.  (Edwards et al. 2012, p1) 
 
The following discussion therefore selects the most critical themes, theoretical approaches 
and aspects of governance for synthesis within an investigative framework for the study 
(Chapter 3). 
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2.1 Perspectives on public governance within the social 
science literature  
Real world governance involves a hybrid of hierarchy, network and market models 
(Wallington et al. 2007, Skelcher 2012). This section surveys these models, outlines the 
main perspectives in the social science literature and explores what these contribute to the 
investigation of adaptive and responsive governance. The ‘adaptive governance’ concept 
emerged from resilience thinking in the environmental management literature (Levin et al. 
1998, Folke et al. 2005, Folke 2007). This background in environmental management 
provided a strong scientific foundation, but also involved isolation from social theory during 
early stages of development. The result of this early isolation is that the adaptive governance 
model is often under-theorised with respect to social ‘systems’ (Batabyal 1998, Anderies et 
al. 2004). To respond to this issue, authors have increasingly identified the need for adaptive 
governance and resilience theory to engage with the political sciences literature, particularly 
since the mid-2000s. For decades the political science literature (including public 
administration) has been concerned with governance, change and resilience. The call for 
engagement of political science with adaptive governance has included reference to: 
institutional analysis (Healey 2006b, Dovers and Hezri 2010); policy analysis (Meijerink and 
Huitema 2009); communicative planning (Goldstein 2009); and collaborative governance 
(Innes et al. 2006, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007, Nelson et al. 2008, Kallis et al. 2009). However, 
few studies have treated political issues directly (an exception is Voß and Bornemann 2011). 
Political concerns mostly have been treated indirectly, such as by those who note the 
importance for adaptive governance to be considered legitimate, or who have defined the 
political context as an impediment (e.g. Cosens 2013). 
Surprisingly, an explicit theorising of the governance concept is rare within the governance 
literature. Jose (2014) notes, that even when claiming to theorise governance, authors 
usually theorise a practice of governance, rather than the concept itself. Models of 
governance then combine these theories of practice into functional strategies. There are 
several significant models of practice within the governance literature (Table 2.1), and most 
typologies of governance usually categorise models according to the dominant relational 
configuration of practice, i.e., hierarchy, network or market (e.g. Powell 1990, Dixon and 
Dogan 2002, Meuleman 2008). 
 
 
15 
 
Table 2.1: Common models of public governance practice according to sectoral focus 
 
                                                            
5  Heterarchy is "the relation of elements to one another when they are unranked or when they possess the potential 
for being ranked in a number of different ways", e.g. democratic elections (Crumley 1995). 
6 I.e. Governance through law and law making processes 
7 City Commission governance is structured into bureaus, each with an elected commissioner assigned as chief. It is also 
called a weak mayor system –e.g. Portland City Council, Oregon, USA. 
8 Mayor-Council governance is also known as ‘the strong mayor system’ (e.g. Brisbane City Council). 
9 Third party governance revolves around public procurement and contract planning and management.  
10 IUCN Trainers Manual for Natural Resource Governance: 
https://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/governance_training_manual_v_5__web_.pdf 
11 The management of governance networks – usually seen as a responsibility of the state (as per Jessop 2003) 
12 Multi-nucleated centres of governance (as per Ostrom 1961) e.g. Metropolitan governance, especially in the USA 
where there may be overlapping municipalities, counties, metro and special service districts.  
13 United Nations Environment Programme: http://www.unep.org/pdf/brochures/EnvironmentalGovernance.pdf 
14 A mixture of hierarchy, markets and networks within a policy regime  
State-centric practice Cross-sectoral practice Society-centric 
practice 
 corporate governance 
 administrative governance 
 executive governance  
 constitutional governance  
 democratic governance 
 hierarchical governance 
 heterarchical governance5 
 bureaucratic governance 
 multi-jurisdictional 
governance 
 cross-departmental 
governance 
 judicial governance 
 legislative governance6 
 public sector governance 
 managerial governance 
 commission governance7 
 mayor-council governance8 
 council-manager 
governance 
 municipal governance 
 federal/unitary/devolved 
governance 
 network governance 
 contract (third party) 
governance9  
 ‘third way’ governance  
 sectoral governance 
 new public management 
 shadow (network) 
governance 
 stakeholder/shareholder 
governance 
 co-governance 
 cross-sectoral 
governance 
 (natural) resource 
governance10 
 corporatist governance 
 adaptive/resilient 
governance 
 technocratic governance 
 public-private 
partnerships 
 socio-political 
governance  
 public policy 
governance  
 deliberative 
governance 
 participatory 
governance  
 direct democracy 
governance 
 civil society 
governance 
 market governance 
 neighbourhood 
governance 
 community 
governance – i.e. 
indigenous 
 big man 
governance 
State-centric and cross-sectoral applications 
 metagovernance11 
 multi-level governance  
 polycentric governance12 
 collaborative governance 
 level of governance (e.g. Local/State/National)  
 
General practice (i.e. State, cross-sectoral and society-centric applications) 
 organisational governance  / good governance 
 environmental governance / landscape governance13 
 regional / metropolitan / urban / rural governance 
 ad hoc governance 
 hybrid governance14  
16 
 
A key reason for limited theorisation of governance is that, like the term ‘sustainable 
development’, ‘governance’ is essentially a ‘floating signifier’ that encompasses many 
different meanings (Offe, 2009). With respect to multiple meanings, Jessop (2003) claims 
that the uptake of ‘governance’ by so many discourses now threatens its usefulness as an 
organising concept. This danger of concept stretching has long been recognised within 
social research (Sartori 1970). 
For research purposes there is a need to delimit the concept of governance, and identify 
relevant framings of governance within the literature. Jose (2014) proposes that the problem 
of conceptualising governance can be approached by locating ‘conceptual theories’ 
(henceforth ‘frame’) as nested between practice and discourse. As such, various theories of 
practice (henceforth ‘model’) fall under the umbrella of a broader conceptual theory. In turn 
a set of conceptual theories that each prescribe different ‘systems of possibilities’ are 
grouped within, and need to be interpreted within, the general discourse. Henceforth, 
‘conceptual theories’ and ‘theories of practice’ are referred to as frames and ‘models of 
practice’ respectively.  
Taking the nested discourse-frame-practice as a starting point, different frames of 
governance can be identified by examining diversity within the general governance 
discourse. Frames can be identified by asking, ‘Governance in whose sense?’ and 
‘Governance in what sense?’ (adapted from Jose 2014). Following a general definition of 
governance, the overarching discourse about governance concerns the structures and 
processes that coordinate social relations (i.e. inter-actor), whether formalised or informal 
(adapted from Jessop 2003, Rhodes 2007). Governance therefore concerns the roles and 
responsibilities of state and society and includes cross-sector interactions between both. 
‘Governance in whose sense?’ then can be answered in terms of three sectoral foci: state; 
society; and cross-sector. Hence, ‘governance in what sense?’ concerns the roles and 
responsibilities of state and society which for this research are broadly grouped15 into two 
functions: (1) institutional performance and (2) legitimate representation. Six frames were 
found within the literature by using the sectoral foci and governance functions. The following 
discussion briefly surveys these six frames. 
  
                                                            
15 Categorisation of core governance responsibilities were developed through a synthesis of the core features of 
government in liberal democracies – i.e. legitimate representation of the public and efficient use of the public’s 
resources, e.g. Parekh (1992) – with typologies developed in the literature (e.g. McCormick, 2011, Edwards et al. 2012) 
and tested against the models of public governance in Table 2.1.     
17 
 
Table 2.2: Frames of governance within the social science literature 
 State-centric frames Cross-sector frames Society-centric frames 
Performance 
 
i.e.  
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
State-performance 
 
Governance enables 
the state to use public 
resources efficiently 
and effectively  
 
 
The state should guide 
and manage 
 
Cross-sector performance 
 
Governance enables 
societal functions to be 
delivered efficiently and 
effectively  by involving 
non-state actors 
 
The state should partner 
with non-state actors 
Society performance 
 
Governance enables 
non-state actors to 
interact and operate 
independently of the 
state 
 
The state should 
minimize involvement in 
governance 
Legitimacy 
 
i.e. 
representative 
and democratic 
State-legitimacy 
 
Governance enables 
the state to represent 
public views in 
decision making 
 
The public should give 
the state a mandate 
Cross-sector legitimacy 
 
Governance enables state 
and non-state to make 
decisions together  
 
 
The public and state 
should dialogue 
 
Society-legitimacy 
 
Governance enables 
civil society actors to 
dialogue with each 
other 
 
The state should 
empower the public 
control 
Note: The premise of each frame is in italics. 
 
2.1.1. State-centric frames of public governance 
State-centric models (Table 2.1) frame governance as carried out primarily by one or more 
government actors. Society is guided by these government actors, often through the use of 
hierarchical structures. The state-performance frame is based on the premise that the state 
should manage and where possible solve societal problems. This thinking developed 
amongst pragmatist and utilitarian philosophers. It was first manifest in top-down rationalist 
models, then through managerialism and then thirdly, through multi-level models of 
governance. Firstly the state-performance frame of governance is associated with the 
emergence of rational planning and policy sciences (Simon 1957, Lasswell 1970, Friedmann 
1987, Mayntz 2003). The idea that government can solve social problems by making policy 
emerged in the 1930s during ‘the great depression’. It was underpinned by rationalist, 
pragmatist thinking and utilitarian arguments for reform.16 A range of rational problem solving 
models for the state manager developed from this approach and many remain central to 
public decision making (Simon 1957, Lasswell 1970, Friedmann 1987, Mayntz 2003). 
                                                            
16 Utilitarian thinkers – e.g Bentham and Mills – have been criticized for poor consideration of equity and moral issues 
(Parsons 1995). Many decisions and calculation techniques are based on utilitarianism (See Mill 2010), but perhaps 
more importantly to Pragmatism – e.g. John Dewey, William James and Charles Peirce. See Healey (2009) for a review 
of pragmatist influences on policy and planning.  
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Secondly, the state-performance frame is associated with managerial models of practice,17 
which emerged in the 1970s. These models are grounded in rational choice theory (Nozick 
1974) and tackle problems of how the state can best use public resources.18 These models 
involve the transfer of private sector concepts such as corporate governance into the public 
sector. Eakin et al. (2011) examined the implications of this transfer for adaptive governance 
and found that managerial models such as New Public Management may inhibit the adaptive 
capacity of governance. Thirdly, an interest in multi-level governance has emerged as a 
strategy for linking different levels of government in an efficient manner; Betsill and Bulkeley 
(2007) refer to this model as a tiered approach to governance research and implementation. 
The ‘tier approach’ tends to concentrate on multi-level effects, government responsibilities 
and is more likely to have a spatial focus. ‘Tier approaches’ have supported studies around 
policy conflict and interplay, policy frameworks and integration. Analyses in this area relate 
to ideas such as nested-hierarchy and institutional fit (Ostrom 1986, Young 2002). 
In comparison, the state-legitimacy frame is based on the view that the public should give 
endorsement and consent, generally at elections, for the state to govern (Emy 1997). 
Essentially the state-legitimacy frame does not seek a role for the public in public 
governance, beyond the endorsement of the state at elections, and consultation where 
needed at other times. Therefore the legitimacy-state frame is mostly contextual for the 
phenomenon of policy arena governance. 
With respect to urban policy arenas, the state plays a strong role and therefore, the two 
state-centric frames have strong relevance for many activities. State-centric analysis 
supports the investigation of: economic efficiency in the public sphere; the distribution of 
resources through policy; and the practical application of policy analysis and design 
(Gunningham et al. 1998). However, state-centric frames assert that governance occurs 
mostly through formal government structures. This focus on formal structures undervalues 
the informal dynamics within governance and the role of policy networks (Rhodes 1994, 
Andrew and Goldsmith 1998). 
                                                            
17 Originally grounded in pragmatist thought also, but took a stronger emphasis on individualist utilitarianism of which 
classic pragmatism was critical (Healey 2009).  
18 By the mid–1970s a critique of ‘large government’ was sparked by concern over increased public spending and the 
failure of state intervention to solve social problems. The critique led by public choice theory, shifted the boundary 
between public and private (Hirschman 1982). It called for a reorientation towards procedural justice (Nozick 1974) and 
advocated competitive ‘free’ markets for the efficient allocation of resources (Hayek 1960). Policy in this vein became 
dominant during the 1980s, led to a downsizing of governments and has maintained its influence as economic 
rationalism. Research on the smaller government models functions has led to policy theories of new public 
management, managerialism and governance. 
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2.1.3. Society-centric frames of governance 
Society-centric models assert that the state should seek to minimise its involvement in 
governance wherever possible. Accordingly, the society-performance frame includes much 
of the rational choice models associated with notions of small government (e.g. Friedman 
2009). These schools of thought impact on, but are marginal to matters of urban ecological 
governance and can be considered as contextual variables. Society-legitimacy models are 
more central to responsive governance. The frame is grounded in structural and sociological 
critiques of society. Foundational concepts and social thinkers include: solidarity (Durkheim 
and Kropotkin); social justice (Rawls); social action (Weber); and civil society (Gramsci).19 
The emergence of the society-legitimacy frame in modern times is associated with the 
turbulent politics of the 1960s–1970s. For public governance this turbulence involved the 
breakdown of the established triads of government, business and science, the so-called iron 
triangle model of governance (Heclo 1978, Jordan 1981). Early analyses in this frame are 
especially concerned with issues of power in state-society relations (e.g. Cobb and Elder 
1971, Granovetter 1973, Lukes 1974, Gaventa 1982). Later studies revolve around civil 
society - i.e. the non-profit sector, community development and social capital (Putnam et al. 
1993, Cohen and Arato 1994).  
Civil society analyses often use ‘spheres of society’ as an analytical concept: public and 
private spheres; and state and market spheres. Earlier studies treat these spheres as mostly 
separate, but more sophisticated studies treat these spheres as overlapping. Overlapping 
spheres, for Janoski (1998), explain why civil society is able to play a critical social role and 
can potentially influence state governance. From this perspective, each sphere has public 
aspects that civil society is able to operate within (Hann and Dunn 1996, Janoski 1998). Civil 
society is viewed as mostly autonomous and independent from the state (Salamon et al. 
1999), and as consisting of non-government organisational actors. For the purposes of this 
research, the society-centric frame can link governance with the broader social system and 
explore the potential for public feedback into governance. However, civil society models 
claim that community-based actors are autonomous from government. This claim has been 
critiqued (Kasfir 1998), and with respect to urban policy arenas, community autonomy is 
unlikely because the state is such a prominent urban landholder and manager. 
                                                            
19 Seminal works by social thinkers that were foundational to the society-legitimacy frame include: Durkheim (1893), 
The division of Labour in Society; Kropotkin (1902), Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution; Rawls (1971), A theory of Justice; 
Weber (1922), Economics and Society; and Gramsci (1971), Selections from the Prison Notebooks. 
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2.1.2. Cross-sector frames of governance  
Cross-sector frames are an alternative to those of state and society. These frames are 
based on the premise that governance should involve the state partnering and/or dialoguing 
with non-state actors. This central premise is grounded in neo-pragmatist thinking. It is 
associated with concepts such as community of inquiry (Rorty and Bromwich 1980), critical 
pragmatism [in planning] (Forester 1987). These social thinkers laid the foundations for 
contemporary practices of stakeholder dialogue (Freeman 1984), collaborative planning 
(Healey 1997; Innes and Booher 2003) and collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash 
2008). The central cross-sector link in these frames is analysed variously as being organised 
around interests (Rhodes 2007) or ideas (Sabatier 1988). The terminology varies from 
networks (Heclo 1978, Rhodes 1996), to epistemic communities (Haas 1992) and coalitions 
(Sabatier 1988) to interactions (Kooiman 2003), but all share the common concept that 
actors are drawn together by organising principles and can be examined on that basis.  
 The ‘cross-sector-performance’ frame is associated largely with models of network 
governance and new public management, both of which sit within the neo-liberal economic 
tradition (Rhodes 1996, Morrison 2007). The definition by Rhodes (1996) places cross-
sector networks at the very core of governance. Governance is managing networks’ and 
networks are the self-organising, inter-organisational linkages rather than the actors 
themselves (adapted from Rhodes 1996). New Public Management is a common analytical 
model within the ‘cross-sector-performance’ frame (Hood 1991, Denhardt and Denhardt 
2000). Accordingly, networks are viewed as delivery mechanisms for societal functions 
where each role is distributed to the actors who can most efficiently achieve the outcomes 
that are sought (Rhodes 2007). Actor networks are a useful analytical tool for interpreting 
institutional change over time, for example, this model identifies roles traditionally played by 
strong government that are now implemented through networks of actors. Accordingly, 
significant studies in this area examine different network structures and the effects of 
‘governance’ on service provision and resource management (Wilks and Wright 1987, 
Rhodes and Marsh 1992, Rhodes 1996, Kenis and Knoke 2002)20. This reduction of direct 
service provision by governments has been claimed to be a ‘hollowing out of the state’ 
(Rhodes 1994). 
                                                            
20 Sorenson and Torfing (2005) refer to this set of studies as first generation governance theorists. They contrast them 
with second generation governance network theorists who are concerned with the normative effects of networks on 
democracy and service provision.  
21 
 
However, some assert that this notion of ‘hollowing out’ has been over-emphasised and that 
hierarchy is more persistent than assumed (Davies 2002, Bell and Hindmoor, 2012). Bell 
and Hindmoor (2009) note that the state retains ultimate control of public governance 
networks through contract governance, funding arrangements, and as a last resort the 
legitimised use of force. In other critiques, commentators highlight the problem of public 
accountability for non-state actors involved in public functions, particularly in complex 
environments (Papadopoulos 2003, Leach 2006 Koliba and Meek 2008, Holmen 2011). 
These authors point out the need for government networks in liberal democratic societies to 
have ‘democratic anchorage’, however the voting public is typically treated as an external 
variable to the governance arrangements (Sørensen and Torfing 2005, Zimmer et al. 2008, 
Skelcher et al. 2011).21 
The basic premise of the ‘cross-sector-legitimacy’ frame is that the state needs to maintain 
a dynamic dialogue with society in order to govern with legitimacy (Dryzek 2010). This frame 
is particularly associated with models of stakeholder participation, deliberative democracy 
and communicative planning. Stakeholder participation used commonly in metropolitan and 
regional planning,is an efficient way to collect public information and input. However, there 
is a need to carefully manage input from different interest groups who claim to speak on 
behalf of the public (Lane and Morrison 2006, Smith et al. 2006). In comparison deliberative 
democracy and communicative planning approaches have a broader view (Innes and 
Booher 2003). These authors advocate for models that enhance democracy in order to offset 
the crisis of the state in western societies, the actions of special interest lobbies and the 
lower democratic accountability of governance network (performance-frame network), when 
compared to traditional state delivery of services (Newman et al. 2004). Parallel to these 
processes for decision making in a pluralist context, some authors focus on frameworks for 
to support decision making amongst diverse groups. These frameworks have been 
described as synergistic, non-binary or integrated. They include concepts such as 
sustainability, quality of life (Costanza et al. 2007) and human development (Neef 1991). 
They have been used as unifying principles to support pluralist or cross-sector decision 
making.  Some authors have a particular focus on using cross-sector-legitimacy to critique 
the cross-sector-performance frame. They call for society to play a stronger role in public 
governance either in general (Zimmer et al. 2008), or by strengthening the role played by 
political representatives (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). Shefter (2007) however notes that an 
                                                            
21 Sorenson and Torfing (2005) refer to these authors as second generation governance network theorists – refer to 
previous footnote for further detail. 
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increase in public engagement can increase the power of the state rather than constrain it 
in some circumstances. 
Network analyses are important cross-sector approaches that have great potential for 
examining urban policy arenas (Thatcher 1998, Fawcett and Daugbjerg 2012). Whether 
performance-framed or legitimacy-framed they are strong on cross-sectoral dynamics, and 
network integration. Those engaged in network analysis of governance are able to recognise 
informal actor relationships as well as networks that have formalised around policy 
instruments (Howlett 2004). They can investigate the extent to which non-state actors are 
involved in the co-production of policy (Bovaird 2007). In general network analyses are seen 
as a way to examine public administration, resource management and service delivery for 
evidence of flexibility and responsiveness (Hooghe and Marks 2003, Bell and Hindmoor 
2009). In addition, network studies can illuminate the interactions between actors and 
institutions. The gap between agency and structure often plagues the investigation of actors 
within institutions (Cammack 1992). Although, some authors note that network analysis does 
have weaknesses and can over-emphasise the significance of relationship structures 
(Thatcher 1998).  
Overly strong application of the network approach has been viewed by some as sharing the 
same analytical problems as pluralism and corporatism (Marsh et al. 2003), namely, the 
overstatement of diffuse and fragmented power within society. Regardless of the extent to 
which governance is networked, a small set of researchers have begun to highlight that real 
world governance involves a hybrid of hierarchy, network and market (Wallington et al. 2007, 
Skelcher 2012), either through purposeful design, or the persistence of older regimes 
(Lowndes 1997). Future research in this area is likely to further examine the problems of 
hybrid governance. 
2.1.4 Summary: Governance perspectives 
In some respects the governance frames identified within the literature are mutually 
incompatible as each begins with differing assumptions about state-society relations. Yet all 
the frames operate simultaneously in a governance arena as the basis for different policy 
instruments, actor networks and responses to change. Table 2.3 provides a comparative 
overview of governance frames from the social science literature that this section has 
reviewed. 
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Table 2.3 Comparison of public governance perspectives in the social and political science 
literature 
 State-centric frames Cross-sector frames Society-centric frames 
Theory of 
the State 
State is the primary 
arrangement for 
governance. A [strong] 
manager who directs 
and guides 
State is constrained and 
reliant on diplomacy to 
achieve its roles and 
responsibilities  
(Rhodes 2007) 
State represents the 
public and maintains the 
legitimacy of this 
representation through 
ongoing dialogue with the 
public  
Primary 
focus on 
Networks 
Networks are (or 
should be) steered and 
managed by the state 
Networks are the primary 
arrangements for 
governance. They link 
state and/or non-state 
actors who are involved 
The public mobilises 
through networks. Non-
public actors and networks 
need democratic 
accountability 
Treatment of 
‘society’ 
Society and the public 
are external variables 
in the analysis of 
governance 
Public and political 
aspects are generally 
external variables in 
governance analysis 
Governance primarily 
occurs to fulfil the needs 
and interests of the public. 
Public participation is 
internal to the analysis of 
governance  
Institutions Formal Both formal and informal Primarily informal 
Trajectory of 
theoretical 
development 
From governance as 
societal management 
to governance as 
corporate management 
From networks as an 
alternative to hierarchy to 
networks within hybrid 
forms of governance that 
include hierarchy 
From public participation 
as agency to public 
participation as 
institutionally structured 
 
More recently various governance frames have shown signs of cross-fertilisation, primarily 
by using the concept of ‘network’, which has great significance for this research. State-
centric authors now recognise the steering of networks as a critical role for the state (Bell 
and Hindmoor, 2009). Cross-sector authors admit that implemented governance is a hybrid 
of state hierarchies, markets and networks (Meuleman 2006, Skelcher 2012). The need for 
a refocus on societal and political elements within network governance studies has also 
been noted (Zimmer et al. 2008, Blanco 2013). ‘Network’ as a concept therefore, has great 
potential for researching empirical governance arena settings. Network analyses can be 
expanded beyond the cross-sector frames to include the state and society frames also 
operating in the governance arena. Chapter 3, section 3.2 explains how ‘network’ is used 
as a meta-concept in this research to build a ‘multiple frames of enquiry’ approach that links 
cross-sector with state and society foci. 
This review of governance frames in the social science literature shows that governance 
includes a range of structures and processes with inter-actor dynamics including: formal 
government units; the constitution; law making; legal compliance; policy making; third party 
contracts; cross-sectoral partnerships; collaborative forums; certain public participation; 
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social movements; lobby groups; and even societal norms. This foreshadows the complexity 
that is likely to be found within urban policy arenas. The next section investigates the theory 
on how this governance might respond to change over time within urban policy settings.   
2.2. Perspectives on inter-actor responses to change 
The previous discussion highlights that regardless of specific structures or processes, 
governance occurs as an inter-actor dynamic. This section accordingly is concerned with 
inter-actor and broadly networked responses in the social science literature. The following 
discussion reviews theoretical perspectives on multi-actor responses to change. These 
perspectives can for introductory purposes, be characterised on a spectrum between 
collaboration and contention. Perspectives from the literature on policy, institutions and 
social movements are reviewed with respect to this spectrum of actor responses to change. 
The extensive theories about particular structural configurations and their responses to 
change, are not discussed here.22 Instead, theories about particular structural configurations 
are addressed, as needed, in later analytical chapters. The theoretical areas reviewed in 
this section differ greatly in their comparative emphases on agency. Therefore, in order to 
review these three areas of theory and understand actor responses to change, it is important 
to first clarify what is meant by agency. 
The concept of agency 
To research responsive governance it is important to determine the sources of agency within 
planning and management. Agency is the capacity to act and engage with social structures. 
This means agency is located amongst actors rather than at the network or structural level 
(Blom-Hansen 1997). It is not governance per se that responds to change, but the actors 
who participate in that governance.23 Actors respond (i.e. agency) and governance adjusts 
(i.e. structure). Actors24 can be understood according to their interests, scale of operation 
and core ideas (Sabatier 1988, Hall 1993). These qualities affect the way that actors network 
with each other (informal structures) and their involvement in policy instruments (formal 
structures). Giddens (1986) addressed the argument over whether agency or structure is 
                                                            
22 Commonly examined structural configurations of governance include: hierarchy; heterarchy; and network 
configurations – see for example Thorelli 1986 and Crumley 1995.  
23  The notion that it is actors rather than governance that responds to change can be understood somewhat through 
the analogy of adaptation in biological systems. In biology the ability to adapt is held at the species level. Species adapt, 
ecosystems adjust. However, beyond this, social science theorists show that the manner in which human actors respond 
to change cannot be simply paralleled with species adaptations. 
24 ‘Actor’ is a broader term than that of ‘stakeholder’. Stakeholder literature is more concerned with deciding who has 
or does not have a ‘stake’ in the particular situation. 
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most important for understanding empirical settings by framing them as an inseparable 
duality. The remaining contention revolves around the emphasis that ‘should’ be given to 
each in order to interpret particular social situations. The frames of governance discussed 
above can be employed in a ‘multiple frames of enquiry’ approach to explore differing 
emphases between agency and structure (Forestiere, 2008). This manner in which agency 
engages with structure is a critical factor in how or whether governance adjusts to change. 
The following review presents a social science perspectives about responding to change, 
each with different comparative emphasis on the role of agency in change. 
2.2.1. Public policy and responding to change 
A broad range of policy contributes to the formal context for urban policy arenas and many 
policies intersect within the arena itself (e.g. policy on land-use planning, infrastructure and 
environmental resources). Policies are the guidelines for distributing public resources. 
Hence, theory to explain the role of agency within policy change is important for 
understanding responsive governance. Policy change literature generally uses state-centric 
frames of governance, although within these frames there has been an increase in 
participation from non-state actors (Arts and Tatenhove 2004). Theory on policy change 
explains the spectrum of actor responses to change with respect to the distribution of public 
resources. It provides an account of actor interests and conflict within decision making. 
However, authors also acknowledge that the causal mechanisms of policy change remain 
poorly understood (Capano 2009). This poor understanding can be compounded further in 
interdisciplinary fields such as social-ecological systems (Folke 2006). On that basis, the 
following discussion outlines policy change, in particular: policy cycles and implementation; 
types of policy change; and their orientation. 
Policy cycles and policy implementation 
A policy cycle metaphor often is used to frame the overall process of policy change and 
development (Bridgman and Davis 2004). The resulting policy cycle model, as with similar 
decision-making models, includes stages that move through design to implementation. 
Although early positivist researchers saw the policy cycle as a stepwise rational problem 
solving process, contemporary authors note that policy cycles rarely progress in this 
manner. A crucial precursor to this cycle is that once an issue has been identified for policy 
design it has already undergone a process of identification and construction amongst key 
actors and networks (Everett 2003, Howard 2005). This process often involves a competition 
for the attention of decision makers between different public issues, which have been 
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conceptualised as policy windows or issue attention cycles (Schattschneider 1960, Cobb 
and Elder 1971, Kingdon 1984, Peters and Hogwood 2009). Other authors examine deeper 
power dynamics such as ‘non decision-making’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1963) and the 
manipulation of symbols and myths (Lukes 1974, Gaventa 1982). This dynamic continues 
throughout stages in the policy cycle, occasionally emerging as conflict and contention. 
Therefore an understanding of responsive governance needs to account for the levels of 
power and associated contention that begin operating even before policy design has begun. 
Remembering that agency is located amongst actors, this research enables an examination 
of differing contributions to responsive change from actors at different stages of the policy 
cycle (Skok 1995, Howard 2005). Similarly, policy instrument research can show how 
change can manifest within instrument mixes and policy frameworks (Howlett 2000, Howlett 
et al. 2006), and then with a focus on actors that participate in these instruments, the agency 
behind these instrument changes can be explored. Finally, the policy evaluation research 
shows how monitoring and evaluation of policy can indicate how actors are involved or not 
involved in responsive decision making and show what policy outcomes are considered 
important (Dryzek 1987b , Palumbo 1987, Cook and Skogan 1991, Bridgman and Davis 
2004).25 
Types of policy change 
Policy can shift in a variety of ways and the literature on this is extensive. The tendency for 
policy to generally shift by increments (Lindblom 1959) with less frequent punctuations of 
larger scale shifts (John 2003, Baumgartner et al. 2009) has important implications for 
responsive change in policy arenas.26 Some researchers (e.g. Sabatier 1988) examined the 
role of actors and networks amongst different types of policy shift; Hall (1993) and Cashore 
and Howlett (2007) investigated the correlation between types of policy shift and the 
                                                            
25 Policy evaluation is often framed as a distinct stage within policy processes although best practice integrates 
evaluation throughout the process (Palumbo 1987). In reality policy evaluation is a work in progress. It is expensive, 
indicators are debated and actors may not be incentivised to support the process (Bridgman and Davis 2004). Policy 
evaluation literature continues to engage with these issues and is a work in progress. Common practice continues to 
make assumptions about objective evaluation of data although post-positivist methodologies have been developed 
around multiple frameworks (Cook and Skogan 1991) and making values explicit within goal setting (Dryzek 1987b). 
26 The policy change literature debates a range of issues such as: ‘the nature of change’, ‘drivers of change’ and 
typologies of change (Capano and Howlett 2009). The nature of change revolves around radical versus incremental 
change (Lindblom 1959) with recent work attempting to link both modes (e.g. Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Major 
drivers of change are identified as socio-economic conditions, ideas (and values) and interests, institutions and 
networks. More comprehensive theories examine the interactions between these drivers (John 2003). 
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adjustment of goals, objectives or settings within policy;27 and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
developed frameworks to link the actor level and network level in research on policy shifts.  
Contention and learning orientations in the study of policy change 
There are two main orientations in the study of policy shifts, the contention orientation and 
the learning orientation. As referred to above, the contention view focuses on questions of 
power and differing interests, as referred to above (e.g. Bachrach and Baratz 1963, Cobb 
and Elder 1971, Lukes 1974). However, most contemporary studies of inter-actor dynamics 
and policy change studies take a learning orientation. The learning orientation approaches 
public policy as a collective puzzle where actors search for solutions to public problems 
(Heclo 1974, Dryzek 1987b). Policy and planning theorists such as Healey (2006a), analyse 
whether a learning outcome is likely and ask what the important requirements are needed 
to achieve this. However, there is a need to reconcile both approaches (Bennett and Howlett 
1992),28 particularly for research on policy development over time. 
There are some policy theorists who take a learning orientation to policy change and also 
recognise a dynamic of contention between some actors. For example: theory on policy 
transfer, social learning and policy learning (Friedmann 1987, Dolowitz and Marsh 2000); 
and even more so, the literature on public participation (Habermas 1985, Pratchett 1999). 
Few studies compare learning and contention oriented processes (Weible and Sabatier 
2009 is an exception and they were uncertain which orientation produced the most effective 
policy), however it is clear that effective learning orientations require detailed processes for 
managing inter-actor contention (Armitage et al. 2008). This situation becomes even more 
pressing when considering the deeper structures that both connect some actors and hold 
others apart – institutions.  
  
                                                            
27 Change in the policy space can include altered goals, values, beliefs, purpose and priorities (Parsons 1995) and these 
need clear definition to define the policy space for policy change research. There are diverse approaches in the 
literature. For example Hall (1993) uses three levels of abstraction: instruments; techniques and priorities. Cashore and 
Howlett (2007) further divide Hall’s categories to give six elements that they associate with different policy change 
processes. Hogwood and Peters (1982) examine change from a policy cycle perspective and use categories of policy 
succession, innovation, maintenance and termination. 
28 Policy learning and social learning have emerged as an alternative to conflict-oriented theories of change (Bennett 
and Howlett 1992). Policy learning focuses on decision makers and influential actors. A diversity of models exists and 
they often contradict each other (e.g. Etzioni 1968, Sabatier 1988, Haas 1991), this suggests that different models are 
built around different types of policy learning. Parsons (1995) notes, that these approaches often have a normative 
element by advocating for policy and process to speed up learning in policy. 
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2.2.2. Institutions and responding to change 
The need to better consider institutions in studies of adaptation and resilience has been 
recognised widely by authors within both fields of resilience thinking and social sciences 
(Folke 2006, Huitema et al. 2009). The problem here though, when investigating responsive 
change, is that institutions are better known for maintaining stability rather than fostering 
adaptation and flexibility (Goodin 1996). Furthermore, institutions operating at higher scales 
will compound this situation at local scales and this is significant for urban policy arena 
governance. 
…to a much greater extent than is the case at the level of the nation-state, institutions 
in urban governance are themselves constrained by organizational factors such as 
constitutional arrangements and other types of legal definitions of the responsibilities 
of public organizations  (Pierre 1999, p374).  
The contemporary institutional literature falls into three schools: 1) institutional economics 
(e.g. Ostrom 1986); 2) the broader more symbolic ‘sociological institutionalism’ (González 
and Healey 2005); and 3) the more power oriented historical institutionalism (Pierson and 
Skocpol 2002). Researchers in institutional economics (also known as rational choice 
institutionalism) see institutions as building stability by lowering transaction costs and 
uncertainty for social interactions (e.g. Ostrom 1986). Sociological institutionalism sees 
institutions as providing social cohesion and legitimacy for actors (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). Historical institutionalism notes that power relationships embodied within institutions 
tend to resist change and thereby maintain stability (Hall and Taylor 1996, Adger 2000). The 
role of history in this situation is significant. Current institutions are primarily an adaptation 
of past structure, discourse and norms. Therefore change tends to be incremental, marginal 
and path dependent (Burch, 2011). With respect to scale effects and the urban policy level, 
many institutions lack incentives to respond to local change (Anderies et al. 2004)29.  
Contemporary neo-institutional theories30 frame institutions as social stabilisers that cross 
sectors and underpin societal structures (Skocpol 1985). State organisations are seen as 
actors in their own right, with their own interests and agency. These theories allow the 
                                                            
29 The lack of incentive for institutions to respond to local change can relate to globalised or aspatial characteristics. 
Globalised characteristics mean that local stressors for change, i.e. agricultural institutions and drought in a local area, 
will not have effect because the processes sensitive to that stressor occur elsewhere (Anderies et al. 2004), i.e. 
agricultural production may occur on a different continent. Aspatial characteristics involve, for example, relationships 
with dominant actors who are located outside of or above the local area (Morrison 2004).   
30 In contrast with neo-institutionalism, classical institutional theory focuses on formal usually state structures and the 
state is viewed as a structure that serves the public interest (Selznick 1996). These theories therefore are limited for 
exploring cross-sectoral connections and processes of responsive change that are informal in nature. 
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agency for responsive change in governance to be located within state as well as non-state 
actors (Selznick 1996).31 By recognising a variety of state actors a more sophisticated 
approach can be taken to identify differing interests, commitments and participation in 
change amongst state actors (Clarke and McCool 1985). Neo-institutionalism also suggests 
that although state actors usually resist change to the status quo and tend to form close 
connections with elite actors, there are also situations where state actors will promote 
responsive change or at least permit it to exist (Abers 2000). Understanding responsive 
governance therefore involves a deeper understanding of the conditions where, and how 
this might this occur.  
Stability, change and bridging the gap between macro and micro level dynamics 
Institutions are an analytical construct for bridging the gap between macro and micro level 
dynamics. An institutional economics analysis focuses on societal rules to, for example, 
allocate property rights and examine transaction costs (e.g. Ostrom 1986)32. The inherent 
systems approach within economics has been used to marry institutional economics with 
ecological science and form the basis for understanding social-ecological systems (Holling 
and Gunderson 2002). Institutional economics has contributed to a more sophisticated 
treatment of social ‘systems’ in resilience thinking (Anderies et al. 2004).33 Responding to 
change from this perspective, involves a rational choice by actors who, once reaching critical 
mass, enable institutional rules to be rewritten. The focus on rational choice amongst actors 
seems to fit well with an investigation of responsive change. However, the assumption that 
actors with sufficient resources will rewrite institutional rules in a rational manner has been 
criticised as disregarding power relations (Skocpol 1995). In addition, actors rarely have 
opportunity to set system wide institutional rules. 
In contrast, sociological institutional analysis uses a broader definition of institution to include 
symbol systems and mental models. In this view institutions outline what is socially 
acceptable and put bounds upon what actions are imagined as possible. This approach can 
explain the spread of behaviours, organisational structure and policy in terms of efforts to 
enhance social legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Morgan 1986, Dolowitz and Marsh 
                                                            
31 Some earlier theories e.g. Marxist approaches saw the state as a simple extension of elite actors and therefore without 
its own interests and agency.  
32 The rule based approach is popular in that it supports examination of multi-level effects, government responsibilities 
and is more likely to have a spatial focus. It has focused on policy conflict and interplay, policy frameworks and 
integration. Tools and typologies in this area relate to ideas of nested-hierarchy and institutional fit (Ostrom, 1986 Young 
2002). 
33 Further discussion of this tradition can be found within Hall and Taylor (1996) where it is referred to as ‘rational choice 
institutionalism’. 
30 
 
2000). Responsive change relates to a shift in the location and/or the actors who create 
cultural knowledge. This may happen as a powerful actor extends their influence or via the 
development of shared cognitive maps.  
A final tradition of historical institutionalism has a focus on asymmetries of power between 
actors, the importance of history in generating path dependencies and the way institutions 
are embedded within temporal processes (Skocpol 1995, Hall and Taylor 1996).  
Although each of the three neo-institutional schools, takes a different approach to using 
institutions to bridging this gap (Cammack 1992, Hall and Taylor 1996). Thelen (1999, p370) 
notes that the “walls dividing the three perspectives have also been eroded by border 
crossers who…borrow liberally (and often fruitfully) where they can, in order to answer 
specific empirical questions.” Taken together, historical and sociological institutional 
theories provide a range of possibilities for investigating policy arenas. By connecting 
institutions with actor and network theories these institutional schools enable a strong 
interrogation of public administration issues (Blom-Hansen 1997), for example, by linking 
approaches that examine ‘sub-systems’ of actors and policy process (Parsons 1995, 
Sabatier 1988).34 For the purposes of this research the term ‘institution’ is defined as ‘a 
pattern of behaviour between interlinked actors that is stable and valued’ (Goodin 1996). 
This incorporates Goodin’s (1996) focus on what institutions do rather than why they do it. 
Enduring governance networks are therefore also institutional networks. 
Taken together, this literature informs the investigation of responsive governance in a 
number of ways. First, the ability of governance to adjust is based on the heritage that exists 
in a particular context. Second, the social construction of the issue will be a key determinant 
of capacity to adjust and last, a novel response is more likely to occur in non-core interests 
and activities, where paradoxically the willingness to resource this response is likely to be 
low. Third, institutions can be examined as networks that seek to perpetuate themselves, 
rather than simply resisting change per se. This approach recognises that institutions are 
not inherently opposed to change and there are situations where an institution will adapt in 
the face of change to perpetuate itself. A particularly dynamic example of this can occur 
through social movements as will now be discussed. 
                                                            
34 They vary in their emphasis on ideas (Sabatier 1988) or interests (Rhodes 1996) as the organising principle. The 
terminology also varies, but whether labelled as networks (Heclo 1978, Rhodes 1996) or epistemic communities (Haas 
1992), coalitions (Sabatier 1988) or simply ‘interactions’ (Kooiman 2003), they share the common concept that actors 
are drawn together by organising principles and can be examined on that basis. 
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2.2.3. Social movements and responding to change 
The key relevance of social movement literature for this research is that collective action 
outside of conventional understandings of governance is part of the broader political 
processes designed to bring about (or constrain) change (MacLeod 2012). Social movement 
theory has a stronger agency focus than either policy science or institutional literatures.  
Scholars in this field are concerned with state-society interactions from a bottom-up 
perspective. Initial research on social movements viewed collective behaviour as ‘irrational’ 
(for example Kornhauser 1959), whereas contemporary approaches view collective action 
as part of broader political processes that are designed to bring about (or constrain) societal 
change (McAdam et al. 2003).  
Political process theory (or contentious politics) is the main contemporary approach in social 
movement research. McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (2003) developed political process theory 
to analyse a range of contentious political situations. Political process theory incorporates a 
number of earlier theories that will now be outlined, namely: social mobilisation; collective 
action frames; ‘dynamics of contention’ theory; and opportunity/threat structures. Firstly, 
political process theory includes ‘mobilisation’,35 Mobilisation investigates collective 
behaviour as rational behaviour that weighs up benefits and costs in an effort to achieve 
particular goals within the political process (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Secondly, ‘collective 
action frames’ involve the use of ‘framing’ to explain the agency of actors in social 
movements (e.g. Benford and Snow 2000). They investigate the generation of meaning 
amongst leaders, development into collective action frames, and efforts to align the frames 
of leaders and participants (Snow et al. 1986). Those using this approach analyse collective 
behaviour as organised through common beliefs and ideas (i.e. frame alignment). Thirdly is 
contention theory, which includes mechanisms, processes and episodes (Tilly and Tarrow 
2007). Mechanisms are delimited classes of events that alter relations among specified sets 
of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations. Processes are a 
regular sequence of mechanisms. Episodes involve sustained periods of ongoing contention 
between ‘parties’, i.e. coalitions or networks (McAdam et al. 2003).36 Finally, political process 
theory investigates the opportunities and threat structure that bears on engagement: this 
includes the degree of political openness, elite divisions and realignments, relations with 
third parties, and the power holders’ capacity and propensity for repression (Schock 2005). 
                                                            
35 Theories of social mobilisation emerged in the 1970s as alternatives to viewing social movements as irrational. 
36 These authors recently distanced themselves from their earlier work and have joined with critics of structural 
approaches to social movements in calling for a less rigid and structurally biased approach (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). 
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Strategic organising then, seeks to identify, create and exploit these opportunities (Tarrow 
and Tollefson 1994).  
In terms of using multiple frames of analysis to study policy arena governance, social 
movement theory interprets agency and structures within the non-state spheres of society. 
It is useful for exploring the democratic anchorage of governance networks, and the 
responses of non-state actors to situations lacking political legitimacy. This literature 
therefore enables a more extensive examination of power relations within policy arenas and 
locates political feedback as a component of public governance rather than an external 
variable.  
2.2.4. Summary: Responses to change 
This review of policy, institutions and social movements has highlighted theoretical positions 
with different emphases on the role of agency in responsive governance. Theoretical 
positions can be matched with empirical cases to tailor the investigation of responsive 
governance appropriate to a particular situation (Skok 1995). The bottom-up orientation of 
social movement theory compliments the generally top-down state-centric policy change 
literature. Some policy theories also provide useful bridges between the two, for example 
advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1988). In addition, institutional change is linked closely to 
policy change as illustrated by phenomenon of policy feedback (Pierson 1993), lobbying 
(Heclo 1978, Lowi 1979) and agenda setting (Kingdon 2002). Goodin (1996), notes that 
institutional change is a combination of intentional design, accident and evolution. This 
combination has parallel concepts in policy change theory, that is policy cycles (Bridgman 
and Davis 2004), transformative and incremental change respectively (John 2003). 
Institutions and networks are active in the policy process, from agenda setting to 
implementation and evaluation. A large body of research traces the distribution of power 
within networks and the effects of institutional interests on decision making (e.g. Heclo 1978, 
Hall 1993). In addition, once a policy does change, a process of policy feedback can take 
place (Pierson 1993). Policy feedback means that the redistribution of resources caused by 
the change in policy can feedback into networks causing reconfiguration of interactions 
between actors, altered network capacities and even a shift in the association with particular 
institutions. The above theories demonstrate: a structured but dynamic relationship between 
institutions and policy; the potential for a structured understanding of social movements to 
link theory on social movements with formal governance arrangements; which then supports 
the analysis within governance of ‘movement’ related processes such as community 
advocacy and lobbying.    
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2.3. Chapter conclusion 
In summary this literature review has analysed core thinking from political and social 
sciences that enable an investigation of responsive governance. State-centric, cross-sector 
and society-centric approaches to governance were investigated. The discussion showed 
that a broad cross-sector or network focus is able to go beyond the analysis of cross-sector 
frames to also examine structures usually associated with state and society-centric frames 
of governance. On this basis, and with a focus on agency, theories on the response of policy 
arenas to change were explored from literatures on policy change, institutional change and 
social movements. The various framings of governance can differ in their goals for 
responding to change. For example, a state-centric author may be concerned with 
integration that can add stability and efficiency to existing institutional networks, while a 
social movement theorist at the other end of the spectrum may theorise the decoupling of 
existing powerful networks in efforts to further a specific social or environmentally focused 
goal. However, strategic matching between governance frames and theories of change can 
support a tailored investigation of empirical settings (Thelen 1999). The following chapter 
outlines the methodology for this investigation and begins with the development of an 
investigative framework from the main literature themes from this review. The interpretations 
vary however across the literature according to the emphasis on top down or bottom up, 
stability or change, efficiency or effectiveness.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
Research Design:  
Case study analysis of responsive governance 
 
The purpose of this research is to examine how urban ecological governance responds to 
change over time. The research asks: 1)“How do actors within a ‘non-core’ urban policy 
arena interact with the broader institutional context over time?”; 2) “How and in what 
respects does governance of this urban policy arena across the metropolitan area adjust to 
change over time?”; and 3) “What are the implications for enhancing how this governance 
adjusts to change?” This chapter justifies and outlines the method developed to answer 
these questions. This research is concerned with responsive governance in a ‘non-core’ 
urban policy arena (Chapter 1) where: urban policy arenas are complex settings that are 
embedded within an institutional context; policy arena governance is the range of 
opportunities for actors to participate in planning and management; and responsive change 
is a networked phenomenon of interaction between diverse actors, their interests and 
prevailing power relations. Due to the ‘publication style’ approach of the dissertation, more 
detailed discussion of methods is included within Chapters 5 to 8. First the selection of a 
case study approach is justified. The chapter then explains the case study design, methods 
and rigor of this approach. Case study methodology requires a clear framing of the approach 
and its underpinning logic, and this is detailed through the discussion that follows (Baxter 
and Jack 2008, Healy and Perry 2000). 
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3.1 Framing a robust qualitative approach 
Personal perspective 
Qualitative research benefits from an explicit acknowledgement of the researcher’s own 
perspectives and theoretical position.37 A researcher’s perspectives are both a source of 
bias that needs careful management and a resource that adds value to the research. To this 
effect, my personal perspectives on this topic proceed from being a white middle-class male 
with interests and experience in ecology, community participation and small business. As 
with many researchers I have long been exposed to aspects of my research problem – my 
childhood took place in an urbanising peri-urban area where the impacts on natural systems, 
management of threats and later efforts towards environmental management formed part of 
my everyday lived experience. My educational background positions me amongst theories 
and methods of environmental management and policy, planning and public governance.  
Theoretical perspective 
My theoretical approach falls under the general banner of critical realism (Næss 2015), and 
due to the relational nature of governance, also uses tools of social constructionism to 
explore the manner in which actors design and maintain ecological governance (Al-Amoudi 
and Willmott 2011).38 Critical realism asserts that “reality is ‘real’ but only imperfectly 
apprehensible” (Healy and Perry 2000, p119). This means that research findings ‘probably’ 
hold intrinsic truth, but for highly social phenomenon such as governance, this truth is 
constructed, to a larger extent than phenomenon with greater physical aspects. Therefore 
in this research, critical realism supports: the examination of urban ecological resources as 
objective reality that is governed subjectively by actors; the multiple framings of governance 
and responsive change, thereby revealing processes of social construction; analysis of 
interactions between actors in order to explore the roles of power relations and knowledge 
in policy change; the examination of urban ecological resources a theoretical foundation for 
responses to change that are appropriate for the social nature of the ecological governance 
arena. 
                                                            
37 As noted by Stake (1995), in all research – the researcher’s previous knowledge and experience influences the 
selection of research problem, the study design and the analysis. The researcher is therefore an integrative part of the 
research and the recognition of this interaction contributes rigour and enhances the interpretation of findings. 
38 Al-Amoudi and Willmott (2011) note that although epistemological relativism has been popularly seen as the domain 
of constructivism – it is a shared point of convergence with critical realist approaches. 
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3.2  Investigating a context embedded and radial 
phenomenon 
The review of literature in Chapter 2 demonstrates that governance is a challenging 
phenomenon to investigate because it is highly embedded within its context and the concept 
is essentially a floating signifier. The following discussion explains why a case study 
methodology was selected to engage with this problem and describes an approach that 
structures the investigation to manage contextual and conceptual issues related to 
governance. A perspective on governance is selected from the literature review, 
methodological approaches to complexity are surveyed and the challenges of context and 
concept for governance research are outlined. Then a case study methodology is 
demonstrated as appropriate for meeting these challenges.  
Examining governance 
Perspectives on governance that were surveyed in Chapter 2 identified three foci: state-
centric; cross-sector centric; and society-centric frames. All three foci provide important 
insights into policy arenas and governance. However, as a methodology, the network 
approach to examining governance holds the most potential for examining the breadth of 
governance structures and processes in a policy arena (section 2.1.4). The concept of 
‘network’ can be expanded beyond the cross-sector frame to examine the relationships 
between actors in state-centric and society-centric governance models that are applied in 
the empirical setting. There are risks involved here, of simplistic harmonisation across 
frames on one hand, and loss of explanatory power from complexity overload on the other. 
However, a hybrid approach has potential for adding explanatory power with respect to the 
‘floating signifier’ qualities of the governance concept. Studies of governance and complexity 
often tackle this problem by constructing such a hybrid approach and treating differing 
governance foci as different levels of abstraction (Hooghe and Marks 2003, Kooiman 2003, 
Edwards et al. 2012). This approach enables the study to use a network focus as the meta-
approach across all three levels of abstraction (state-centric, cross-sector centric, society-
centric) and also to use contributions from state-centric and society-centric thinking to 
governance as multiple frames of enquiry into responsive change. Multiple frames of enquiry 
can be used to reveal different aspects of responsive change in order to explore situations 
where a particular approach gives a more accurate interpretation, thus more clearly 
revealing the implications for responsive governance (Forestiere 2008, Cairney 2009).  
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Examining complexity 
Urban policy arenas are complex and research on responsive governance benefits from 
examining its internal rationality. Dryzek (1987a) examined three rationalities for engaging 
with complex problems: (1) instrumental rationality; (2) ‘invisible hands’; and (3) 
communicative rationality. His framework illustrates the implications of different approaches 
to the complex setting for this research. First, instrumental rationality can examine 
complexity through disaggregation, systems modelling and integration. In disaggregation, 
which is the traditional approach to policy analysis, complex policy problems are broken into 
their constituent parts, analysed extensively and then recombined (Dryzek 1987a, Bridgman 
and Davis 2004). However, governance possesses emergent qualities and this requires a 
holistic approach (Sol et al. 2013) - disaggregation is better suited to a positivist orientation. 
‘Systems modelling’ seeks to capture the interactions amongst components that generate 
complexity. However, it is more effective where system elements are not goal driven and 
have reflective capacity, as with human actors (Dryzek 1987a). Integrative approaches are 
inherent within the sustainable development paradigm and seek to find a robust solution to 
complexity by integrating diverse perspectives. However under conditions of social 
complexity these examinations are likely to be ‘surprised’ by unexpected change, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
Second is the rationality of invisible hands for examining complexity. Dryzek (1987a) notes 
political, market and natural systems rationality as prominent examples. He describes this 
type as the renouncement of instrumental rationality. Therefore as a research strategy it 
does not seek direct resolution of a problem, but instead establishes an approach for 
understanding and managing the complex system. Dryzek (1987a), notes that this rationality 
also struggles with higher levels of complexity and understanding actor strategies for 
building resilience (such as hierarchies) within the complex system.  
Last is communicative rationality. Dryzek (1987a) proposes communicative rationality as a 
preferable strategy for engaging with complexity. He takes a classic Habermasian position 
by noting that communicative rationality is achieved where power, strategy and deception 
amongst actors is managed (Habermas 1985). This research uses communicative rationality 
as a lens for examining how diverse actors establish coalitions of common ground within 
complex governance dynamics.39    
                                                            
39 This research, while taking a general communicative rationality approach does not claim primacy for communicative 
rationality for engaging with complexity – as does Dryzek (1987a). The research integrates the relativist approach to the 
‘truth’ of governance from communicative rationality within the broader critical realism epistemology (see 3.1) 
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The challenges of context embeddedness and concept stretching  
The investigation of responsive governance poses a number of other challenges related to 
the relationships between governance, its context and its conceptual vagaries. Importantly, 
the distinction between governance networks and the institutional context is unclear (Taylor 
and Cheng 2012).40 There are two important challenges within this lack of clarity: bounding 
of the case study; and differentiation between governance and its cultural context. First, the 
boundary of governance for a particular policy arena can be difficult to delineate; for 
example, a dominant actor who skews the behaviour of governance actors but is not 
involved in governing the resource could be considered as a contextual variable if the 
network is bounded tightly, or considered a governance actor if a broader boundary is 
established. Second, the differentiation between the phenomenon of governance and its 
cultural context is difficult. Planning and policy generally are deeply embedded amongst 
particular cultural practices (Booth 2011); this means that in some regards differentiation 
between the two is not possible. In order to tease apart the effects of context from 
governance it is necessary to compare a similar governance phenomenon in a different 
context.  
However as the concept of governance is applied to more cases it needs to be made more 
general to ‘travel’ without encountering the problem of concept stretching which Sartori 
(1970) described as a process of climbing a ladder of abstraction. As a concept is applied 
to more cases and becomes more broadly applicable in order to travel, the trade-off is that 
the concept contains fewer defining characteristics and is therefore less useful for 
generating theory (Collier and Mahon 1993, Sartori 1970). Temporal stretching can 
accentuate this process of generalisation further. For example, as the period for a temporal 
analysis is extended, more changes will accumulate to the phenomenon of concern, and the 
theoretical conclusions related to that case study are likely to become more generalised 
With respect to research into governance, this problem is compounded even further because 
‘governance’ has already been abstracted to the point of being a floating signifier (Jessop 
2003, Offe 2009). Hence, the application of an already generalised concept across multiple 
cases may be futile unless managed appropriately.  A common strategy for managing this 
problem is to establish a typology for the abstracted concept and then narrow the research 
focus onto one of the ‘types’ (e.g. Steiner 2008). However in Chapter 2 when the typology 
of six governance frames was established (Section 2.1), they were all identified as important 
                                                            
40 Other unclear distinctions include those between adaptation of governance and general policy change 
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in addressing the problem of responsive governance. Thus a variation of this strategy to 
narrow the focus through typologies will be employed in this research. Collier and Mahon 
(1993) provide a way forward through the idea of radial categories, which is applied to the 
six governance frames in Table 3.1. 
…the overall meaning of a [radial] category is anchored in a "central subcategory," which 
corresponds to the "best" case, or prototype, of the category." In the process of cognition, 
the central subcategory functions as a gestalt, in that it is constituted by a bundle of traits 
that are learned together understood together, and most quickly recognized when found 
together. "Non-central subcategories" are variants of the central one. They do not 
necessarily share defining attributes with each other but only with the central 
subcategory-hence the term radial, which refers to this internal structure  
(Collier and Mahon 1993, p848) 
The radial category approach was applied to the governance frames identified in this 
research (Chapter 2). Where the central subcategory is ‘governance’ and it possesses the 
full set of traits (Table 3.1). Non-central subcategories are variants that share some, but not 
all traits in common. 
Table 3.1 Governance as a radial category  
Categories Governance traits 
A B C D E 
Central 
subcategory 
Governance frame     
Non-central 
subcategories 
  
i.e. governance 
frames from 2.1 
state-legitimacy      
state-performance     
cross-sector legitimacy      
cross-sector performance     
society-legitimacy     
society-performance     
Governance traits: A is legitimacy focused; B is performance focused; C is state-centric; D is cross-sector centric;41 
E is society-centric. Source: adapted from Collier and Mahon 1993, p850. 
 
Addressing the problem of governance as a radial concept meant that, in order to examine 
a broad understanding of governance that investigates the influence of context 
embeddedness, a multiple frames of enquiry approach was applied in order to manage 
conceptual stretching.  
                                                            
41 As per the literature review, this typology recognises that a cross-sector approach is not equivalent to state + society. 
This means that cross-sectoral is a third category because these approaches are not encompassed by state-centric or 
society-centric approaches.   
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Meeting the challenges through case study methodology 
To investigate governance, a ‘thick description’ of the phenomena is required to support 
analysis in a context embedded manner. For environmental governance a thick description 
includes background data on the ecological context in addition to the foreground data of 
socially embedded aspects. Booth (2011) notes that data collection for context embedded 
problems is likely to involve a greater emphasis on data collection through intensive 
interviews, key informants and media reports in order to understand the situation, particularly 
for comparing different cases, generalising findings or transferring policy approaches 
outside of a case study setting (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). 
This research problem is networked amongst actors, embedded in context and challenged 
by conceptual stretching. Case study analysis is an appropriate method for this research 
problem because it enables a phenomenon to be researched within its context: where it is 
not possible to manipulate the behaviour of participants through experimentation; where 
context is likely to be associated with the phenomenon; and especially where the distinctions 
between the phenomenon and its context are not clear (Yin 2003). Case study analysis also 
is effective in situations that involve multiple variables of interest that may be multi-causal in 
nature (Yin 2003, p12). Yin (2003) further notes, that case studies are suited to studies that 
are interested in how and why questions. All of these conditions apply for investigating how 
responsive governance occurs within an urban policy arena. In order to achieve this, a case 
study methodology uses an integrated strategy of design, data collection and analysis. This 
integrated strategy is explained in the remainder of this chapter.   
3.3 Conceptual frameworks for research and 
investigation: context, structure and agency 
It is common to develop conceptual frameworks in order to guide and communicate 
qualitative research (Miles and Huberman, 1984). This section outlines the overarching 
research framework and presents an explanation of the investigative framework, which 
guides data collection and analysis through each of broad stages of the research framework.  
Research framework 
The research framework is the overarching strategy for answering the research question 
(Figure 3.1).  It draws directly from the major categories reviewed in Section 2.2.  
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Figure 3.1 Research framework for responsive governance, showing the development of responsive 
governance concepts as the framework progresses, that is from concept 0.1 through 0.2 and 0.3 to 
1.0 and the completion of this research. (Adapted from Essers et al. 2008 as shown in Doorewaard 
2010)  
 
Investigative Framework: context, structure and interaction 
Theory from the areas reviewed in Chapter 2 is used to build an analytical framework to 
drive the case study investigation; this particularly draws on concepts of new institutionalism 
(Hall 1993, Goodin 1996), policy instruments (Gunningham and Sinclair 1999) and collective 
action frames (Benford and Snow 2000). The following discussion explains three categories 
of embeddedness that influence an adjustment in governance (context, structure and 
interaction), each with three aspects (Figure 3.2) that were synthesised from the review of 
literature (Chapter 2). The resulting framework is used to guide the investigation of 
responsive governance. An adjustment in governance can be understood as embedded 
within the macro-context, embedded across meso-structures and with micro-interactions 
embedded within the adjustment. These various aspects also interact with each other. They 
need to be examined both separately and together.   
Political 
arenas 
Chapter 6 and 7 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 
 
Chapter 9 
 
Responsive 
governance 
(1.0) 
Responsive 
governance 
(0.2) 
Responsive 
governance 
(0.3) 
Problem 
solving 
through 
policy 
instruments 
Actor 
agency 
Responsive 
governance 
(0.1) 
Context 
embedded 
Theory: 
Policy 
change 
Theory: 
Governance 
Theory: 
Institutional 
change 
Theory: 
Social 
movements 
Pilot: Oxley 
Watershed 
 
 
Investigative 
framework 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Chapter 8 
 
Chapter 10 
 
 
Background 
to cases 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Summary of investigative framework for responsive governance 
 
Adjustments in governance are embedded within broader contextual aspects 
Contextual facets of responsive governance can be understood as various ways that an 
adjustment in governance is embedded within macro-level contextual processes. 
Specifically those that are biophysical; institutional and temporal.   
When governance adjusts to change, the adjustment has a biophysical aspect to the extent 
that the policy arena is embedded within social-ecological systems. Social-ecological 
systems are biophysical systems and social systems that are inter-linked (Folke et al. 2007). 
Linkages of particular interest are those between the resource of interest (which is in this 
case, urban ecological resources) and the arrangements for the governance of that 
resource. A range of social-ecological links are inherent and persistent within the ecological 
governance arena, for example the critical habitat of an endangered species will be directly 
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linked with instruments for the conservation of that species.42 However even this link cannot 
be assumed in urban settings where exemptions to environmental legislation may be 
granted to prioritise other interests in the urban area.43  Other social-ecological links are less 
apparent or direct, for example the topology and climate of a city can link with governance 
through; flood planning and management of flood; the areas operated the location of 
environmental corridors along rivers; and the territories of watershed groups.44   Influences 
from the biophysical context can be investigated by using concepts such as ‘institutional fit’ 
and ‘institutional interplay’ (e.g. Young 2002). ‘Institutional fit and interplay can be examined 
through structural and functional links between urban ecological resources and policy arena 
governance. Primary data for the examination of institutional fit may include participant 
perspectives on responding to environmental change such as drought or flood. Secondary 
ecological data can be used to delineate the biophysical context. 
When governance adjusts to change, the adjustment has an ‘institutional context’ aspect to 
the extent that the policy arena is embedded within its exogenous institutional context. Policy 
arenas are inherently linked with broader governance arrangements. Linkages of particular 
interest are those between the governance of the urban ecological policy arena and the 
broader governance existing at metropolitan, state and federal scales.45 Influences from the 
institutional context can be investigated by using concepts such as path dependency, 
transformative change (Peters et al. 2005, Healey 2006b) and multi-level governance 
(Stephenson 2013). Path dependency and transformative change can be examined through 
the effects of changes to broader governance upon governance at the policy arena level. 
Multi-level governance structures these broader changes in terms of nested levels and 
                                                            
42 For example, Portland governance displayed explicit social-ecological links between salmonid species and 
instruments to protect and restore riparian areas including: Oregon State’s ‘salmon plan’, Metro’s Title 13 and PCC’s 
Grey to Green initiative. Brisbane displayed explicit social-ecological links between the koala and instruments for 
habitat protection such as: BCC’s bushland acquisition program and Queensland State’s koala conservation regulation.   
43 In principle, exemptions to environmental legislation in urban areas seeks to balance the range of planning interests 
requiring integration across a city. The exemptions should therefore become more extensive as the ecological value of 
a resource decreases so that non-environmental interests are directed away from urban environmental assets. For 
example the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) exempts urban areas from protecting ‘of concern’ ecosystems, 
but has fewer exemptions for ‘endangered ecosystems’.  
44 For example, less direct social-ecological links between governance and the configuration of metropolitan riparian 
corridors and watersheds contributed to ecological connectivity in Portland where waterways and associated flood 
prone areas ‘fanned’ out from the Port and CBD into the upper watersheds. Social-ecological links were strengthened 
further when BES restructured their activities into watershed-based teams.  
45 For example, inherent institutional-context links for the Brisbane ecological governance arena included strong 
vertical integration from state to regional to Brisbane planning, post 2004, which linked which impacted the 
prioritisation of urban biodiversity amongst other planning interests.  The Portland case displayed institutional-context 
links between instruments related to the Oregon ballot system and the litigious legal system, which linked respectively 
with, local and metropolitan voter participation on environmental planning and a number of law suits that then 
triggered environmental governance to remedy water quality and protect salmon populations  
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vertical integration. Primary data may include participant perspectives on broader scale 
change such as regional planning, both in terms of constraints and strategic opportunities 
at the policy arena level. Other primary sources include legislation, plans and strategies that 
identify broader scale structures and change. Secondary analysis of both cities is also 
readily available as reports and journal papers.  
When governance adjusts to change, the adjustment has a temporal aspect to the extent 
that the policy arena is embedded within its historical context. The contemporary 
governance of a resource is linked with its historical context through previous, usually 
incremental change and historical knowledge amongst actors. Linkages of particular interest 
are those between past and present policy, planning and management associated with 
urban ecological governance. Influences from the temporal context can be investigated by 
using concepts such as incremental change (Rayner 2009, Peters et al. 2005) and 
institutional memory (Booth 1999). Past changes can be examined through a temporal 
institutional analysis of historical events. Primary data may include participant identification 
of historical change perceived to be important and retrospective narratives of case studies. 
Secondary and may include historical documents and archived program data that supports 
or contrasts with participant perspectives. 
Due to the context embedded nature of governance it can be difficult to delineate between 
these context-related facets and the phenomenon of governance. Comparative analysis 
between and within cases will assist to manage this issue (see Section 3.4). 
Adjustments in governance are embedded across broader structural aspects 
Structural facets of responsive governance can be understood as the various ways that an 
adjustment in governance is embedded across meso-level structures; specifically those that 
are: functional, governmental and civil-political. See Section 2.2 for the set of frames under 
which these structures can be categorised.  
When governance adjusts to change, the adjustment has a functional aspect to the extent 
that the policy arena is embedded across a set of social functions. Policy arenas consist of 
structured relationships amongst governance actors that seek to fulfil particular social 
functions and are inter-linked; these include relationships formalised around policy as well 
as informal partnerships and alliances. Linkages of particular interest are those within and 
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between policy instruments, networks of actors and cross-sectoral arrangements.46 
Influences from the functional aspect can be investigated by using concepts such as policy 
instrument mixes (Gunningham and Sinclair 1999, Hood 1983, Howlett 2009) and policy 
cycles (Bridgman and Davis 2003, Everett 2003, Howard 2005). Policy instrument mixes 
can be examined through the implementation of policy over time and participation from 
different types of actors. For the purposes of this research, policy instruments are defined 
broadly as: programs and initiatives; policy and legislation. Policy cycles can be examined 
through the use of policy stages as a heuristic tool (as per Bridgman and Davis 2003). 
Primary data may include actor perspectives stratified according to involvement with an 
instrument and roles within the policy cycles. Other primary sources include policy 
documents, while secondary data may include reports and print media.    
When governance adjusts to change, the adjustment has a ‘governmental’ aspect to the 
extent that the policy arena is embedded across state-centric structures and processes. The 
model of government in a setting is a critical determinant of adaptive capacity within a policy 
arena. Linkages of particular interest include those structured by models of organisational 
governance, departmental structures and ‘internal politics’ between state actors.47 
Influences from the governmental aspect can be investigated by using concepts such as 
heterarchy48 (Crumley 1995)  and integration (horizontal and vertical) amongst state actors. 
Horizontal and vertical integration can be examined through the coordination of decision 
making over time. Heterarchy can be examined through events where government priorities 
are re-ordered or reconfigured. Primary data may include actor perspectives on the 
interactions amongst state actors and their aggregated performance.49 Secondary data may 
include minuted meetings and some reports, although state-state interactions can be difficult 
to triangulate through documentation.    
                                                            
46 For example, Portland showed strong functional links between policy instruments related to urban biodiversity and 
those related to urban greenspace planning and water quality. Brisbane displayed fewer inter-functional links, but 
stronger intra-functional links between urban ecological instruments and actors.    
47 For example, Brisbane displayed governmental-links between the ecological governance arena and the shift to 
managerial models of urban governance. Portland displayed more subtle governmental-links associated with a shift 
from risk-based to asset-based assessment of resources, ‘beyond compliance’ decision making for legislative 
responsibilities and politicisation of PCC bureaus by certain commissioners.      
48 Heterarchy is defined by Crumley (1995, p.3) as, “the relation of elements to one another where they are unranked 
or where they possess the potential for being ranked in a number of different ways”. For example, a democratic election 
is a formalised heterarchical process.  
49 The perceived performance of government actors can be further investigated by using concepts of output and 
throughput legitimacy (Palazzo and Scherer 2006; Lindgren and Persson 2010). Output legitimacy is the endorsement 
of results or outcomes and is established when the actors are seen as achieving the right things in the right way 
(Lindgren and Persson 2010). Throughput legitimacy is the endorsement of government processes – i.e. the process of 
moving from input activities to output activities (Palazzo and Scherer 2006). 
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When governance adjusts to change, the adjustment has a civic-political aspect to the extent 
that the policy arena is embedded across societal decision-making structures. Policy arenas 
are linked with the general public through structures of and processes for civic engagement. 
Linkages of particular interest include: formal and informal mechanisms of civil society; and 
democratic participation related to ecological governance. These mechanisms can include: 
elections that feature issues such as tree clearing and urban expansion; submissions on 
development applications, community protest over clearing or lobbying to maintain funding 
for a popular program.50  Influences from the civic-political facet can be investigated by using 
concepts such as democratic anchorage (Sørensen and Torfing 2005, Skelcher et al. 2011) 
and opportunity structures (Newman et al. 2004, Schock 2005, Tilly and Tarrow 2007). 
Democratic anchorage can be examined through the accountability and input legitimacy of 
governance (Lindgren and Persson 2010). Input legitimacy, is established when actors 
perceive that they have avenues for contributing their views into decision-making processes 
— e.g. voting mechanisms. Opportunity structures can be examined through formal and 
informal mechanisms that facilitate societal engagement with state actors. Primary data may 
include state/non-state actor perceptions of each other and accounts of contentious 
interactions. Secondary data may include news media, minutes and reports. 
Adjustments in governance: embedding of interactional aspects 
Interactional facets of responsive governance can be understood as the various ways that 
micro-level dynamics are embedded within an adjustment in governance; specifically, 
dynamics that generate opportunities for ‘rational’, collegial or adversarial interactions. 
‘Micro’ refers to the actor level focus of these facets, not the scale of impact that actor 
interactions can have on governance.  
When governance adjusts to change, the adjustment has a ‘rational’ aspect to the extent 
that rational or science-based decision-making processes are embedded within 
governance. Decision support tools provide opportunities for evidence-based interactions 
within a policy arena. Opportunities of particular interest include evidence-based principles, 
rational-instrumental techniques (i.e. cost-benefit analysis) and frameworks that support 
                                                            
50 For example, in Brisbane the BCC mayoral election in 1990 was strongly influenced by public interest in acquiring 
iconic ecological assets such as Boondall wetlands.  In Portland the Metro elections in 1993, 1995 and 2006 included 
ballot measures for funding to acquire urban natural areas. Other civic political links can be seen through the planning 
system of each city where Brisbane (post-Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld)) and Portland (post 1972 Oregon state 
planning goals) have strong performance-based and prescriptive-based planning systems respectively. Performance-
based planning can complicate civic-political involvement in planning decisions while prescriptive planning has clearer 
opportunities for civic involvement through the ‘rule-setting’ process of the prescriptive approach (Steele 2010).      
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evidence-based decision making amongst actors. These approaches seek to link the 
perceptions of actors with scientific evidence on the issue of concern. Although actors 
interpret the evidence through their particular interests, scientific data can: contribute 
towards a common basis for negotiation amongst actors; increase the extent of agreement 
in decision making; strengthen the likelihood of compliance with any evidence-based that is 
developed; and Influences from the ‘rational’ aspect can be investigated by using concepts 
of evidenced-based boundary objects (Carlile 2002), and adaptive management (Kallis et 
al. 2009, Allen et al. 2011). Evidence-based boundary objects can be examined through 
decision-making instruments and other agreements between actors. Adaptive management 
can be examined through the role of science within changes in governance. Important data 
for this facet relates to the development of scientific knowledge for the policy arena and the 
intentional input of data into decision making.  
When governance adjusts to change, the adjustment has a collegial aspect to the extent 
that interest-based coalitions of actors are embedded within governance. Collegial 
interactions become more likely when actors perceive that they have common interests. 
Opportunities of particular interest include strategic partnerships and coalitions in order to 
support inter-actor decision making. Influences from the collegial aspect can be investigated 
by using concepts of collaborative governance and coalition/regime building (Lowndes 
1997, Michaels 2009, Liu et al. 2010). Collaborative governance can be examined through 
forums that organise actors around particular interests or ideas. Coalition and regime 
building can be examined through collective action frames and their interactions with 
governance over time (Snow et al. 1986, Benford and Snow 2000). Primary data will include 
interview accounts of close partnerships between actors.  
When governance adjusts to change, the adjustment has an adversarial aspect to the extent 
that contention-based interactions are embedded within governance. The perception of 
divergent interests between actors can generate opportunities for contention-based 
interactions within a policy arena. Opportunities of particular interest include a range of 
advocacy strategies, competitive tendering and other inter-actor rivalry. Influences from the 
adversarial aspect can be investigated through concepts of urban regimes (Digaetano and 
Klemanski 1993, Mossberger and Stoker 2001, Whitehead 2003, Blanco 2013) and 
advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1988, Weible and Sabatier 2009). Regimes can be examined 
through long-term strategic partnerships and interest-based boundary objects. Advocacy 
coalitions can be examined through accounts of contentious politics, campaigns and 
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lobbying. Contentious aspects will especially need careful triangulation with other 
participants and key informants.  
The following section presents a summary of the investigative framework and its application 
in the analytical chapters of the thesis. 
Framework Summary 
Contemporary governance and policy research recognises that ‘change’ cannot be 
separated from ‘continuity’ and analyses need to reflect this interaction in an integrated 
fashion. Therefore a focus on change is more a tool for understanding the function and 
development of policy rather than simply understanding change per se (Capano 2009). 
These aspects of change and continuity apply to each aspect of responsive governance 
discussed above (Table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.2 Conceptualising the dynamic and stable dimensions of responsive governance  
Category Aspect Dynamic dimension Stability dimension 
Context 
Biophysical   Institutional interplay with 
environment 
Institutional fit 
Institutional  Transformative change Path dependency 
Temporal   Incremental change Institutional memory 
Structure 
Functional Policy cycle Policy instrument mix 
Governmental Heterarchy Integration 
Civil-political Democratic anchorage Opportunity structures 
Interaction 
‘Rational’ Adaptive management Evidence-based boundary 
objects  
Collegial Collaborative governance Coalition building 
Adversarial Advocacy coalitions Urban regimes 
 
The aspects of responsive governance are summarised diagrammatically in Figure 3.2. This 
diagram also depicts the perspectives taken in the analytical Chapters 7 and 8 and 9. The 
synthesis (Chapter 10) then brings these three angles through the investigative framework 
together around the main research aim. While each chapter employs analyses of the data 
that are specific to understanding that perspective, the entire study takes place within a case 
study methodology as will now be explained. 
3.4 Case study design and methods 
The case study approach is able to manage the issues involved with researching context 
embedded phenomena. However, a specific methodological approach was needed in order 
to guide the enquiry appropriately. This approach facilitated the active management and 
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clear contingency plans needed for in situ investigation (Yin 2003). This section presents 
the case study design and methodology of the research. The design of meta-structure, 
selection of cases and embedded units of analysis are outlined. Next, the strategy for 
identifying the population and sampling a set of interview participants is presented. Then, 
the approach for ensuring robustness through multiple lines of convergence is explained. 
Finally, the method undertaken to analyse data is discussed. However, first it is necessary 
to explain the selection of the focal policy arena. 
The policy arena of ecological governance was chosen for the examination of issues 
identified in previous chapters. Ecological governance is a ‘non-core’ urban priority which 
has faced multiple pressures to adapt and become more flexible. Formal governance for this 
arena has been implemented for at least twenty years in many liberal democratic countries, 
which is a period deemed suitable for observing institutional change (Sabatier 1986, Thelen 
1999). The period also captures the emergence of a number of important urban discourses 
concerning urban planning (Healey 2006a) and biodiversity conservation (Wallington et al. 
2005). The following discussion explains the meta-structure established to align the analysis 
of urban ecological governance with the research question.  
Meta-structure 
A comparative meta-structure can benefit a research question such as how governance 
responds to change. A comparative approach is preferable for answering explanatory 
research questions, for analysing organisational change and investigating institutions 
(Campbell 2010).51 The strategy is beneficial for examining contrasts, similarity and patterns 
between case study variables. A ‘most difference’ comparison52 was selected to enhance 
the potential for separating the context embedded aspects of governance from those of actor 
agency (Sellers 2005). A ‘most difference’ comparison captures a range of governance 
models for this policy arena and anchors the investigation of data rich extreme cases, for 
which analysis can become distorted in a single case design (Jahnukainen 2010). However, 
the robustness that multiple case design adds to the analysis, does involve a trade-off 
between breadth and depth of data collected (Yin 2003). 
                                                            
51 For in situ research such as this case analysis, a comparative research design plays the equivalent role to that played 
by experimentation in ex situ deductive methodologies (See Denters and Mossberger 2006) 
52 A ‘most difference’ comparison compares highly contrasting cases of a phenomenon in order to highlight its diversity. 
Each case is therefore significant in itself as an extreme case of the phenomenon and in comparison, provides evidence 
for the effects of context on the phenomenon in question (i.e. urban ecological governance). 
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Therefore the number of case cities was limited to two in order to best address the data 
richness needed for governance studies53 (Alston et al. 1996). An international comparison 
was chosen to enhance the ‘most difference’ aspects of the institutional context, while 
maintaining sufficient similarity for the comparison of ecological governance. Pierre (2005) 
notes the great potential’ for examining urban settings through international comparative 
research.  
An Australia-USA comparison was found to fit these methodological criteria and was also 
the most pragmatic choice for the researcher.54 Cities in Australia and the USA have a long 
history of explicit engagement with urban environmental problems. Efforts in these two 
countries have many commonalities resulting from comparable levels of development, 
economic and liberal democratic systems. In more recent years globalised research and 
practitioner networks have further strengthened these commonalities in for example urban 
governance,55 water governance56 and environmental management.57 With respect to native 
biodiversity, Australia and the USA have experienced comparatively recent fragmentation 
of native vegetation and patches of relic native vegetation persist in many urban areas58. 
Yet there are important legal, constitutional and political contrasts between the two 
countries, which provide sufficient contrast in the institutional context of metropolitan areas. 
A USA-Australia comparison provides a practical and methodological opportunity to 
highlight the effects of history and institutional structures on governance. 
Case selection 
Metropolitan areas were screened on the basis of theoretical criteria (Table 3.3). The 
primary criterion concerned the selection of contrasting extreme cases as the basis for the 
comparative case design. Other criteria screened for data richness of: potential ‘democratic 
anchorage’ of governance (#2); urban ecological resources (#3); state and non-state actor 
participation in ecological governance (#4 and #5), i.e. a purposive sampling strategy 
(Patton 1990).   
                                                            
53 Data richness and depth for governance studies is linked to the complexity of the governance phenomenon.   For 
example, multiple policy instruments, actor networks and spatial scales 
54 Pragmatic reasons for a USA-Australia comparison include the common English language and the Australian residence 
of the principal researcher. Hyett et al (2014) recommend that where cases are selected for pragmatic reasons, the 
researcher should identify and manage any potential weaknesses for the study that result. The following case selection 
section demonstrates that Brisbane is the best theoretical choice for comparing institutional context as it is an extreme 
case therefore the pragmatic reasons for selection have no effect on the study except to enhance it. 
55 For example ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability (http://www.iclei.org/) 
56 For example the International Water Centre (http://www.watercentre.org/) 
57 For example the International Network for Environmental Management (http://www.inem.org/) 
58 In contrast with the USA and Australia, European cities rarely contain relic patches of native vegetation.  
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Table 3.3 Criteria for selection of case cities to examine the theoretical problem 
Criteria Indicator/s 
1. A case of strategic importance in 
relation to the institutional context for 
urban ecological governance 
(Flyvbjerg 2006, p229), i.e. a critical 
and extreme case. 
Contrasting jurisdictional metropolitan 
arrangements, contrasting models of urban 
governance (as per Pierre 1999) 
2. Clear capacity for democratic 
accountability at the metropolitan 
level (Sørensen and Torfing 2005) 
Metropolitan level election of public 
representatives 
3. Significant urban and regional 
ecological resources 
Species richness, significant urban patches, 
% of urban area with native vegetation cover, 
adjacent non-urban biodiversity, listed 
species 
4. Significant metropolitan investment in 
the ecological resource over at least 
a 20 year period 
Land acquisition expenditure 
5. Significant non-state participation in 
ecological planning and management 
The presence of urban watershed groups 
(also known as catchment groups in 
Australia) 
6. Comparability between metropolitan 
cases 
Substantive and functional equivalence for a 
significant number of contextual variables 
 
Screening and selecting 
Screening was first undertaken for Australia, and indicated Brisbane as a suitable 
metropolitan area and a critical case for responsiveness of urban ecological governance 
(Figure 3.3). Brisbane, unlike other large Australian cities is governed by a single 
metropolitan government – Brisbane City Council (criterion #2). Stenhouse (2005) in her 
analysis of urban ecological management in Australian cities also noted that Brisbane is a 
special case due to the size of budgets and its spatial extent. With respect to criteria 3–5, 
all Australian cities except Melbourne have significant percentages of native vegetation 
cover and levels of biodiversity (Table 3.4). Brisbane is the most species rich, with 80 of 
these species also listed as rare and threatened at the state level59 (Table 3.5). A broad 
range of vegetation communities ranges from subtropical rainforest in the western foothills, 
eucalypt forest, riparian and coastal communities. The Brisbane urban area has a national 
park adjacent to the west60 and is bordered by the Ramsar listed Moreton Bay to the east 
(criterion #3). Significant patches within the metropolitan area include Boondall Wetlands 
                                                            
59 Species prioritised within the Brisbane area include: platypus (Ornithorhynchus anatinus), koala (Phascolarctos 
cinereus), gliders (Petaurus species), flying foxes (Pteropus species) and small marsupial carnivores such as Antechinus 
species. A full  list of conservation action statements for fauna and flora species in Brisbane can be found at 
https://www.brisbane.qld.gov.au/environment-waste/natural-environment/protecting-wildlife-brisbane/threatened-
species (accessed September 2016) 
60 D’Aguilar National Park – Southern Section, 36,000 ha (http://www.nprsr.qld.gov.au/parks/daguilar/index.html) 
52 
 
(~1200ha, and also Ramsar listed) and Karawatha Forest (~900ha61). Brisbane City Council 
has demonstrated a very high investment in the acquisition of land with high biodiversity 
value through a rate levy that has been in place since 199162 (criterion #4). In addition, urban 
watershed groups were established in the mid–1990s across the Brisbane metropolitan area 
(criterion #5). Section 4.3 provides further characterisation of Brisbane’s biodiversity as the 
biophysical context for responsive governance. 
Table 3.4 Native vegetation and flora biodiversity in major Australian cities 
City % remnant 
vegetation a 
# flora 
spp. 
Adelaide 12 ~825a 
Brisbane 22  ~2075b 
Melbourne 3 ~1150a 
Perth 49 ~1500a 
Sydney 33 * 
a) Stenhouse (2005, p50–51), b) Queensland Government Wildlife Online,  
Extraction Date 05/07/2015 https://www.qld.gov.au/environment/plants-animals/species-list/ 
 
Screening of US cities indicated the Portland Metro area as a suitable case study and a 
critical case for responsiveness of urban ecological governance (Figure 3.3). Portland Metro 
is the only directly elected regional government and metropolitan planning organisation in 
the USA (Seltzer 2004) (criterion #2). Under this regional umbrella there are 25 municipal 
government areas. With respect to criteria 3-5, Portland Metro, due to its higher latitude has 
lower species richness than Brisbane, however significant habitat persists in urban areas.63 
Portland Forest Park is one of the largest urban forests in the USA.64 The city is adjacent to 
the Columbia River and natural features in the region include the Columbia Gorge and 
Mount Hood. Oregon salmonid species were federally listed under the US Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) from the mid–1990s and several other species (e.g. Streaked Horned 
Lark) have placed on a watch list. Portland clearly demonstrates a significant urban 
biodiversity resource (Table 3.5). Comparative data for urban biodiversity resources across 
US metropolitan areas are not easily accessible. However, the Portland regional 
government (Metro) has invested substantially in the acquisition of high quality habitat since 
                                                            
61 Karawatha forest also forms part of the FGK Corridor, a regional wildlife corridor that borders the south of the 
Brisbane City Council area and crosses into two other local government jurisdictions.  
62Brisbane City Council has invested ~AUD$90,000,000  in biodiversity acquisitions between 1991 and 2007  
(Churchill, 2007) - http://www.arachne.org.au/_dbase_upl/exploring_brisbane_invertebrates_project_newsletter.pdf) 
63 For example, persistent patches of original ecosystems ranges from coniferous Douglas Fir forests, to mixed 
broadleaf deciduous trees, oak woodland to significant wetland systems. Iconic species include pacific salmon and 
migratory birds and American beaver (refer 4.2 for further details).  
64 Portland Forest Park has a total acreage of 5,172.14 (Portland Parks, 
http://www.portlandoregon.gov/parks/finder/index.cfm?&propertyid=127&action=ViewPark, accessed 16/07/2013) 
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199565 (criterion #4). Watershed groups were established across the state of Oregon in the 
mid-1990s, including the Portland Metro area (criterion #5). Section 4.2 further characterises 
Portland Metro’s biodiversity in terms of the biophysical context for ecological governance.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Metropolitan cases: Brisbane, Queensland Australia (left) and Portland, Oregon 
USA (right) 
 
Table 3.5 Demonstration of significant urban ecological resources (Criteria #3)66 
City % native 
vegetation  
Climate # flora 
spp. 
# vertebrate 
spp. 
Rare & threatened 
species 
Portland Metro ~29% a Temperate ~400 b ~350b ~150 b 
Brisbane 22% c Sub-tropical ~2075d ~720d 8067 
a) Metro (2002), Metro Fish and Wildlife Habitat Plan68, b) Intertwine Alliance (2012), Biodiversity guide of the 
Greater Portland-Vancouver Region69. c) Stenhouse (2005, p50-51), d) Queensland Government Wildlife 
Online, Extraction Date 05/07/2015 https://www.qld.gov.au/environment/plants-animals/species-list/  
                                                            
65 Total Portland Metro expenditure on biodiversity acquisitions since 1995 is US$303,600,000. This includes $135.6 
million from a 1995 bond measure and $168 million from a 2005 bond measure (as of 2014 is still being expended). 
66 These biodiversity data are not intended for direct comparison between case cities, merely to demonstrate that an 
urban ecological resource requiring governance exists in each case area. Furthermore, for climatic reasons, species data 
are not directly comparable between temperate Portland Metro and sub-tropical Brisbane. 
67 Of the 80 species ranked as rare or threatened, 20 plant and animal species are listed as endangered by the 
Queensland State Government under the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (QLD). 
6880,000ha of a total jurisdictional area of 280,000ha were identified as high quality habitat in a 2002 inventory  
69 The area surveyed for plant species in this resource, includes the Vancouver-Washington portion of the Greater 
Portland conurbation. This area is not included in the case area for this research. Species listed are those found annually 
in the region and does not include less frequent visitors and vagrants. Rare and threatened species includes 101 plant 
species and 49 vertebrate species. Of the vertebrate species 17 are rated as ‘sensitive critical’ or higher, 32 are rated as 
sensitive vulnerable, i.e. in decline 
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Pragmatic factors also reinforced the selection of these cases. The Brisbane case study was 
chosen as it was partially known to the researcher and easy to access. The selection of 
Portland was furthered by offers of support from Portland State University and a partnership 
between The University of Queensland’s School of Geography Planning and Environmental 
Management and The University of Oregon’s Department of Public Policy and Planning. 
Comparative contrast and equivalence  
The cities differ in terms of environmental planning approaches and degree of jurisdictional 
complexity.70 Their key contrasts revolve around theoretical variables that are important for 
the main research question (Table 3.6).  
Table 3.6 Case study contrasts with respect to the research question (fulfils Table 3.3, 
criterion #1) 
Categories Brisbane Portland Relevance to research 
question 
Jurisdictional 
structure 
Single regional 
municipal council for 
the metro area 
Single regional 
government and 25 
municipal councils 
Hierarchical compared with 
networked 
Model of urban 
governance (as 
per Pierre 2005) 
Managerial/ pro-
growth: efficiency & 
growth objectives, 
pragmatic policy style 
Distribution and equity 
objectives, ideological 
policy style  
The nature of cross-sectoral 
integration for urban 
governance 
State involvement 
in watershed 
groups 
State actors generally 
not members of 
watershed groups 
State actors generally 
are members of 
watershed groups 
The nature of cross-sectoral 
integration for 
environmental management 
 
However, other common characteristics strengthen Brisbane and Portland (Table 3.7). In 
particular, similar populations, growth rates (in 2007), areas and metropolitan planning 
(Searle and Bunker 2010) embedded within established multi-level governance frameworks. 
Both are also the political and economic capitals of their respective states. 
Table 3.7 Commonalities that strengthen internal validity of the comparative case study meta-
structure (fulfils Table 3.3, criterion #6) 
Inherent equivalence Brisbane Portland 
Urban growth rates 2.2% pa (2007) 2.02% pa (2007) 
Population 1.06 million 1.4 million 
Meso-scale environmental 
governance (i.e. extra-metropolitan) 
e.g. Regional NRM 
planning 
e.g. Regional nature 
conservation strategy 
Area 1367 km² (527.8 
square miles) 
1036 km2 (~400 square 
miles)  
Comprehensive Metropolitan Planning Brisbane City Plan Metro Functional Plan 
                                                            
70 Jurisdictional structures in the United States tend to be more complex and involve greater political decentralisation 
in comparison with Australia. The Portland metropolitan area includes 25 local jurisdictions, a regional metropolitan 
government and overlaps with 3 counties. The Brisbane case study involves one large local jurisdiction within a larger 
poly-metropolitan region under state government responsibility. 
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Watershed based sub-cases 
The small N problem of N=2 for a comparative case study was reduced by selecting three 
focal watersheds in each metropolitan area: Johnson Creek, Columbia Slough, and Tualatin 
River watersheds in Portland71 (Figure 3.5); and the Oxley Creek, Enoggera Creek, and 
Bulimba Creek watersheds in Brisbane (Figure 3.4). These watersheds were chosen to 
represent the diversity of watershed groups in each city. In addition to reducing the small N 
problem and thereby adding robustness to metropolitan level observations, this approach 
also facilitated a more detailed examination of local-level interactions. In particular, the 
interactions between networked actors and instruments in specific localities.   
 
Figure 3.4 Brisbane Case: General location of focal watersheds used for sub-metropolitan 
bounding 
Bulimba Creek watershed is located in the south east of Brisbane (#1, Figure 3.4). It is the 
second largest watershed in the metropolitan area (122km2).72 Virtually all of the urban 
portions are within Brisbane City Council with a negligible portion of the upper watershed 
crossing into an adjacent council area.73 The watershed includes five significant wetland 
systems, for example Tingalpa wetlands. The area supports a declining population of koalas 
and a large population of squirrel gliders. More than 350 species of birds have been recorded 
in the watershed (BCC n.d.). The watershed group (Bulimba Creek Catchment Coordination 
Committee – B4C) formed in 1997 and is involved in advocacy as well as restoration and 
                                                            
71 Due to the complexity of the Portland Metro Case Study peripheral environmental governance processes were 
excluded from the analysis and treated as contextual variables, in particular: Damascus City Council; Clackamas County; 
Gateway Green Project; Green Streets, and West Hayden Island Annexation 
72 Brisbane City Council (2012), Know your creek – Bulimba Creek Catchment 
73 The Logan Local government Area (LGA) is adjacent to Brisbane on its southern border  
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education activities. They have played an important role in pilot programs, advisory 
committees and networking with other watershed groups.     
Enoggera Creek watershed is located in the north west of Brisbane (#2, Figure 3.4). It covers 
89.2 km2 and urban areas are located within Brisbane City Council. Approximately 30% of 
the watershed is protected by D’Aguilar National Park, Mt Cootha Reserve and Enoggera 
Barracks74. These upper watershed areas support patches of sub-tropical rainforest and dry 
rainforest, while eucalypt stands are found in more urbanised areas. The watershed group 
(Save Our Waterways Now – SOWN) formed in 1994 in partnership with a local council ward 
member. They have played an important role in networking with older ecological groups75 
as well as undertaking environmental education and restoration activities. 
Oxley Creek watershed is located in the south of Brisbane (#3, Figure 3.4). It is the largest 
creek watershed in the metropolitan area (260km2). The lower third of the watershed lies 
within the Brisbane City Council (BCC) area. The upper sections are mostly rural and cross 
into two other local government areas (LGAs) that are beyond the scope of this study.76 
However some external sites such as Greenbank Military Training Area maintain 
populations of koala, yellow-bellied glider and other species that can potentially migrate 
along the riparian corridor and into the case study area. The lower watershed is prone to 
flooding, has been highly modified and includes Brisbane’s largest industrial zone. 
Nevertheless it includes natural assets such as wetland systems (e.g. Archerfield), large 
open spaces (e.g. Oxley Common) and endangered regional ecosystems (e.g. Corinda 
habitat site)77. The creek corridor also provides important landscape level connectivity for 
urban biodiversity by intersecting with the Forestdale-Greenbank-Karawatha (FGK) regional 
environmental corridor on the southern boundary of the BCC area. The watershed group 
formed in 1996 under an integrated catchment management model (ICM) or watershed 
council model i.e. council membership included community, government and private sector 
actors (Chapter 5 examines OCCA and its development in more detail).78 
                                                            
74 Brisbane City Council (2012, Know your creek – Enoggera-Breakfast Creek Catchment 
75 SOWN emerged in close proximity with already established groups such as ‘Men of the Trees’ and Greening Australia 
Queensland  
76 Oxley Creek Watershed includes areas of Brisbane, Logan and Ipswich LGAs. 
77 In particular the angle-stemmed myrtle is found at some sites in Corinda (Gossia gonoclada).  
78 Further biodiversity characterisation of the focal watersheds for the Brisbane case can be found on the Brisbane City 
Council website - https://www.brisbane.qld.gov.au/environment-waste/natural-environment/brisbanes-creeks-
rivers/know-your-creek-catchment. 
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Figure 3.5 Portland case: General location of focal watersheds used for sub-
metropolitan bounding 
The Columbia Slough watershed is located along the northern edge of Portland Metro in the 
floodplain of the Columbia River (#1, Figure 3.5). It covers 132 km2 (51 sq mi). The 
watershed includes large industrial zones and lower income residential areas. Although the 
watershed is highly modified, 33% is recognised as wildlife habitat, including wetlands, 
cottonwood forest and parklands (BES 2005). 79 The Smith and Bybee wetlands are located 
in the slough, one of the largest urban wetlands in the USA (2000 acres). These wetlands 
support more than 100 species of birds throughout the year.80 The lower slough also has 
salmonid breeding sites and significant migratory bird stop-overs. The slough is located 
within Multnomah County and overlaps five municipal jurisdictions.81 The watershed council 
emerged due to contention about water pollution in the 1980s and officially formed in 1995.82  
Johnson Creek watershed is located in the east of Portland Metro (#2, Figure 3.5). It covers 
140 km2 (54 sq mi). Lower reaches of the waterway are highly modified and flood prone, 
however the presence of salmonid species has contributed to high levels of interest in its 
ecological governance.83 BES (2005b) reports that 57% of the watershed is vegetated, 
                                                            
79 BES (2005, pp6-7) notes that “Upland habitats in the 2003 data [used to calculate 33% habitat]  include vacant land 
(regardless of zoning) as well as developed farms, parks, and golf courses” 
80 A species checklist for Smith and Bybee wetlands can be found at  
http://www.oregonmetro.gov/sites/default/files/13606_smith_bybee_checklist_jan_2013.pdf [retrieved September 
2016) 
81 The Columbia Slough watershed overlaps five municipal jurisdictions: Portland and Gresham are the most prominent; 
Fairview, Maywood Park, and Wood Village are small municipalities. The slough also falls within the County of 
Multnomah.  
82 Further characterisation of biodiversity in the Columbia slough can be found in BES (2005a, pp6-7), 
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/bes/article/63589 [retrieved September 2016]. 
83 Oregon salmonid species began receiving federal listing in the mid-1990s under the US Endangered Species Act 
Portland Focal Watersheds 
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3 Tualatin River 
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including grass, invasive species such as blackberries, and small areas of native vegetation. 
A range of bird species remain and large investments in riparian restoration continues to 
take place.84 The area overlaps two counties and three municipal jurisdictions.85 Citizen 
groups86 began forming from 1980 onwards, initially in opposition to government flood 
control planning. A cross-sector committee was established in 1990 and the Johnson Creek 
watershed council emerged from this committee in 1995. 
Tualatin River watershed is located in the west of the Portland Metro area with the majority 
of the basin lying outside the Portland Metro urban growth boundary (#3, Figure 3.5). 
Approximately 276km2 of the lower watershed falls within the Portland Metro case study 
area; this is approximately 15% of the large 1,844 km2 (712 sq mi) river basin. Biodiversity 
within the urban portion of the basin is concentrated in a few large sites such as Cooper 
Mountain, but mostly fragmented across smaller sites.87 The Tualatin River was the subject 
of early water quality issues under the US Clean Water Act 1972 and contention between 
environmental advocates and government agencies. The portion of the basin within the 
Portland Metro case study area overlaps two counties and eleven municipal jurisdictions.88 
The Tualatin River Watershed Council formed in 1993 and is an important forum for 
communication amongst these state actors. 
Population and sampling strategy 
The research examined how diverse actors participate in urban biodiversity planning and 
management and how this participation responds to change over time. In USA and 
Australian settings the key actors are local jurisdiction departments and other government 
                                                            
84 Further characterisation of biodiversity for the Johnson Creek watershed can be found in BES (2005b, pp27-34), 
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/bes/article/214368, retrieved September 2016. 
85 The Johnson Creek watershed overlaps three municipal jurisdictions: Portland, Gresham and Milwaukie (the smaller 
local government of these three). The watershed falls within the counties of Multnomah and Clackamas. Some 
urbanised portions of the watershed lie within unincorporated areas of Clackamas County. 
86 The ‘Up the Creek Committee’ and its reincarnations in the mid-1980s included the group ‘Friends of Johnson Creek’. 
87 Conifer and mixed conifer/hardwood stands can be found in steeper areas, hardwood stands in riparian areas and 
oak woodland in drier sites. Iconic fauna include Pacific salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.), Northern red-legged frog (Rana 
aurora aurora) and American beaver (Castor canadensis). Bobcat (Lynx rufus) and Cougar (Puma concolor) sitings, 
although occasional have increased at some sites in recent years (Hawksworth 2001). Further characterisation of 
Tualatin basin biodiversity can be found in Hawksworth (2001, pp.16-20) at http://trwc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Lower-Tualatin-Watershed-Analysis-2001.pdf [accessed September 2016].  
88 Due to the complexity of the Tualatin basin the case study focused on integrative forums such as: the Watershed 
Council and Special Service Districts (e.g. Clean Water Services); the larger municipalities and areas of urbanised 
unincorporated Washington County. Thirteen municipal areas lie within the basin, many of them small. They are the 
cities of: Banks, North Plains, Beaverton, Cornelius, Durham, Forest Grove, Gaston, Hillsboro, King City, Sherwood, 
Tigard, Tualatin and West Linn. Only the former two lie outside of the Portland Metro case area. Six counties lie within 
the basin: Washington, Clackamas, Multnomah, Tillamook, Columbia, and Yamhill. The former three lie within the 
Portland Metro case area. 
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agencies, nongovernment organisations and a few key individuals involved across these 
categories. To establish the population of actors in each metropolitan area, a scoping 
exercise was conducted using documents from significant biodiversity instruments and actor 
forums. Key informant dialogue was used to refine this list, account for a more complete mix 
of biodiversity instruments and select focal watersheds within each city. The list of actors 
was further expanded through a participant referral technique (snowball sampling) and 
ongoing key informant dialogue (Patton 1990).   
A purposeful stratified sample was selected from this large population in order to ensure a 
cross-section of actor participation types at the metropolitan level and for the three focal 
watersheds in each case area. The sampling was therefore designed to maximise 
representation of the range of actor perspectives (Shkedi 2005). Actors were stratified 
according to the type of instrument they were primarily involved with and their main role 
within the policy cycle (Table 3.8). This added elements of intensity sampling (as per Patton 
1990) to the primary purposive stratified approach. Further purposeful sampling occurred 
where practical to better survey the 20 year timeframe and to identify functional equivalents 
that were not captured in one case area but played an important role in the policy arena of 
the other.89   
 
Table 3.8 Example of stratification grid for actors 
  Policy Stage 
  Problem 
identification 
Policy design 
(& review) 
Implementation 
and 
management 
In
s
tr
u
m
e
n
t 
C
a
te
g
o
ry
 
Purchase 
(e.g. acquisition of 
land) 
NGO -
environmental 
advocacy 
Program 
coordinators  
Program staff – 
Natural Areas 
Protect  
(codes & laws) 
Stakeholder 
‘Commission’ 
Local 
Government 
Planning 
Division 
Private 
contractors 
Public Restoration 
and Management  
(activities on  
          public land) 
NGO -
environmental 
advocacy 
Local 
Government 
‘Water’ 
Division 
NGO -
environmental 
management 
Private Restoration 
and Management 
(activities on  
          private land) 
Non-
government 
Land Trust 
Watershed 
group  
NGO -
environmental 
advocacy 
 
                                                            
89 For example water quality issues were central in the Portland Metro case, but peripheral were in Brisbane and not 
included in the initial data collection until case matching occurred.  
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Data Sets, Triangulation and robust design 
Context embedded research relies on multiple data sources that converge in order to 
establish accuracy (Yin 2003). This section outlines the data collection for the research and 
their multiple sources. Ethics approval was received from the University of Queensland in 
April 2011.90 A copy of the ethics approval letter is included in this thesis as Appendix 4. 
Data were collected from different actors and were cross-checked with other actors, 
organisational documents and public reports (Table 3.9).  
Table 3.9 Data sets for the research 
Primary data Stratified interviews 
Key informant interviews 
Selected participant observation 
Government policy, organisational documents 
Secondary data Public reports 
Organisational reports (where raw data has 
been interpreted by the author)  
Parallel research, environmental studies and 
peer reviewed literature. 
 
I collected data between April 2011 and February 2013. The majority of data collection took 
place during extended fieldwork of about twelve months in Brisbane (Queensland, Australia) 
and four months in Portland (Oregon, USA). Periodic communication with key participants 
and desktop research throughout the project were used to complement fieldwork data and 
validate findings. Primary data were collected through semi-structured interviews, 
participant observation and key informant dialogue, government policy and organisational 
documents. Secondary data included public reports and media. This approach enabled data 
gaps to be managed effectively, developed a rich description of the context for each city and 
established the triangulation of data required for robust case study analysis. The methods 
to collect these data are detailed below. 
Primary data: 
The main source of primary data was through semi-structured interviews of approximately 
one hour in duration. Interview participants were managers of organisations with, where 
possible, a long period of experience within environmental governance in that metropolitan 
area (Appendix 2). The investigative framework (see Section 3.3) guided interviews 
according to issues identified in the literature review.  
                                                            
90 Ethics approval number is GPEM20110005. A copy of the ethics approval letter is included as Appendix 4. 
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Figure 3.6 Investigative framework developed in Section 3.3 
 
The interview focused on participant perspectives of major changes in biodiversity 
governance, critical cases of flexibility or adaptation, and significant factors supporting these 
changes. The aim was to understand the experience of the actors and the meaning they 
attached to their experience (Shkedi 2005). Accordingly, the semi-structured interviews 
began with a broad question about major milestones in ecological governance. This allowed 
participants to highlight whatever milestones came to mind, regardless of a focus on context, 
structure or agency. This less-structured approach then supported a reflective discussion 
about contextual influences, policy structures and important actions taken by organisations 
and key individuals. A second stage of the interview was more structured, and collected data 
regarding the instruments in which their organisation participated, governance 
arrangements, activities and their flexibility (Appendix 3).  The interviews were piloted with 
three professionals who were not involved with the case studies and a pilot analysis was 
undertaken for the Oxley Creek watershed in Brisbane (see Chapter 5). In addition to 
interview data, participant observation was also undertaken for watershed councils in focal 
watersheds, as an avenue for ground-truthing the interview data and better understanding 
the culturally embedded nature of governance. I attended a number of meetings and was 
given access to minutes of other relevant meetings. Primary data was recorded in the form 
of written entries and audio recordings stored in a case study database. 
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A number of unstructured interviews were carried out with key informants (Appendix 2), 
organisational and government documents were also collected. Key informants from each 
case city region were practitioners and academics in biodiversity planning and management 
who had extensive experience in the area. These interviews took place as part of the initial 
scoping exercise and also for interpretation of data. Organisational documents included 
annual reports, plans, legislation and policy. They were sourced through websites, supplied 
by interview participants and some key informants.  
Secondary data: 
Public documents were collected and included news reports, public reports, policy reviews 
and relevant academic reports. Some of these were authored by key informants and so 
complemented their input into the project. Portland was a particularly rich source for this 
type of data through diverse local media, publically available government reports and locally 
focused environmental research. A sample of policy instruments was collected and a 
timeline for both cities was developed from secondary sources in addition to primary 
sources.   
Analysis 
This section discusses stages of data analysis from exploratory to descriptive and 
explanatory stages. The investigative framework guided the data collection and analysis 
within these stages (Yin 2003), while maintaining flexibility for an iterative process of 
inductive enquiry into the empirical cases; this means that the implementation of these 
stages was more iterative than the mostly linear process described below. It is also worth 
noting that, before the main data collection process was complete, a substantial amount of 
exploratory analysis had been achieved through the initial scoping exercise and the actor 
stratification process. The following discussion outlines the storage of data, initial thematic 
coding and the selective coding process for the research.  
Case study database 
A case study database was established to store data in a reliable and secure fashion. 
Interview data was de-identified and codified. Data from structured and unstructured 
interviews, observation and documents were filed within an NVivo database and a locked 
filing cabinet. This enabled logical and confidential management of the case material. These 
different sources were then reviewed and thematically coded. 
63 
 
Major research themes and thematic coding 
The initial analysis concerned the coding of data into major and emergent themes. This task 
was more exploratory and descriptive in nature than explanatory. Major themes were 
indicated by the investigative framework (and therefore the literature review): institutions 
and path dependency; policy and problem solving; actors and agency. Emergent themes 
were indicated by the data itself in reflection on the major themes, for example the scale, 
watershed and interests of the dominant actor involved in a particular change. Although 
strongly guided by a priori theory, the development of emergent themes also drew from 
thematic and axial coding practices used by the more structured grounded theory 
researchers (Juliet, Corbin and Strauss 2008, Heath and Cowley 2004). Each case city 
initially was treated separately in order to develop a focused narrative for each, and then 
viewed together in order to support theoretical development (Flyvbjerg 2006). The interview 
data in NVivo was manually coded with the major and emergent themes. In parallel, events 
of note were entered into a Microsoft Excel database and codified into the same categories. 
This chronological data then formed the basis of case narratives that could be viewed by 
reordering the spreadsheet according to the theme of interest. An example portion of the 
Excel spreadsheet is included as Appendix 8. Due to the publication style of this thesis, 
further methodological detail is included within these thematic chapters. However a common 
selective coding process was also used as an element of these analyses and is described 
below. 
Selective coding and major theme chapters 
The analysis behind each thematic chapter involved further coding according to the 
investigative framework (Section 3.2). This task was more descriptive and explanatory in 
nature. Participant perspectives in the data were used to identify core categories to be 
analysed in detail and to refine the sub-questions for each major theme (Shkedi 2005). The 
analysis followed a pattern matching approach across different data sources (Yin 2003). 
Plausible relationships between concepts were proposed inductively and checked 
deductively against participant data. Second order analyses were carried out where data 
was rich in references to other phenomena or parts of their world; this was achieved by using 
principles in the literature in dialogue with key informants, and allowed the relationship 
between participants and their context to be explored (Shkedi 2005). The ‘most difference 
comparison’ between Brisbane and Portland then assisted to discriminate between 
participants and their context for each research theme. 
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Synthesis 
The research themes were integrated with the main research question through a final 
synthesis (Chapter 10). This meta-analysis of the major research themes explores path 
dependency, problem solving and actor agency in parallel. This enables theoretical 
reflection on the established adaptation literature and implications for practice. The 
analytical process behind this synthesis was not only researcher driven but was also refined 
through formal and informal presentation of thematic findings to key informants and 
participants in both metropolitan areas. 
3.5 Validity, reliability and robustness of design 
Thorough application of case study analysis needs a rigorous study design. Yin (2003) 
proposes four tests for the validity of case study design: construct validity, reliability, internal 
validity and external validity. The way each applied to this case study is detailed in Table 
3.10.  
 
Table 3.10 Case study validity tests    
Validity test Application to the methodology of this study 
Construct validity  
‘Correct operational measures.’ 
 Multiple sources to give convergence of evidence 
 Triangulated data, theory and methods 
Reliability 
Consistent and documented 
operations that can be repeated  
 Protocols and case study database 
 Explicit presentation of the researcher’s perspective 
 Chain of evidence maintained between research 
questions, protocol, data, database and case study 
report 
Internal validity 
Establishing plausible 
relationships where one 
condition leads to another 
 Pattern matching and the acknowledgement of 
reservations regarding cause and effect relationships 
 Strengthened by micro-cases within each case city 
External validity 
“The domain to which a study 
can be generalized” 
 Searched for similar studies to compare, check current 
literature 
 Compared and contrasted with current theory91  
 Participation with Actors and immersion in the case 
cities established detailed knowledge of uniqueness 
within each city (Stake 1995). 
 Strengthened by comparative case study approach 
Source: adapted from Yin 2003, p34 
                                                            
91 The ‘theory’ referred to for external validity tests (Table 3.10) flows directly from literature reviews and formed the 
basis of the investigative framework.   
65 
 
Yin’s (2003) validity tests, maintained chains of evidence, and the case study database 
established rigor within the case study meta-structure. Document analysis and key 
informants played key roles for checking proposed explanations. The comparative case 
study approach added robustness to the analysis (Yin 2003), while limiting the number of 
case cities to two supported the ‘thick’ approach to analysis required for governance and 
institutional studies (Geertz 1973, Alston et al. 1996). This ‘thick approach’ meant that within 
each case city there was a set of more specific cases that strengthened the explanation 
building process and internal validity of the study.92 Internal validity was further strengthened 
through pattern matching, i.e. empirical patterns were compared with predicted findings and 
alternative predictions. This approach improved internal validity testing findings for 
unsupported assumptions. Case study analysis has a recognised bias towards the 
falsification of assumptions (Flyvbjerg 2006). External validity was further strengthened 
through an intimate understanding of each case city (Stake 1995), a thorough understanding 
of uniqueness within the case studies, supported the ability to generalise by enhancing the 
understandings of what was potentially in common between them (Stake 1995, Booth 2011). 
3.6 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has provided a justification and an explanation of the methodological approach 
taken to investigate responsive ecological governance. A more detailed discussion of 
methods is also included within Chapters 5 to 9. The context embedded and radial nature 
of governance presents particular challenges for researchers. The investigative framework 
provides a theoretical guide to inductive and deductive analyses for the study that manages 
problems such as concept stretching. The comparative case meta-structure is designed to 
exploit differences in contextual factors between Brisbane and Portland while maintaining a 
robust comparison. Chapter 4 now outlines the important background to urban ecological 
governance in Brisbane and Portland in order to set the scene for the thematic, analytical 
chapters. 
 
  
                                                            
92 The ‘thick’ analysis follows through into methodology in the multiple frames of enquiry approach and through the 
presentation of findings with thick descriptions from interview participants. 
66 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
Background to the Empirical Cases 
 
This chapter outlines the background to the empirical cases for this study – the urban 
ecological policy arenas of Brisbane and Portland Metro. The discussion: contributes to the 
achievement of the first research question, which asks “How do actors within a ‘non-core’ 
urban policy arena interact with the broader institutional context over time?”; characterises 
each city in terms of the themes within the investigative framework (Section 3.3); and 
establishes a thick description (Geertz 1972) for further interpretation of the research 
findings presented in the chapters that follow. The data for this thick description was 
collected through participant interviews, document analysis and published sources. 
Temporal analyses are important in retrospective case study research, and particularly 
important for the study of institutional change (Pierson and Skocpol 2002). Although the 
period 1991–2012 was examined in detail, it was also necessary to frame this period within 
in its broader temporal setting. Historical institutional analyses show that the temporal setting 
of a case forms part of the context of a study because institutional change involves path 
dependent aspects.  Hence, the temporal setting provides a line of enquiry for understanding 
and interpreting responsive governance in the period 1991–2012. Urban environmental 
history has received scholarly attention as an important tool for urban planning, 
management and analysis in recent years (Melosi 1993, Schott 2004, Szabo 2010). 
Case study methodology calls for a thick description of case studies to be established to 
contextualise both the case and the methodology that has been applied (Healy and Perry 
2000, Baxter and Jack 2008). Ponterotto (2006, p543) notes that ‘thick descriptions’ require 
“a description and interpretation of a social action within its context” (p543). The following 
analysis, interprets social action in terms of different types of embeddedness in the 
investigative framework. Ponterotto (2006, p543) concludes that “thick description leads to 
thick interpretation, which in turns leads to thick meaning of the research findings.” Hence, 
the thick interpretation within this chapter contributes to the findings of later analytical 
chapters and their treatment of the main research questions.  
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This chapter proceeds as follows: first the development of urban environmental governance 
and the emergence of urban ecological governance are outlined (4.1); and then a historical 
review of themes within the investigative framework (3.3) is presented for both Portland (4.2) 
and Brisbane (4.3).  
4.1 Urban environmental governance and responses to 
change 
The policy arena for urban ecological governance has emerged from within urban 
environmental planning and management. This section analyses the developmental 
responses of urban environmental governance to industrialisation and rational planning. 
Responses to industrialisation resulted in the uptake of greenspace, water and to a lesser 
extent, soil, into the governance of urban settings. Responses to rational planning are 
associated with public participation and the emergence of integrated planning.   
Responses of governance to industrialisation 
At the turn of the twentieth century, urban intensification and industrial growth led to a decline 
in urban environmental quality in many developed cities. The emergence of urban 
environmental governance can be explained as a response to industrialisation. The stress 
on urban systems from industrialisation emerged from the early 1800s onwards (Rydin and 
Thornley 2003). Environmental decline was evident especially in older, more industrialized 
urban centres of Europe and North America. One public response was to secure more open 
spaces in urban areas (Freestone 2010).93 In Australia, the layout of some cities coincided 
with impetus coming from Britain to include public parks in urban planning – e.g. Melbourne’s 
early planning and the 1937 plan for Adelaide, see Proudfoot (2000) and Harris (2005. 
These concerns for open space were embodied by Ebenezer Howard and the Garden City 
Movement, the first major urban planning movement. The Garden City approach advocated 
the creation of green wedges and green belts in order to improve quality of life, and therefore 
the productivity of urban industrial workers (Howard 1965). Garden City principles were 
incorporated within the first planning legislation in England, the Housing and Town Planning 
Act 1909 (Sutcliffe 1988). While older cities found it difficult and costly to retrofit these ideas 
into established urban settings, younger cities could plan for these issues and design 
metropolitan plans that employed these principles. An unexpected opportunity for expanded 
                                                            
93 For example in 1833 a British Parliamentary Select Committee looked at strategies for securing urban open space 
(Freestone 2010, p240). 
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Garden City planning resulted from large scale rebuilding and redesign in Europe following 
the World Wars – e.g. The Greater London Plan, Abercrombie (1945). This trend became 
normalised within English planning when it became compulsory for municipal governments 
in the United Kingdom to develop comprehensive plans – including provision for greenspace 
– in 194894 (Hall and Tewdwr-Jones 2011).  
Garden City principles reached the USA and were disseminated as part of the fledgling 
landscape architecture and then regional planning professions (Gillette Jr 2010). 
Environmental planning and governance in Portland, is directly connected to early 
developments in both these disciplines (refer to Section 4.3). In Australia, landscape 
designers drew upon the same set of principles developed in Europe and the USA. They 
implemented green wedges in cities such as Melbourne and Brisbane (Harris 2005, BCC 
2013),95 regardless of the fact that industrialisation there, did not begin to accelerate until 
the post-war period (Freestone 2000). Australian cities are also generally younger than 
those in the USA and so urban infrastructure design often had the opportunity to implement 
more advanced approaches to environmental management and learn from previous 
challenges in other developed countries. For example, the sewering of Brisbane in the 1970s 
avoided combined storm water-sewerage systems and their associated overflow issues 
(Tucker 1995).96 
Governance arrangements also developed for urban soil and water. Soil rose to prominence 
in response to the 1930s USA Dust Bowl event. In response, Soil Conservation Districts 
were established across the country, usually along county lines.97 Water became embedded 
as an urban concern when combined sewage and stormwater systems reached full capacity 
and began spilling into waterways during storm events.98 Soil remained a lesser urban 
concern, although urban growth began to encroach on many of the Soil Conservation 
Districts. 
It is important to note that although governance during this time was driven by professional, 
mostly technical networks, the addition of new environmental resources tended to be 
triggered, especially in the USA, by an environmental crisis concerning each resource. In 
                                                            
94 The Town and Country Planning Act 1947 (UK) came into force in July 1948 and required municipal planning. 
95 Other prominent Australian examples of green belt designs, the plans for Adelaide (1937) and Canberra (1912) 
96 NRMMC 2004. Guidelines for Sewage Systems: Sewage System Overflows (November 2004). Natural Resource 
Management Ministerial Council, Commonwealth of Australia. 
97 1939 Oregon passed its Soil Conservation Districts Law. In 1963 in Oregon, Soil Conservation Districts explicitly 
acknowledge their concern with water resources by changing their names to Soil and Water Conservation Districts. 
98 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act 1948 (USA), the forerunner of the Clean Water Act 1972 (USA). 
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Australia the time lag for urban development and accompanying urban environmental issues 
meant that the technical systems initially implemented tended to be more advanced than 
those initially established in older US cities. The rational planning approach dominated 
environmental urban governance for decades, but from the 1970s onwards a new type of 
governance network began to make its presence felt – the environmental social movement. 
Responses of governance to rational planning and scientific management 
In the late 1960s environmental pollution from pesticides and industrial effluent rose as a 
significant public concern, even in developed cities (Dunlap 1991).99 The emergence of 
public participation, environmental concern and then ecological governance can be 
explained as a response to ‘top-down’ rational planning by experts – i.e. the first wave of 
responses to industrial pressures. The growing influence of environmental social 
movements and lobby groups transformed decision making from technocratic solutions and 
ushered in a new phase of regulatory legislation (Heclo 1978). By the end of the 1970s these 
environmental regimes were enshrined from the federal level. The US constitution generally 
supported federal involvement in environmental matters, although enforcement of US 
environmental law has been complicated by new interpretations of other parts of the 
constitution concerning the rights of individuals.100 In contrast, the Australian constitution 
has limited the federal head of power in environmental matters and environmental 
governance traditionally has been implemented at the state level.101 While these new 
environmental governance tools were typically ‘command and control’ instruments, they 
eventually came to enshrine a certain level of public participation. The increased focus on 
participation and sustainability was eventually epitomised in the United Nations Local 
Agenda 21 process (Freeman 1996, Rydin and Pennington 2000). Over time, the set of 
urban environmental resources with formal governance regimes expanded to include urban 
                                                            
99 Dunlap (1991, p288) notes that the percentage of US citizens identifying water and air pollution as a national problem 
tripled from 17% to 53% between 1965 and 1970. In Australia during the 1960s, major environmental groups were 
founded (Wilderness Preservation Society of Queensland, 1962, Australian Conservation Foundation 1964, Australian 
Marine Conservation Society 1965) however public concern did not build until the 1970s, especially with respect to 
urban issues (See Hutton and Connors 1995) 
100 Most prominently this has involved the ‘Takings clause’ (5th amendment, US constitution) which reads “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”. This originally related to the physical resumption 
of land by governments but since the landmark case in 1978, of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, it 
potentially relates to ‘regulatory takings’, meaning that the economic impact of a new environmental law may be 
considered a taking that requires compensation. This issue became prominent in the Portland case study during the 
mid-2000s. 
101 Over the last 35 years the Australian federal government has built a head of power on some environmental matters, 
mainly through the use of section 51 (Australian Constitution) which grants the Australian government authority over 
international agreements. Therefore if an international environmental agreement is signed, it allows the federal 
government to make decisions to achieve that international commitment, e.g. the World Heritage Convention.  
70 
 
air102 and then urban native vegetation. The community-based networks campaigning for 
these changes were, by and large, environmental or social movements. Core groups were 
environmentalist but by the start of the 1990s (when the case timeline begins), these 
networks had extended into mainstream sections of the community in both the USA and 
Australia (Dunlap 1991, Hutton and Connors 1999).103 
4.2 Backgrounding the Portland Metro case 
The background to the Portland Metro case study is described under five facets from the 
investigative framework (Section 3.3): biophysical context; institution context; functional 
structures, governmental structures and civil-political structures. The latter two facets in 
particular reflect state-centric and society-centric frames (see sections 2.1 governance 
frames and 3.2 multiple frames of enquiry). Types of embedding amongst and interactions 
between facets from the investigative framework (3.3) are also cross-referenced throughout. 
High institutional, temporal and civic-political embedding are shown as particularly important 
in the background to the Portland case.  
Biophysical background to ecological governance in Portland Metro 
Portland Metro is located at the confluence of the Columbia and Willamette Rivers on the 
northern border of Oregon. It is the largest metropolitan area in Oregon with pioneers 
arriving in the area 1843. Geographically the Portland Metro area incudes diverse features 
such as the Columbia River floodplain in the north, forested hills in the centre and south, 
and the Tualatin basin to the west. The regional landscape of Portland was recognised as 
unique from very early on (strong temporal embedding). It attracted the attention of bird 
enthusiasts and the Audubon Society — a bird focused environmental group — was 
established in 1902. Biodiversity resources such as timber and salmon supported important 
commercial industries within the Oregon economy. Contiguous areas of mixed conifer forest 
continue to persist in the north western foothills, wetlands are located at places like Oaks 
                                                            
102 Governance regimes for air: In the USA this included the Clean Air Act 1963 (USA), with major amendments in 1970, 
1990 and 1997. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established in 1970 alongside the first major 
amendment. The 1963 statute can be found at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-77/pdf/STATUTE-77-
Pg392.pdf; In Australia urban air governance emerged as a responsibility of the states, e.g. Clean Air Act 1961 (NSW) 
and Clean Air Act 1963 (Qld). During the 1980s penalties became more substantial (Norberry, J. 1993). 
103 Dunlop (1991) notes that public environmental concern peaked in the US in 1972, but in contrast to predictions of 
drastic decline in public support (e.g. Downs 1972), this support was not markedly lower in the early 1990s. Crook and 
Paluski (1995) found that in Australia, public environmental concern peaked in 1989–1990, but was not markedly lower 
by 1993 at the beginning of the 1991–2012 timeline for this research.  
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Bottom and Smith and Bybee lakes.104 In addition Portland lies on an intercontinental 
migratory bird route – the Pacific flyway – and as such experiences bi-annual influxes of 
important migratory bird species.105   
Institutional background to ecological governance: Portland before 1991 
Oregon was established in 1858 and the legislature was dominated at first by well financed 
land speculators, but in 1902 the constitution was amended and the ‘Oregon system’ was 
established.106 The ‘Oregon system’ became one of the foundations for Portland’s tradition 
of participatory democracy. It allowed voters to place initiatives, referendums and referrals 
onto election ballot papers. Hence higher institutional-context embedding facilitated higher 
civic-political embedding. Over time, Oregon’s population grew. In the 1970s Oregon’s 
population grew by 26%, with many new arrivals seeking refuge from ‘modern America’ 
(Abbott 1983, Walker and Hurley 2011). During this time of political change and the 
international oil crisis, Oregon underwent another significant transformation. The state-wide 
land use planning system was adopted (1973).107 This system established state-wide 
planning goals (1974),108 enshrined public participation in land use processes109 and a 
strong regulatory approach to planning.110 Commercial farmers had campaigned for the 
changes in order to protect agricultural land from urbanisation. They were supported by 
urban environmentalists (Seltzer 2009). State ‘planning goal 5 (environment)’ is of particular 
importance for this research. The ‘Goal 5 process’ (est. 1982) established an evidenced-
based and triple bottom line framework for applying Goal 5 (environment) in decision 
                                                            
104 Forest Park and support populations of elk (Cervus canadensis) and smaller deer species. Oaks Bottom wetlands 
and Ross Island sustain populations of american mink (Neovision vision), northern river otter (Lontra canadensis). 
Upland areas include oak woodland and savannah ecosystems. Other special status fish and wildlife species include: 
pacific salmon (Salmo species); great blue heron (Ardea herodias); Cope’s giant salamander (Dicamptodon copei); 
northern red-legged frog (Rana aurora aurora); peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus); north american beaver (Castor 
canadensis); and western grey squirrel (Scriurus griseus). A full list of special status species can be found as Appendix 
D in the 2008 draft Willamette River Natural Resources Inventory: Riparian Corridors and Wildlife Habitat.   
105 A map of upland and riparian habitats for the Portland Metro area can be extracted from interactive mapping at 
https://gis.oregonmetro.gov/metromap/. Further biodiversity characterisation for Portland Metro can be found in, 
The Intertwine Alliance (2012, pp305-307) at 
http://www.theintertwine.org/sites/default/files/Biodiversity%20Guide%20for%20the%20Greater%20Portland-
Vancouver%20Region.pdf. [retrieved September 2016] 
106 The campaign for this amendment was carried out by the Direct Legislation League. 
107 Oregon Senate Bill (SB) 100 and SB101 established the planning system in 1973 under the Oregon Land Conservation 
and Development Act 1973.  An earlier framework was adopted in 1969 (SB10), but its implementation was not funded. 
108 Oregon Administrative Rules Chapter 660, Division 015 
109 Planning goals implemented in 1974 have enshrined public participation in land use processes (Goal 1, Oregon 
planning goals) and therefore most issues and departments also involve citizen advisory groups in some manner. For 
detailed explanation of Oregon’s planning goals refer to LCDC 2010. Oregon's Statewide Planning Goals and Guidelines. 
Salem: Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development.  An earlier framework was adopted in 1969 (SB10), 
but its implementation was not funded. 
110 The Oregon land use planning system is the only comprehensive land use planning system in the USA. 
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making.111 The State planning goals also enshrined public participation in land use 
processes (Goal 1, Oregon planning goals). Therefore departments and public decision 
making tends to involve citizen advisory groups in some manner (high civic-political 
embedding). The litigious culture combined with the high levels of public participation made 
the evidence based approach of the Goal 5 process an important instrument for achieving 
social-legitimacy. Hence higher ‘rational’ embedding facilitated higher civic-political 
embedding. In addition to these changes, however, the new planning system had specific 
regional implications for the Portland metropolitan government (Metro). 
The adoption of the planning system, set events in motion that led to the creation of Metro 
and its Urban Growth Boundary (UGB). The first change was that the membership in the 
regional association of local governments – the Columbia Regional Association of 
Governments (CRAG), changed from voluntary to compulsory for Portland Metro councils 
(Seltzer 2009).112 A Columbia district planning region was also established. Then CRAG 
developed a number of planning tools. For instance, the CRAG Columbia-Willamette 
Comprehensive plan (1974) with provisions to focus growth away from agricultural and 
forest land; CRAG planning goals (1976), a regional expression of the state wide goals; and 
then a CRAG regional land use plan (1977).113 However, despite this productivity, CRAG 
was deeply unpopular and seen as undemocratic by many voters (Seltzer 2009). In 1978, 
the voters passed a ballot measure to disband CRAG and establish the Portland regional 
government114 – Metro. Civic-political embedding enabled a new path for governmental 
embedding. The new path of governmental embedding was typified by Metro’s: directly 
elected council (higher civic-political embedding); authority to review local government 
comprehensive plans (vertical governmental embedding); and responsibility for establishing 
and maintaining a metropolitan UGB (higher biophysical embedding).115 The UGB was the 
principle instrument for maintaining the interface between urban land and the productive 
rural landscape. The control of sprawl was a primary goal of the Oregon land use planning 
system (Seltzer 2009). Within the original intentions of the planning system, natural 
                                                            
111 The Oregon government states that “The Goal 5 process and its rules establish a five-step planning process for 
Oregon's cities and counties: 1. Inventory local occurrences of resources listed in Goal 5 and decide which ones are 
important; 2. Identify potential land uses on or near each resource site and any conflicts that might result; 3. Analyze 
economic, social, environmental, and energy (ESEE) consequences of such conflicts; 4. Decide whether the resource 
should be fully or partially protected, and justify the decision; 5. Adopt measures such as zoning to put that policy into 
effect. 
112 Oregon Senate Bill 769 
113 Metro (1988), Urban Growth Boundary Periodic Review Workplan, December 1988, Metro 
114 Ballot Measure 6, a state-wide ballot measure was in May 1978. Metro was formally established in January 1979. 
115 Metro (1988), Urban Growth Boundary Periodic Review Workplan, December 1988, Metro. 
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resources were understood as a non-urban value. They therefore received little 
consideration within metropolitan planning (low biophysical embedding in urban areas). 
Local city councils were required to amend their comprehensive plans, codes and zoning to 
comply with the UGB and other regional policy that developed over time. However this was 
affected by temporal embedding — Metro was aware that it could face the same fate as 
CRAG if it was perceived as heavy-handed and undemocratic (Seltzer 2009). 
Local councils in the area pre-dated Metro by almost 130 years. The oldest, Portland City 
Council (PCC) formed in 1851.116 In 1913 PCC amended its charter and installed a 
commission style government — a weak mayor system with separate bureaus and an 
elected commissioner allotted to each. In his 2013 speech117 for the centenary 
commemoration of PCC’s commission style government, Portland historian, Carl Abbott 
noted that it took about 50 years for the new system of decision making to be completely 
embedded.118 Although the system still has it challenges, such as the tendency towards 
siloed power and decision making as illustrated through the words of one interview 
participant, the system can be challenged by a tendency towards siloed decision making. 
…with the commission form of government we (PCC) really have 5 Mayors, well there 
is one mayor, but a commissioner is assigned to each bureau and once that is done 
he is the virtual mayor of that bureau. 
The commission style of PCC is seen as a flexible and collaborative way of governing. Other 
local councils in Portland have not converted to the commission system as PCC has, 
although Oregon planning goal 1 (public participation) maintains fairly extensive civic-
political embedding throughout the region.   
Planning background to ecological governance: Portland before 1991 
Garden City principles reached the USA and were incorporated into the fledgling professions 
of landscape architecture and then regional planning. Environmental planning in Portland 
Metro is directly connected to early developments in both these disciplines. Although the full 
Garden City philosophy did not take root in the USA, many plans incorporated Garden City 
principles, for example, New York’s Central Park (Gillette Jr 2010). The Olmsted brothers 
                                                            
116 Other councils significant for this study formed in 1876 (Hillsboro City Council), 1893 (Beaverton) and 1905 
(Gresham). 
117 The centenary commemoration of PCC’s commission style government was held in 2013 on October 22, 5–7pm in 
the Portland City Hall Council Chambers. 
118 The embedding of the commission style government was slow because of the required cultural change. The 
annexation of East Portland areas (1983–1998) also caused some complications.  
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were commissioned (1900) by the newly formed Portland Parks Commission to develop 
such a plan for Portland, Oregon (Olmsted et al. 1903). The completed plan (1903), with its 
vision of an interconnected system of parks was never fully implemented however its formal 
recommendations were an underpinning factor for protecting iconic urban environmental 
assets throughout the twentieth century and working towards their planning in an 
incremental fashion (Houle 1996, Orloff 2004), e.g. Forest Park in NW Portland. The high 
temporal embedding connected with Olmsted, supported the increase of biophysical 
embedding overtime. Another significant influence on Portland’s ecological planning was the 
American Regional Planning Movement (institutional-context embedding). In particular 
Lewis Mumford, proposed a regional approach to metropolitan areas and called for cities to 
be viewed as organisms — capable of exceeding their natural limits — rather than as simple 
machines for economic production (Stephenson 1999). Mumford visited Portland (1938) and 
in his address to the Portland City Club he called for a regional open space plan. He 
proposed an alternative to PCC’s existing plan (1939) by recommending the greening of the 
inner city and the establishment of a regional planning authority.119 These proposals were 
controversial, but a number of key recommendations eventually did take place. Forest Park 
was established in 1948, inner city greening increased with time and as outlined above, the 
regional planning organisation Metro was established with responsibility to manage a UGB.  
However, moving forward 40 years, when the responsibility to manage the UGB became 
due after seven years of its implementation (1987), Metro decided there was no need. An 
economic recession had affected the Portland region for most of the 1980s, the housing 
market was depressed and urban growth was slow (institutional-context embedding). In 
contrast, some regional land use planners at Metro were concerned about patterns of 
development inside the UGB. Under the state planning goals, development could happen 
within the UGB as a right (low functional embedding). There was pressure building to expand 
the UGB more rapidly and the urban sprawl that the UGB was designed to avoid was 
contained but still occurring. In response, Metro was given state permission to adopt a UGB 
review program (1988)120 and the first step toward this was to provide guidelines for growth 
inside the UGB in order to maintain standards of liveability (1989).121 These guidelines 
became known as the Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives (RUGGOs). In Oregon 
                                                            
119 For detailed discussion of Mumford and his influence on Portland Metro refer to Stephenson (1999). 
120  Metro Resolution No. 88–1021, December 1988, established the UGB periodic review program. 
121 This UGB program required Metro to provide a 20 year land supply within the UGB. This led to a cascade of 
planning projects. The first step here involved designing more detailed standards for liveability that would be 
maintained as the population inside the UGB increased growth. This instrument - the RUGGOs (Regional Urban 
Growth Goals and Objectives) was adopted in 1991 provided a foundation for the 2040 Growth Concept in 1995. 
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participatory style, and as demanded by planning goal 1 (public participation), negotiation 
with local councils and public participation exercises were initiated. Two years later Metro 
adopted its RUGGOs (1991), which as noted by Metro (1991), for the first time recognised 
the importance of environmental values inside the UGB as a component of liveability. This 
change was a paradigm shift in the Oregon planning system which was originally established 
to constrain urban land uses inside the UGB and assumed that environmental values were 
associated with non-urban land uses (Houck 2011). Higher functional embedding via the 
RUGGOs generated a new path for higher biophysical embedding in urban areas. 
State-centric structures for ecological governance: Portland before 1991 
The beginning of ecological governance at the metropolitan level is associated with the 1971 
CRAG Open Space Plan (Houck 2011). The CRAG plan was the first to connect 
contemporary metropolitan planning with the 1903 Olmsted plan and Mumford’s regional 
plan. Temporal embedding of these early plans supported higher functional embedding of 
ecological governance within metropolitan planning. Following the replacement of CRAG 
with Metro a regional parks inventory was undertaken (1984) and then in 1989 the next step 
towards metropolitan ecological governance took place. Mike Houck from the Portland 
Audubon Society addressed the Portland City Club. He called for CRAG’s open space plan 
to be re-launched and for Olmsted’s plan to be realized. At about the same time a Metro 
study had established a need for metropolitan coordination of greenspace and natural areas 
and the regional government assumed this responsibility (Metro 1992). Within a few months, 
a project was launched to inventory natural areas towards the achievement of state goal 5 
(environment). Institutional-context embedding with goal-5 drove functional embedding into 
metropolitan planning. Mike Houck was contracted to support this work and Portland State 
University (PSU) undertook remote sensing (Stephenson 1999).122 
This metropolitan level work joined a long history of local level governance by local councils 
and special service districts – for example Tualatin Hills Parks and Recreation District 
(THPRD) had been established in 1955.123 Local ecological governance had also been 
adjusting to the 1973 planning system for a number of years. The Oregon government 
issued a rule (1981) that required local councils to apply state planning goal 5 (environment) 
                                                            
122 This initial mapping exercise of native vegetation made the urban greenspace issue visible in new ways and to a broad 
constituency.       
123 Local level governance implicitly involved with urban natural resources included the PCC parks commission 
(established 1900) and, a special service district, the Tualatin Hills Parks and Recreation District (established 1955). 
Special Service Districts are a unit of government in the USA with an elected board that provides a specific service such 
as water, sewerage or parks. They often span a number of small local councils.  
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to their planning. In response, throughout the 1980s local Portland Metro councils began to 
formalize their ecological governance. Institutional-context embedding with Goal 5 drove 
higher functional embedding into local governments to varying extents.124 The PCC Parks 
bureau increased its focus on natural area management and in 1988 the first urban wildlife 
refuge was declared at Oaks Bottom. This process was also characterized by high levels of 
involvement from community-based greenspace advocates — high civic-political embedding 
contributed to the functional embedding of wildlife refuges. PCC also established: a Bureau 
of Environmental Services (1983), environmental zoning (1989)125 and an Urban Forest 
Commission (1987).126 In the west of Portland Metro, THPRD expanded its activities in 
response to rapid urbanisation.127   
Society-centric structures for ecological governance: Portland before 1991 
Society-centric structures for ecological governance in Portland emerged from a long 
tradition of community participation and advocacy – for example the Portland Club and 
neighbourhood associations in the PCC area were established in 1913 and the late 1960s 
respectively (Abbott 1983). Other groups focused on community based legal action, and 
then in the mid-1980s an urban greenspace movement coalesced around the vision of an 
urban wildlife refuge network. This demonstrates the high temporal embedding of civic-
political aspects of Portland governance.  
The Portland Club and neighbourhood associations played an early and pivotal role. The 
Portland Club formed in 1913 with a view to encourage informed citizen debate and 
participation in public life. This group of prominent citizens was instrumental in establishing 
Forest Park (1948) and carrying out a number of independent studies on public policy 
issues. The Portland Club is still active and the tradition of independent community review 
has been taken up by other groups, for example Portland Audubon released an independent 
study of Portland Metro tree regulations in 2009 (Audubon Portland and PSU, 2009). More 
recently than the Portland Club, a new wave of participatory structures emerged in the 1960s 
around neighbourhood planning. After high levels of contention between council and 
                                                            
124 Formalised ecological governance at the local council level included: a parks and tree preservation levy in Gresham 
council, other local bonds in 1989/1990 and local tree laws. A number of councils carried out natural resource 
inventories. In particular, PCC carried out extensive inventories in the mid to late 1980s,environmental zones were 
introduced and then began developing through a cascade of  refinements. 
125 PCC environmental zones were developed during the mid–1980s, approved in 1989 and adopted in 1990. Although 
a law suit forced the Bureau of Planning to better quantify the e-zones through surveys carried out between 1990 and 
1994 (Ozawa and Yeakly 2004).  
126 The Urban Forest Commission was established in response to the spread of Dutch Elm disease in the USA. 
127 The highest growth was in Beaverton’s population with a 66.8% increase of approximately 21,500 people. - from a 
population of 31,962 to 53,310  (US Decennial Census),  
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resident groups over development issues, 95 neighbourhood association eventually formed 
across the PCC area. The civic-political dilemma was resolved when council support for and 
interaction with these groups was formalised – PCC’s Office of Neighborhood Involvement 
(ONI). Thus governance adjusted to adversarial aspects of neighbourhood-council relations 
by embedding those adversarial aspects within the more collaborative structure of ONI. In 
many other parts of the Portland Metro Area, while less formalised than in the PCC area, 
neighbourhood associations also play an important role in community governance (Abbott 
1983).128  
Society-centric governance in Portland is also organized around legal action. Embedding 
with the judiciary system (Institutional-context) supports civic-political embedding in 
ecological governance. At the state level an organisation named ‘1000 Friends of Oregon’ 
was established (1975) by the Oregon governor as a community watchdog for the state 
planning system (Walker and Hurley 2011). Environmental groups were also active at the 
state level, for instance legal action by Audubon resulted in protection for the Northern 
Spotted Owl under the US Endangered Species Act in 1990. As the detailed case study 
period begins (1991), the group North West Environmental Advocates was also preparing 
two law suits again Portland Metro local governments in the Tualatin Basin and Columbia 
Slough under the Clean Water Act 1972 (USA). 
Finally, and most significantly for this research, society-centric ecological governance 
involved the urban greenspace movement (‘the movement’). In the same year that the 
Portland UGB was established (1980), the Audubon Society of Portland established an 
urban naturalist program.129 By the mid–1980s ‘the movement’ coordinated by Audubon 
gathered momentum and called for an urban wildlife refuge system (higher biophysical 
embedding). They argued that liveable cities required nature near to where people live, not 
just outside the UGB. ‘The movement’ was characterised by a new combination of temporal, 
functional and collegial embedding. First, temporal embedding occurred by linking proposals 
with older and popular visions for greenway and trail systems — such as the 1903 Olmsted 
plan. Second, functional embedding occurred via informal and formal avenues. In an 
informal fashion, the number of resident groups in ‘the movement continued to expand and 
they organised under the banner of ‘Friends and Advocates of Urban Natural Areas’ 
                                                            
128 For a detailed history and analysis of Portland’s neighbourhood association movement see Abbott (1983). 
129 Mike Houck was employed for the position of urban naturalist at Portland Audubon. 
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(FAUNA).130 Many of these ‘friends’ groups were attached to neighborhood associations 
across Portland Metro and some were focused on water quality – such as Friends of Fanno 
Creek, established in 1989. Formally, ‘the movement’ also participated in Metro’s efforts to 
develop its RUGGOs. In parallel with formal processes, they kept urban ecological 
resources high on the RUGGOs policy agenda through other activities. The annual ‘City in 
the Country’ symposia (1989-1990) built community momentum and strengthened the 
networks involved. Audubon also received funding from a private trust to develop an urban 
wildlife refuge system. Third, embedding of more collegial aspects occurred because ‘the 
movement’ was seen by government decision makers as moderate in comparison with other 
environmental groups who were suing local councils over pollution issues. Government 
staffers were also involved in ‘the movement’ which become increasingly cross-sectoral in 
nature.   
Cross-sector structures for ecological governance: Portland before 1991 
There has been a diversity of cross-sector centric structures in Portland Metro over time. 
The following three examples provide a cross section of the different types with respect to 
interactions between state and non-state sectors. They are: 1) the ‘advocacy partnership’ 
formed by the urban greenspace movement discussed above; 2) an ‘implementation 
partnership’ through ‘Friends of Trees’; and 3) ‘alternating advocacy-collaboration’ for the 
protection of Oaks Bottom wetlands. The characteristics of these are outlined in the following 
discussion. 
The urban greenspace movement was a network including environmental groups, 
government staff and the strong neighbourhood association system. Within this society-
centric movement, cross-sectoral relationships formed to advocate for stronger ecological 
governance. The resulting ‘advocacy partnerships’ provided a stronger basis for functional 
embedding of ecological governance within metropolitan planning. Non-profits such as 
Audubon partnered with government departments such as Metro Greenspaces and the 
Portland Parks bureau. Through these cross-sectoral links ecological governance actors 
could more directly participate inside state structures and hence more directly advocate to 
actors governing established urban functions.  
In contrast with the policy-focused ‘advocacy partnerships’ in the greenspace movement are 
a set of implementation partnerships exemplified by ‘Friends of Trees’, This community 
                                                            
130 FAUNA published an Urban Natural Resources Directory in 1990, which listed groups who were involved and was 
updated periodically. It was coordinated by key staff from Audubon and other environmental organisations. 
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group was established in 1989 for citizens to plant street trees and increasingly worked with 
community organisations such as schools that do not have a primary focus on environment. 
These implementation partnerships demonstrate functional embedding amongst non-
government actors with a collegial aspect. During the case period ‘Friends of Trees’ 
expanded to become a key actor in the policy arena.131  
Differing from both advocacy and implementation partnerships, ‘Oaks Bottom wetlands’, 
provides a third example of cross-sector centric structures – alternating advocacy-
collaboration. The ultimately successful campaign for Oaks Bottom to become an urban 
wildlife refuge was initially proposed by Audubon and after many years PCC Parks also 
recognized the status of ‘wildlife refuge’. Non-profit advocates such as Audubon 
campaigned with a level of support from allied staff within the PCC Parks Bureau. 
Community advocates provided a combination of pressure and support to PCC bureaus 
throughout this time. This example illustrates the complexity of interactions involved in the 
embedded governance arena. The advocates (civic-political aspect) steered PCC-Parks 
(governmental aspect) towards declaring its first urban wildlife refuge (stronger biophysical 
and functional embedding) by toggling between advocacy (adversarial aspect) and 
partnership (collegial aspect) over a number of years (temporal aspect). 
The background to the Portland case is essentially an identification of cross-sectoral 
networks. There are few elements of governance in Portland Metro that do not involve a 
state-community connection of some sort, whether through formal citizen advisory boards, 
partnerships or social movements. The following section presents the background for the 
Brisbane case which contrasts with Portland in a range of important ways. 
4.3 Backgrounding the Brisbane Case 
The background to the Brisbane case study is described under five facets of the investigative 
framework (Section 3.3): biophysical context; institution context; functional structures, 
governmental structures and civil-political structures. The latter two facets in particular 
reflect state-centric and society-centric frames (see sections 2.1 governance frames and 3.2 
multiple frames of enquiry). Types of embedding amongst and interactions between facets 
from the investigative framework (3.3) are also cross-referenced throughout. Important to 
the Brisbane case was weak embedding of institutional-context and civil-political aspects. 
                                                            
131 It is interesting to note that the establishment of ‘Friends of Trees’ filled a gap that was left when PCC tree planting 
programs were defunded earlier in the 1980s recession. State delivery was replaced with community-based delivery. 
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This was characterised by adversarial state-society relations (adversarial aspect) for an 
extend period of time (temporal embeddedness).  
Biophysical background to ecological governance in Brisbane 
Brisbane, the capital city and the largest city in Queensland, is located in the extreme south 
east corner of the state. Northern Queensland has iconic biodiverse areas such as the 
tropical rainforests of Cape York and the Great Barrier Reef. Similarly, South East 
Queensland (SEQ), where Brisbane is located, is a highly biodiverse region (Australian 
Government, n.d.).132 However, Eddy (1996) notes that the political attention afforded North 
Queensland’s biodiversity often has overshadowed the plight of SEQ and Brisbane’s 
biodiversity (weak civic-political embedding). Brisbane is located on the flood plain and 
surrounding hills of the Brisbane River. The eastern edge of the urban area is delimited by 
Moreton Bay, a Ramsar listed site and on the west by the Brisbane Ranges. The river itself 
meanders through the urban area and many of the creek systems that feed into it are 
contained within the boundaries of the Brisbane City Council (BCC). Churchill (2007, pp4-
5) lists general types of Brisbane vegetation communities and example sites as: dry eucalypt 
woodlands and open forests at sites like Belmont Hills reserve and reserves within Bayside 
Parklands, Brisbane Forest Park and Karawatha Forest Park; subtropical rainforest at sites 
like Boombana; riparian communities such as flood gum forest at sites like Buhot Creek and 
Belmont Hills reserve; Melaleuca woodlands at sites like Boondall wetlands133. 
Institutional background to ecological governance: Brisbane before 1991 
Brisbane demonstrates strong interactions between adversarial, institutional context and 
governmental aspects of governance. Unique amongst Australian states — and rare 
amongst democracies in general — Queensland has just one house of parliament, the 
legislative assembly (Wanna and Caulfield 1995). The recent political history of Queensland 
was dominated by the Bjelke-Peterson National Party administration (1968–1987). Although 
population growth in SEQ generally and Brisbane in particular began to accelerate from 
1960 onwards, this conservative, ‘right of centre’ government had a rural rather than an 
urban focus (Hamnett 1984). “As a result…urban policies were fragmented, ad hoc and 
occurred more by accidents of federalism than by government intent” (Caulfield 1995, p144). 
Tension between the BCC and the Queensland State government was prominent during the 
Bjelke-Peterson administration, but this dynamic had an even longer history that contributed 
                                                            
132 http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/conservation/hotspots/national-biodiversity-hotspots#hotspot3 
133 A map of the BCC biodiversity, waterway and wetland overlays can be extracted from interactive mapping at 
http://cityplan2014maps.brisbane.qld.gov.au/CityPlan/ 
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to delaying the development of Brisbane’s urban planning. State governments often felt the 
need to constrain the BCC’s power. For example, successive attempts were made by BCC 
planners to establish a town plan in 1928, 1944 and 1952. These efforts were complicated 
by coalitions between urban private interests and the State Government, amongst other 
factors (Low Choy 2005, England 2007). This demonstrates strong adversarial embedding 
within governmental aspects and this situation contributed to weak functional embedding 
within Brisbane and its institutional context.  A first official town plan was adopted by Mayor 
Clem Jones in 1965 with the second plan (1987) spurred on by preparations for the World 
Expo (hosted in Brisbane 1988). 
Brisbane exhibits very strong vertical governmental aspects and weak civic-political 
embedding in formal structures. Brisbane was founded in 1823 and its administration is 
unique amongst Australian cities – and rare amongst metropolitan areas in general. The 
BCC was created from the merger of 20 municipal jurisdictions (1925). In effect this 
established a miniature urban state within the larger rural state of Queensland. Brisbane’s 
budget and population was larger than the Australian state of Tasmania. As the council 
struggled to govern such a large area and budget, a succession of mayors worked to 
increase their powers. In 1968, Mayor Clem Jones achieved a coup when powers were 
granted for the mayor to prepare and present council budgets independently, rather than 
through a committee of aldermen, who had been unsupportive in Jones’ case (Tucker 
1995).134 This proposal was inspired by strong-mayor models of local government that Clem 
Jones had observed while studying in the USA. On coming to power in 1985, Mayor Sally 
Ann Atkinson further concentrated power in the mayoral position. The City of Brisbane Act 
1924 (Qld) was amended so that council resolutions rather than city ordinances could be 
used to delegate to or withhold powers from bureaucrats. Fletcher (1990) details how this 
tool was used to further bolster mayoral powers by removing the title of ‘city administrator’ 
from the town clerk role and editing the town clerk position description so that full support of 
the mayor became an official requirement. In his 1995 analysis of Brisbane mayoral power, 
Tucker (1995, p57) refers to these changes and concludes by noting that,  
by 1991…the [Brisbane] mayor possessed formal general-policy formulating powers 
which some of the more dominant big city ‘strong mayors’ in the United States do not 
                                                            
134 See Tucker (1995) for further discussion about how Clem Jones used a combination of Labor party caucus and 
relationships with the liberal state government to achieve this change. 
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possess…Today the mayoral role in Brisbane is undoubtedly that of an elected chief 
executive officer with extensive formal and informal powers. 
Planning background to ecological governance: Brisbane before 1991 
Landscape designers in Australia had the opportunity to draw upon Garden City principles 
developed in Europe and the USA before industrialisation began to accelerate in the post 
war period.  
Australian cities and towns have been fortunate in being founded and developed at 
a time when the value of open space in planning terms has been recognised by 
administrators and the community. (Freestone 2010, p241) 
This recognition of open space values translated into an appreciation of English planning 
and Garden City principles. For example, the first planner employed to manage the newly 
formed BCC planning department was from England and had studied Garden City designs 
(Low Choy 2005). Accordingly early planning efforts in Brisbane: protected scenic value in 
iconic places such as Mount Gravatt; proposed a green-belt; and used Garden City 
terminology like ‘green wedges’. For example, the ‘Oxley Wedge’ described a flood prone 
area of the Oxley Creek where urbanisation was restricted (BCC 2013). Hence, stronger 
biophysical embedding was attempted through the Garden City movement — an informal 
and very marginal element of Brisbane’s institutional context. Accordingly, the first statutory 
town plan in 1965 did not include a long proposed green/agricultural-belt due to lobbying 
efforts from the private sector (Low Choy 2005, England 2007). In translation, the functional 
embeddedness of local economic interests and its adversarial aspects were much stronger 
than weak links that local actors established with the Garden City movement. However in 
1987 and 1990, a new planning scheme for Brisbane and a new Planning Act respectively 
put stronger focus on Brisbane’s planning and environment.135 The stage was set for rapid 
change in environmental planning over the following decade.  
State-centric structures for ecological governance: Brisbane before 1991 
Explicit ecological governance at the state level was slow to develop. The Bjelke-Peterson 
administration had a development focus and environmental management was clearly not a 
priority (Fitzgerald 1984, Kellow and Niemeyer 1999).136 During the 1970s this stance 
                                                            
135 The Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act 1990 (Qld), for the first time separated planning from the 
Local Government Act and gave explicit mention to the environment. 
136 Fitzgerald (1984) labels the Bjelke-Peterson government as anti-environmental. Fitzgerald (1984, p288) uses the 
agricultural sector to exemplify what he calls “development policy [with] a blatant disregard for the environment”.   
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directly influenced the growth of federal Australian government involvement in 
environmental affairs. For example, the Whitlam administration, in response to Queensland 
government plans to exploit the Great Barrier Reef for oil extraction, passed legislation in 
1973 to give the Commonwealth authority over coastal waters.137 Queensland government 
disregard for the environment also fostered the growth of environmental social movements 
at state and national levels (Hutton and Connors 1999). After 21 years in power, the Bjelke-
Peterson era ended in 1989. The Labour party administration that followed increased state 
level efforts to manage urban growth and environmental quality – the embeddedness of 
ecological governance in the institutional context began to increase rapidly. New legislation 
began to be adopted early in the case timeline 1991–2012 (e.g. the Nature Conservation 
Act 1992 (Qld) for biodiversity and the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) for air and 
water). 
In several areas related to environmental planning, the BCC was further advanced than the 
Queensland government when the Bjelke-Peterson era ended (1987). In 1982 BCC 
established a conservation and environment committee, mostly consisting of scientists 
(governmental and rational aspects). This group developed a Brisbane bushland strategy 
during the 1980s and supported a range of mapping projects (SLATS138) that revealed a 
high rate of vegetation clearing.139 Key managers involved at the time identified the decision 
to map native vegetation as BCC’s first important step towards ecological governance. A 
commitment to getting the science down on paper was an important theme throughout the 
mid to late 1980s (‘rational’ aspect). In 1988 BCC employed its first environment officer and 
over the following four years she established the BCC policy framework for nature 
conservation. The SLATS mapping data showed that 63% of bushland in Brisbane was 
privately owned. In response a bushland levy on rates was implemented (1989/1990) as the 
basis for a bushland acquisition program,140 although purchases did not begin until a new 
council administration took office (1992). By 1990, the city plan had some policies that 
                                                            
137 The Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (C’wlth) gave the Australian Federal Government authority over states 
concerning coastal waters and this was used to block Queensland plans to exploit the Great Barrier Reef for oil 
extraction. The following year the Australian government further extended its environmental authority by: passing the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1974 (C’wlth); signing the World Heritage Convention; and passing the Environment 
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (C’wlth.), which gave the Australian government power to undertake 
Environmental Impact Assessments on projects it was funding.  
138 The Queensland Statewide Landcover and Trees Study (commonly known as SLATS) 
139 Mapping projects showed that between 1982 and 1990, 17% (4470ha) of the remaining native vegetation in Brisbane 
had been cleared (BCC 1990, p9).  
140 The special environmental levy was set at $20 per household per year and due to the size of Brisbane’s housing stock 
this generated $4.7 million in 1990/91 (BCC Environmental Management Strategy 1990). 
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supported urban ecological resources in particular locations (BCC, 1990).141 In addition, a 
proposed Open Space/Natural Area Network highlighted the need to establish connectivity 
between native vegetation in Brisbane and the broader landscape.142 A number of 
environmental initiatives had also taken place.143 However, the BCC Environmental 
Management Strategy noted that “at least three quarters of existing bushland could be 
expected to be cleared if current policies and trends are maintained” (BCC 1990, p9).  
Society-centric structures for ecological governance: Brisbane before 1991 
In Brisbane, an environmental social movement emerged within the context of a Queensland 
government that was “unashamedly anti-environmental” (Fitzgerald 1984, p388). 
Accordingly the social movement often took a combative stance on environmental issues 
and ‘anti-state’ sentiment played a very prominent role in strategy development and actions, 
especially on state level issues (Hutton and Connors 1999). Although, the City of Brisbane 
was a different regime to that at the state level, many resident action groups and other 
environmental groups also campaigned on metropolitan issues (Caulfield and Davies 1995). 
Caulfield and Davies (1995) note that the structures and tactics of these groups were 
transferred from the Green Ban movement in Sydney.144 Nevertheless, the local government 
was progressive in comparison with the Queensland government and a different set of 
environmental groups tended to be active within the urban area. Amongst leaders of the 
environmental social movement itself, there was a split between groups with a focus on 
iconic state level issues such as the rainforests of Northern Queensland, and an ‘urban 
coalition’ of groups with a metropolitan focus (Caulfield and Davies, 1995, Doyle 1990, 
personal communication M. Petter, 2010). Until the end of the Bjelke–Peterson 
administration environmental groups in Queensland were usually informal. Research 
participants alleged that applications to incorporate an environmental group at this time 
tended to be refused without any reason being given. Therefore, the incoming Labor 
administration of 1989 marked a time of new opportunities for links between ecological 
governance, its institutional-context and functional structures. Environmental groups could 
                                                            
141 The 1987 Brisbane Plan: Policy 7.20-Limiting development on hillsides surrounding the Gap, and policy 11.01-
Promoting an open space corridor along Bulimba Creek). 
142 Major options for landscape scale connectivity were identified as north along the D’Aguilar range, east to Mount 
Cotton and South to Greenbank (BCC 1990, p64). Enoggera Creek, Bulimba Creek and Oxley Creek, the three focal 
catchments for this study are respectively located in these parts of the Brisbane area. 
143 Other environmental initiatives that BCC had undertaken included a Brisbane conservation atlas and a Bushland 
taskforce report. 
144 The ‘Green Bans’ are seen by Burgmann (2000) as the beginning of the environmental movement in Australia. Unions, 
resident and environmental groups protested developments in Sydney between 1971 and 1975 that were seen as 
environmentally destructive. 
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begin to register under a variety of legal structures and develop their organisations in ways 
that were previously constrained. Important regional planning also began at this time, such 
as the Regional Frameworks for Growth Management.  
Cross-sector structures for ecological governance: Brisbane before 1991 
It is difficult to identify many cross-sector centric structures from the Bjelke-Peterson era. 
The analysis again demonstrates very weak embedding with the formal institutional context 
and adversarial state-society relations. Important formalised networks supported community 
groups that were fortunate enough to have federal level funding – e.g. Queensland 
Community Council. Activists reported having secret meetings with bureaucrat allies to 
share information, because formal contact with environmental groups was not encouraged 
by the administration (Interview participant). Embryonic networks for revegetation began 
forming in Brisbane – e.g. Bushland Rehabilitation Unit at BCC. However, many of the state-
society networks were adversarial (adversarial aspect). Mayor Atkinson (1985-1991) was 
unpopular with many resident action groups for not implementing stricter controls on 
development (Caulfield and Davies 1995).  
4.4 Chapter Conclusion 
The background to the case areas shows important commonalities with respect to concern 
about native vegetation clearing, the use of emerging mapping technologies and important 
social movements, although the history, institutions and other aspects of embeddedness 
within each metropolitan area are strikingly different.    
Portland can be regarded as an environmentally progressive city, based on early Garden 
City planning and highly developed social movements. The Olmsted brothers’ 1903 vision 
of an interconnected system of parks inspired the acquisition of key urban environmental 
assets145 throughout the twentieth century. An urban green space movement emerged out 
of a long tradition of community based advocacy in the mid-1980s and intersected with a 
range of ‘state engagement’ strategies such as participatory neighbourhood planning and 
state level planning strategies (Abbott 1983, Walker and Hurley 2011). Governance 
demonstrated strong temporal, institutional-context and civic-political embedding. 
Functional and biophysical embedding increased in the decade leading up to the 1991-2012 
study period. 
                                                            
145 For example: Forest Park in North West Portland and Mount Tabor in Portland’s East. 
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Historically, Brisbane is regarded as a less environmentally progressive city than Portland. 
Efforts to establish a greenbelt in early city planning were strongly resisted (Low Choy 2005). 
Urban populations tended to perceive environmental issues as a rural problem. At the state 
level social movements clashed with a conservative Queensland government and some of 
this contention translated into the metropolitan level. Ecological governance was rarely 
formalised and weakly embedded in the formal institutional-context. Opportunities for 
functional, and governmental embedding increased immediately prior to the 1991-2012 
study period.    
The main implications for responsive governance from this chapter will be highlighted in later 
material where the importance of historical background for responding to change is 
repeatedly demonstrated. However, this chapter in itself demonstrated the usefulness of the 
investigative framework in characterising the nature of embeddedness in each city. 
Furthermore, embedded characteristics were found to interact with each other, further 
increasing the complexity of responsive governance. A range of contemporary 
characteristics in each city have a long history of local development. The design of 
ecological governance arrangements and efforts to respond to change need to account for 
these temporally embedded characteristics – i.e. social, political and economic contexts); 
this is particularly likely in situations where instruments or strategy are transferred from 
another setting.  
By the beginning of the case study timeline (1991–2012) arrangements to plan and manage 
biodiversity were in development. The ecological governance of Brisbane and Portland 
rapidly diverged as it became more formally expressed through their specific institutions and 
cultures. Even where similar policy instruments (such as acquisition programs) were called 
for, a different underpinning rationale tended to be used in each city. For example, in 
Brisbane, the response to rapid clearing was a call to develop ‘a city in the bush’, while in 
Portland where sprawl management had been in place for a decade, there was a call to find 
a place for nature inside the urban growth boundary. The following chapter shifts the focus 
of analysis to examine the relationship between environmental governance and its 
institutional context (Research question 1) through an examination of the Oxley Creek 
watershed in Brisbane.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Watershed Management in an Urban Setting:  
Process, scale and administration 
 
This chapter was published in the journal Land Use Policy using the title above. The 
published text commences under the subheading below, but first an outline of the 
contribution towards the thesis research questions from the paper is presented, along with 
further methodological details. 
This chapter makes an important contribution to the overall thesis. In terms of the main 
research questions the analysis in this chapter has a primary focus on question one, “How 
do actors within a ‘non-core’ urban policy arena interact with the broader institutional context 
over time?” There is an ancillary focus on question two, “How and in what respects does 
governance of this urban policy arena across the metropolitan area adjust to change over 
time?”  With respect to the overall research framework (Figure 3.1), this stage used one of 
the three embedded sub-units (watersheds) from the Brisbane case to pilot an investigation 
of urban ecological governance. The findings confirmed important research themes and 
assisted in refining the investigative framework (Figure 3.2). In particular the contextual 
aspects of responsive governance were shown to need an explicit stage of analysis 
(Chapters 6 and 7) in order to better understand governance as a context embedded 
phenomenon. The embeddedness patterns identified for Brisbane in Chapter 4 provide a 
starting point for the analysis in this chapter. However institutional-context and functional 
embedding increase rapidly from pre-1991 levels. As the ecological governance arena 
expands, the diversity of actors also expands and more collegial state society relations 
emerge. However much of the heritage identified in Chapter 4 persists, for example: civic-
political embeddedness remains weak and actually declines from 1991 levels; functional 
embeddedness increases but ecological governance then slips down the policy agenda for 
the city council; adversarial state-society relations re-emerge for ecological governance and 
BCC also re-emerges as the dominant actor, albeit within a more networked extra-
metropolitan region. With respect to the three categories (contextual, structural and 
interactional) within the investigative framework, this chapter has a general focus, but a 
stronger concern with contextual and structural elements.  
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The Oxley watershed case also targets: 1) important institutional change within the broader 
1991–2012 timeline in Brisbane; and 2) important commonalities between the contrasting 
cases of Brisbane and Portland. Important institutional change included: the emergence of 
statutory regional planning (at an extra-metropolitan level146); the implementation of an 
urban growth boundary (2004); and formalisation of significant state/non-state governance 
networks, all of which were enduring characteristics of the Portland case. Important 
commonalities were the formal Integrated Catchment Management (ICM) model and a 
critical defunding event. Oxley Creek Catchment was the only exploration of formal ICM in 
Brisbane (which eventually transitioned to a community-based approach in line with other 
Brisbane watersheds), whereas in Portland, formal ICM is the standard model. The critical 
defunding event was a shift in federal NRM funding in 2002147 which was partly offset by 
increased metropolitan resourcing (see 5.2, phase 3). A parallel process occurred in 
Portland with the defunding of the federal Metropolitan Greenspaces program (2004). Hence 
Oxley Creek is a critical case for Brisbane and for comparison of responsive change with 
Portland.   
The analysis was based on data collected from semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation and desktop review of policy documents. It is important to note that the 
approach to governance in this chapter is concerned with cross-sector frames (see 2.1.2) 
rather than the broader multiple frame approach sitting behind later analytical chapters 
(Chapters 6 to 9). The broader approach was further developed following this analysis. 
Interview participants were selected through a purposeful stratification process of 
governance actors involved with ecological governance in the Oxley watershed according 
to scale (e.g. local, metropolitan) and interest (e.g. environment, government). Semi-
structured interviews examined actor perceptions of the creek corridor and changes in its 
governance. Participant observation occurred at revegetation and catchment group 
meetings. Desktop review of policy documents focused on the Oxley Creek Catchment 
Association (OCCA), Brisbane City Council and Queensland State government but also 
included other prominent watershed actors such as SEQ Catchments.  
The following published text highlights the role of context embeddedness which is then 
examined as the focus of Chapters 6 and 7. In particular the chapter demonstrates the 
                                                            
146 Brisbane is located within the extra-metropolitan region of  South East Queensland 
147 For example, the cessation of the National Heritage Trust 1 funding (NHT1) and transition to NHT2 implementation. 
NHT2 focused on delivery through regional NRM groups rather than at the catchment level, i.e. Oxley Creek level. 
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impact of the broader institutional setting on the application of integrated environmental 
management and the responses of ecological governance to change.    
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Schmidt, P. & Morrison, T.H. 2012, “Watershed management in an urban setting: 
process, scale and administration”, Land Use Policy, 29, 45–52. 
Ecologies inside of urban footprints are increasingly pressured by the search for more 
compact and consolidated cities (Gleeson et al. 2004, Gillen 2006). Over the last decade 
tension has increased between efforts to reduce urban sprawl on one hand and the provision 
of urban ecosystem services on the other. Sprawl reduction requires higher population 
density but the provision of ecosystem services to that population requires functional 
ecosystems such as riparian corridors (Naiman et al. 1993). Urban ecologies can also 
support significant biodiversity and influence a city’s impact on the non-urban hinterland 
(Forman 2008). This is especially the case in South East Queensland (SEQ), Australia, 
which is experiencing pressures from unprecedented population growth and urbanisation 
(Minnery et al. 1998, Peterson et al. 2007). 
Over the last two decades significant resources have been invested to plan and manage 
these ecological systems, and new governance arrangements have been designed to tackle 
complex pressures from multiple actors and interests. This paper examines the changes in 
the governance of the urban Oxley Creek corridor in Brisbane between 1996 and 2008. The 
application of the watershed management model to this setting during this time provides a 
“critical case” that can shed much light on questions of process, scale and administration in 
urban planning and environmental management (Flyvbjerg 2006). The analysis was based 
on data collected using semi-structured interviews, participation observation, and desktop 
review of policy documents. We explore both the structures in place and the effects of new 
policy initiatives on the management of the urban riparian corridor.  
The paper proceeds by outlining the theory and practice of integrated environmental 
management before presenting a brief overview of the case study area. The case study 
analysis then shows how environmental governance of the urban corridor has changed over 
time according to three key phases. The article then reviews the trends across these three 
periods and discusses the future implications for the corridor. We conclude by exploring the 
wider implications for urban local governments in the management of urban catchments. 
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5.1 Integrated environmental management in theory and 
practice: participatory processes, regionalism and 
governance 
For much of the 20th century, management of urban lands was primarily designed to facilitate 
exploitation of natural resources. For the last four decades, however, state and community 
responses to environmental problems have rapidly increased. By the 1960s, pollution and 
degradation (of urban waterways in particular) had increased to levels that prompted 
responses from government. 
Action was also increasingly demanded by the general community and newly formed 
environmental non-government organisations. By the 1970s new national environmental 
agencies had formed to negotiate clashes between the newer environmental and older 
‘developmentalist’ discourses which were especially dominant in resource centred 
economies. By the 1980s, political priority for environmental protection was exemplified by 
new provincial-level legislation and programs and a surge in community level environmental 
non-government organisations (Clarke and McCool 1996, Kellow et al. 1999, Wanna and 
Weller 2003). Yet most of these responses and approaches were reactive and ad hoc. 
It was not until the 1990s that a discourse on integrated environmental management – and 
specifically watershed management – saw a conceptual convergence amongst scholars and 
practitioners of environmental policy, natural resource management, land use planning, and 
community development. Also referred to as Integrated Catchment Management (ICM) (e.g. 
in Australia), watershed management is a model of environmental management that is 
centrally concerned with the integration of land and water management on the basis of river 
catchments (Leach 2006, OCCA 1999). The model seeks to achieve integration through 
coordination of “community involvement, technical knowledge, organisational structure and 
policy objectives” (Bellamy et al. 1999). Integrated watershed management was an 
important and popular development in environmental policy at that time in that it drew upon 
and spoke to three critical sub-discourses: public participation, regionalism and governance, 
as will now be outlined. 
First, the watershed management model was regarded as an important environmental 
management model in that it was one of the first to seek to systematically involve a variety 
of citizens within catchments. While the discourse that describes the need to involve citizens 
in the formulation of public policy is by now well over a generation old – indeed, the 
participation of citizens in policy processes has been advocated as far back as the 1960s 
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when public policy was largely understood as a top-down and technical activity (Faludi 1973) 
– citizen participation did not come to be systematized in environmental management until 
the 1990s, when it came to be seen as both a means of informing public policy as well as a 
way of legitimising and validating environmental policy decisions (Amy 1987). 
Second, the watershed management model was distinguished by its attention to scale – 
originally the catchment, and then the bioregion – at which actors participate, and science 
is integrated. The model originally focused on small catchments, but as this model 
developed, ecologists began to emphasise the importance of managing wider regional 
ecosystems – often groups of catchments – according to ecological differences in 
landscapes, and to understandings of landscapes as ‘systems’ (Slocombe 1993, Haeuber 
1996). 
Finally, the watershed management model was also notable for its emphasis on the need to 
integrate administration of environmental management. The model recognises that 
watershed management involves linkages between different government, private and 
community sector actors, each with particular interests, responsibilities and challenges 
(Clarke and McCool 1996). Successful environmental management is therefore also 
dependent on the resolution of the institutional complexity that has arisen as a result of the 
reactive and piecemeal response of governments to environmental problems over time 
(Morrison 2006). 
The model of integrated environmental management, and the sub-discourses that inform it, 
provide both conceptual tools for understanding environmental problems, as well as 
representing specific strategies actors have deployed to manage environments. However a 
number of issues have emerged as a result of the practice of watershed management, and 
also in response to wider political, administrative and scientific developments. First, 
numerous scholars have shown that participatory processes have contributed to the 
situation in which environmental policies are no longer created by one formal organisation-
in-charge, but rather several formal organisations and individual actors strategically using 
institutional arrangements as both constraints and assets for present and future action 
(Imperial 2005, Renn 2006, Agger and Löfgren 2008). According to Rhodes (1996), these 
arrangements are based on trust and cooperation and “are an alternative to, not a hybrid of, 
markets [efficiency through price competition] and hierarchies [planning and regulation 
through administrative orders] and they span the boundaries of the public, private and 
voluntary sectors” (Rhodes 1997, p52). This phenomenon of ‘network governance’ 
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contradicts traditional models that assume policy is contained within a spatial unit (such as 
a catchment) or a level of government (Reeve et al. 2007, Morrison 2007) and also reflects 
that “ecological change occurs in a patchy, cross-scale manner... [and that] there is no single 
right scale for management” (Pritchard and Sanderson 2002, p150). Furthermore, while 
governments have sought to devolve environmental responsibility to local and regional 
levels, through indirect policy mechanisms such as economic instruments promoting 
regional organisation and civic action, they have still retained ultimate control (Gunningham 
and Grabosky 1998, Wallington et al. 2008). The underlying problem of the model with 
delegation of local power and authority (e.g. to local governments and communities) has yet 
to be resolved (Kenney 2000, Lane and Morrison 2006, Morrison et al. 2010). These 
unresolved issues generate important questions of process, scale and administration for the 
watershed management model, as will now be explored through the case study analysis. 
5.2 Case study: management of Oxley Creek, Brisbane 
(1996–2008) 
Oxley Creek is a tributary of the Brisbane River in the south-east region of the State of 
Queensland, Australia. The Brisbane River runs through Brisbane City, which is Australia’s 
third largest city, and fastest growing – with a projected growth from 1 to 1.25 million 
residents and from 400 to 550 thousand dwellings between 2006 and 2031 (Queensland 
Government 2009). The corridor supports social, economic and ecosystem services of city-
wide importance (Fig. 1).  
The Oxley Creek catchment is a strategic case study because it was one of the first sites 
selected by the Queensland State Government for an urban watershed management pilot 
in the mid–1990s.148 This uncommon application of watershed management to an urban 
setting was an important policy experiment for both environmental managers and urban 
planners. Furthermore, it was the first time governments had sought to manage the 
environmental processes of the catchment in an integrated and systematic manner. The 
following analysis charts the period from 1996 to 2008 and reveals that management of the 
catchment has developed over time through three distinct phases (Fig. 2). These phases 
will now be explored. 
                                                            
148 This pilot was endorsed by non-government organisations and the provincial government’s Environmental Protection 
Agency in 1995 under the state-wide watershed management strategy. 
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Phase 1: participation in watershed management planning 
In 1991, the Queensland State Government launched a state-wide watershed management 
strategy to integrate land and water management on the basis of river catchments149 (OCCA 
1999). While there was a much stronger uptake of watershed management in rural areas (in 
Australia and internationally), this initiative also laid the foundations for management of the 
rapidly urbanising Oxley Creek. The Oxley catchment watershed management pilot project 
began in 1996 amongst numerous state-funded scientific studies (Kinhill 1996). 
 
Fig. 5.1 Location of the Oxley Creek Catchment, South East Queensland, Australia 
 
 
Fig. 5.2 Phases in governance of the urban Oxley Creek corridor 1996–2008 
                                                            
149 Other governments – e.g. national and provincial governments in Australia, Canada and the USA –also initiated similar 
programs – with slightly different names – at this time. 
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As discussed in the previous section, participation in public policy had been on the upswing 
since the late 1960s, and the emerging watershed management model was one of the first 
environmental management models to incorporate this trend. The Oxley Creek pilot 
supported stakeholder involvement to found a catchment association, and prepare and 
launch a Catchment Management Plan. A high level of participation was enabled through 
the watershed management framework and was augmented by the transfer of most 
previously existing activities (e.g. local volunteer bushcare groups) to the new catchment 
association. The initial energy within the Oxley Creek Catchment Association was also 
bolstered by the broader environmental movement, mainstream political support, and 
improved scientific understanding of ecosystem processes, all of which gave the 
organisation strong institutional recognition. The formal watershed management approach 
included committed industry, state and local government involvement throughout the 
development of the Catchment Management Plan. A stakeholder working group structure 
facilitated specialised involvement in particular aspects of catchment management (see Fig. 
3). 
Later, a special Oxley Creek Taskforce (henceforth named ‘the Taskforce’) was given the 
brief for responding to development pressures and needs in the Oxley catchment and sought 
funds from developers for urgent remediation in the corridor.150 The Taskforce established 
a number of working groups to focus on particular issues and channel information to the City 
Council in an advisory capacity. A range of stakeholders participated in special working 
groups including representatives from the catchment association and other non-government 
organisations, industry and local government. The style of participation had a professional 
focus and meant that participants could have strong input into one aspect of planning. 
                                                            
150 This Taskforce was controversially chaired by a local property developer, of both wealth and influence. 
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Fig. 5.3 Original voluntary watershed management model for the Oxley catchment (OCCA 
1999, p15) (BRMG, Brisbane River Management Group and BRMBWMS, Brisbane River and 
Moreton Bay Waste Water Management Strategy) 
 
Therefore, just like experience elsewhere (e.g. Kraft and Johnson BN 1999), trends involving 
participation in the catchment association were not static during this period. The launch of 
the Catchment Management Plan in 1999 signalled a shift from catchment planning to 
ongoing catchment management and accordingly some stakeholders drew back from active 
involvement. Alongside this, government involvement changed with policy and funding 
arrangements, industry priorities shifted as projects in the catchment were completed, and 
the original working group structure began to breakdown. For the catchment association, 
the creation of the Taskforce effectively reframed their involvement from ‘multi-aspect’ 
catchment managers to representatives of a community organisation interested in 
waterways. The Taskforce focused on practical proposals aimed to unite the diverse 
participants, however many stakeholders became sceptical about the level of industry 
influence within this group. Thus, while the inclusion of public stakeholders had an important 
democratising effect on the wider catchment management group, the strong conceptual 
convergence of actors on the Taskforce also indicated the institutional capture of civil 
society, which affected their ability to express a critical voice. Later, and in line with wider 
trends in Australia and elsewhere, the group began to experience problems with the 
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sustainability and representativeness of its volunteer base (Lockie 2001; Byron and Curtis 
2002; Ruzza 2006). 
Phase 2: regionalisation of natural resource and population 
growth management 
Following the management plan launch, the catchment association also began to be 
influenced by issues beyond the catchment level and the interests of individual stakeholders. 
By 2000 newer networks and approaches at other scales began to emerge in the corridor 
including regional planning for both natural resource management (NRM) and population 
growth management. The entire context for the catchment association and corridor 
management had begun to shift. 
Thus, as watershed management was established a wave of important regional planning 
emerged from higher (national and provincial) governments, and also in response to land 
use degradation and development pressures in urban areas. They consisted of a 
controversial shift to regional land use planning through a new state planning Act151 and 
non-statutory regional growth management plans.152 In addition, federally funded programs 
for water quality and NRM respectively were also established through agreements between 
State and National governments.153 Significantly these programs also established regions 
and regional bodies as vehicles for the programs. 
Thus a range of events during this time firmly established regional frameworks as the new 
institutional reality for actors and networks across all scales. The number of regional 
approaches continued to expand from NRM and growth management planning to include 
regional water quality and ecosystem assessments. This triggered the catchment 
association into a period of review to identify how well the catchment planning goals fitted 
with the newer regional frameworks that had emerged over the top of them.  
This regionalisation also stimulated a shift in stakeholder relations, from a loosely integrated 
horizontal arrangement (an inter-organisational network according to the Rhodes (1997) 
typology) pre 2000 to a more tightly integrated vertical arrangement (a policy community in 
Rhodes’ eyes) post 2000 (Fig. 2). 
                                                            
151 Queensland Integrated Planning Act 1997 
152 Regional Frameworks for Growth Management. 
153 The Natural Heritage Trust program (Stage 2) and the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality. 
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Phase 3: re-emergence of local government in a networked and 
multi-level governance context 
By 2005 a variety of actors were now participating in the governance of the corridor at 
various levels of scale and with differing organisational focus and differing levels of 
intervention. Provincial level actors included planning and environment departments. 
National government involvement included agriculture and environment departments. 
Significant metropolitan and regional organisations included the Brisbane City Council (the 
City Council), the regional Natural Resource Management NRM body (‘SEQ Catchments’) 
and the Healthy Waterways Partnership, a state facilitated regional waterway initiative. 
Catchment level organisations included the Oxley Creek Catchment Association (the 
catchment association) and the Oxley Creek Taskforce. Private sector and not-for-profit 
groups included developers and corporations, and environmental and socially-centric NGOs 
(Table 5.1). 
Critically there was a delay in the roll out of the new regional NRM funding in some areas. 
At the catchment level this de-funded positions and reduced the organisation to a skeleton 
crew of volunteers. In response, the City Council stepped into the gap and began funding 
coordinator positions for catchment groups across the city. When the new funding came 
through in the following year and a regional body was established to support catchment 
groups, the catchment association had begun to more strongly identify and be identified with 
the City Council than with the regional framework. 
The strategic development taken by the catchment association at this time is best 
understood as a policy community response to new regional arrangements. The response 
was to attempt to maintain access to decision making at higher spatial scales and 
reconstruct ideas of participation within this reality. The now City Council funded coordinator 
focused on capacity building and revitalisation of the catchment association’s networks. The 
original stakeholder working group structure was reinvigorated as ‘interest groups’ 
composed of individuals from the community and structured around themes of ‘water’, 
‘biodiversity’, ‘community’ and ‘land’. There was also a reconnection with industry and 
community sector groups who had dropped away in the years following the catchment 
management plan. The new ‘interest’ groups consisted of individuals rather than 
organisations from a range of sectors. Although the catchment association retained a 
watershed management model on paper, in reality it had lost the cross-sectoral involvement, 
adapted to the new institutional reality and morphed into a local government funded peak 
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community body. This signified a growing voice in the urban electorate to support open 
space and private conservation, and re-energised the environmental sampling and reporting 
programs. While this is evidence of the difficulties in policy implementation (Sabatier 1986) 
and sheer instability of networks as posited by Wagenaar and Hajer (2003) the most 
important aspect of this reality at the catchment level was the stronger role taken by the City 
Council, and the fact that the model overall failed to have any lasting impact on the water 
quality rating. The next section highlights why these developments are important and also 
suggests some ideas for future reform. 
Table 5.1 Significant government and non-government actors in governance of the Oxley 
Creek corridor 1996–2008 by scalar-level 
Scale  Government Non-government 
National Departments for: 
   Environment, Water, Heritage and Arts 
   Fisheries and Forestry 
   Agriculture 
Cooperative Research Centre for 
Catchment Hydrology 
State Departments for: 
   Infrastructure and Planning, 
   Natural Resources and Water, 
   Primary Industry and Fisheries, 
Also: 
  Environmental Protection Agency 
Brisbane-based Universities 
Greening Australia Qld 
Regional SEQ Regional Association of Councils 
Healthy Waterways Partnership 
SEQ Catchments* 
Municipal Brisbane City Council and divisions for: 
   City Planning 
   Water Resources 
   Natural Resources and Sustainability 
Also: 
   Brisbane River Management Group* 
   Brisbane Catchments Network* 
Brisbane Regional Environment Coalition 
Industry partners of the City Council 
Land developers 
Catchment Oxley Creek Taskforce* Oxley Creek Catchment Association 
Readymix and other local industry 
Local Neighbourhood Planning Teams* 
Council bushcare groups* 
Council wards 
Oxley Creek Environment Group 
Community action groups 
Resident associations 
Community Development Associations 
* Involves government and non-government participants. 
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5.3 Analysis: process, scale and administration 
Watershed management is an environmental management model that has experienced high 
levels of adoption in rural areas. There has been less experience with the application of the 
model to highly urbanised environments. The Oxley Creek case illustrates some of the key 
factors which influence environmental management in urban areas, and affect its 
applicability to these areas. The ways in which these factors can be reflected in future 
applications of the model are now discussed: 
Integrated environmental management and the importance of 
local government in urban regions 
Significant trends over the last two decades in environmental management and planning 
include public participation, the shift to regional scale approaches, and the emergence of 
multi-level governance networks. In the Oxley Creek catchment corridor governance shifted 
dramatically over this time from informal networks in the late 1990s to a watershed 
management model and then to the tight multi-level policy community (Fig. 5.2–Phase 2) 
under new regional scale approaches after 2003. Central to the watershed management 
model as it is still understood today is the view that successful environmental management 
is the product of the participation of intraregional actors. Regions have come to be seen as 
the key scale of civic interaction – small enough in size and complexity to allow citizens 
informally and endogenously to make decisions about their own problems, and yet large 
enough to mobilise the significant voluntary capacity required to manage these problems 
(Ostrom 1990, Healey 1997). 
However opportunities for public participation in watershed management have been 
transformed under the effects of regionalisation of land use planning and NRM. Within the 
Oxley catchment many stakeholders have found it difficult to identify with the spatial scale 
of catchment, let alone the idea of a region. Hooper (2002) also highlights that large 
populations in urban areas are a challenge for the traditional stakeholder consultation 
approaches characteristic of NRM planning. Urban stakeholders have been found to have 
the lowest acceptance of and respect for regional NRM bodies’ authority, and poor views of 
regional bodies’ engagement with stakeholders (Davidson et al. 2008). This has been 
attributed to land use pressures, the busy lifestyle of urban dwellers which may preclude 
volunteering, the physical removal of urban people from the environment, and a differing 
sense of community than found in rural areas (Western and Pilgrim 2001, Keogh et al. 2006). 
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Participation for the purposes of both efficiency and legitimacy of decision making therefore 
becomes complicated by the difficulty for an appropriate diversity of local stakeholders to 
access decision-making processes at the regional level and a struggle to identify with the 
regional scale and its concerns. In this case local government has played an active role in 
fulfilling this need and has re-emerged as a central actor within this networked multilevel 
policy environment. The position of local government as a central actor is crucial in three 
ways: managing cross-scale connections, enabling regionally recognised action and 
facilitating specialized local participation. 
The limits of local government within current institutional 
settings 
Yet there are limits to the role that local governments can play in urban environmental 
management. While there is growing recognition that local governments in recent times have 
embraced environmental assessment and expanded their environmental programs to 
include flood, erosion and wetland management and participation in watershed 
management, their environmental role is still underdeveloped relative to their federal and 
state counterparts (Crowley 1998, Margerum 1999, Tarlock 2002, Morrison et al. 2010). 
This is because these units have often not been assigned a formal role in the implementation 
of major environmental policy such as pollution policy and biodiversity conservation policy. 
For example, while the new regional frameworks in Queensland expanded the expectations 
of and responsibilities for environmental management and growth management at the local 
level, there was no commensurate expansion of local government powers, nor funding 
opportunities. Where local government is often centrally involved (e.g. in regional growth 
management planning), the process has also often been ineffective because “local 
governments have neither the coverage nor the scale needed to carry this responsibility, or 
to support the evidence based, comprehensive planning it necessitates” (Gleeson et al. 
2010:5). Furthermore, a number of recent studies of state and federal regional NRM policy 
in Australia, for example, show that local government has been systematically marginalised 
from successive generations of regional NRM programs (Australian Government 1997, 
2008, 2010a; Morrison et al. 2010). 
Additionally, local governments are usually not willing to use their existing land use authority 
to correct this gap (Tarlock 2002). While urban local governments arguably have stronger 
planning powers than rural local governments (Keogh et al. 2006), it can be difficult to get 
NRM on the urban agenda due to a number of factors. Not only is there often a lack of 
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interest by the urban constituency, urban and rapidly urbanising local governments are often 
dealing with rapid population expansion, and high levels of development intensity. Local 
governments also have a challenge meeting the demands of peri-urban areas, especially 
as local governments often suffer from a lack of information about small-scale landholdings 
in this area. Land parcels in this area are shrinking and values are rising, meaning an 
increase in potential revenue for councils, but also increasing costs of service provision. The 
varying objectives and experience in land management of the landholders in this zone also 
create challenges for national NRM programs (Emtage et al. 2007). Crucially, local 
governments are working within the constraints of a market-based property development 
system on which their income depends (Crowley 1998). 
The challenge within this arrangement rests on the capacity of local governments to 
administer catchment management and conservation in the virtual absence of economic 
and political incentives to do so. Scholars such as Colburn (2005), warn that federal reforms 
with decentralised implementation are not the answer, concerned about both, the “factional, 
opaque, and self-dealing” reputation of local governments, as well as the “incredible power 
of, and ambivalence toward conservation by, our land development markets”. There is also 
a great variation across local governments, who are the products of decisions made at 
higher levels. In the case of Brisbane, the local government is unusually large, powerful and 
stable. For the SEQ region, the combination of changes to regional NRM and the shift to 
integrated growth management planning has resulted in a concentration of power at the 
local government level where local government is strong. This suggests that in the context 
of regional frameworks and strong local government the response to this power dynamic will 
result in stronger integration of urban catchment networks under local government auspices. 
Through strong local governments there is a significant opportunity for integration of land 
use planning and environmental management at the local level. 
5.4 Chapter conclusion 
By charting institutional and policy changes in a region undergoing rapid population growth 
this paper contributes to understandings of the linkages between environmental 
governance, participation and scale in urban and rapidly urbanizing settings. These 
understandings generate important implications for urban environmental systems and policy 
networks. The case analysis in this paper shows that the broader institutional setting clearly 
affects the application of the integrated environmental management model. This 
demonstrates the importance of the governance context to local environmental 
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management. In the case of Brisbane, despite the best efforts of the council and the urban 
electorate to support open space and private conservation, and some re-energised 
environmental sampling and reporting programs underway – the model overall has failed to 
have any lasting impact on the water quality rating. This shows that the application of 
integrated environmental management is so highly dependent on local context (such as the 
existence of a strong local government and civil society) that there is limited transferability 
of lessons — as Putnam (1993, p183) notes, successful regions have, “deep historical roots. 
This is a depressing observation for those who view institutional reform as a strategy for 
political change” (also see Robins 2007).  
The re-emergence of local government as a key actor in integrated environmental 
management in urban areas is not only important in that local governments are usually the 
major land management stakeholder and decision-maker (Nobbs et al. 1995), but that it also 
signifies a return to the centrality of state actors in an increasingly networked and multilevel 
governance context (Bell et al. 2009). Yet, the IEM model may not be the most appropriate 
model for managing urban environments — urban local governments have traditionally been 
more concerned with population and development pressures, and have had difficulties in 
getting NRM issues on the agenda.  
Finally, some scholars are now arguing that there are so few natural waterways and patches 
of bushland left in urban areas, and what is left is so modified, that urban NRM should focus 
on restoring ecosystem functions rather than on IEM as it is usually understood (Bryant 
2006). Biodiversity protection is identified as one of the major issues in urban areas and 
local governments can play the most significant role in monitoring further development 
(Hooper 2002). Further research needs to be done on what other strategies and instruments 
are available to local governments to manage urban environments. These need to be 
designed in a way which exploits local government’s “deep connection to private property 
entrepreneurialism” so that local governments can leverage land use policies away from “all 
development is good” to a more complex understanding of the relationship between land 
stewardship and property values in urban environments (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998, 
Colburn 2005). 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Anatomy of a Governance Arena: Embeddedness part 1 
 
This chapter delineates the urban ecological governance arena in Brisbane and Portland, 
and examines their significant internal dynamics. These dynamics are viewed through the 
lenses of ‘political arenas’ (Lowi 1972), policy instruments (Hood 1983, Howlett 2000) and 
policy roles (Bridgman and Davis 2003). Embeddedness is therefore examined with respect 
to the political processes various urban interests in which the instrument mix is embedded. 
The analysis finds patterns of inter-linkage between policy roles and actor networks are that 
are significant for determining adjustments to change within the governance arena. The 
findings demonstrate that many differences between Brisbane and Portland can be 
explained by their differing institutional contexts. However, strong patterns of commonality 
were also identified, which is significant for ‘most different’ comparisons. Commonalities in 
most difference comparisons imply that a phenomenon – in this case urban ecological 
governance — is not purely generated by its context and they provide a glimpse into the 
underlying phenomenon (Campbell 2010). The results imply that there are aspects of the 
ecological governance arena that could be used for institutional design. The chapter 
engages with the main research questions by examining the relationship between different 
structures of governance and political dynamics within the arena, in particular the chapter 
engages with research question 2) “How and in what respects does governance of this urban 
policy arena across the metropolitan area adjust to change over time?” with an ancillary 
focus on 1) “How do actors in a ‘non-core’ urban policy arena interact with the broader 
institutional context over time?” The analysis mostly relates to the structural aspects of the 
investigative framework – functional, governmental and civic-political (Figure 3.2). Hence, 
embeddedness is examined with respect to the political arenas in which these structures 
are embedded. Chapter 7 continues this line of enquiry beyond the internal structure of the 
arena to focus on the broader context. Taken together this chapter and the next develop the 
concept of responsive governance to the first stage outlined in the research framework 
(Figure 3.1).  
The Brisbane and Portland cases were investigated both in situ and retrospectively. The 
period 2009–2012 was studied in situ, with in depth interviews and participant observation 
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occurring during this period. A retrospective analysis was undertaken for the period between 
1991 and 2008 using interviews and extensive document analysis. The identification of the 
governance arenas was an iterative process that occurred during scoping exercises, was 
fine-tuned by the actor referral process and further extended through document analysis. 
This chapter examines Brisbane and then Portland Metro. For each case city: the political 
arenas and their linkages are identified; policy instruments are categorized; and policy roles 
and their alignment with actor-networks are briefly outlined. The chapter concludes with a 
comparison of Brisbane and Portland followed by discussion of the implications for 
responsive governance.  
6.1 Governance arena anatomy and urban ecological 
resources 
This section begins with a discussion of political arenas, policy instruments and the nature 
of urban ecological resources. This research is interested in the practice of governance and 
therefore the implementation of policy. Contemporary governance arrangements are usually 
implemented through a mix of diverse instruments (Gunningham and Sinclair 1999). 
Instruments have been defined as ‘the tools of government’ (e.g. Hood 1983), however, this 
research broadens the definition to ‘the tools of governance’. In this way, significant 
programs, advocacy and management by non-state actors are also recognised as 
instruments within urban ecological governance. Different instruments generate different 
types of political arenas. 
Political arenas and their instruments 
The following discussion explains the links between ‘policy instrument’ and ‘political arena’ 
that are used to examine the anatomy of ecological governance. The governance arena 
consists of multiple interacting policy instruments and this instrument mix generates a set of 
overlapping, interlinked political arenas. For the purposes of this research a political arena 
is a set of political processes and structures that develop on the basis of what participants 
hope to achieve from a particular policy instrument (adapted from Lowi (1964) and Hill and 
Plumlee (1984). The political arenas concept was first put forward by Lowi (1964) as a causal 
model. The main premise that ‘policy creates politics’ was the basis for identifying types of 
political arenas – i.e. regulatory and distributive, redistributive and constituent – and their 
accompanying political dynamics. Rather than as a causal model, this research applies the 
political arena model as a heuristic tool to delimit the boundaries of urban ecological 
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governance and categorise the instruments therein.154 ‘Political arenas’ have had a 
significant influence on political science over the last 50 years. The model continues to be 
debated, theoretically extended and applied.155  The approach engages with issues of 
structure and power, a gap in responsive governance research that was identified in the 
literature review (Chapter 2). The ‘political arenas’ model examines different policy types 
according to their political dynamics (Peters 1992). In contrast, the ‘policy instrument’ is an 
analytical model of policy analysis that focuses on the defining of a policy problem and the 
construction of a solution (Peters 1992), as will be now outlined. 
Many typologies have been developed for policy instruments. The seminal approach by 
Hood (1983) categorises substantive instruments according to the governance resource that 
is drawn upon: nodality (i.e. information), authority, treasure or organisation. Hood (1983) 
further bisects these according to whether the instrument is an effector (effecting change), 
or a detector (detecting change). Howlett (2000) extends Hood’s approach to include 
procedural instruments which are important for contemporary ‘hollowed out’ governance 
settings. Howlett’s (2000) model also uses Hood’s (1983) four governance resources, 
however procedural instruments are categorised according to whether they are positive (i.e. 
support other governance actors to participate) or negative (i.e. discourage participation). 
This research combines Hood’s and Howlett’s models (Table 6.1), but does not include 
Howlett’s ‘negative procedural instruments’ because these tend to be external to 
governance networks at the policy arena level in Brisbane and Portland. In addition, this 
research also alters Hood (1983) and Howlett’s (2000) state-centric approach to 
instruments. The network focus of this research calls for an approach that recognises tools 
used by non-state actors as instruments where they are significant in planning and 
management. 
Table 6.1 Policy instrument categories in this research 
Sub-
categories 
Authority Nodality Organisation Treasure 
Procedural Procedural-
authority 
Procedural-
nodality 
Procedural- 
organization 
Procedural-
treasure 
Effector Effector-authority Effector-nodality Effector-organisation Effector-treasure 
Detector Detector-authority Detector-nodality * * 
 *No instruments from these categories were identified within ecological governance of Portland Metro and 
Brisbane 
                                                            
154 The political arena model is useful here as it provides a scope broad enough to include societal, government and 
cross-sectoral elements (see chapter 3). 
155 Lowi’s original model has been subject to much debate, research, criticism and theoretical extension (e.g. Hill and 
Plumlee 1984, Peters 1992, Anderson 1997, Smith 2002, Rhodes 2007, Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). For discussion its 
popularity, adaptations and critiques refer to Peters, B.G. 1992. The policy process: an institutionalist perspective. 
Canadian Public Administration, 35, 160–180. 
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Governance, policy roles and actor networks 
In contrast with Lowi’s (1964) typology of policy which is focused on political process, ‘policy 
cycle’ models present generalised stages of policy-making process that can be used as a 
heuristic for examining different roles played by actors (Bridgman and Davis 2003). This 
moves the analysis from an instrument-based definition of the policy arena to an actor-based 
definition. The approach assists with identifying informal networks of actors that are not as 
readily identifiable through a policy instrument focus. Table 6.2 illustrates the stratification 
grid used to scope Portland and Brisbane by combining policy instruments with a simplified 
policy stage model. The stages are self-explanatory, with the standard caveat for this 
research that instruments can be state, non-state or cross sectoral in nature.  
Table 6.2 Stratification of actor roles within policy instruments 
 Policy stages / Actor roles 
 Problem 
identification 
Policy 
design 
Management 
and 
implementation  
Monitoring and 
evaluation 
Instrument 
1 
    
Instrument 
2 
   
 
 
The examination of governance arenas in Brisbane and Portland Metro identified a broad 
range of instruments that were implemented between 1991 and 2012. The political arenas 
model indicates the general political dynamic of urban ecological governance. Hood’s (1983) 
and Howlett’s (2000) policy instrument types indicate the governance resource that is drawn 
upon and the approach to implementation. A policy stage model identifies different roles 
within each instrument. However, for the purposes of understanding responsiveness to 
change it is also necessary to understand the manner in which ecological governance is 
embedded amongst other policy arenas. 
Governance and urban ecological resources 
Important local ecological value continues to persist in many urban areas. Urban sites often 
play important roles in regional habitat connectivity, human quality of life, and the provision 
of urban ecosystem services (Savard et al. 2000, Dearborn and Kark 2010). For the 
purposes of this research urban ecological governance includes activities and arrangements 
that focus on, or significantly influence, the protection, restoration or maintenance of 
biodiversity that is ‘native’ to the urban area. However, many activities that govern urban 
ecological resources are based primarily within other policy arenas (e.g. urban planning), 
108 
 
have other primary foci and their main actors vary in their sympathy to biodiversity concerns. 
In fact, the most significant impacts on urban biodiversity routinely involve instruments and 
networks with primarily non-environmental foci (Figure 6.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The range of primary foci amongst instruments and actor networks within 
urban ecological governance 
 
It is expected that this situation will critically affect the way ecological governance adjusts to 
change. It indicates the extent to which ecological governance overlaps with and is a co-
benefit of other urban policy arenas. Hence the embeddedness of governance amongst a 
diversity of urban interests is an underpinning factor of the political arenas that develop. The 
investigation of this problem of context embeddedness now begins with an identification of 
Brisbane and Portland’s policy arenas for ecological governance. 
6.2 Identifying the Brisbane and Portland arenas 
This section identifies the governance arena for urban ecological resources in Brisbane and 
then Portland Metro. The political arenas, policy instruments and actor roles are explained 
for each case. The instruments that form the basis for these analyses were identified through 
participant interviews and documents analysis. All instruments in the sample were 
implemented within ecological governance for some portion of the 1991 to 2012 period. Both 
cases supported diverse instrument types which in some cases coexisted within a program 
— e.g. a steering committee for a grants program. Over time, the reform of programs could 
involve the implementation of new instruments to achieve their purposes — i.e. the change 
from government delivered weed management to a procurement model to deliver the same 
weed management program.  
A policy — or program to carry out the policy — often consists of multiple instruments and 
has important implications for applying the political arenas model to the instrument level. It 
means that while some instruments are categorised within one political arena, others are 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primarily  
non-environmental foci  
e.g. social, economic, land 
use planning 
Other environmental 
resources  
e.g. water  
Ecological 
resources 
 Biodiversity  
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categorised within one arena, but are linked with, or have direct implications for a second 
arena — within the broader policy process. These linkages are examined in this analysis 
and provide further insight into the politics of each case and associated institutional design. 
A full list of the instrument samples and political arenas for each city are attached as 
Appendix 5 and 6. 
Instruments are categorised into constituent and distributive, regulative and redistributive 
arenas, according to Lowi’s (1964) typology.  Their adaption to urban ecological governance 
is as follows:  
 constituent instruments provide broad benefits to a broad constituency and may be 
strategic rather than expenditure based — e.g. a management plan;156  
 distributive instruments provide benefits to a narrow constituency and general 
expenditure for a specific purpose — e.g. a grant;  
 regulative instruments are statutory or non-statutory but are embedded within 
statutory processes in a regulative manner; and  
 redistributive instruments involve the transfer of resources from one societal group to 
another or a transfer of responsibility from one actor to another — e.g. a social 
security based program.   
Instruments are also categorised as ‘effector’, ‘detector’ and ‘procedural’. These three 
categories are further divided into: ‘authority’, ‘nodality’, ‘organisation’ or ‘treasure’ 
instruments (Table 6.1). For urban ecological governance these manifest as follows:  
 ‘effector-authority’ and ‘detector-authority’ instruments draw upon authority as a 
resource to effect or detect change respectively. They can use non-statutory or 
statutory authority and through a network governance lens, some are triggered by 
non-state actors — e.g. lawsuits.157 ‘Procedural-authority’ instruments are concerned 
with how authority is implemented amongst actors — e.g. advisory committees;  
 ‘nodality’ instruments use information as a governance resource to effect (e.g. 
training), detect (e.g. technical reports) or procedurise (e.g. awareness raising 
programs) change;  
                                                            
156 The constituent category also included instruments that provided indirect benefits to a broad constituency and did 
not regulate, involve general expenditure (distributive) funds or redistribute resources.  
157 The network focus of this research means that authority can be held (albeit in a diminished form) by non-state actors, 
in contrast to Hood’s (1983) state-centric approach to policy instruments. 
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 ‘organisation’ instruments use the ability to organise as a governance resource to 
effect (e.g. most programs) or procedurise (e.g. strategies); and  
 ‘treasure’ is used to effect (e.g. grants) or procedurise (e.g. research funding) change 
through a range of instruments.  
More specific types within each of these categories were identified through inductive 
analysis, for instance the specific type of ‘strategies’ sits within the category of ‘organisation-
procedural’ instruments. Sub-types were established within each specific type, for instance, 
‘strategies’ has an internal typology of four different strategy types.158 In this way further 
detail was added to the primary identification the instrument samples for each case. Then a 
secondary identification further developed the samples via pattern matching between 
Portland and Brisbane. Pattern matching involved the selection of an instrument or 
instrument type identified in one city and a search for functionally equivalent structures in 
the other city. Stake (1990) identifies this process as a critical stage in the interpretation of 
qualitative data.  Pattern matching enabled the identification of instrument types that were 
prominent in one city but less formal in the other and these less formal equivalents were 
also included in the instrument sample for that city. 
The instrument samples from each city were extensive (Brisbane n=171, Portland n=519), 
internally consistent and the patterns concurred across multiple data sets from interviews, 
key informants and document analysis. The instrument samples were collected from these 
data sets into spreadsheets and then codified according to the instrument categories 
detailed above. The categorised instruments established a detailed description of the range 
of instrument types in each city that drew on a particular governance resource (i.e. authority, 
nodality) and the political arena they existed within. In addition the codified sample provided 
a numerical count of these categories. The data however, may be influenced: by the 
interview participants’ perceptions of significance; by the constructed nature of policy 
instruments; and by differing access to information under the differing models of urban 
governance in each case area. I revisit these constraints in section 6.6 to consider the 
lessons learnt from this analysis and potential refinements for more detailed work in this vein 
for future research. For the purposes of this research, these constraints were taken into 
account in the following analysis and interpretation. The findings for Brisbane and then 
                                                            
158 The internal typology of the ‘strategies’ subcategory includes: collective vision, conceived vision, instrument norm 
and analytical positioning strategies. Internal typologies were designed with reference to relevant literature as well as 
inductive analysis. For example, the strategy typology draws on strategic management theory (e.g. Mintzberg 1994, 
1998). 
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Portland will be presented with a focus on political arenas and their inter-linkage, policy 
instruments and their governance categories; and policy roles played within these 
instruments. 
6.3 Brisbane’s arena for ecological governance  
Analysis of Brisbane instruments indicates that ecological governance in Brisbane has: 
political arenas that are strongly constituent in nature — broad benefits to a broad 
constituency — with moderate inter-linkages between different arenas; policy instruments 
that include a core of stable, long implemented programs and influence from the hierarchical 
structure of the large metropolitan council; and policy roles that form the basis of actor 
networks, many of which revolve around formalised programs. These networks show high 
levels of convergence with the BCC policy division Natural and Environment and 
Sustainability (NES) and also with stronger watershed groups — which are non-state groups 
in Brisbane. The following discussion is based on the examination of 171 instruments that 
were implemented in Brisbane for at least a portion of the period 1991–2012. 
Political arenas 
Arena types indicate the political dynamics that are likely to proceed from each instrument. 
Table 6.3 provides examples for Brisbane within their respective arenas. Both substantive 
and procedural instrument examples are included. 
Table 6.3 Example instruments by political arena for Brisbane ecological governance  
Political Arena Main structural type Brisbane example 
Constituent 
51% (n=88) 
Actor agreements  
Strategies and plans 
Collaborative forums 
Events 
Advisory forums 
Science program 
Publications and reports 
Voluntary Conservation Agreement 
Brisbane Biodiversity Strategy 
Brisbane Catchments Network 
Peaks to Point Festival 
Biodiversity Advisory Committee 
OCCA Water Quality Monitoring 
“The Creek in Your Backyard”, SOWN 
Distributive 
23% (n=40) 
Government delivery 
Outsourced delivery 
Community based 
Grants / funding instruments 
Land acquisition 
2 Million Trees Program 
Revegetation Contracts 
Habitat Brisbane 
BCC Environment Grants 
Bushland Acquisition Program 
Regulative 
20% (n=34) 
Zones and codes 
Local laws 
State planning legislation 
State environmental legislation 
Planning Scheme Biodiversity Code 
BCC’s Natural Assets Local Law 2003 
Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) 
Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) 
Redistributive 
5% (n=9) 
Employment programs 
Transfer of program 
Roll up into other instrument 
Jobskills Program 
Creek Rangers transferred to NES 
Brisbane River Plan rolled into BCP2000 
Abbreviations in Table: OCCA is Oxley Creek Catchment Association; SOWN is Enoggera Creek Catchment 
Group; NES is Natural Environment and Sustainability; BCP is Brisbane City Plan 2000. Source: Political 
arenas adapted from Lowi (1964) 
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A high proportion of the instruments that were surveyed in Brisbane were categorised as 
constituent (~50%). Distributive and regulative instruments were relatively equally 
represented (~20%) and redistributive instruments were rare (5%). Several instruments that 
were linked with or had direct implications for a second arena are indicated in Table 6.4. In 
the following discussion cells from Table 6.4 are referred to by [column]-[row], i.e. 
constituent-distributive for constituent instruments (column 1) with distributive links (row 2). 
Shaded cells have no clear linkages with other arenas and are referred to by [column]-
unlinked.  
For constituent instruments (column 1), constituent-distributive (52%) had a majority over 
constituent-unlinked (28%). For column 2, distributive-unlinked (65%) had a strong majority. 
For regulative instruments (column 3), there was a relatively even spread across regulative-
unlinked, regulative-distributive and regulative-redistributive. Whereas the redistributive 
arena (column 4) was completely linked (i.e. unlinked = 0). Furthermore, column 4 
(redistributive instruments, n=9) were outnumbered by row 4 (redistributive linkage, n=22), 
which indicates that redistributive processes mostly occurred as a by-product of other 
political arenas. This characteristic is not surprising, given the non-core position of ecological 
governance in the broader urban setting.  In contrast, the constituent arena had a low 
proportion occurring as a by-product of other arenas (row 1) and most constituent 
instruments were linked (column1, rows 2, 3 and 4 = 72%, or 63 of 88 instruments). 
Constituent-distributive was particularly frequent (52%, 46 from 88 instruments). 
Distributive-regulative were absent from the Brisbane sample (n=0) which is a striking 
contrast with the Portland case (Section 6.4). This contrast may relate to the institutional 
contexts of each metropolitan area, a comparative discussion of results for Portland and 
Brisbane furthers this line of enquiry in section 6.5. 
Table 6.4 Brisbane instruments by political-arena and political-arena linkage 
 
Political Arena 
Linkage 
Political Arena 
Total 
1. 
Constituent 
2. 
Distributive 
3. 
Regulative 
4. 
Redistributive 
Constituent linkage 25 28% 7 18% 0 0% 2 22% 34 20% 
Distributive linkage 
46 52% 26 65% 15 44% 7 
78 
% 94 
55% 
Regulative linkage 14 16% 0 0% 7 21% 0 0% 21 12% 
Redistributive linkage 3 3% 7 18% 12 35% 0 0% 22 13% 
Total 88 100% 40 100% 34 100% 9 100%  
% of total 51% 23% 20% 5% 
Shaded cells indicate instruments with no clear linkage to other arenas 
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A numerical count does not of course indicate the relative influence of particular instruments. 
The following discussion investigates policy instruments within these political arenas and 
begins to explore the relative influence of particular instrument groups. To do so it is 
necessary to interpret the thin description generated from numerical data with thick 
descriptions from the case study database (Geertz 1973). Later Chapters 7, 8 and 9 further 
this line of enquiry as a main focus. 
Policy instruments 
Instrument categories — i.e. authority, nodality, organisation and treasure — indicate the 
governance resource that is used to implement planning and management. The governance 
resources most frequently drawn upon in the Brisbane sample were ‘authority’ (33%) and 
‘organisation’ (43%). ‘nodality’ (15%) and ‘treasure’ (10%) based instruments showed a 
lower, but comparatively similar incidence (Table 6.5). These instruments were further 
categorised as procedural, effector-substantive or detector-substantive. The effector-
substantive category was more common than detector-substantive, except in the case of 
detector-nodality instruments — such as policy assessment and reporting. 
It is important to interpret the numerical data within its ‘thick’ context (Geertz 1973). For 
instance, the proportion of detector-authority instruments in the sample was low (2%). 
However, they were mostly informal and some were identified through pattern matching with 
the Portland case159 rather than being immediately identified without the comparative 
analysis. This category is likely to be less influential than even the low count suggests. In 
general, procedural instruments in Brisbane were comparatively weak, although 
unsurprisingly, procedural instruments were stronger where more closely associated with 
strong state actors. However, a trade-off between ‘authority’ and ecological governance 
concerns was highlighted by interview participants. 
…the technical officer looks at a decision and says, ‘that’s how it should be’, black 
and white. Then it goes to me and I’m putting a bit of strategy, a bit of big picture into 
it…and then it goes to my section head who puts even less subject matter and a 
broader picture into it…and then it goes to the branch manager who’s looking at it 
90% politics and bureaucracy and 10% subject matter.        (Brisbane state participant) 
This illustrates the tendency for higher levels of state authority in hierarchical structures to 
include broader, more strategic responsibilities and lower relative concern for specific 
governance arenas. It shows that the instrument patterns in Brisbane resulted at least in 
                                                            
159 Authority-detector instruments in Portland Metro are more readily identifiable and numerous than in Brisbane. 
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part from the hierarchical structure of urban governance and concurs with strong 
governmental embeddedness identified for Brisbane (Chapter 4). These findings show that 
within the hierarchical governmental structure in Brisbane, the range of embedded interests 
can increase with the level within the hierarchy. There was however one set of significant 
procedural instruments that did not involve state actors, except at a peripheral level — e.g. 
Brisbane Catchments Network. While rarely strong, these non-state instruments have great 
potential for flexibility and innovation.   
Table 6.5 Example instruments by governance resource for Brisbane 
Governance 
Resource 
Resource 
Category  
(% of total) 
Instrument sub-type Example Brisbane Instrument 
Authority 
33% (n=56) 
Effector-
authority   
(20%) 
Certification / awards 
Environmental plans / policy 
Management plan 
Regulatory protection 
Revenue collection 
Statutory land use planning 
Strategic planning 
Watershed planning 
Landcare awards 
SEQ NRM Plan 
Boondall Wetlands Management Plan 
Natural Assets Local Law 
Bushland Preservation Levy 
Conservation Zone, Brisbane City Plan 
Canopy targets, Brisbane Strategic Plan 
Oxley Creek Watershed Management Plan 
Detector-
authority 
(2%) 
Community advocacy 
Legal proceedings 
Public feedback 
Resident Action Groups 
Environmental Defenders Office 
Watershed-Councillor communication 
Procedural-
authority 
(10%) 
Advisory group 
Management group 
Shared political decision 
 
Neighbourhood planning committee 
GA at Downfall Ck. EnviroCentre 
Memorandum of Understanding - 
     FGK Corridor 
Nodality 
15% (n=25) 
Effector-
nodality 
(2%) 
Training 
Guidelines 
Habitat Brisbane Volunteer Training 
BCC Ecological Assessment Guidelines 
Detector-
nodality  
(8%) 
Policy advice/assessment 
Non-state actor feedback 
Reporting 
Technical information 
Brisbane climate change report – Tim  Low 
Habitat officer-volunteer communication 
Healthy Waterways Report Cards 
Biannual GIS Canopy analysis 
Procedural-
nodality  
(5%) 
Awareness raising programs 
General  information  
     provision 
Technical information  
     Provision 
BCC Greenheart Program 
BCC Environment Committee Minutes 
 
SEQ NRM Atlas 
Organisat’n 
43% (n=73) 
Effector-
organisation 
(18%) 
Collaboration programs 
Commercial-led programs 
Metropolitan-led programs 
Non-profit led programs 
Habitat Brisbane groups (post ~1996) 
Preferred contractor list 
Wildlife Movement Solutions 
OCCA Catchment Care Team 
Procedural-
organisation 
(25%) 
Partnership/network change 
Planning process 
Program review 
Reform project 
Strategy / Vision 
Watershed Group Formation 
Draft Policy - Core Biodiversity Network 
2 Million Trees Program Review 
Environmental Program Review (2011) 
Brisbane Biodiversity Strategy 
Treasure 
10% (n=17) 
Effector-
treasure 
(10%) 
Grant disbursement 
Development application  
     process 
Land acquisition 
BCC Environment Grants 
Developer contributions 
 
Bushland Acquisition Program 
Source: resource categories adapted from Hood (1983) and Howlett (2000) 
Abbreviations in table: BCC is Brisbane City Council; FGK is Forestdale-Greenbank-Karawatha; GA is 
Greening Australia; GIS is Geographic Information Systems; NRM is Natural Resource Management; SEQ is 
South East Queensland  
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A set of prominent instruments in Brisbane are important for the examination of ecological 
governance as a whole. Most have longevity. They were established in the early 1990s and 
continue to be implemented. For example, this includes the community-based revegetation 
program Habitat Brisbane and the Bushland Acquisition Program. These instruments and 
other significant examples often display a chain of sequential reform events where, “the 
program is its own spin-off program” (Brisbane participant). These sequential chains are 
listed as separate entries in the instrument sample (Appendices 5 and 6) if a reform shifts 
the categorisation of the instrument into a different category or sub-category. These 
significant examples include the Natural Assets Local Law — i.e. a metropolitan level 
vegetation protection law — and the iconic ‘2 Million Trees program’. A range of state and 
non-state actors participated throughout the policy cycle.    
 
Policy roles and actor networks 
A range of state and non-state actors participated in the Brisbane instrument mix for 
ecological governance (Table 6.6). The most prominent state actor within ecological 
governance in Brisbane was the council division Natural Environment and Sustainability 
(NES),160 although NES was itself only a moderately sized actor within the broader BCC 
structure. NES developed through a series of incarnations since the early 1990s. For much 
of that time it was a policy focused, rather than a service delivery unit. NES played a key 
coordination role across the instrument mix, which converged on NES managers (Table 
6.6). Other BCC actors included Local Asset Services (LAS) and the Roads and Drainage 
Division (RaD). LAS were the implementation arm of BCC with broad responsibilities 
including natural area management. The RaD was traditionally an engineering focused 
division with more resources than NES and LAS. A range of other council teams participated 
according to specific situations. With approximately 7000 employees, BCC was in many 
ways a large network of government actors coordinated by a strong mayoral system rather 
than a monolithic unitary actor (refer Section 2.2.2. and neo-institutionalism). Accordingly, 
the Brisbane mayor and councillors were also important actors and were often the main 
interface between residents and council actors.  
  
                                                            
160 Centrality of NES is also confirmed by non-state participants as well as policy analysis. E.g. INTERVIEWER: “Who do I 
ask about that?” PARTICIPANT: “Like I keep telling you - NES! It all goes back through them.”  
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 Table 6.6 Example actor roles within programs and instruments in Brisbane 
 Policy stages / Actor roles 
 
Problem 
identification / 
Evaluation 
Policy design 
Management and 
implementation  
Bushland 
Acquisition 
Program 
BCC Internal 
Stakeholders  
Watershed Groups 
NES NES Acquisition officer 
Natural Assets 
Local Law 
Watershed Groups NES BCC Compliance staff  
Habitat 
Brisbane 
Local Asset 
Services 
NES 
Habitat Officers  
Habitat Groups 
Creek Rangers Watershed Groups 
Water Division  
NES 
Creek Rangers 
Watershed Groups 
2 Million Trees Mayor / NES 
Greening Australia  
NES 
Greening Australia  
NES,  Contractors 
Voluntary 
Conservation 
Agreement 
NES Officers NES 
Conservation Officers 
Landholders and supporters 
Abbreviations in table: BCC is Brisbane City Council, NES is Natural Environment and Sustainability,  
Non-state actors in Brisbane include local revegetation groups (Habitat Brisbane groups) 
which are often linked to a catchment group — i.e. a watershed group. Similarly, landholders 
with a conservation agreement — a commitment to manage their land for biodiversity 
outcomes — are often linked with like-minded residents. Habitat groups usually consist of 
local residents and a leader. The leader coordinates the group and is the main point of 
contact for BCC habitat officers who sit within LAS. Most watershed groups in Brisbane have 
had a BCC creek ranger appointed to their group since 2007. Watershed groups vary in their 
activities and focus across the city. Some non-state actors were more involved earlier in the 
case timeline, such as Greening Australia, who over time have become more involved with 
regional rather than metropolitan scale operations — see Chapter 4 regarding 
regionalisation of environmental governance in Queensland. A final significant group of non-
state actors are the commercial contractors which consist of mostly private companies, but 
also include the commercial arms developed by some watershed groups — e.g. OCCA 
Biodiversity Services Unit. With respect to stages of the policy cycle — i.e. identification, 
design, implementation, — there is a greater concentration of actors at the implementation 
stage in Brisbane. This concurs with the weak civic-political embeddedness in Brisbane 
(Chapter 4). Problem identification roles are often informal and as noted previously NES 
plays a prominent role in the policy design stage. Interestingly, some watershed groups are 
involved in implementation and problem identification roles. Figure 6.2 shows the interplay 
been the significant governance roles and structures in Brisbane (c.2009).  
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Figure 6.2 shows that instruments converge within NES (Figure 6.2), but instrument 
participation also converges within the larger watershed groups. 
 “Quite commonly the catchment groups are an amalgamation of a bunch of habitat 
[brisbane] groups with the key environmental advocates for various [habitat and 
environmental] groups, forming a catchment management committee”  
(State participant) 161 
                                                            
161 In a similar vein “Most catchment groups are made up of bushcare groups from the ground up… [a few are] connected 
with their habitat groups but they’re not their core business. They always want to support them where they can, but 
they’re not the core business.” (State participant 2) 
Figure 6.2 The Brisbane ecological governance arena (c. 2009) 
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 Links between policy, planning and management also converge through NES. Some actors 
note that these three spheres often have maintained fairly separate networks according to 
their professional areas of concern, although there is evidence of increased networking in 
recent years.162 Cross-sectoral networks tend to follow program lines, while more functional 
networks exist internally to BCC. Non-state networks are diverse and show evidence of local 
embeddedness within particular urban watersheds or interest groups. This issue of 
contextual embeddedness will be further examined in Chapter 7. 
This completes the discussion of the Brisbane arena. The following presents corresponding 
results for Portland Metro.  
6.4 Portland’s arena for ecological governance 
Analysis of Portland Metro instruments indicates that ecological governance in Portland has: 
political arenas that are strongly constituent in nature — i.e. broad benefits to a broad 
constituency — with strong inter-linkages between different arenas; policy instruments that 
include very few stable, long implemented programs and show influence from the strong 
regulative context that ecological governance is embedded within; and policy roles that form 
the basis of actor networks, along functional, as much as along programmatic lines. These 
networks show high levels of convergence with Metro’s Natural Areas Program, and very 
high convergence with Audubon that in some situations, rivals the network resources held 
by state actors. This analysis draws on a survey of 519 instruments that were implemented 
in Portland Metro for at least a portion of the period 1991–2012. 
Political arenas 
The sample of governance instruments from Portland Metro follows a pattern similar to 
Brisbane across the four political arenas. A high proportion of instruments are categorised 
as constituent (~50%). Distributive (30%) and regulative (22%) instruments are fairly equally 
represented and redistributive instruments are rare (2%). Table 6.7 provides example 
instruments from Portland within their respective arenas. Both substantive and procedural 
instrument examples are included.  
  
                                                            
162 Participants: M2, BRIS1, C3,  
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Table 6.7 Example instruments by political arena for Portland ecological governance  
Political 
Arena 
Main structural category Portland Metro example 
Constituent 
46% (n=241) 
Actor agreements  
Strategies and plans 
Collaborative forums 
Events 
Advisory forums 
Science program 
Publications and reports 
Cooper Mtn. Inter-governmental Agreement163 
Terrestrial Ecology Enhancement Strategy, PCC 
The Intertwine 
Johnson Creek Watershed Wide Event, JCWC 
Greenspaces Policy Advisory Committee, Metro 
Amphibian monitoring program, Gresham 
Regional Urban Forestry Assessment Report 
Distributive 
30% (n=155) 
Government delivery 
Outsourced delivery 
Community based 
Grants / funding instruments 
Land acquisition 
Healthy Streams Program, CWS 
Watershed revegetation program contracts, PCC 
‘Friends of’ Groups 
Nature in Neighborhoods Grant Program, Metro 
Regional Greenspace Acquisition Program, Metro 
Regulative 
22% (n=115) 
Zones and codes 
Metropolitan laws 
State planning legislation 
Environmental legislation 
Environmental Zones, PCC 
Title 13, Metro164 
Oregon Land Conservation and Development Act165  
State Planning Goal 5 
Redistributive 
2% (n=8) 
Permit trading 
Land transfer 
Roll up into other instrument 
NPDES Permit - Water Quality Trading, CWS166 
Transfer of Multnomah County Parks to Metro 
MGSP Masterplan into Metro’s Functional Plan 
Abbreviations: CWS is Clean Water Services (Tualatin Basin Water Services District); JCWC is Johnson 
Creek Watershed Council; MGSP Masterplan is Metropolitan Greenspaces Masterplan; NPDES is National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System under the US Clean Water Act; PCC is Portland City Council 
 
As with the Brisbane case (Section 6.3) linkage patterns differ amongst political arenas 
(Table 6.7). Constituent-distributive (55%), distributive-unlinked (45%) and regulative-
redistributive (80%) instruments are the majority in their respective arenas. As with Brisbane, 
the Portland sample has a redistributive arena that is completely linked (shaded cell = 0), 
and outnumbered by instruments in row 4 (linkage with redistributive). In contrast, 
constituent processes mostly occur within their own arena (column 1), rather than as a by-
product of other arenas (row 1), a high proportion (76%) are linked to (column 1, rows 2, 3 
and 4). In particular there is a high incidence of linkage with the distributive arena (56%) 
amongst constituent instruments. A significant contrast with Brisbane is the incidence of 
distributive-regulative instruments. Although absent from the Brisbane sample, distributive-
regulative instruments are fairly common in Portland (23%, n=36). These instruments 
contribute towards compliance with regulatory responsibilities such as salmon conservation 
(listed under the US Endangered Species Act) and water quality (Total Maximum Daily 
Loads set under the US Clean Water Act). These distributive-regulative instruments 
                                                            
163 An agreement for the Metro owned, Cooper Mountain Regional Park to be managed by the local parks and recreation 
district, Tualatin Hills Parks and Recreation District. 
164 Metro’s legislation to satisfy its commitments to state environmental legislation 
165 Established in 1973 by Senate Bill 100, the Oregon Land Conservation and Development Act is the only comprehensive 
land use planning system in the USA — see Walker and Hurley 2011 for further details. 
166 In 2004 Clean Water Services began a program to plants trees to shade waterways and lower heat pollution as a 
strategy to trade water quality permits. 
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distribute public funds to, for example, floodplain restoration projects and vegetated 
stormwater facilities, watershed revegetation and land acquisition for watershed health. 
Oregon’s strong state planning system and associated regulative instruments (Table 6.7) 
also frame the governance arena with land-use regulations such as environmental zoning 
that have strong redistributive implications (n=92). 
Table 6.8 Portland instruments by political-arena and political-arena linkage 
Political Arena 
Linkage / Direct 
Implication 
Political Arena 
Total 
1.  
Constituent 
2.  
Distributive 
3.  
Regulative 
4. 
Redistributive 
Constituent linkage 58 24% 15 10% 0 0% 3 38% 76 15% 
Distributive linkage 133 55% 69 45% 6 5% 3 38% 211 41% 
Regulative linkage 44 18% 36 23% 17 15% 2 25% 99 19% 
Redistributive linkage 6 2% 35 23% 92 80% 0 0% 133 26% 
Total 241 100% 155 100% 115 100% 8 100%  
% of total 46% 30% 22% 2% 
Shaded cells indicate instruments with no clear linkages to other arenas 
The numerical count indicates the policy making resources applied in each arena. The 
discussion now turns to a closer examination of the policy instruments in Portland within 
these political arenas. 
Policy instruments 
Portland instruments in the sample have a distribution similar to Brisbane. The most frequent 
categories are ‘authority’ (40%) and ‘organisation’ (33%), while ‘nodality’ (16%) and 
‘treasure’ (11%) are less frequent. The results show a similar pattern to Brisbane across 
instrument sub-categories (Table 6.9).  
As with Brisbane, the detector-authority instruments demonstrate the importance of 
interpreting instrument count data within its context. For example, the proportion of detector-
authority instruments (e.g. lawsuits) in the Portland sample is even lower than that for 
Brisbane (0.4% - Portland, 2% - Brisbane). However, this does not automatically mean that 
the arena lacks reflexive capacity or legal accountability. In this case it means that ecological 
governance in Portland has few stressors that would encourage the implementation of 
authority-detector instruments. In support of this claim are land mark law suits over water 
quality and Oregon’s planning system. The landmark lawsuits occurred in general water 
quality issues — and so were not registered in Table 6.9 as they occurred before 1991 
and/or were categorised as outside the ecological governance arena.  
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“In the 80s there wasn’t a strong relationship between environmentalists and the city. 
It was a very litigious relationship and environmental groups weren’t shy about suing 
to hold governments to these new environmental laws…The North West 
Environmental Advocates…successfully sued the city over the combined sewer 
problem to get cities to clean up their CSOs (Combined Sewer Overflows)”. 
These 1980s lawsuits established a political climate where state actors were interested in 
collaboration and avoiding further legal proceedings. 
“Portland City set up the Johnson Creek Corridor Committee [a cross-sectoral 
instrument], in part to try and avoid a similar lawsuit to Tualatin”  
(Portland non-state participant) 
Regardless of the need for contextual interpretation, the categorisation in Table 6.9 provides 
a sound indication of the governance resources that are drawn upon to implement ecological 
governance in Portland Metro. The categorisation shows that the emphasis in Portland is on 
collaboration rather than legal wrangling (law suits and other authority-detector instruments). 
Although there are clear legal avenues available to non-state actors as the following 
Portland participant illustrates: 
State Actor: “[He] wouldn’t be reluctant to sue if needed.” 
Interviewer: “So why does [he] get invited to sit on these [government] committees?” 
State Actor: “Same reason, it is better to have them in the room than on the outside. He is 
an advocate…his interests are lined up with the bureau’s interests. He has 
absolutely no hesitation to go to council and make an argument to council for 
stuff and he comes with ideas…so you want to have him in the room. He is a 
really thoughtful guy…and if it wasn’t for the position that [the environmental 
group] has taken …the bureau would have a snowball’s chance in hell of 
getting any [ecological] restoration out there.” 
With respect to the notion of embeddedness, the findings concur with analysis of the 
Portland background (Chapter 4): there is a strong influence from Oregon’s planning system 
(institutional context embeddedness) with its emphasis on participation (civic-political 
embeddedness) and collaboration (collegial aspect) as well as a strong evidenced based 
approach to land use and natural resource decisions (‘rational’ aspect). 
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Table 6.9 Examples of instruments by governance resource in Portland  
Governance 
Resource 
Resource 
Category 
(% of total) 
Significant sub-type Portland Metro example 
Authority 
40% (n=206)  
Effector-
authority   
(28%) 
Action Plan 
Certification / awards 
Environmental plans 
Management plans 
Regulatory protection 
Revenue collection 
Statutory land use plans 
Strategic planning 
Watershed planning 
Masterplans 
Johnson Creek Action Plan 
Migratory bird park certification, Oaks Bottom 
Lwr Columbia Steelhead Recovery plan,PCC 
Urban Forestry Management Plan, PCC 
Oregon Salmon Listing under the ESA 
Metro Solid waste excise tax – for parks 
Portland Plan (PCC Comprehensive plan) 
PPR Strategic plan 
Johnson Creek Restoration Plan 2001 
Metropolitan Greenspaces Masterplan 
Detector-
authority 
(0.4%) 
Legal proceedings Audubon lawsuit settled with FEMA, 2009 
Procedural-
authority 
(11%) 
Advisory group 
Management group 
Shared political decision 
MPAC - Parks subcommittee 
Portland Parks and Recreation Board 
Transfer of Multnomah County Parks to 
Metro 
Nodality 
16% (n=84) 
Effector-
nodality 
(2%) 
Training 
Guidelines 
Tree Steward Training, Portland Parks and 
Rec 
Gresham volunteer bird survey protocol  
Detector-
Nodality 
(12%) 
Policy advice/assessment 
Non-state actor feedback 
Reporting 
Technical information 
Regional Urban Forestry Assessment 2009 
Urban Greenspaces Movement 
Annual reports 
Riparian corridor / wildlife habitat inventories 
Procedural-
nodality (3%) 
Awareness raising 
programs 
General  information 
provision 
Technical information 
provision 
Urban Natural Resource Directory, FAUNA 
Regional Equity Atlas, Coalition for a living 
future 
Urban Ecology Research Consortium 
Organisat’n 
33% (n=169) 
Effector-
organisation 
(12%) 
Collaboration programs 
SSD-led programs 
Metro-led programs 
Local council programs 
Non-profit led programs 
Backyard Habitat Certification program 
NPDES Permit - Water Quality Trading, CWS 
Floodplain restoration projects  
Watershed Revegetation Program, PCC 
Plant it Portland Campaign, Friends of Trees 
Procedural-
organisation 
(20%) 
Partnership/network level 
change 
Planning process 
Reform project 
Strategy / Vision 
Formation of Intertwine Alliance 
Urban Growth Boundary expansion process 
Environmental Zone Streamline project, PCC 
Metro Greenspace Vision 
Treasure 
12% (n=60) 
Effector-
treasure- 
(9%) 
Grant disbursement 
Land donation 
Land acquisition 
Metropolitan Greenspace Grants 
Ross Island natural area, 44ac donated to 
PCC 
Metro Open spaces acquisition program 
Procedural-
treasure 
(2%) 
Capacity building 
Funding initiative 
BES capacity building – watershed grant 
program 
Nature in Neighborhoods Program, Metro 
Source: resource categories adapted from Hood (1983) and Howlett (2000) 
Abbreviations in table: BES is Portland City Bureau of Environmental Services; CWS is Clean Water 
Services; FAUNA is Friends and Advocates of Urban Natural Areas; FEMA is US Federal Emergency 
Management Agency; MPAC is Metropolitan Policy Advisory Committee; NPDES is National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System under the Clean Water Act 1972 (USA); PCC is Portland City Council; PPR is 
Portland Parks Bureau; SSD is Special Service District 
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Instruments that are particularly significant for ecological governance in Portland Metro 
rarely exist for the entire case study period (1991–2012). They include ‘treasure-effector’ 
instruments such as the Metropolitan Greenspace program, Metro’s Natural areas 
acquisition program and PCC’s Watershed grant program. In contrast with Brisbane, many 
other prominent instruments are ‘detector’ or ‘procedural’ in nature, such as the ‘Nature in 
Neighborhoods’ Program, the TEES Strategy and the Grey to Green Initiative. A range of 
state and non-state actors participate throughout the policy cycle and prominent networks 
show greater longevity than many of the identified instruments in Portland Metro. The 
transient nature of networked settings is noted in the governance literature (Wagenhaar & 
Hajer, 2003) 
Policy roles and actor networks 
The Portland Metro instrument mix is more complex and fragmented than the Brisbane 
arena with state actors at both metropolitan and local levels. With respect to the metropolitan 
level, the main state actor is the Metro Natural Areas Team. This team oversees 
metropolitan programs such as acquisition, management and monitoring. However, at the 
local level the Portland Metro case becomes more complex – as there are 25 local councils. 
As noted previously, Portland City Council (PCC) is the largest of the local councils, it 
operates under a commission style government and important bureaus involved in 
ecological governance include the Bureau of Environmental Services (BES) and Portland 
Parks and Recreation (PPR). BES has responsibilities for stormwater and water quality 
which involves actions to comply with the federal Clean Water and Endangered Species 
Acts. This role also involves a large budget and diverse teams of engineers and watershed 
management staff. PPR is the bureau with responsibility for open spaces within PCC. In 
2004, PPR established City Nature, a team to manage natural areas in the PCC jurisdiction. 
In addition to PCC, other significant state actors examined in this research included 
Gresham Council, Clean Water Services (CWS) and Tualatin Hills Parks and Recreation 
District (THPRD). Gresham is a local council in the east of Portland Metro. It is described by 
some as a ‘goldilocks council’ because it is large enough to generate resources for explicit 
ecological governance, and yet small enough so that staff have a high level of interaction 
and are well known to local residents.167 In the west of Portland Metro a large group of 
councils are located across the Tualatin basin. Two special service districts have been 
established across many of these local councils to govern stormwater and sewerage (CWS) 
                                                            
167 Interview participant PS3 
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and parks (THPRD). CWS, like its counterpart in Portland Council, BES is responsible for 
large scale efforts to comply with the US federal Clean Water Act 1972 such as infrastructure 
upgrades and green infrastructure alternatives. THPRD has become increasingly involved 
in natural area management on its own properties and also in partnership with the 
metropolitan government Metro. 
Table 6.10 Example actor roles within programs and instruments in Portland 
Policy Instruments / 
Programs 
Policy stages / Actor roles 
Problem 
identification 
Policy design / 
evaluation 
Management and 
implementation  
Metro Greenspace / 
Nature in 
Neighborhoods grants 
(Metro) 
Audubon, 
FAUNA 
Metro natural area   
team 
Metro grants officer, 
USFWS, grant recipients 
Title 13 / Nature in 
Neighborhoods land 
use program (Metro) 
Audubon, 
FAUNA, 
Neighborhood 
associations 
Metro science 
officers. 
Local Councils,  
Metro compliance officers 
TEES Strategy (BES) 
Bureau of 
Environmental 
Services (BES) 
BES project officer 
Multi-bureau team 
BES Teams 
Portland Parks teams 
Watershed Grant 
Program (BES) 
- 
BES officer 
PSU Staff 
Student Project officer, 
grant recipients 
Grey to Green (BES) 
BES staff,  
PCC Mayor, 
Audubon 
BES staff Friends of Trees 
Gresham Environment 
Program 
FAUNA Environment officer 
Americorp volunteers  
Parks team 
Amphibian monitoring team 
Backyard Habitat 
Certification Program  
Columbia Land 
Trust 
Friends of Tryon 
Creek 
Audubon 
Abbreviations in table: BES is Portland Council Bureau of Environmental Services; FAUNA is Friends and 
Advocates of Urban Natural Areas; PCC is Portland City Council; PSU is Portland State University; TEES is 
Terrestrial Ecosystem Enhancement Strategy  USFWS is US Fish and Wildlife Service  
 
Non-state actors in the Portland arena include ‘Friends’ groups and citizen advisory groups, 
FAUNA,   Audubon and many other local non-profit groups. ‘Friends of’ groups are resident 
groups that are committed to a particular, park, natural area or waterway. Many of these 
groups are members of FAUNA, the advocacy network established by Audubon and others 
from the urban greenspaces social movement in the late 1980s. FAUNA also includes 
civically minded individuals and groups such as neighbourhood associations. The Audubon 
Society of Portland is a large environmental group with an established urban constituency. 
Audubon members are actively involved in citizen advisory groups and commissions, 
watershed council boards and some members are on staff at Metro or PCC. Watershed 
councils are established across Oregon and five of these are active within Portland Metro. 
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In particular this research was concerned with watershed councils for Columbia Slough, 
Tualatin Basin and Johnson Creek. With respect to stages of the policy cycle, there is a 
greater diversity of actors at the problem identification stage in Portland, than there is in 
Brisbane. This reflects the role of public participation in the Oregon planning system (civic-
political embeddedness, section 3.3). Not only are a large number of advisory committees 
identified in the Portland case study, but neighbourhood councils and environmental groups 
also play a role. However, the most distinctive public participation is the Oregon ballot 
system, where voters can directly participate in law making and budget setting. Portland 
participants claimed that this arrangement further sensitises state actors towards public 
attitudes and participation in order to manage issues where possible, before they reach a 
ballot measure.168 Problem identification roles therefore involved both collegial and 
contention based activities. 
A diagrammatic portrayal of ecological governance in Portland Metro (c. 2009) shows a 
highly networked setting (Figure 6.3). Many programs converge with Metro’s ‘Greenspaces 
and Natural Areas Program’, PCC’s, Bureau of Environmental Services and Audubon. 
However, none have a monopoly on funding or program resources. Watershed groups for 
instance have their own recurring, state level funding, which gives them an uncommon level 
of stability. Within specific units of government, spheres of planning, management and policy 
have developed strong levels of integration in recent years.169 Programs are often structured 
to achieve a bundle of benefits from biodiversity and water to social equity and public 
participation – i.e. high functional embeddedness. Policy roles generate actor networks that 
tend to follow functional lines and cross between state and non-state actors even in networks 
concerned with technical functions (functional embeddedness, cross-sector frames).170 
Audubon’s connectivity within these functional networks is impressive and rivals that of state 
actors in some situations — as will be revisited in Chapter 9. Some local councils work 
closely with Metro, while others prefer to be independent where possible. Horizontal 
collaboration between local councils is often facilitated by regulatory requirements for 
watershed management under the US Clean Water Act.171 As one informant noted…”it is 
difficult to overstate the role played by environmental legislation in how it all works in Oregon” 
(personal communication R. Margerum, 20 October 2011) 
                                                            
168 Interview participants L3, M2, B4, J2 
169 E.g. Metro acquisition program, Grey to Green initiative and Gresham Council staff,  
170 e.g. Urban Ecological Research Consortium, BES – Commission and the Meadowscaping pilot project 
171 E.g. The Johnson Creek Inter-jurisdictional Council (interview participant RI) and Tualatin council participation in the 
Tualatin river Watershed Council (Actor observation, and interview participant OR).  
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 Figure 6.3 The Portland ecological governance arena 
 
This concludes the Portland arena results. The following section compares Brisbane and 
Portland Metro to better identify contextual influences in each city and the underlying 
phenomenon of ecological governance. 
6.5 Comparing the arenas of Brisbane and Portland 
While these patterns in Portland and Brisbane are further examined and triangulated in later 
chapters, a number of conclusions can be made from this analysis. A stronger than expected 
set of commonalities were identified between Brisbane and Portland. Commonalities, in 
‘most-difference’ comparisons indicate a context independent characteristic of the 
underlying phenomenon (Section 3.4 and Campbell 2010). For instance, a similar proportion 
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of political arenas and governance resource categories can indicate an aspect of ecological 
governance that is more independent of context. Similarly, redistributive instruments in both 
case cities are entirely linked with other arenas and usually occur through instruments based 
in other arenas. As redistributive policies are characterised by higher levels of controversy 
(Peters 1992), linkages with other arenas, particularly the coercive power of regulative 
instruments may assist with stabilising this controversy, regardless of the institutional 
context. In contrast, a high proportion of constituent instruments are linked to other arenas 
in both case areas. Constituent instruments tend to be associated with a broad set of actors 
(Lowi 1972). For ecological governance, this broad set includes general public support 
around a core of advocates. Constituent instruments are therefore also likely to have 
implications for the manner in which public funds are distributed. This may explain the high 
incidence of linkage with the distributive arena amongst constituent instruments (Brisbane 
n=46 from 88 constituent instruments, Portland n=133 from 241 constituent instruments).  
Contrasts between the two cases indicate potential influences of each specific context. For 
example, distributive-regulative instruments are absent from the Brisbane sample (n=0), 
while fairly common in Portland (n=36). The nature of vertical integration with the 
Queensland regulatory framework is a likely determinant of this absence in Brisbane. 
Queensland planning legislation between 1991 and 2012 has exempted most biodiversity 
related regulation from application in urban areas — i.e. weak embeddedness of ecological 
governance in the institutional context. This means that there are few regulatory drivers to 
stimulate the development of distributive instruments with regulative linkages. Further 
supporting evidence for this claim is provided by the instruments from this category in 
Portland. In contrast with Brisbane, Portland has strong regulatory drivers in the urban area 
through the Clean Water Act (USA) and the listing of Portland salmon species under the 
Endangered Species Act (USA) in the late 1990s. With respect to distributive-regulative 
instruments and the Portland arena, virtually all are programs to distribute public funding in 
order to achieve salmon conservation and/or water quality outcomes (e.g. vegetated storm 
water facilities) – this relates to embeddedness with both institutional and biophysical 
contexts.    
As noted in the analysis above, different policy stages exhibit higher levels of participation, 
and a greater diversity of actors. These characteristics also differ between the case cities 
and across different types of instruments. In Portland there are greater numbers of ongoing 
actor collaborations involved in implementation — e.g. watershed councils, problem 
identification — e.g. UERC, and even management — e.g. some Intertwine Alliance 
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activities. A range of other actor concentrations are more temporary in nature, such as 
FAUNA advocacy campaigns and some advisory groups. These types of interactions will be 
investigated further in Chapter 8. The reason for this highly networked situation is at one 
level connected with the complex jurisdictional structure of the metropolitan area.172 
However, the analysis in Chapter 9 will show that this collaboration hasn’t occurred as a 
deterministic outcome of the Portland context. Key actors take advantage of the jurisdictional 
context and operate strategically to create and maintain these networked connections.     
The examination of ecological governance in the case cities provides useful insights into the 
general dynamics of each case and also a method of ‘opening the black box’ of governance 
arenas in order to investigate the inner complexity of the instrument mix (Latour 1987). 
However, the relative strength of these instruments needs to be interpreted in context. For 
instance, the proportion of authority-detector instruments is low in Brisbane, they are mostly 
informal, and some were identified through pattern matching with the Portland case173 rather 
than in the primary identification stage (6.2). In addition, Brisbane has a hierarchical 
structure, with urban ecological governance located in the lower echelons of urban priority. 
This knowledge about aspects of embeddedness (Figure 3.2) can explain the low incidence 
of authority-detector instruments and suggests that these instruments are comparatively 
weak.  
6.6 Arena anatomy and the implications for responsive 
governance 
The findings above are now brought together to sketch an anatomy of urban ecological 
governance arenas (Figure 6.4). The anatomy incudes three main components: governance 
resources, political arenas and instrument mixes. The core governance resources (Box 1) 
are ‘authority’ and ‘organisation’, which are flanked by ‘treasure’ and ‘nodality’ (adapted from 
Hood 1983). Policy instruments are shaped by the institutional context they are embedded 
within as they draw on these governance resources to construct programs, planning and 
policy. Instruments sit within political arenas (Box 2) and many link with a second arena. 
Assuming that commonalities between the Portland and Brisbane cases are generally true 
for ecological governance arenas (Eisenhardt 1989), a set of instrument types (Figure 6.4, 
Box 3) can be used to analyse ecological governance arenas.  
                                                            
172 Portland Participant (E1), “We have so many institutions at so many scales and so many organisations and sectors 
that it gives, it means that if you attach yourself to a particular institution or scale you’ll never see the whole resource.” 
173 Authority-detector instruments in Portland Metro are more readily identifiable and numerous than in Brisbane. 
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With respect to the labelled instrument types in Figure 6.4 (Box 3):  
 Type 1 instruments are redistributive, and their history assists with indicating the 
general trajectory of the governance arena. They include programs that are rolled up 
into other initiatives — such as the Brisbane River Plan, rolled into the Brisbane City 
Plan in 2000. They also include program and resource transfers between actors.  
 Type 2 instruments provide a regulative check of the arena. Many type 2a instruments 
are strong land use planning regulations with redistributive implications. This subtype 
has the potential to tilt the entire governance arena in a particular direction. Land use 
policy has been recognised as having redistributive and therefore controversial 
aspects (Innes de Neufville, 1981). In Brisbane these are few in number and some 
have numerous exemptions in urban areas — e.g. Vegetation Management Act 2004 
(Qld). Whereas in contrast Portland Metro exhibits a large number of these 
instruments and many have strong application in the urban setting — e.g. Portland 
E-zoning. The next type, 2b had a direct relationship with 2a in both case cities. In 
Brisbane where 2a was weak, 2b was absent, and in Portland where 2a was strong, 
2b was numerous. 2b instruments were distributive programs that sought to fulfil 
regulative requirements such as flood plain restoration projects in Portland to meet 
CWA and ESA requirements. 
 Type 3 instruments were mostly acquisition programs. In Brisbane there was one 
iconic acquisition program, while Portland had 13 programs during the case study 
period. Some of these sought to achieve regulatory requirements and therefore 
further demonstrated the strong regulative context of Portland.  
 Type 4 instruments provided a controversy check of the arena. Most of these 
instruments were visions or strategies with redistributive implications. In situations 
where actors attempted to formalise these instruments or fully implement them, they 
virtually always generated high levels of controversy — e.g. Healthy Portland 
Streams Project. In all prominent examples from both cities, type 4 instruments 
continued to play an important governance role as informal strategies for key actors, 
following the controversy concerned with their attempted formalisation.  
  
130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Governance Arena Analysis (Box 3) 
1: Redistribution check 
2: Regulation check 
3: Acquisition check 
4: Controversy check 
5: State-Community interface  
Governance Resources (Box 1)  
 adapted from Hood (1983) 
T:   Treasure 
A:   Authority 
O:   Organisation 
N:   Nodality 
 
Institutional Context 
A O 
T N 
Con Dis Reg Red 
Con 
Dis 
Reg 
Red 
1 
1 5 
4 
5 
2b 
3 2a 
Program with Policy Roles (Box 4) 
 
 Problem identification 
 
 Design and Evaluation 
 
Implementation and 
Management 
  
Actor Networks (Box 5) 
 
A: Implementation network 
B: Advocacy network 
C: Program network 
 
  
B 
A 
} Instrument Mix 1 
C 
} 
Instrument 
Mix 2 
Instrument mixes and programs 
Instruments and Political Arenas 
Figure 6.4: Governance Arena Anatomy 
Political Arenas (Box 2) 
Con =  Constituent 
Dis = Distributive 
Reg =  Regulative 
Red =  Redistributive 
131 
 
 The final type 5 was the main interface between state and community based actors. 
They included important programs that have a strong constituent linkage, such as 
Habitat groups in Brisbane (revegetation groups).  The activities in this area were 
resilient and a number of participants noted that they can be very difficult to alter once 
implemented.  
The final section of Figure 6.4 illustrates the manner in which instruments are employed 
within programs or instrument mixes (Box 4). The policy roles involved have been simplified 
to: ‘Problem identification’; ‘Policy design / Evaluation’; and ‘Management / Implementation’.  
These roles can be summarised as follows. 
 Problem identification – typically involved advocates both internal and external to 
government and often, but not always, with core interests in biodiversity and the 
natural environment. 
 Policy design – was usually carried out by government actors responsible for the 
instrument, but at times included external consultants or other government actors with 
a key stake. This important group interacted with both advocates and implementers 
as formal policy was shaped or adjusted. 
 Policy evaluation – is included with policy design in these schemata as they are often 
played by the same actor.   
 Implementation and management – included a diverse mix of actors from the 
community, government, and private sectors, although management and 
coordination was almost exclusively carried out by government.  
These roles indicate that opportunities for non-state actors to participate were greater for 
particular roles — e.g. problem identification and implementation — and within certain 
instruments — particularly public restoration and management). Figure 6.4 demonstrates 
three types of common networks that participating actors formed around instruments in 
Portland and Brisbane (Box 5). Program networks connect roles within the policy cycle, 
advocacy networks and implementation networks lie across the instrument mix with a focus 
on a particular policy role.  Some of the implications of these and other findings for 
responsive governance are briefly discussed below. Primary implications for responsive 
governance from this analysis include: influential instrument types and the need to identify 
key gaps within networks, the influence of overlapping governance arenas and the influence 
of the broader context.  
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Implications of critical instrument types 
The discussion of Figure 6.4 highlights key instrument types that can be used to diagnose 
ecological governance in a particular setting. This has strategic implications for responsive 
governance. In theory, the identification of critical instrument types can contribute to 
institutional design efforts aimed to improve the responsiveness of governance.  In addition 
the governance arena anatomy (Figure 6.4) indicates where certain instruments may be 
difficult to implement, and types that may be difficult to change once implemented. Further 
analysis of responsiveness in Chapters 8 and 9 will identify the strategies that actors use to 
refine these theoretical strategies.  
Implications of redistributive instruments and perceived 
redistribution 
The political arenas model highlights the controversy involved with redistributive policies. 
This emphasis has great explanatory power for land use planning, as illustrated by debates 
in the USA (Innes de Neufville 1981, Walker and Hurley 2011). The controversial nature of 
redistributive instruments — discussed in section 6.5 — implies that responsive governance 
will need strategies to manage this situation. Even the perception of redistribution is 
sufficient to generate resistance – as demonstrated by successful ‘property rights’ 
campaigns in Oregon. The examination of Portland and Brisbane at this point, indicates a 
range of ‘redistribution management strategies’ to craft policies that have sufficient buy-in 
from key actors.  
Implications of gaps in governance networks 
The analysis in this chapter also identified a range of interesting linkages between actors, 
instruments and political arenas. However it was observed that there are key gaps within 
governance that have implications for change. For instance, in general — and especially in 
Brisbane – there are few links between actor networks involved in planning, policy and 
management activities. Further investigation is needed to clarify the implications of this for 
responsiveness. On one hand these gaps question whether normative learning models such 
as triple loop learning can be implemented in an ongoing way (Flood and Romm, 1996). On 
the other hand, this separation is a way to achieve stability and efficiency in governance by 
partitioning these functions. For this reason, New Public Management (NPM) theorists 
recommend a clear division between policy and implementation arms of government. 
However Eakin et al. (2011) have shown that this partitioning (and the strong focus on 
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efficiency) in NPM been shown to reduce the adaptive capacity of governance by limiting 
organisational flexibility (Eakin et al. 2011) – and functional embeddedness (3.2).  
Implications of co-benefits and hybridity 
 The quantity and diversity of instruments in each case area was surprising. The range of 
types establishes the ecological governance arena as a hybrid governance model (Skelcher 
et al. 2013). Some instruments operate in a hierarchical manner, others are networked, and 
a few use trading systems to achieve environmental outcomes. The challenge of hybrid 
governance is recognised as a research need amongst some scholars (Skelcher 2012, 
Meuleman 2011) and organisation management research has identified the challenges 
involved with competing institutional logics in these situations (Reay and Hinings 2009, 
Pache and Santos 2013). In part the instrument diversity in Portland and Brisbane was 
generated by overlapping governance arenas such as open space planning, water 
management, regional planning and public participation. The ability of ecological 
governance to achieve outcomes as a co-benefit of these other arenas is a credit to its 
flexibility. The implications of this situation for responsive governance are poorly understood 
and are therefore examined further in Chapters 7 to 9. The intersections between these 
interests hold potential for collaboration or conflict. They encourage actors to resolve 
differences by finding synergies – i.e. win-win solutions – or trade-offs between their various 
interests. In this way, decisions at these intersections over time have shifted policy 
instruments, governance and institutions (Schmidt and Morrison 2012). 
The implications of the broader context 
Portland and Brisbane prioritise different instrument categories and this confirms the 
importance of understanding contextual interactions. This includes the manner in which 
instruments are structured within programs. In Brisbane, many instruments are directly 
focused on biological resource protection and management, while in Portland, ecological 
outcomes are more likely to be an ancillary benefit to instruments with a different primary 
focus — such as water quality, environmental justice, or quality of life. Portland also has a 
range of acquisition programs with biodiversity goals while Brisbane has only one iconic 
metropolitan program. Brisbane has invested heavily in restoration programs for private land 
while Portland has few activities in this category. The two cities also differ in the way 
instruments are incorporated into programs. Brisbane has a higher incidence of single-
instrument programs, but in Portland — a more complex setting — instruments are more 
likely to be packaged into initiatives or multi-instrument programs involving, for example, 
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acquisition funds, restoration, and management activities. These differences can be 
explained, in part, by each city’s institutional context, particularly the structure of local 
jurisdictions and the history of particular policy approaches.  
6.7 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the embeddedness of ecological governance in Brisbane and 
Portland by examining the linkages between instruments and political arenas. The analysis 
showed that ecological governance was structured according to different instruments, actor 
roles and political arenas.  An influence from the institutional context was evident in both 
case cities however a greater than expected set of commonalities was also identified. These 
commonalities were used to identify points within political arenas that provided a check on 
the ecological arena, its dynamics and its general trajectory of development. These findings 
contribute towards strategic management of governance arenas and institutional design 
efforts. The anatomy of governance that was established provided a clear structure to 
analyse the internal complexity of instrument mixes and actor responses to change in 
following chapters. 
The methodology developed for this analysis was sufficient for the purposes of this research, 
however a number of directions for future research were identified – in particular, a more 
extensive survey of ‘informal instruments and ’the further categorisation of instruments 
according to the ‘scale of adjustment’. First, data collected from this study can be used to 
design a survey for more extensive sampling of informal structures in future work. This would 
be useful as informal instruments are difficult to identify from documents and reports. 
Second, it would also be useful to disaggregate instruments resulting from a major 
adjustment in governance – such as a biodiversity code — from more incremental 
instrument chains – such as a series of amendments to a code. This would enable a more 
sophisticated analysis and support more robust comparisons between cases.   
This analysis has contributed towards understanding the embeddedness of governance at 
the arena level. It has analysed the instrument types throughout the case study period and 
deliberately excluded questions of temporal development to achieve its goals. The following 
chapter continues this line of enquiry by examining the embeddedness of ecological 
governance in the broader context.   
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Responsive Governance and the Problem of Context 
Embeddedness: Embeddedness part 2 
 
This chapter examines the manner in which ecological governance is embedded within its 
context (Granovetter 1985), in particular with respect to actor perspectives and governance 
structures (Figure 7.1). The analysis finds that patterns of embeddedness are significant 
influences on responsive change within the policy arena. The findings demonstrate that all 
contextual facets — i.e. biophysical, institutional and temporal — from the investigative 
framework are significant. However, the nature of embeddedness differs across policy roles, 
instruments and case settings. With respect to the case study period (1991–2012) the arena 
has become more embedded within its context over time. The results imply that actors within 
policy networks are likely to respond differently to change according to the nature of their 
embeddedness. These connections change over time and metagovernance strategies will 
need to be designed accordingly. 
           
 
  
Figure 7.1 Investigative framework and the examination of embeddedness: 
interaction and structure through the lens of context. 
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The problem of embeddedness is both a challenge for investigating the phenomenon of 
governance and a significant constraint on responses to change (refer Chapter 3). 
Ecological governance is highly context embedded, to the extent that many activities occur 
as a co-benefit of other urban governance arrangements. To give a precise definition: ‘High 
context embeddedness’ means that while some technical activities and functions are 
common between different locations, the practice and functions of governance are 
substantially generated from the political, cultural and physical setting — see section 6.6 
‘implications of the broader context’. Furthermore, embeddedness is to some extent 
reflexive. Governance actors are not only shaped by their context but also seek to reshape 
it (Abbott 2012). This chapter is concerned with the former ‘shaped by’ aspect of 
embeddedness. The latter reflexive aspect is treated in Chapters 8 and 9. 
This chapter outlines the problem of governance and contextual embeddedness, then 
reports on findings with respect to the experiential dimension – i.e. experiences of interview 
participants – and then with respect to the structural dimension – i.e. the expression of actor 
experiences within governance structures. Findings are presented for Brisbane (7.2) and 
Portland (7.3) before comparing the two cities (7.4). The chapter concludes by discussing 
the implications of contextual embeddedness for responding to change. The completion of 
the analysis establishes the ‘responsive governance 0.1’ concept in the research framework 
(Figure 3.1). 
7.1 Governance and embeddedness 
Governance is a highly context embedded phenomenon (Chapter 2) and this affects the 
manner in which it adjusts to change (3.3). The concept of embeddedness was coined by 
the economist Polyani and then applied to sociological economics (Granovetter 1985).174 
The original ‘social embeddedness’ focus was concerned with the relational ties of actors 
within a market system. Since that time the theory has been influential and has been 
expanded to examine institutional ties (Baum and Oliver 1992, Tavakoly and Beck 2013), 
environmental ties (Whiteman and Cooper 2000, Morris and Kirwan 2011) and has also 
been applied beyond market systems (Pilbeam 2013, Ansell 2003, Manning 2008). 
Embeddedness is a concept that examines the tension between the efficiency of an actor 
and its legitimacy (Fernández‐Alles and Valle‐Cabrera 2006), or as roughly translated for 
this research, between the performance of a governance arena and its recognition within 
                                                            
174 For Granovetter (1985) the concept of embeddedness is a response both to economists who undervalue the role of 
context in the decisions made by actors and institutionalists with a deterministic explanation for most phenomena. 
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the broader context. The intent of this analysis is to investigate how different contextual 
influences are distributed across different policy roles, instruments and networks in 
governance, and to gauge what this implies for responding to change. 
Biophysical, institutional175 and temporal176 embeddedness differ in their implications for 
ecological governance and responsiveness to change (3.3). Biophysical embeddedness 
relates to the impacts of the surrounding natural system on governance. It relates to notions 
of ecological embeddedness (Whiteman and Cooper 2000, Morris and Kirwan 2011) and 
social-ecological linkages (Anderies et al. 2004, Wilkinson 2012). The biophysical context 
of Brisbane and Portland is outlined in Sections 3.4, 4.2 and 4.3. A brief description of urban 
ecological resources is also presented in Section 6.1. Institutional embeddedness concerns 
the broader formal and informal connections that affect governance. These connections 
relate to governance as nested within, vertically integrated with and influenced by higher 
scale arrangements (Gibbs et al. 2002, Whitehead 2003, Paavola et al. 2009). The 
institutional context for Brisbane and Portland is outlined in Chapter 4. With respect to 
institutional embeddedness, temporal embeddedness overlaps in some regards but has a 
focus on the impact of past events, and what is valued in past events for current decision 
making.177 Temporal embeddedness within governance relates to notions of organisational 
memory (El Sawy et al. 1986, Sherif and Mandviwalla 2000, Berger and Udell 2004, Stephan 
et al. 2010) and often to path dependency (Rayner 2009, Thelen 1999).  
This chapter examines the embeddedness of ecological governance with respect to its 
broader context, i.e. the biophysical, institutional and temporal as defined by the 
investigative framework (3.3). Embedded governance was investigated both in situ and 
retrospectively. The period 2009-2012 was studied in situ, with in-depth interviews and 
participant observation occurring during this period. The retrospective analysis undertaken 
for the period between 1991 and 2008 used interviews and extensive document analysis. 
An iterative process identified the embedded arena through scoping exercises, then the 
actor referral process and finally through document analysis (3.4). Experiential and structural 
dimensions were observed by: focusing on transformative change events; correlating 
                                                            
175 Institutional embeddedness for this research relates to the structural context i.e. formal and informal arrangements.  
176 Embeddedness with respect to the temporal context in the investigative framework is referred to as historical 
embeddedness in order to avoid confusion with the notion of ‘temporal embeddedness’ used within organisational 
management theory. The notion of ‘temporal embeddedness’ in organisation management relates to the manner in 
which activities are coordinated and structured by time constraints (see Pilbeam 2013). In contrast this research is 
interested in the connections that governance has with its history and the manner in which this influences structures of 
governance and the behaviour of actors. History embeddedness relates to concepts such as path dependency and 
incremental change. 
177 Historical embeddedness here is the past oriented dimension of the temporal context. See previous footnote. 
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change in the governance arena with contextual constants — i.e. jurisdictional structure; 
and comparative analysis of equivalent structures within each metropolitan case — i.e. 
watershed groups. Interview data that had been codified as contextual embeddedness — 
i.e. biophysical, institutional and temporal — was further examined to code the main forms 
of each that were experienced by participants. Then the structural dimension was examined 
by identifying the forms of embeddedness experienced by actors within various governance 
structures. The different forms of contextual embeddedness were examined in terms of their 
interactions with other facets of the investigative framework (Figure 7.1). This approach 
therefore uses the experiential dimension to highlight features of embeddedness that frame 
and structure ecological governance, both in terms of the functions of governance and the 
roles of the actors involved.178  
The nature of embeddedness is likely to be a key determinant of responsive governance.  
Actor experiences of contextual structures – i.e. planning and management frameworks — 
indicate the extent to which ecological governance is steered by concerns that are external 
to the arena. The analysis of experiential and structural dimensions begins with Brisbane.  
7.2 The nature of embeddedness in Brisbane 
The following analysis shows that ecological governance in Brisbane has contextual 
embeddedness with: biophysical linkages that have shifted over time; temporal linkages that 
are disjointed and siloed; and institutional linkages that have strengthened over time but 
vary across the instrument mix. Many institutional linkages also show hierarchical 
characteristics. These findings concur with and add further detail to the examination of 
embeddedness in Chapters 4 and 6. As expected, some types of embeddedness 
experienced by actors are expressed by formal governance structures more readily than 
others. 
Brisbane’s ecological governance and the biophysical context 
Biophysical embeddedness relates to the links between governance and the surrounding 
natural system. In general, biophysical embeddedness in Brisbane has shifted over time. As 
noted in Chapter 4 the city is located on the flood plain and surrounding hills of the Brisbane 
                                                            
178 The critical realism approach by this research views experiential embeddedness as more than a relative social 
construction. It is based on a material reality (Stedman 2003, Carolan 2005) and this has implication for integrating 
different actor perspectives within governance decisions. Stedman (2003) asks “Are we really likely to attribute 
‘‘wilderness’’ meanings to a suburban shopping mall? I suggest that these symbols are at least partially based on some 
material reality.” 
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River. The eastern edge of the urban area is delimited by Moreton Bay, a Ramsar listed site 
and on the west by the Brisbane ranges. The river itself meanders through the urban area 
and many of the creek systems that feed into it are contained within the boundaries of the 
Brisbane City Council. The biophysical context rarely triggers transformative changes to 
environmental governance in Brisbane — the 1974 floods being a rare exception. The 
following discusses the interactions between actor experiences of the biophysical context 
and ecological governance structures.  
Experiential dimensions of embeddedness in the biophysical context 
Four main forms of biophysical embeddedness were expressed by Brisbane interview 
participants: ‘through a personal connection’; ‘as an advocate’; ‘via pragmatic intervention’ 
and ‘as a natural system’. ‘Through a personal connection’ includes themes of ‘affinity with 
nature’, ‘ambivalence with urban settings’ and ‘restoring nature in the urban setting’ (Figure 
7.2). ‘Advocacy’ includes community and state actors that make a case for stronger 
ecological governance. Pragmatic intervention refers to decision making that aims to 
harmonise ideal values with practical realities (Hildebrand 2005), and ‘as a natural system’ 
includes management and planning that considers the dynamic nature of the environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ‘personal connection’ form was rare amongst participant responses in Brisbane, 
especially the latter theme although many professional participants showed an ‘affinity with 
nature’ in more subtle ways — i.e. a number mentioned that they had purchased houses 
adjacent or close to urban natural areas and that a large proportion of environment officers 
Affinity with nature: e.g. 
I was there because I loved the bush. I didn’t join for people, although I 
have met beautiful people too. 
Ambivalence with urban settings, e.g. 
Sometimes I wonder, am I in the wrong place in a city? [because for me] 
biodiversity is a system that is restoring itself 
Restoring nature in the urban setting, e.g. 
The biodiversity I want to focus on is getting back to some sort of 
remnant flora and fauna and getting rid of pest species, pest birds. 
Figure 7.2 Personal connection with the biophysical context in Brisbane: 
themes from interview participants 
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reside in Brisbane’s leafy western suburbs.179 Personal connections developed over time 
and therefore were linked with the temporal aspect of responsive governance (Figure 3.2). 
Participants also experienced biophysical embeddedness ‘as an advocate’ for the 
environment — whether government based or community based180. Government based 
advocacy often sought better integration for environmental governance. The following 
reflection from an environmental officer illustrates the governmental, collegial and functional 
aspects of their advocacy: 
I like to meet on site with the relevant people, the engineers, the waterway managers 
and say, ‘what are you proposing, this is a habitat site, this is how it is going to 
potentially affect the habitat site, what you are planning, how can we mitigate that 
effect? How can we change our planting plans to make them more correct, because 
often what is proposed to replant by city design is not something we would advocate. 
It might be a reasonably limited species list, or we’d be worried about the removal of 
key hollow bearing trees or anything like that. So often we can advocate, to get a 
better outcome…I don’t really have time for these meetings!  
(Brisbane government participant) 
Many community-based advocates in Brisbane were first mobilised through resident actions 
groups and campaigns against the conservative state administration of Joh Bjelke-Peterson 
— i.e. civic-political and adversarial links — while mobilisation from 1990 onwards was 
usually a response to local urbanisation or infrastructure developments — e.g. construction 
of the Gateway motorway. A number of community advocates successfully linked their 
campaigns with formal policy instruments such as the acquisition program — i.e. functional 
links. 
[For most of the last 20 years our] suburb was developing. So there was always bits 
of land that were going to be bulldozed and bits of bush and so we would go from 
one foot to the other. Hearing bulldozers and saying ‘what’s that!’ or seeing 
development applications up in another spot…we did stop some of it…if you drive 
towards the creek you will see an area there that was saved...they had put the water 
and sewerage in and then the council had to buy back some allotments. They bought 
it back through the acquisition fund. (Community-based Brisbane participant) 
                                                            
179 Participant SB8  
180 An interesting but somewhat indirect form of advocacy also occurred through memes such as the oft repeated 
‘Brisbane is Australia’s biodiversity capital’. 
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In contrast, and not surprisingly, state-based participants — and contracted professionals 
— rarely expressed an idealistic view of urban biodiversity.181 Instead, their biophysical 
embeddedness tended towards ‘pragmatic intervention’ and planning – i.e. rational and 
functional links.  
…with the new planning scheme and what’s been done through acquisition we are 
going to have largely set the landscape in the city in terms of…what areas are 
primarily managed for nature conservation, [and] what areas are perhaps a mix of 
uses…we’ve moved out of that to establish the network [phase] and you’ve had wins 
and losses along the way. It won’t be an ideal [biodiversity] network. Then you look 
at consolidation, restoration…to enhance the resilience of that network and get it 
to…the optimum size and shape that we can achieve. 
The final form of biophysical embeddedness is “as a natural system.” In this form the 
environment is experienced as dynamic and was often related to extreme weather events. 
Actors involved in on ground works and their management particularly mentioned the 
millennium drought (~2000–2010), the gap storm (2009) and the 2011 Brisbane flood. 
Habitat Brisbane…changed policies in the drought – water policies and planting 
policies… In the drought we could do no watering, it was stopped, we couldn’t use 
our hoses; they tried to get us to lay off the planting and focus more on weeding and 
natural regeneration and planting drought tolerant species. They gave us some plant 
lists and said this is what you should be planting rather than the soft stuff… I suppose 
from about 2000 to 2010 those changes were in place. And that was mainly driven 
through the Habitat Brisbane officer rather than a centrally controlled sort of thing.   
(Community-based participant) 
Biophysical embeddedness as a ‘natural system’ is a more recent trend than other forms 
identified in Brisbane — i.e. ‘personal connection’, ‘advocate’ and ‘pragmatic intervention. 
Participants noted the shift from planting and watering, to more efficient natural regeneration 
techniques. However these adjustments were not common or easy, particularly where 
commercial contracts and were involved. 
  
                                                            
181 E.g. “So I guess, restoration and conservation for the purposes of biodiversity I don’t have a purist angle on 
it…because I think essentially it is corrupted as far as it being, an actually useful or achievable term.” 
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[At the height of the drought], mulch went from $6 a cube [m3] to $23 a cube overnight 
… so we went from a cut throat pricing scenario to a situation where we couldn’t 
source at the right price. We asked for an extension to the contract because of that, 
but they said, sorry too bad that’s the contract. 
These situations showed general low levels of linkage – in particular, functional and 
governmental, temporal and rational aspects of responsive governance. 
Many participants with high biophysical embeddedness also showed high levels of place-
attachment to urban ecological resources. Although detailed examinations of individual 
place-attachment was beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that community 
based governance actors showed a strong commitment to particular sites across the city 
that hold special value.  
Structural dimensions of embeddedness in the biophysical context 
Experiential dimensions of the biophysical context are unevenly distributed across 
governance structures (Table 7.1). Different instrument types also trended over time as 
ecological governance developed and the social context changed. Advocacy 
embeddedness in Brisbane decreased over time, especially advocacy by government 
officers.182 However ‘pragmatic’ and more recently, ‘natural system’ embeddedness has 
increased, especially in management and implementation roles.183 The problem 
identification’ stage of policy showed higher ‘personal connection’ and ‘advocacy’ 
embeddedness. The policy design and implementation stages showed higher ‘pragmatic 
intervention’; and on-ground works and their management were most likely to show ‘natural 
system’ embeddedness. 
  
                                                            
182 Participant 1: “There were activists who helped set up the Environment Branch [in BCC]”  
 Participant 2: “They [environment officers in the mid-1990s], “were on the right side of the biodiversity agenda“ (i.e. 
environmentalist)…”the guys there [BCC Environment Branch] now wouldn’t be game to stick their heads up” 
Participant 3: For BCC staff to be…“talking to you (Interviewer) right now (2011)…its high risk stuff!” 
183 Please note: the reduction in ‘advocacy’ embeddedness amongst government staff at the time of interviews also 
needs to be understood within the specific context of staff cutbacks resulting from the global financial crisis, and the 
political environment within BCC in the lead up to Campbell Newman’s - Mayor of BCC at the time - state election 
campaign. However there is a longer term trend that can’t be completely explained by these time-specific events.  
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Table 7.1 Policy instrument categories and biophysical embeddedness in Brisbane 
Policy 
instrument 
categories 
Biophysical embeddedness tendencies 
Developmental 
Trends 
Problem 
identification 
Policy 
design and 
evaluation 
Management 
and 
implementation  
Acquisition 
Advocacy, 
Pragmatic 
Pragmatic Pragmatic 
Improved technical 
information, contemporary 
purchases likely to need 
greater rehabilitation (narrower 
advocacy)  
Increasing management 
budget has driven stronger 
pragmatism 
Regulation 
Advocacy, 
Pragmatic 
Pragmatic Pragmatic 
Earlier regulation and planning 
was more prescriptive, shift to 
integrated and performance 
based in the late 1990s/early 
2000s  (i.e. stronger 
pragmatism) 
Public 
restoration 
and 
management 
Advocacy, 
Pragmatic 
Pragmatic 
Pragmatic, 
Personal 
Natural system 
Slow uptake of ecological 
restoration methods. Fostered 
by BCC environmental officers 
(i.e. stronger natural systems), 
stronger consideration of flood 
events in plantings. (i.e. 
pragmatism and natural 
systems) 
Private 
restoration 
and 
management 
Personal 
Pragmatic, 
Personal 
Pragmatic, 
Personal 
Natural system 
Moderate uptake of ecological 
restoration methods (natural 
systems), difficult adjustments 
to drought and flood 
(pragmatism) 
Watershed 
management 
groups 
Advocacy 
Advocacy, 
Pragmatic 
Pragmatic,  
Natural system 
Increased involvement in land 
management issues, 
enterprise development and 
neighbourhood planning 
(pragmatic) 
 
Particular networks tended to connect with the biophysical context in different ways. 
Community networks and advocacy, planning or environmental management networks and 
pragmatic intervention, research networks and ‘rational-evaluation’. In particular, the 
‘personal connection’ form was more easily expressed within some — i.e. environmental — 
networks, whereas it was present but rarely obvious amongst policy instruments.  
A final observation about structural dimensions is that the landscape itself contributes to the 
structuring of governance. Local government collaboration, watershed groups and 
community management groups exemplify this in Brisbane. Landscape structuring with 
respect to local government collaboration is a function of the interplay between jurisdictional 
boundaries and watershed boundaries (3.3 governmental aspect). In Brisbane, most creek 
watersheds do not cross jurisdictional boundaries, hence the management of watersheds in 
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Brisbane does not promote collaboration with neighbouring councils. Landscape structuring 
with respect to watershed groups results in a deficit of social capital for environmental 
governance in particular areas (3.3 civic-political aspect). For example, the configuration of 
creek watersheds results in the main Brisbane river corridor falling outside the territories of 
watershed groups. This means that the major environmental asset in Brisbane does not 
have a dedicated community group acting in a stewardship role.184 Community management 
groups also demonstrate landscape structuring of governance. These groups had a stronger 
role, in the early 1990s, but portray an interesting model of ‘establish then steward’ (3.3 
functional and collegial aspects). In this fashion, as large natural areas were purchased and 
formally established — a community management group also was established. Community 
stewards were structured around that landscape feature.185   
Brisbane’s ecological governance and the temporal context 
Temporal embeddedness relates to the links between contemporary governance and its 
preceding timeline. Most Brisbane participants began their narrative of ecological 
governance in the early 1990s with the commencement of the Habitat Brisbane or Bushland 
acquisition programs. However, the analysis finds temporal embeddedness in Brisbane to 
be disjointed and institutional memory partially siloed within certain organisations. The 
Brisbane case is also interesting with respect to the social transition underway at the 
beginning of the case study timeline. In 1991: the long lasting conservative Bjelke-Peterson 
government had been recently removed from office (1987); an inquiry into corruption was 
completed (1989); and far reaching reforms were beginning to be implemented (1991 
onwards). Until that time, according to one environmental activist, “Brisbane had more in 
common with some Eastern European countries than with Portland Oregon!” There is a 
certain level of hyperbole in this statement, but regardless, a couple of long term participants 
in Brisbane were strongly radicalised by their experiences under the Bjelke-Peterson 
government during the 1970s and 1980s and continue even now to advocate for progressive 
social change.186 In her PhD thesis, Elizabeth Eddy (1996) examines the green movement 
in South East Queensland over the period of the Bjelke-Peterson government and notes the 
                                                            
184 Recently the watershed group at Bulimba Creek has recognised the lack of social capital in the Brisbane river 
corridor and has facilitated revegetation events in an effort to remedy the situation. Interestingly these were done in 
partnership with non-state actors and forums operating above the watershed scale — Brisbane Catchments Network 
and SEQ Catchments.    
185 Participant: “When Soorley got in [as Lord Mayor in 1991] one, the first things he did with that [land acquisition fund] 
was to acquire the Boondall wetlands. And took on the model of natural area management where he would involve local 
community groups in implementing the management plans for natural areas in Brisbane. It’s a largely abandoned model 
now, but it was quite strong in the interim.” 
186 BC1, BC6,  
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strongly adversarial relationship between state and green groups. More generally, Fitzgerald 
(1989) notes that: 
There are a number of powers presently [in 1989] exercised by law enforcement 
officers which are particularly intrusive. Searches of body cavities and the electronic 
monitoring and recording of communications are such powers. Wider powers to allow 
for the detention of persons for the purpose of interrogation and the compulsory 
production of documents and exhibits and answering of questions are powers that 
limit traditional individual rights.    (Fitzgerald 1989, Section 5.3.3) 
Some interview participants agreed that environmental and social change advocates were 
harassed and surveilled by police in the years preceding the case study period. This 
immediate history is important for understanding temporal embeddedness in Brisbane and 
interpreting the high levels of energy amongst some actors at the beginning of the study 
period – i.e. adversarial, governmental and civic-political  
Well in 1991 we were just transiting to democracy! 1988 Joh was out, and the Nats 
[National Party] only finished in ‘89 when Goss was elected…which then became 
legal to do environmental activism activities and openly criticise the government and 
it was the end of being followed around by the secret police!   
(Community-based participant) 
Experiential dimensions of embeddedness in the temporal context 
Participant experiences of temporal embeddedness were codified according to three 
variables: breadth, coverage and directionality. ‘Breadth’ is the specificity of the timeline that 
participants communicated. This varied from narrow program specific histories through to 
cross-sectoral views of ecological governance. ‘Coverage’ is the proportion of the 1991–
2012 timeline of which participants were aware, whether first hand or otherwise. While 
‘directionality’ is the extent to which governance was perceived as developing and improving 
over time. Concerning ‘breadth’, those involved early in the timeline had a broad frame. They 
acknowledged state and non-state contributions to ecological governance – i.e. functional 
(3.3). However, those whose experience began in the second half of the timeline – post 
2002 — tended to frame the temporal context more narrowly. For example: a number of 
community-based actors framed the timeline as one of non-state achievements – i.e. civic-
political, or of ongoing contention with state actors - i.e. adversarial; similarly, many state 
actors spoke only of state actor achievements or viewed public contributions as problematic 
– governmental and adversarial respectively. Some, even more narrowly, preferred to speak 
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only with respect to their organisational or program responsibilities. These effects of 
‘breadth’ are further accentuated by the nature of temporal ‘coverage’.   
Of the thirty Brisbane interview participants, just five were involved in governance for the 
entire case period. This in itself suggests that the temporal context of the Brisbane arena is 
not extensively accessible to current actors. Approximately 50% of contemporary 
participants were involved in Brisbane’s ecological governance for less than ten years, 
although some had been involved in other places previously to Brisbane. Other Brisbane 
participants had been involved, very prominently for three to five years during the 1990s 
before moving on to other work. The perspectives of these people were invaluable for 
understanding the earlier portions of the Brisbane timeline. The coverage of the Brisbane 
timeline is disjointed and mid to short term for many contemporary actors. The following, 
was a common reply from Brisbane respondents with respect to questions about 
governance activities between 1991 and 2012.  
That’s a tough one for me to answer because I haven’t been involved … that long. I 
think it has been refined, I wouldn’t say changed. I know that we did originally have 
some planning documents that have probably become a little bit obsolete now. And 
the scope…has probably enlarged quite a bit since the original days. So I would say 
that it has changed over time, but I couldn’t tell you how, because I haven’t seen a 
lot of the 20 years old documentation.  
Of course, few employees know a 20 year history of their workplace. However comments 
from other Brisbane participants suggest that other factors contributed to this situation.  
If you were to talk to a management expert in the western countries and say how are 
we better than a third world country... They would say we have much greater 
managerial efficiency. Because we revise management processes, we updated them 
with new thinking in management. But from my observations in government that jerks 
people around big time. That every year or every 2 years you’ve got the latest thinking 
in managerial thinking and style so you get constant restructuring of departments and 
different ways of doing things... I think that’s a serious problem in terms of retaining 
institutional memory. Even at the level of pissing people off so that they leave and go 
and get another job when they get sick of it…there’s massive loss of institutional 
knowledge when people get moved between departments. I don’t think Brisbane is in 
a good situation in that regard … I’ve been amazed at some of the decisions at the 
top when they’d throw out stuff and I’d grab it out of the bin. 
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These experiences of departmental reorganisation correlate with periods listed in Table 7.2 
– correlation between historical events and disjointed aspects of timeline data. They have a 
critical effect on the institutional memory of government, however for many state 
participants, regular machinery of government changes are a normal part of their working 
life. 
We are talking a dozen years ago probably. My dates will be a little sketchy I’m afraid! 
There has been so many changes that it has been hard to keep up with when they 
happened. And that is a pretty common thing…it’s a continuum of change… 
Table 7.2 Correlation between historical events and disjointed aspects of timeline 
data collected from Brisbane interview participants. 
Event/Period Correlation with data collection 
Late–1980s to mid–1990s: Early 
development of formal governance 
and prominent role of Greening 
Australia 
A set of actors with early involvement but little connection 
after the internalisation of key activities within BCC that 
were formally carried out by Greening Australia. (e.g. 
facilitation of the Habitat Brisbane program) 
Early to mid–1990s: Expansion of 
environmental branch to survey and 
implement VPOs and later 
rationalisation following this task 
Hiring of some key actors that have maintained 
participation. Others had extensive involvement during 
this time which became sporadic as the need for 
surveying tapered away 
2004 Shift from Labor party Mayor 
(centre left) to Liberal party Mayor 
(centre right)  
Data from community-based actors about internal BCC 
processes becomes increasingly distant as political and 
administrative approaches to public participation shifts 
2007 Transfer of water services to the 
regional and state level and transfer of 
creek rangers program from 
waterways division to LAS 
Pause in development of integrated water management, 
low levels of data connecting water and ecological 
governance arenas 
2007–2011 ‘2 Million Trees’ project  Multiple management stages reflected by actors involved 
for periods of the project, but with little knowledge of 
events preceding or following their involvement 
Recent (2011) downsizing in response 
to the GFC 
Some current actors cautious to speak openly about 
matters outside of their strict position description 
Abbreviations: BCC is ‘Brisbane City Council’; VPO is ‘Vegetation Protection Order’; GFC is ‘Global Financial Crisis’ 
Actors also perceived a continuum of change in ecological governance. Although some 
aspects of change over time are perceived as non-directional or a political pendulum, many 
changes are framed in terms of development or directionality. 
Mt Petrie road ran up there and people used to drive cars in there and strip them and 
burn them and we would have bushfires every year…I think we took over 2000 tyres 
away one year. So programs like [Clean up Australia]…it was enormous 
initially…now it is a minor part, now we don’t really need to do it. I mean we have 
done all the big stuff. 
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Other participants saw a directional mode to the development of practice away from a strict 
preservationist approach. 
` Yes, things have changed. Early on there seemed to be talk of John Oxley’s journals 
to decide what to plant where. For example down at the arboretum they wanted to do 
a rainforest planting [because that was the original ecosystem] …I more saw it that 
we needed to restore what was [now growing] there rather than try and put it back 
the way it was. BCC was more rigid. [BCC originally] seemed more about planting 
natives than restoring bushland integrity, but now this has changed.  
Temporal embeddedness also includes significant losses and challenges from the past.187 
Some of these continued to significantly colour the interactions between actors up to 15 
years later although despite these events, actors confirm that ecological governance has 
achieved much over time: 
Just a few changes!…Every single gully grate that goes out in Brisbane is stamped 
with the words, “Dump no waste, flows to creek”, whereas we used to have to get 
school kids to go around and stencil it on…There was no EPAct [Environmental 
Protection Act], there now is. There was no NCA [Nature Conservation Act], there 
now is…there was no bushland protection levy, there were no vegetation protection 
orders, there now are, there was no state legislated vegetation management, there 
now is. There was no annualised monitoring of tree clearing rates and there now 
is…Just a few changes! You see what I mean? (Brisbane environmental activist) 
Structural dimensions of embeddedness in the temporal context 
Temporal embeddedness varied across policy roles and instruments (Table 7.3), especially 
between state and community actors. A narrow temporal framing was more likely in policy 
roles that have extensive overlap with other policy arenas or technical professions. In 
contrast, instruments with strong community participation were more likely to have a broad 
framing. Temporal coverage varies according to the length of time a participant has been 
involved, which as mentioned previously can be quite recent. Some programs such as creek 
rangers are noted for a high turnover amongst staff. Over time, directionality has reduced 
and framing has narrowed in many instruments. Many programs have reached capacity 
                                                            
187 For example, the ‘disappearance’ of the BCC-Brisbane Biodiversity Strategy, the failure of the Core Biodiversity 
Network to be formalised as policy and the instalment of George Deen (developer with a notorious reputation amongst 
environmentalists) as president of OCCA in 1997.  
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(governmental aspect), some roles have become more technical (rational aspect), and some 
functions are more strongly steered by non-environmental BCC actors (functional aspect).  
Due to the generally disjointed access to historical developments, long-term participants are 
particularly valued as important sources of institutional memory, although the need for this 
history often is not stressed within programs that have been established for long periods of 
time.  In addition, temporally embedded individuals were not usually networked across the 
Brisbane arena. So institutional memory is to a large degreed siloed within particular BCC 
units or watershed groups. Some actors developed their own low level processes to record 
institutional memory on websites and in archives. One individual had authored a book about 
archiving organisational knowledge in community-based groups.   
Table 7.3 Policy instrument categories and temporal embeddedness in Brisbane 
Policy 
instrument 
categories 
Temporal embeddedness and policy roles 
Problem identification 
Policy design and 
evaluation 
Management and 
implementation  
Acquisition 
(Bushland 
Acq. 
Program) 
Broad framing 
High coverage 
Medium/Low 
directionality 
Narrow framing 
High coverage 
High directionality 
Narrow framing 
Medium/Low coverage 
Medium directionality 
Regulation 
(Natural 
Assets Local 
Law) 
Narrow framing 
Medium coverage 
Low directionality 
Broad framing 
Medium/High coverage 
Medium directionality 
Broad framing 
Broad coverage 
Medium directionality 
Public 
restoration 
and 
management 
[Undetermined] 
Broad framing 
Medium coverage 
Medium/Low 
directionality 
Broad framing 
Medium/Low coverage 
Low directionality 
Private 
restoration 
and 
management 
Broad framing 
Medium/Low coverage 
Medium/Low 
directionality 
Broad framing 
High/Medium coverage 
Low directionality 
Narrow/Medium framing 
Medium/Low coverage 
Medium/High 
directionality 
Creek 
Rangers and 
catchment 
coordinators 
Narrow/Medium framing 
High coverage 
Low directionality 
 
Narrow framing 
Medium coverage 
Low directionality 
Broad framing 
Medium coverage 
[Undetermined 
directionality] 
 
 
Brisbane’s ecological governance and the institutional context 
Institutional-context embeddedness is the linkage between governance and surrounding 
institutional structures. In general, institutional linkages with ecological governance have 
strengthened over time although this trend varies across the instrument mix and is shaped 
by the hierarchical structure of Brisbane City Council (BCC). Brisbane is administered by 
one large metropolitan council and the resulting hierarchical structure has significant 
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implications for the ecological governance arena. (Figure 7.3). A side-view would show the 
hierarchical nature of this arrangement with BCC internal stakeholders and core-policy 
arenas positioned above ecological governance – i.e. governmental and functional aspects. 
This metropolitan context is important for interpreting the experiences of actors and 
considering the manner in which they connect with ecological governance structures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 7.3 Structural dimensions of institutional embeddedness in urban ecological 
governance in Brisbane. Key: Ecological governance is green; other policy arenas and processes are 
red, BCC internal stakeholders are purple; and other aspects of BCC are blue 
 
Experiential dimensions of embeddedness in the institutional context 
The following discussion outlines participant experiences of the institutional context, and the 
manner in which these experiences connect with ecological governance structures. Three 
forms of institutional embeddedness were expressed by interview participants: facilitators; 
‘overlapping policy arenas and processes’; and ‘institutional stressors’ — e.g. urban 
development. The latter category will be examined in Chapter 8 with respect to the 
adjustments governance makes to institutional stressors. The following section presents 
findings on the former two categories of institutional embeddedness.   
First, ‘facilitators’ were largely expressed in terms of ‘funding’, which is not surprising given 
the largely non-commercial nature of ecological governance. Funding involves institutional 
linkages of some type and just as defunding was a significant stressor, new funding (public 
and private) was celebrated and remembered for its facilitative role.. Ecological governance 
actors in Brisbane have a history of seeking to generate their own revenue streams. This 
entrepreneurial approach facilitated activity in carbon markets and community nurseries, 
Key 
1 
2 
5 
4 
3 
1 Brisbane City Council (BCC) 
2 Ecological governance arena,  
3 Overlapping processes that are 
independent of BCC  
e.g. corporate partnerships and 
sponsorship of watershed groups 
4 BCC Internal stakeholders  
e.g. Waterways Branch, City Design 
5 Policy arenas that involve other BCC 
internal stakeholders and overlap 
with ecological governance interests  
e.g. urban planning and development 
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environmental management services and the policy arenas.188 Hence market institutions 
became embedded into ecological governance through these activities. 
Second, ‘overlapping policy arenas and processes’ were numerous (Table 7.4) and had 
strong functional aspects. These functional links supported a range of influences and 
opportunities. ‘Overlapping policy areas and processes’ varied in terms of the functional 
links that were supported, their scale of operation and the extent to which other BCC actors 
participated therein. These variations had functional and governmental implications 
respectively.  
Table 7.4 Arenas overlapping with ecological governance in Brisbane 
Overlapping arena189 Type of overlap Brisbane examples 
Biophysical science Global professional practice Queensland Museum (state actor)  
Development Industry Regional industry (with City 
Planning division) 
Delphin (at Forest Lake) 
Horticulture Trade practice (with Council 
Parks/Ward teams) 
Parks contractors and ward teams 
(metropolitan actors) 
Ecosystem restoration 
/ Environmental 
Management 
Global professional practice Ecosystem rehabilitation panel (i.e. 
preferred contractors at BCC) 
Industry partners General private sector Suncorp (corporate volunteer 
program) 
Infrastructure Regional/national  industry Powerlink (regional actor) 
Neighbourhood Localised Socio-political 
dynamics  
Community involvement in 
watershed groups (local actors) 
Planning Global professional practice BCC Planning division, Planning 
consultancies 
Political Local and State electoral cycles Mayor Campbell Newman 
campaign for state premier 
Recreation Regional interest group Mountain-bike networks 
Roads and drainage Internal council stakeholder – 
engineering and management 
BCC Roads and drainage division 
Water Internal council stakeholder 
(scaled up to regional/state 
governance in mid 2000s) 
BCC Waterways division, 
Queensland Urban Utilities, Qld 
Water Commission 
Abbreviation: BCC is the Brisbane City Council 
 
Some overlaps operated at global and national scales as with professional arenas and 
global best practice; while others, such as neighbourhood arenas operated at a sub-
metropolitan scale. In effect these overlaps formed cross-scale linkages, a feature that is 
recognised as important for adaptive systems (Termeer 2010). Cross-scale linkages have 
                                                            
188 For example: BCC’s 2 Million trees project (original incarnation); The SOWN community nursery and OCCA’s 
Biodiversity Services Unit. 
189 Indigenous heritage is an increasingly important overlapping arena in many settings of ecological governance. This 
research did not identify a significant overlap of ecological governance with Indigenous heritage in the metropolitan 
area. 
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functional implications because overlapping arenas that link to different scales or though 
different urban functions are likely to support different responses to change. Overlapping 
arenas often involved BCC actors who were not directly involved in ecological governance, 
however the overlap between ecological governance and the responsibilities of these actors 
had clear implications. For example, the design of a greenfield development is the 
responsibility of the BCC planning division, but also has significant implications for ecological 
resources on and adjacent to the development site. By the end of the study timeframe, 
BCC’s preferred process in these types of situations was to carry out an internal stakeholder 
check – whereby BCC actors could dialogue with each other about the implications of a 
decision for their respective responsibilities, before actors external to BCC became involved. 
In these situations the functional implications of overlapping arenas also had strong 
governmental implications – i.e. hierarchical structures and managerial governance. 
In general these overlaps were moderated also through planning and management 
processes — and while many decisions tended to prioritise the other arenas, some decisions 
were made with a focus on biodiversity — e.g. culverts under the Gateway Motorway to 
facilitate animal movement.190 It is important to note the complexity of internal coordination 
within BCC due its size and the associated difficulty of connecting with stakeholders beyond 
a particular organisational section. 
Council’s got 7000 employees and it’s really hard. I’ve worked for council for [more 
than 5] years now and I still don’t know who to talk to about everything. It’s really 
challenging. Often you don’t find out about these things that are going on in another 
section of council until it’s almost too late. We try to be inclusive, but unfortunately we 
can’t always succeed. 
‘Institutional processes’ was the final form of institutional embeddedness discussed by 
participants. These can be grouped into levels of stability, for example: regulation,191 
planning, policy192 and regional coordination.193 These processes often extended beyond 
not only ecological governance, but also the metropolitan level. Table 7.5 provides examples 
of this multi-level — and multi-arena — embeddedness.   
                                                            
190 Participants: W2, V1. 
191 Aside from the NALL, regulation in Brisbane sits at state (and occasionally federal) government levels.  
192 Policy transfer was commonly mentioned, such as the environmental levy, or offset policy possibilities that had been 
investigated in other settings. 
193 Regional coordination through the SEQ Regional plan and the SEQNRM plan was particularly mentioned. 
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Table 7.5 Example institutional processes and embedding beyond the metropolitan level in 
Brisbane 
Level of process Process Type Example 
SEQ region Regional coordination SEQ Regional Plan,  
SEQ NRM Plan 
State (Queensland) Regulation for land 
acquisition 
Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) 
State (Queensland) Regulation for local 
government 
City of Brisbane Act 1926 (Qld)  
City of Brisbane Act 2010 (Qld) 
National Policy transfer Landcare Program 
Profession/Global Policy transfer Offset policy development 
Profession/Global Spatial technologies GIS mapping 
 
Structural dimensions of embeddedness in the institutional context 
The institutional context also shows an uneven distribution across policy instrument and 
network structures. Over time actors in Brisbane have shown a general increase of 
institutional embeddedness into the ecological governance arena, in particular, regional 
coordination, legal input and BCC-internal stakeholder overlap (Table 7.6).  
However embeddedness has to a certain extent flowed both ways. Particularly with respect 
to the embedding of ecological concerns into planning and development arenas.  
So basically what happened was the big stick happened, which means that councils 
had to comply, developers had to comply. Federal and State departments, private 
people had to comply with tree protection and restoration orders… As the compliance 
pressure builds, it stimulated a lot more activity, which means that if somebody 
wrecked something, there was an obligation to fix it. If there was something already 
there then there was more pressure to maintain or keep it, rather than let it be 
destroyed. That has increased significantly over the last 20 years… So that increases 
the industry that follows to do the work…the people who grow the plants, the people 
who decide to do environmental science and get a job somewhere, the landscape 
architects , the restoration people who design projects. There’s an expansion of 
people with expertise who are involved in that sector. So the spin-off is that the sector 
has increased because there are more obligations to do the work. 
Many of the adjustments to facilitate this stronger embedding, concern a more precise and 
technical approach to practice – stronger functional embeddedness was facilitated with 
stronger instrumental rationality (Dryzek 1987a) 
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Table 7.6 Policy instrument categories and institutional embeddedness in Brisbane 
Policy 
instrument 
categories 
Example overlapping arenas 
Developmental 
Trends 
Problem 
identification 
Policy 
design and 
evaluation 
Management 
and 
implementation  
Acquisition 
Planning 
Development 
  
Planning 
Political 
Legal 
Rates levy 
Funding 
Environmental 
management, 
Property market 
Increased involvement of 
BCC-internal 
stakeholders, especially 
those involved in land 
management. More 
precise mapping and 
science with respect to 
the ecological network. 
Greater willingness to 
compulsorily resume land 
in order to complete 
corridors 
Regulation 
Public 
Roads and 
drainage  
Planners 
Legal 
Science 
BCC-
Compliance, 
BCC-asset 
services , 
Ecological 
science 
Stronger integration of 
other values related to 
urban vegetation – e.g. 
aesthetics and safety and 
increased involvement of 
ecologists in compliance 
Public 
restoration 
and 
management 
Legal 
BCC-
workplace 
safety 
BCC-funding 
Social Capital194 
Neighbourhood 
Stronger legal and 
insurance advice that 
limits the role of 
volunteers (e.g. 
chainsaws) 
Private 
restoration 
and 
management 
Property 
market 
Legal 
Environmental 
management 
Legal, 
Public 
support195 
Policy transfer (Land for 
Wildlife), regional 
coordination and overlap 
with legal with respect to 
covenants 
Watershed 
management 
groups 
Science, 
Environmental 
management 
Science 
Industry 
Government 
Community 
Political 
support196 
Implementation of 
regional planning. Scale 
up of water provision to 
the regional level 
(affected metropolitan 
water planning) 
 
                                                            
194 “Some people have criticised it [Habitat Brisbane program] because in terms of quantity of habitat restored….it’s not 
thousands of hectares…but that’s not the point of it. It’s completely not the point. It’s a priceless investment if you are 
looking at the social benefits”. (BCC staffer) 
195 “Because of the regional approach there is more kudos attached to the [Land for Wildlife] program. Because of this 
community awareness and involvement it would be difficult to completely shut the program down. There would have to 
be consultation and negotiation with the community around what else was going to be offered.” Brisbane participant 
196 “…we [watershed groups] fall into that category of being political propaganda almost in that we are a touchy feel 
good program. That has political impact as opposed to someone on my level who’s out there mowing lawns and cutting 
trees. That role doesn’t get them votes, where as we at least do because we are a community face”. 
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A final observation about structural dimensions of institutional embeddedness concerns the 
structuring provided by jurisdictional boundaries. The large jurisdiction of BCC provides 
economy of scale in terms of council budgets. The council is a similar size to a small 
province. This means that BCC has higher levels of responsibility for urban functions and a 
more complex internal structure than the average local government. Accordingly, BCC has 
higher needs for confidentiality and functional integration, which results in lower levels of 
community participation and public access than is common for local government units.  
7.3 The nature of embeddedness in Portland 
The following analysis shows that the contextual embeddedness of ecological governance 
in Portland has: biophysical linkages that are underpinned by regulative and cultural 
institutions; temporal linkages that are broad, extensive and strongly directional; and 
institutional linkages that display networked characteristics and embeddedness into other 
arenas. As expected, some types of embeddedness experienced by actors were taken up 
more readily into formal governance structures than others.    
Portland’s ecological governance and the biophysical context 
The links between governance and the surrounding natural system in Portland are 
underpinned by regulative and cultural institutions. As noted in Chapter 4 the metropolitan 
area is located at the confluence of the Columbia and Willamette Rivers. The Columbia 
River floodplain in located the north, forested hills in the centre and south, and the Tualatin 
basin to the west. The original ecosystems ranged from coniferous Douglas Fir forests, to 
mixed broadleaf deciduous trees, oak woodland to significant wetland systems. Federal 
legislation for species protection and water quality has triggered many of the shifts in the 
ecological governance of Portland. The following discusses the interactions between actor 
experiences of the biophysical construct and ecological governance structures.  
Experiential dimensions of embeddedness in the biophysical context 
Embeddedness with the biophysical context was codified into four forms, three of which are 
in common with Brisbane: ‘through a personal connection; ‘as an advocate’ and ‘as a natural 
system’. The fourth is ‘integrated benefits’ and after outlining the former categories this 
section drills down into this distinctive form of embeddedness.  
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The value of ‘a personal connection’ with urban nature was commonly expressed. For 
example: 
…I love birds! So you’ll hear me talk about them a lot. But people who live here … 
appreciate the green-ness, and appreciate having birds in their yard, and that is 
reflected in the two bond measures that were voted in. People here really value the 
importance of nature and wildlife, some just for protecting it, not just for accessing it. 
(Portland state actor) 
The clearest numerical evidence of ‘personal connection’ is the growth in Portland Audubon 
membership from six to twelve thousand members as the group shifted from a traditional 
environmental organisation to one with a strong urban focus (~1980). Personal connection 
was also expressed as a sense of place that incorporated local natural areas within the 
concept of ‘neighbourhood’. 
This park used to be a really underused, under-appreciated natural area. And through 
all of these things … [i.e. community volunteering and council support]…it has 
become a place that a lot of people really love. It used to be…just a place the train 
went through … [but] now it’s become a place that, everyone thinks it deserves to be 
taken care of and now there are more places where everyone thinks they deserve to 
be taken care of beyond that. (‘Friends group’ leader) 
The biophysical context ‘as a natural system’ was evident in attitudes about adaptation to 
climate change and the need for urban areas to be viewed as part of a larger natural system 
(i.e. salmon runs through urban areas). It was also expressed clearly through scientific 
research and monitoring (3.3 rational aspect), which was very prevalent in Portland.  
We have the listed salmon and steelhead going through our entire system and then 
we have the Clean Water Act violations. In some ways these very negative things 
have forced this community to think very, very hard about the science.  
Embeddedness ‘as an advocate’ for the environment, was also common in Portland. It was 
expressed by state actors and non-state actors in terms of individual action, but also as part 
of a larger advocacy movement. 
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And for the next 15 years every year on that anniversary people from government 
and non-government groups would gather there and celebrate. And we would plot! 
We would talk about what we had done in the last year and what we were going to 
do next! 
The roles played by Audubon in the Portland case, illustrates the main avenues for 
advocacy, occasionally through litigation and protest (i.e. adversarial and civil-political), but 
usually via participation in citizen committees and similar forums (i.e. functional and 
collegial).197 For advocates, this collaborative role involved an interesting tension between 
biophysical embeddedness as ‘personal connection’, ‘advocacy’ and the final category of 
‘integrated benefits’.  
Sometimes I get frustrated because we are talking about everything but biodiversity, 
it is about human health and as an advocate there is part of me that wants to say…this 
has intrinsic value too. We share this planet…but when you are up against people’s 
economic interests and property rights, there better be more compelling arguments 
than simply intrinsic value. You do get the…I am doing what for fish? Or a bug? 
 (Portland environmental advocate) 
The final form of biophysical embeddedness, ‘integrated benefits’ concerns the experience 
of urban ecologies as a co-benefit of other urban functions – i.e. functional aspects. 
Ecological governance was seen as a component of: programs that aimed for a bundle of 
benefits; urban liveability198; and as a legal necessity. Within this frame, the term 
‘biodiversity’ was usually avoided or downplayed. 
’Green spaces’, ‘open spaces’, ‘nature in the city’, these kinds of terms have a lot 
more meaning … Biodiversity is rarely invoked except by ecologists or biologists. So 
what we are trying to do is bring the term in a bit more through ‘ecosystem services’. 
We are trying to explore what are the services being provided by biodiversity.  
(Planner/researcher) 
                                                            
197 Audubon staffer: “in any given time we [Audubon] will be on 20 to 30 committees: storm water committees, Portland 
parks board, Portland planning commission, Portland [urban] forestry commission. We have staff on vitally every major 
committee that happens, and part of the reason that we do that is that we spend a lot of time on the regulatory 
infrastructure and trying to make sure that all those committees are actually connecting and forming into something 
meaningful and letting the community choose them, and very few groups have the capacity to do that.” 
198 “In liveable cities is preservation of the wild” Mike Houck 
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However, actors also avoided the term ‘ecosystem services’ when communicating 
‘integrated benefits’ with the general public. 
When you speak of ecosystem services – that’s a good term for decision makers – 
but when you talk to the community it doesn’t resonate – what resonates is a sense 
of place – safety – local community – sports integrates with natural areas – it’s about 
a bunch of feelings…if doesn’t connect with people it’s just a bunch of numbers.  
(Government officer) 
Structural dimensions of embeddedness in the biophysical context 
As with Brisbane, experiential dimensions are unevenly distributed across governance 
structures (Table 7.7), although embeddedness as ‘integrated benefits’ and ‘natural system’ 
have a strong presence within roles of policy design, management and implementation. 
Furthermore, there has been a general trend towards ‘integrated benefits’ over time. The 
use of ‘integrated benefits’ within governance structures highlights synergistic approaches 
to the biophysical context. These approaches support decision making in pluralist settings 
(Section 2.1.2, Neef 1991, Costanza et al 1997). ‘Advocacy’ has not reduced over time but 
is structured around particular events related to ballot measures and urban development – 
i.e. advocacy is underpinned by institutional civic-political links. State actors acknowledged 
that non-state advocacy maintained the political will for ecological governance – particular 
for activities that went beyond regulatory compliance. Networks were well integrated and 
although some coalitions tended towards particular types of embeddedness with the 
biophysical — e.g. advocacy — the networks remained interconnected. This aspect will be 
further investigated in Chapter 9 regarding the coordination of responsive governance.  
The structuring provided by the landscape itself was expressed in combination with 
regulatory requirements under the US Clean Water Act and the US Endangered Species 
Act. These responsibilities required local government membership in watershed councils 
across Portland Metro i.e. institutional underpinned governmental, collegial and functional 
aspects.199 Along the main Willamette River corridor, due to the absence of a watershed 
group, social capital was lower. However this was offset to a large degree by a dedicated 
Willamette BES team that applied a ‘restore then steward’ approach at a number of sites. 
This approach established and supported local residents to restore and maintain a site 
following waterway rehabilitation works. Regulatory drivers along the Willamette channel 
                                                            
199  Watershed councils for Tualatin River, Columbia slough and Johnson Creek includes 11, 5 and 3 urbanised councils 
respectively. 
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were also significant and included TMDLs under the Clean Water Act, recently recovering 
salmon runs (Endangered Species Act) and a Superfund site (Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 1980).  
Table 7.7 Policy instrument categories and biophysical embeddedness in Portland 
Policy 
instrument 
categories 
Biophysical embeddedness tendencies 
Trends and Trajectories Problem 
identification 
Policy 
design 
and 
evaluation 
Management 
and 
implementation  
Acquisition 
Advocacy, 
Integrated 
benefits 
Integrated 
benefits, 
Natural 
system 
Integrated 
benefits,  
Natural system 
Improved technical information, 
Increased ‘integrated benefits’ 
though social equity and 
development of a regional 
alliance i.e. The Intertwine 
Regulation 
Advocacy 
(very 
controversial) 
Integrated 
benefits, 
Natural 
system 
Integrated 
benefits 
Controversy with the property 
rights movement has 
decreased the regulatory 
component of new planning 
and increased the ‘integrated’ 
voluntary components i.e. Title 
13 
Public 
restoration 
and 
management 
Advocacy, 
Personal 
Integrated 
benefits 
Integrated 
benefits, 
Personal 
Natural system 
Shifts from revegetation 
towards watershed 
management (integrated 
benefits), shifts from 
protectionism to ‘re-naturing’ 
and a focus on the urban matrix 
Private 
restoration 
and 
management 
Personal 
Integrated 
benefits, 
Personal 
Personal 
A minor instrument type with 
recent growth through a 
‘personal connection’ approach 
(Backyard habitat program) 
Watershed 
management 
groups 
Advocacy, 
Integrated 
benefits 
Integrated 
benefits, 
Natural 
system 
Integrated 
benefits,  
Natural system 
Increasingly integrated into 
formal planning at the local 
council level (e.g. New Portland 
Plan) 
 
Portland’s ecological governance and the temporal context 
Most Portland participants traced the history of ecological governance back to 1903 and the 
Olmsted Plan. In general, the temporal embeddedness of the Portland arena displayed 
broad, extensive coverage that was strongly directional. A set of significant events formed 
a common history that was acknowledged by most actors with both long and shorter term 
involvement. Some prominent mechanisms that support the maintenance of this temporal 
embeddedness in Portland Metro were also identified.  
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Experiential dimensions of embeddedness in the temporal context 
The majority of interview participants had been involved in governance for more than ten 
years, including seven key individuals involved for the entire case period — since 1991. 
When asked to identify major milestones in ecological governance most actors named a 
common set of developments across the 20 year timeline, including some who had been 
involved for less than five years. These events typically included: 
 1991 Clean Water Act lawsuit against PCC and the ‘Big Pipe Project’ began 
 1992 Greenspaces Masterplan and 1991–2004 Metro Greenspaces grant program 
 1993 Failed regional bond measure for acquisition funds 
 1996 Successful regional bond measure and Metro starts acquisition and  restoration 
 1996+ Oregon Salmon Plan and Oregon Watershed Management Program 
 1997/1998 Federal listing of Oregon salmon species 
 2004 Metro Title 13: urban natural resource regulation and associated voluntary 
programs 
 2006 Second successful bond measure for further acquisition which framed access 
to urban nature as a social equity issue 
 2006 PCC Watershed Management Plan and 2nd Urban Forestry Management Plan 
 2008 BES Grey to Green Initiative: green infrastructure, included revegetation and 
land acquisition for water quality outcomes. 
 2008 Formation of the Intertwine Alliance 
Longer term actors also referenced a common set of more distant events;200 
 1903 Olmsted Plan – Forest Park and 40 Mile loop 
 1948 establishment of Forest Park 
 1969 CRAG Open Spaces Plan 
 1972 State Planning Rules 
 1980 Implementation of urban growth boundary, and subsequent expansions 
 1980s urban greenspace movement 
 1988 First urban wildlife refuge at Oaks Bottom 
 1991 Regional and Urban Growth Goals and Objectives (RUGGOS) and 2040 
Growth Concept (1994)  
                                                            
200 For example: “in the early 1900s there was something called the 40 mile loop and that was part of those efforts and 
some very early planners were involved with that. I forget the famous guy’s name, I’ll think of it as soon as we leave the 
room. Mike [Houck] knows all that history, and so we aren’t starting this [urban ecological management and planning] 
from 15 years ago.” 
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This common embedded history was maintained by the long involvement of key actors, who 
used a number of avenues to relay their personal experiences, such as university 
lectures,201 publications202 and public speaking events. The administrative culture of Metro 
and PCC — reinforced by State planning goal 1 (public participation) — also supported the 
maintenance of temporal embeddedness. For example: most PCC decision making is 
archived online and is publically accessible; most new policy also includes a thorough 
historical background in the introduction; and recent online databases (e.g. REIN203) have 
catalogued the history of rehabilitation work across Portland Metro. 
This strong environmental history at times led to minor revisionism. For example the 
achievements of PCC were very prevalent, while the key role of other local councils in 
metropolitan level planning and ecological governance needed to be intentionally sought out 
at times. Similarly, the environmental advocacy perspective and the urban planning 
perspective identified different causal triggers for change and key events were also 
interpreted differently. 
Portland’s temporal embeddedness is broad as well as extensive. Most actors referred to 
developments as a common history, whether achieved by state or non-state actors.  
And this new regional conservation strategy brings in the best mapping we have ever 
done. I use 'we' a lot, but it was not necessarily [our organisation] doing the work. 
Finally, temporal embeddedness is framed as ‘directional’, however rather than taking a 
future oriented ‘progress’ orientation, the directional history begins with events in 1903 and 
this gives an aspect of ‘returning’ to contemporary development of ecological governance. 
[The] Metro green spaces system…wasn’t a new vision and one thing I should say is 
that the Olmsted brothers who decided central park in Boston, came out here in 1903 
and designed a system that looks a lot like what we…if you look at the maps today 
and their rudimentary maps from 1903, there’s a lot of similarities. 
                                                            
201 Some advocates regularly lecture at local universities and a number of academics have participated in Portland 
ecological and urban governance for more than 30 years. In addition Portland State University prioritises local 
engagement with environmental and planning issues. 
202 For example the book, “Wild in the City”, first and second editions 
203 “There are recognised neighbourhood associations and there are also less recognised groups within these areas. They 
tend to steward those areas in ways that often we don’t have down on records, so part of what we are doing is trying to 
inventory all of that. There’s a website created called REIN.net.org. And it’s a way that a lot of organisations have come 
together to put information on the web. To say hey I and my neighbours have gotten together to restore our 
neighbourhood and this is how we did it. We have this information and REIN is a place we can go and as a wiki site push 
up that organisation. So there’s an attempt to try to bring all this information together.” 
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Structural dimensions of embeddedness in the temporal context 
Temporal embeddedness did not vary greatly across policy roles and instruments in 
Portland. This was probably due to the extensive and broad histories held in common 
amongst most actors. The view of history was broad, including an acknowledgement from 
government actors that environmentalists had achieved important and skilled contributions 
over time. For example, the question “What drove the initial integration?” received this reply: 
It was due to advocates – non-profits – individuals outside of any agency and then 
you had people within the agencies that worked with them and we were all the same 
community essentially – and we needed people outside government to organize – 
the government can’t take the initiative alone. (Government participant) 
Technical roles, such as ecologists, also saw the need for public support as an important 
part of their work.204 These characteristics can be explained mostly as a result of the Oregon 
ballot system, the importance placed on public participation and the local strength of 
environmental advocacy networks. Temporal embeddedness slightly diverges amongst 
actors with respect to different scales and interests rather than via policy roles. For example, 
some local councils use a slightly narrower framing of history in terms of Metro’s role in 
ecological governance and the imposition of this on local sub-metro governance, particularly 
with respect to regulative instruments — e.g. Title 3 and Title 13. Other interests however, 
such as environmental organisations have a contrasting view of regulation, seeing it 
historically as the least effective of Portland’s ecological governance types. 
Where we have been less successful are things like some of our regulatory 
programs…protecting streams and rivers, some of the land use planning…We have 
been fairly successful there. I wouldn’t say it has been a failure but when you get into 
regulations. That’s where you get into a lot of pushback. Portland probably has 
stronger regulations than a lot of American cities, but that’s also where the real 
battlegrounds occur. (Environmental advocate) 
Whereas Metro actors were more likely to express a cautious approval of Metropolitan 
regulation such as Title 13. In general however, amongst ecological governance actors there 
was a common view of history. It was between ecological governance and other (especially 
new) institutional actors that temporal embeddedness diverges more starkly. For example 
with respect to the emerging focus on social equity in PCC. 
                                                            
204 L2, R4,j2, j3 
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So you now have a new group of politicians that probably don’t know this history 
[about the delegation of social services to the county government] or don’t choose to 
recognize this history who are basically redefining what the city’s [PCC local council’s] 
mission is…and in ways that are more aligned with whole service cities like Chicago 
and San Francisco and New York. And that isn’t what Portland’s history has been 
about. So the more that happens, the more the issues around environmentalism, 
around environmental rules now get benched. 
It is to this more divergent and contentious interaction with the institutional context that this 
discussion now turns. 
Portland’s ecological governance and the institutional context 
Institutional-context embeddedness is the linkage between governance and surrounding 
institutional structures. In general, institutions in Portland are networked and ecological 
governance embeds out into other arenas, more so than vice versa. Portland Metro is 
administered by a metropolitan level government (Metro), 25 local jurisdictions (local 
councils), special service districts (e.g. Clean Water Services, in the Tualatin Basin) and 
portions of three counties (which are not included in detailed analysis of this study). This 
means that urban governance is highly complex. Figure 7.4 shows two government units 
each with two internal stakeholders that network across two urban planning interests. The 
following discussion outlines how interview participants experience the institutional context, 
and considers the manner in which it connects with ecological governance structures.  
 
Figure 7.4 Structural dimensions of institutional embeddedness in urban ecological 
governance in Portland Key: ecological governance arena is green; other policy arenas is red; and 
government units are blue or purple 
Government units:  e.g. Metro and PCC 
each with a number of internal 
stakeholders (purple) 
Ecological governance arena – highly 
embedded  
Government internal stakeholders: e.g. 
Metro Planners, Metro science program 
PCC planning bureau (BoP), PCC- BES 
 
Overlapping Policy arenas: e.g. urban 
planning and watershed planning  
 
Metro PCC 
Urban planning 
arena 
Watershed planning 
arena 
 
BoP 
Metro  
Science 
BES 
Metro  
Planners 
Ecological 
governance 
arena 
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Experiential dimensions of embeddedness in the institutional context 
The experience of institutional embeddedness in Portland was codified into the same forms 
as in Brisbane: facilitators; overlapping policy arenas and processes. ‘Institutional stressors’ 
such as legal pressures were also experienced and will be examined in Chapter 8. 
Facilitators involved funding and key external partnerships. Funding sources were varied 
and ranged from revenue generated by Portland government units to state watershed 
funding (Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board) and private trusts (e.g. The Meyers 
foundation). These diverse sources offset some defunding events by providing alternative 
sources (e.g. the end of federal greenspaces funding 2004 and beginning of Metro’s Nature 
in Neighborhood grants). Over the course of the case study, some state actors were given 
voter permission (through ballot measures) to collect new taxes for the purpose of funding 
ecological rehabilitation (e.g. Soil and Water Conservation Districts).  
Overlapping policy arenas were very numerous (Table 7.8) and varied in terms of the 
overlap with ecological governance.     
Table 7.8 Arenas overlapping with ecological governance in Portland 
Overlapping 
arena 
Type of overlap Portland examples 
Biophysical 
science 
Global professional practice Government ecologists, local 
universities, USFWS, UERC 
Engineering Global professional practice BES Watershed team (PCC) 
Horticulture Trade practice Parks contractors 
Industry partners General private sector Intertwine alliance partners 
Neighbourhood 
associations 
Localised socio-political dynamics  Community involvement in 
watershed groups (local actors) and 
Audubon 
Parks / Open 
space planning 
National Portland Parks and Recreation 
(PCC) 
Planning Global professional practice Bureau of Planning and 
Sustainability (PCC) 
Political Interaction between elected 
members and bureaucrats 
PCC commissioners and PCC public 
servants 
Property rights 
movement 
National and State level networks Campaign against environmental 
regulation 
Recreation Metropolitan interest group Mountain-bike networks 
Transportation Internal stakeholders and external 
actors – state, metro, local 
Airport, Metro-Transport, Bureau of 
Transportation (PCC), ODOT 
Social equity County-based services, national 
practice 
Multnomah county–social services  
Water, 
Stormwater and 
Watersheds 
Internal stakeholders and external 
actors – national state, metropolitan, 
local 
US-EPA, OWEB, Metro-Ecosystem 
monitoring program, BES 
Abbreviations in Table: BES is the Bureau of Environmental Services (city council bureau); EPA is the 
Environmental Protection Agency; ODOT is the Oregon Department of Transport (state level actor); OWEB 
is Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board (state level); PCC is Portland City Council (city council); UERC is 
the Urban Ecological Research Consortium (cross-sector network); USFWS is the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service (federal actor). 
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Over time, many of these overlaps have become more integrated, for example, engineers 
and watershed planners within BES now work closely on green infrastructure projects. This 
may demonstrate a process of context embedding by engineering professionals according 
to Portland Metro approaches, or simply a generational change. Different participants raised 
both of these options and this would require further research in order to determine a robust 
finding. 
As in Brisbane, institutional processes were grouped by level of stability, for example, 
regulation and planning and policy. These processes often extended beyond not only 
ecological governance, but also the metropolitan level. Table 7.9 provides examples of this 
multi-level (and multi-arena) embeddedness.   
Table 7.9 Example institutional processes and embedding beyond the metropolitan level in 
Portland 
Level of process Process Type Example 
Greater Portland 
region 
Regional Coordination Regional Biodiversity Strategy 
State (Oregon) Regulation, Natural 
environment 
Goal 5 process  
(State planning goals) 
State (Oregon) Ballot measure system Measure 37 
National Policy transfer Water quality trading, 
Ecosystem services,  
Profession/Global Spatial technologies GIS mapping 
 
Structural dimensions of embeddedness in the institutional context 
This section outlines the manner in which institutional linkages that go beyond the ecological 
governance arena have been taken up into structures within ecological governance. Over 
time there has been a general increase of institutional embeddedness, in particular through 
the use of science (3.3, rational embeddedness), the integration of urban natural resources 
into urban planning and the integration of biodiversity with urban water management 
(functional embeddedness). In fact, although Table 7.10 demonstrates arena overlap from 
the perspective of urban ecological governance, in the Portland case it is more accurate to 
view the embedding from the perspective of the other policy arenas. Accordingly, urban 
ecological governance has become embedded into other urban policy arenas more so than 
vice versa. 
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Table 7.10 Policy instrument categories and institutional embeddedness in Portland 
Policy 
instrument 
categories 
Example overlapping arenas 
Trends and Trajectories Problem 
identification 
Policy 
design and 
evaluation 
Management 
and 
implementation  
Metro 
Acquisition 
Legal, 
Political, 
Democratic  
(Ballot 
measure 
system) 
Planning, 
Legal, 
Democratic 
(Citizen 
Oversight) 
 
Environmental 
management,  
Biophysical 
science, 
Property market 
Increased consideration 
of social equity. More 
precise mapping and 
science – development of 
ecological corridor 
mapping  
Regulation 
Property rights 
movement  
Planners, 
Legal, 
Science 
Planners, 
Environmental 
groups 
Stronger integration of 
other values related to 
urban vegetation – e.g. 
aesthetics and safety. 
Increased involvement of 
ecologists in compliance 
Public 
restoration 
and 
management 
Recreation 
groups 
BCC-funding 
Social capital205 
Neighborhood 
Stronger legal and 
insurance advice that 
limits the role of 
volunteers (e.g. 
chainsaws) 
Private 
restoration 
and 
management 
Property rights 
movement 
 [unidentified] 
Legal, 
Public support206 
Policy transfer / 
adaptation (Backyard 
habitat certification 
program) 
Watershed 
management 
groups 
Science, 
Environmental 
management 
Science 
Industry, 
government, 
community 
Political 
support207 
Implementation of 
regional planning. Scale 
up of water provision to 
the regional level 
(affected metropolitan 
water planning) 
 
  
                                                            
205 “Some people have criticised it [Habitat Brisbane program] because in terms of quantity of habitat restored….it’s not 
thousands of hectares…but that’s not the point of it. It’s completely not the point. It’s a priceless investment if you are 
looking at the social benefits”. (BCC staffer) 
206 “Because of the regional approach there is more kudos attached to the [Land for Wildlife] program. Because of this 
community awareness and involvement it would be difficult to completely shut the program down. There would have to 
be consultation and negotiation with the community around what else was going to be offered.” Brisbane participant 
207 “Because we fall into that category of being political propaganda almost in that we are a touchy feel good program. 
That has political impact as opposed to someone on my level who’s out there mowing lawns and cutting trees. That role 
doesn’t get them votes, where as we at least do because we are a community face”. 
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The following is a list of instruments from other arenas that ecological governance concerns 
have become embedded within. The manner by which this embedding took place will be 
examined in Chapters 8 and 9. 
 Metro Urban Greenspaces Masterplan (1992) and regional greenspace system 
 Metro Title 3 – Floodplain Management Plan (1998) 
 Johnson Creek Restoration Plan (1998) PCC  
 Metro – transportation planning process South West Corridor project (2001) 
 PCC Portland Watershed Management Plan (2004) 
 PCC Portland Urban Forestry Management Plan (2005?) 
 BES Grey to Green Initiative (2008–2012)  
 Metro – UGB expansion process via urban and rural reserves (2012) 
 PCC – TEES Strategy (2010) 
 Coalition for Living Future (2004+) and Metro’s 2040 Urban Growth Concept (2004) 
A final observation about structural dimensions of institutional embeddedness concerns the 
structuring provided by jurisdictional boundaries. The Metropolitan jurisdiction of Metro 
provides economy of scale in terms of budgets and the Metro charter gives the agency a 
special focus on land use planning and environment. Local councils provide a patchwork of 
variation at a lower scale and lower still are the neighbourhood associations — strongest in 
PCC. The complexity of Portland’s jurisdictional landscape also includes Special Service 
Districts, Soil and Water Conservation Districts and Counties. With respect to ecological 
governance and this setting, one participant noted there is “an ecology [of organisations] to 
manage an ecology.” 
7.4 Comparing the embeddedness of Brisbane and 
Portland 
The discussion so far shows that the context embeddedness of ecological governance 
contrasts markedly between the case cities. Table 7.11 summarises the findings in the 
previous discussion. This section outlines the commonalities and contrasts between 
Brisbane and Portland, beginning with a discussion of contrasts.   
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Table 7.11 Overview of context embeddedness in the ecological governance of Brisbane 
and Portland  
Facet Brisbane Portland 
Biophysical 
embeddedness 
Variable and shifts over time More consistent and stable over time  
Not underpinned by strong 
regulatory and cultural institutions 
Underpinned by strong regulatory and 
cultural institutions 
Jurisdictional boundaries 
internalised watershed issues 
within one jurisdiction 
Jurisdictional boundaries distributed 
watershed issues across jurisdictions 
Temporal 
embeddedness 
Siloed extent 
Disjointed coverage  
Variable development 
Broad extent  
Extensive coverage 
Directional development 
Narratives generally begin in the 
early 1990s 
Narratives generally refer to 1903 and 
begin in the mid-1980s 
Institutional 
embeddedness 
Hierarchical characteristics Networked characteristics 
Increasing over time  
Increasingly in from other arenas 
Increasing over time  
Increasingly out from other arenas  
 
As Brisbane and Portland are a ‘most-difference’ comparison (3.4) and governance is highly 
embedded in its particular context (3.2), a comparison of embeddedness was expected to 
find high levels of contrast. All three facets of context displayed this contrast. Biophysical 
embeddedness shifted in Brisbane and retained more stability in Portland. Watershed 
boundaries fostered collaboration in Portland while generally discouraged inter-jurisdictional 
work in Brisbane. Similarly temporal embeddedness was broader and more extensive in 
Portland while disjointed and siloed in Brisbane. Institutional embedding also contrasted with 
respect to organisational characteristics — i.e. hierarchical or networked — and the direction 
of embedding with respect to overlapping policy arenas — i.e. embedding into or embedding 
out from. 
The direction of embedding with respect to other policy arenas merits further discussion at 
this point because it highlights many of the contrasts between Brisbane and Portland. Figure 
7.5 presents a simplified diagram of what is meant by embedding into (Brisbane) and 
embedding out from (Portland) the ecological governance arena. It is important to note these 
diagrams display the dominant direction of embedding only. A more detailed presentation 
would show a degree of embedding that flows both ways and shifts somewhat over time. 
For example there has been some embedding out from ecological governance to urban 
planning in Brisbane via the integration between the Vegetation Management Act 1997 and 
the series of Planning Acts.   
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Figure 7.5 Overlapping policy arenas and embeddedness.  
Key: A) embedding into ecological governance from other policy arenas — Brisbane; B) 
embedding out from ecological governance into other policy arenas — Portland; C) embedding into 
watershed governance from ecological governance – Portland 
 
In the Brisbane case (7.5A) the ecological governance arena began with very little formal 
structure. The establishment of an acquisition fund and initial purchases were not highly 
embedded with other policy arenas – particular as the initial purchases were focused on 
preservation. However the development of integrated planning, regional planning and new 
public management facilitated embedding into the ecological governance arena. In contrast, 
ecological governance in Portland (7.5B), which also began with little formal structure, 
became formalised as a component of urban greenspace planning, watershed management 
and urban planning. Hence a predominant pattern of embedding out from ecological 
governance was established and supported by strong advocacy networks. Embedding out 
has also resulted in urban ecological governance that to a great extent, is a co-benefit of 
other policy arenas.208 The third diagram (Figure 7.5C) illustrates the reorientation that has 
occurred in Portland around watershed management. Some elements of this have existed 
in Portland for most of the case timeline, but this has occurred especially in PCC with recent 
integration through the Portland Watershed Management Plan (2004), the emergence of 
green infrastructure (2004+) and the Grey to Green Initiative (2008-2012). A similar pattern 
can be demonstrated for Urban Forestry in PCC at a lower level, Urban Forestry in Gresham, 
                                                            
208 Due to high levels of functional integration in Portland’s policy and planning, it can be difficult to identify explicit 
biodiversity governance - particularly with respect to terrestrial biodiversity. For example – water governance often 
provides co-benefits for biodiversity as with the Grey-to-green initiative (2008–2013 City of Portland). Flood 
management is combined with riparian protection through Metro’s Title 3. Even where biodiversity is more dominant, 
it is rarely structured as a single objective program. For example the regional bond measures approved by voters for 
natural area acquisition in 1995 and 2006 also establishes a metropolitan trail system.    
A          B     C 
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Green Streets at Metro and Healthy Streams at Clean Water Services. A final observation 
with respect to Brisbane is that a similar embedding of ecological governance into watershed 
governance is now more possible — as with for example the recent Norman Creek waterway 
project. Facilitating this potential reorientation at the SEQ regional level is the Healthy 
Waterways Partnership and new SEQ water governance. Both feature biodiversity 
considerations as a component of watershed governance — i.e. Figure 7.5C. 
Many of the contrasts between Brisbane and Portland can be explained by the embedding 
of ecological governance within particular institutional features, particularly the structures of 
local jurisdictions and the history of particular policy approaches. For example, Brisbane’s 
actor networks were more likely to be dominated by a single characteristic, while many of 
Portland’s networks were strongly integrated across characteristics – as with integration 
between ecological and storm water management interests within Portland’s Bureau of 
Environmental Services. Some policy shifts could be correlated with particular trends in 
conservation theory, regional planning, and the spatial sciences. These trends were then 
interpreted within the specific institutional contexts of each city. Different governance models 
respond differently to change (Duit and Galaz 2008). 
Portland and Brisbane also prioritised different instrument categories differentially and 
structured them differently into programs according to their context embeddedness. In 
Brisbane, many instruments are focused directly on biological resource protection and 
management, while in Portland, ecological outcomes are more likely to be an ancillary 
benefit to instruments with a different primary focus — such as water quality, environmental 
justice, or quality of life. Portland also has a range of acquisition programs with ecological 
goals while Brisbane has only one iconic local government program. Brisbane has invested 
heavily in restoration programs for private land while Portland has few activities in this 
category. The two cities also differ in the way instruments are incorporated into programs. 
Brisbane has a higher incidence of single-instrument programs, but in Portland — a more 
complex setting — instruments are more likely to be packaged into initiatives or multi-
instrument programs involving, for example, acquisition funds, restoration, and management 
activities. 
In terms of commonalities between Brisbane and Portland it is clear that the institutional 
context does shape the functions and embeddedness of ecological governance. In both 
cities embeddedness has increased over time, although this has manifested differently. The 
technical components of ecological governance has also increased. Commonalities 
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between in the coding of data was considered carefully. Poor inductive coding can force 
multiple case studies into homogenous categories. However, the analytical steps took care 
to collect data into the most natural groupings possible. Most codified groups were the same 
for each city, not only because they were broad enough concepts, but also because they 
evidence aspects of ecological governance that are not context specific. These included: 
biophysical embeddedness in the forms of personal connections, advocacy and natural 
systems; temporal embeddedness in the forms of coverage, breadth and direction; and 
institutional embeddedness in the forms of facilitators, overlapping arenas and processes. 
The specific content of these categories did however differ according to context specific 
factors, but due to space requirements they are not discussed in detail here.  What is clear 
though is that the nature of embeddedness has clear implication for responsive governance.  
7.5 The problem of embeddedness and implications for 
responsive governance 
Embeddedness has significant implications for responsive governance. Granovetter (1985) 
entitled his influential paper “the problem of context embeddedness” with reference to the 
tension that actors experience between legitimacy and efficiency (Fernández‐Alles and 
Valle‐Cabrera 2006). This section concludes the chapter by highlighting some key 
implications for responsive governance. The problem of embeddedness is this. Increased 
embeddedness means that governance is more synced with its surrounds, and hence more 
legitimate. However, increased embeddedness also means that governance is more driven 
by changes within its context and hence less efficient and able to adjust according to the 
priorities and functions of the policy arena. Embeddedness in Portland and Brisbane was 
found to occur both in terms of overlapping policy arenas and processes with different levels 
of stability — e.g. management and policy, planning and law. 
The tension between legitimacy and effective response was observed in Brisbane and 
Portland. The main implication for responsive governance is that embeddedness can be 
both an enabler and a hindrance for responding to change. Therefore active management 
of embeddedness could be a useful strategy for priming governance networks to change in 
particular ways. Synergistic approaches such as Neef’s (1991) human development index 
and planning tools such as ‘quality of life’ have great potential for bridging these legitimacy-
efficiency tensions. However any strategy in this area must also examine the general pattern 
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of embeddedness that is in place — i.e. whether it is an embedding into, or embedding out 
from pattern.  
Those implementing adaptive governance models generally have struggled to manage 
interest based decision making, contention and institutions that are not sensitised to local 
environmental change (Anderies et al. 2004). The forms of embeddedness that interview 
participants identified also provide a taxonomy for a more interest-based management of 
governance actors. For example, the ‘personal connection’ form of embeddedness implies 
a level of personal identify, respect and sense of place. There is research that indicates that 
a sense of place will support pro-environmental behaviours (Halpenny 2010). This then 
strengthens ‘advocacy embeddedness’ but may also provide opportunities to strengthen 
‘natural systems’ based responsiveness. The analysis showed that the implementation 
stage of policy is most conducive to the natural systems embeddedness, especially for 
instruments involved with on ground works and stewardship — such as Habitat Brisbane. In 
turn, individuals with a stronger personal connection are likely to make effective members 
of environmental steward groups. This means that if the ‘personal connection’ 
embeddedness of individuals involved in governance was increased, this could be 
harnessed to increase the natural systems approaches to governance. 
 This chapter has presented findings from the embeddedness analysis of Portland and 
Brisbane. The two cities showed starkly contrasting results that can be mostly explained by 
the respective contexts of each case. Especially significant were: the effects of overlapping 
policy arenas; levels of stability such as management, policy and planning; and patterns of 
embeddedness over time. There are a number of implications for responsive governance 
that stem from this analysis, some of which will be explored in the following chapters and 
final synthesis. This chapter establishes responsive governance 0.1 from the research 
framework (Figure 3.1) which has in particular established the nature of embeddedness for 
the arena and the structures therein. The next chapter develops responsive governance 0.1 
towards version 0.2 by examining the embedded arena with respect to actor responses and 
adjustments of governance structures to change over time. 
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Chapter 8 
 
 
Adjustment to change:  
Sector, state and societal structures over time 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between the development of structures for ecological 
governance and actor responses to change over time (Figure 8.1). This relationship sits at 
the interface between structure — i.e. policy instruments — and agency — i.e. governance 
actors. The effects of agency on structure are a central element of responsive governance. 
Hence, earlier findings regarding policy arenas and embeddedness in ecological 
governance are further developed in the following analysis. The chapter first, highlights key 
themes from the investigative framework (Chapter 3) and constructs a conceptual lens for 
the chapter. Then, methodological detail is provided (Section 8.2) before findings are 
presented for Portland (8.3) and Brisbane (8.4). The chapter concludes with a comparison 
and synthesis of findings towards a more refined model of governance structures and 
adjustment to change — thereby establishing state two of responsive governance in the 
main research framework (Figure 3.1). 
 
      Figure 8.1 Governance structures as a lens for viewing interactions and 
context: analysis of governance frames and the investigative framework  
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8.1 Governance and responding to change 
This analysis builds on the findings from earlier chapters. Chapter 6 showed that instruments 
— and the policy roles within them — are associated with different policy arenas. The 
significance of this is that different policy arenas are associated with different political 
dynamics and this can impact the responses of governance to change at the policy 
instrument level. Chapter 7 showed that the governance arena is embedded within a multi-
faceted context and this also can effect responsive change within governance. 
Policy development and responses to change 
The complex nature of a policy cycle involves multiple forums for policy development and 
implementation. Hence, there are diverse opportunities and potential pathways for actors to 
respond to change. Certain forums are more likely at particular policy stages (Table 8.1), 
within particular instruments — e.g. environmental regulations or volunteering programs — 
and at different levels — e.g. local, metropolitan. At the governance level, actor responses 
to change can put pressure on policy to shift. The actual shift and whether a shift occurs at 
all, is influenced strongly by the controversy, complexity, or uncertainty associated with 
stressors (Matthews 2012). Policy shifts are further influenced by the structuring of different 
actor interests within decision making — e.g. taskforces and committees — and the level at 
which decision making occurs — e.g. local, metropolitan and SEQ level decisions in 
Brisbane, see Chapter 5.  
 
Table 8.1 Example opportunities for feedback by stage in an idealised policy cycle  
Stages in the policy 
and planning process 
Examples of opportunities for feedback and adaptation 
identified in Brisbane and Portland 
Problem identification  Non-government lobbying and advocacy 
 Internal policy champion 
 Change in priorities of elected decision-makers 
 Legal processes and court cases  
Policy and instrument 
design 
 Expert consultancies  
 Committees and taskforces 
 Community consultation 
 Policy instrument choices  
Implementation  Refinements for site level factors 
 Implementation strategies 
Management  Flexibility for staff to interpret specific policy application 
 Operational procedures and plans for critical incidents 
 Position description review  
Evaluation and 
adjustment 
 Regular periodic review 
Source: adapted from Heclo (1978); Gunningham and Sinclair (1999); Lipsky (1980) 
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Shifts in policy can be viewed within a broader pattern of policy development over time. 
These patterns often are categorised according to whether the shift is incremental or 
transformative, and has been studied extensively — e.g. Cashore and Howlett (2007). It is 
generally accepted that shifts in policy are more commonly incremental, with rarer 
transformative events that shift the entire policy regime (Wison, 2000, Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993). Research to examine the triggers and precursors for transformative shifts is 
an ongoing area of investigation (Johnson et al. 2005). 
Institutions and responses to change  
Inter-actor behaviour is influenced strongly by actor interests and can be resistant to change. 
These enduring patterns of inter-actor behaviour are institutions (Goodin 1996). Institutions 
provide a stable context for governance and in general they resist change (Hall 1993). When 
institutional change does occur it is often a path dependent process according to the 
particular history, power structures and core values (Thelen 1999, Peters et al. 2005, Djelic 
and Quack 2007). Goodin (1996) notes that institutions emerge and change very slowly 
according to three elements — intervention, accidents and evolution. Intervention involves 
deliberate efforts such as policy design, accidents are unplanned events or processes, and 
evolution refers to an incremental path or trajectory. These three elements are present within 
most institutional change. They have important implications for the extent to which 
institutional change can be considered an intentional or rational response. For example, the 
roles of intentionality with respect to the accidental and the evolutionary elements of 
institutional change are unclear. Although even here, Goodin (1996) emphasises that 
intentional decision making has an important effect on determining the probability of 
accidents that may occur and the pathways available for evolutionary change of institutions. 
So, institutions are not the direct product of intervention and instead tend to change under 
the indirect influence of multiple, interacting stressors and actor responses. The following 
discussion outlines how these stressors and responses were analysed. 
8.2 Methodological approach 
The analysis for this chapter was driven by a conceptual lens that was developed from 
elements of the broader investigative framework for the research (3.3). Governance 
stressors were identified from an analysis of interview and document data. Stressors were 
identified and typified through: the embeddedness analysis (Chapter 7); the political arena 
analysis (Chapter 6); and temporal analyses (Chapters 4 and 5 and this current chapter). 
Then the conceptual lens was used to examine the response of governance to these 
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stressors over time. Three levels of change were investigated: critical disturbance events; 
shifts in governance — i.e. the instrument mix; and longer term institutional transitions. 
Stressors were typified as institutional or regime related, biophysical or flagship. Institutional 
stressors were significant aspects of the institutional context, while regime related stressors 
were associated with the particular dynamics within each transitional stage. Biophysical 
stressors showed direct links between environmental change and governance responses, 
while flagship stressors proceeded from politically driven environmental programs. 
Ecological governance was therefore embedded amongst regime-related and flagship 
stressors in a more immediate way than with institutional stressors. 
Investigating responses to change: a conceptual lens 
The conceptual lens was developed from earlier findings and relevant theory concerned with 
governance arenas and responding to change, namely embedded instrument mixes, actor 
networks and stressors on governance (Figure 8.2).  
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Figure 8.2 Conceptual lens (A) for examining 
adjustment to change at three structural levels (B) 
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This lens was especially concerned with the challenges identified by rational decision-
making models when implemented in complex settings — such as adaptive management 
and triple loop learning. The active experimentation required for adaptive management 
requires a high degree of controllability that is rarely present in governance arenas, while 
triple-loop learning at the governance level does not occur as a single integrated process 
but instead occurs across networks and instruments. Chapter 2 highlighted the interest-
based, rather than rational process that drives most policy development and instrument 
implementation. Responsive governance needs to be examined on this basis. 
 
The examination of disturbance events and shifts in governance involved a more direct 
processing of data than the examination of institutional shifts. For this stage, the case period 
was stratified into transitional stages. These stages, alone, were a significant research 
finding. The identification of stages was achieved by first identifying the shifts in governance 
for embedded units such as instruments and watersheds within each case study — e.g. 
Figure 5.2 Phases in governance of the urban Oxley Creek corridor. These shifts were 
overlayed to build a case study level set of transitions — i.e. governance arena and 
metropolitan level. The process avoided the forcing of events into artificial categories by 
alternating between phases of inductive reasoning and deductive checking against case 
study data (Eisenhardt, 1989). Conceptual forcing was managed by allowing transitional 
phases to overlap rather than demanding a progression of neat sequential sections (Figures 
8.3 and 8.4). The approach drew inspiration from an overlapping stages model in Brown et 
al. (2013). The following sections present significant findings from using the conceptual lens 
to examine Portland and then Brisbane. 
8.3 Responding to change in Portland  
Adjustments to change in Portland proceeded from stressors that actors could partially 
access through formal trigger mechanisms such as the ballot measure system. Institutional 
transitions involved highly overlapping stages that strengthened networks over time. The 
findings for Portland are presented for stressors (8.3.1), institutional transitions (8.3.2), 
governance shifts (8.3.3) and disturbance events (8.3.4).  
8.3.1 Stressors on Portland’s ecological governance 
A range of institutional and regime related, biophysical and flagship stressors were active 
over time in Portland. Four institutional stressors were identified through the coding of 
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interview participant responses: (1) the economy; (2) funding issues; (3) flood management; 
and (4) regulatory stressors. The first three had equivalents in the Brisbane case study while 
the fourth was unique to Portland. ‘The economy’ involved the contemporary effects of the 
global financial crisis and for Portland this impacted on council budgets, but an effect on 
collaboration was also noted. 
I think everyone buys into the idea that we are stronger together than we are apart, 
but when things start to dry up and tighten up sometimes you do just need to claw for 
what you need to survive and you don’t have the flexibility to have the bigger vision. 
The idea of ‘clawing to survive’ also implies that in response to economic stressors, actors 
tended to withdraw into particular models — and therefore particular frames — of 
governance that were perceived as most likely for achieving what was needed to survive. 
Returning to the notion of governance as a radial concept (Chapter 3), this also implies that 
responding to the economic stressor can involve a shift in the radial-subcategory of 
governance — i.e. from cross-sector frames to society or market-based frames. The extent 
to which this finding is transferable to other stressors and types of responses was examined 
throughout the remainder of this analysis. 
Funding issues throughout the Portland timeline were linked to ballot measures such as the 
failed bond measure in 1993, shifts in federal funding (e.g. cancellation of greenspaces 
grants program in 2004), and maintenance of acquired property. Following a defunding 
stressor, Portland actors usually managed to substitute a new funding source, although not 
immediately or necessarily at the same quantity. In contrast with the economic stressor, 
funding issues in Portland, linked with the ballot measure process, encouraged actors to 
strengthen civic-political and cross-sector frames prior to the ballot measure. 
‘Flood management’ in Portland had been an institutional stressor for many years, especially 
in Johnson Creek. Portland academic and resident Steve Johnson examined the chain of 
failed government attempts at flood response in Johnson Creek beginning in the 1930s 
(Johnson 2004). Then following a period of slow social capital build up, a peak flood event 
in 1996 set a wave of planning in motion at metropolitan (e.g. Metro Title 3) and local council 
levels — e.g. BES. This evidences that as with funding issues, the ‘flood management’ 
stressor encouraged adjustments towards cross-sector frames.  
The final category expressed by participants was ‘regulatory’. “It is difficult to overstate the 
role played by environmental legislation in Portland,” (personal communication R. 
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Margerum, Oct 2011). Regulatory stressors from a range of sources in Portland impacted 
significantly on ecological governance. For example:  
 flood control legislation was established by Metro — Title 3, adopted 1998;   
 lawsuits under the Clean Water Act triggered the ‘Big Pipe Project’ (1992) in PCC 
and eventually led to the development of green infrastructure;  
 planning regulations from 1980 onwards established an urban growth boundary 
(UGB) and progressively applied state planning goal 5 (environment) inside the UGB; 
and 
 the listing of Oregon salmon under the US ESA (1997/1998) also sent shockwaves 
through the urban and ecological governance of Portland Metro; and finally,  
 public participation in forming law was also a potent stressor on ecological 
governance. For example campaigns to support or oppose ballot measures were a 
significant drain on resources.  
Public participation for establishing new regulation was especially noted as a drain for non-
government actors. For example:  
Much of the work in policy and legislation is very technical and it is difficult to keep 
people engaged, or for people to understand what the implications are. Unlike a bond 
measure where you can build a campaign and momentum this work [the Goal 5 
process for Metro’s Title 13] didn’t allow us to build our constituents. It is like burning 
your capital. And we knew that and made that decision. Since then [5 years ago] we 
have been working on rebuilding…our active membership.  
In contrast with institutional stressors, regime construction and flagship stressors were more 
specific to the metropolitan and ecological governance arena levels. Regime related 
stressors in Portland included RUGGOs, the establishment of Portland e-zones, and the rise 
of social equity concerns. These stressors were embedded firmly within the broader context 
and overlapping arenas. They were transformative events that introduced a new institutional 
logic into the governance arena. Environmental ‘flagships’, the final significant type of 
stressor was exemplified by the Grey to Green Initiative in PCC. It was a well-resourced, but 
time-bound initiative seeking politically driven goals. Biophysical stressors are exemplified 
by the urban intensification and associated vegetation clearing that launched the urban 
greenspace movement. The following section explains the instrument responses in relation 
to this range of stressors. 
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8.3.2 Institutional transitions in Portland’s urban ecological 
governance 
Transitions in Portland’s ecological governance fell into a series of six overlapping waves 
(Figure 8.3): (1) facilitative governance and legitimisation (mid 1980s–1995); (2) activation 
of direct metropolitan governance (1989–1995); (3) embedding into the watershed arena  
(1993-2004); (4) embedding out from natural assets and property rights pushback (1999–
2006); (5) urban matrix and co-benefit governance (2005–2012); and (5) landscape level 
governance and meso-regionalism (2007+). A number of important stressors furthered (e.g. 
participation in RUGGOs) or inhibited (e.g. Measure 37 and corresponding scale back of 
Title 13) the progression of these waves as the following section demonstrates. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3 Transitional stages in Portland’s ecological governance 
Transition 1: Facilitative governance and legitimisation (mid-1980s–1995) 
Although the case study began in 1991, the first wave needs to be traced from the mid-
1980s when a response to urban intensification inside the UGB began via an urban 
greenspace movement (later named FAUNA) and the first formalised environmental 
Transitional stages 
1: Facilitative governance and legitimisation (mid 1980s–1995) 
2: Activation of direct metropolitan governance (1989–1995) 
3: Embedding into the watershed arena (1993–2004) 
4: Embedding out from natural assets and property rights  
       pushback (1999–2006) 
5: Urban matrix and co-benefit governance (2005–2012) 
6: Landscape level governance and meso-regionalism (2007+)  
Stars (Selected stressors and triggers) 
A: RUGGOs begins 
B: 1996 Flood  
C: 97/98 Salmon listing 
D: Measure 37 
E: Grey to Green Initiative begins 
F: Urban and rural reserve process 
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planning209 emerged. These interests were taken up at the metropolitan level when planning 
for Metro’s Greenspace system began (1989). This planning was triggered by Metro officer 
collaboration with FAUNA advocates. The growth of legitimacy for natural resource 
protection inside the UGB is traced from this point. While initial steps included responses to 
law suits, community advocacy, and refinement of the state planning framework, Metro also 
began to play a facilitative role through the Metropolitan Greenspaces grant program, 1991-
2004. This role accelerated the growth of local capacity for environmental restoration. The 
Metropolitan Greenspaces masterplan (1992) was released and this further strengthened 
the legitimacy of natural resources as an urban planning interest. When voters rejected a 
regional bond measure for natural area acquisition funds (1992), governance responded via 
the transfer of Multnomah County park management to Metro (1994), making Metro a 
legitimate natural area manager. Following a broader advocacy campaign from FAUNA and 
other actors a more focused second bond measure was successful (1995), and the Metro 
acquisition program began.210  
Transition 2: Activation of direct metropolitan governance (1989–1995) 
A few years earlier (1989), Metro began responding to urbanisation patterns inside the UGB 
by launching the RUGGOs process. This response became direct ecological governance 
from the metropolitan level when the metropolitan acquisition program began (1995). The 
newly formed Metro natural areas’ team responded to opportunities and the need to 
establish legitimacy. Metro moved quickly to establish itself as a natural area manager and 
expand the capacity that had been inherited when County parks had transferred land to 
Metro.    
Transition 3: Embedding in to the watershed arena (1993–2004) 
Meanwhile (1993 onwards), the watershed policy arena was formalising and ecological 
governance responded by embedding into the watershed arena through activities such as 
revegetation for riparian buffering and salmon conservation. When major floods occurred 
across the urban area (1996), Metro joined with the City of Portland (PCC) to assist in new 
flood-planning efforts. A metropolitan floodplain regulation — Metro’s Title 3, 1998 — and 
local watershed programs in Johnson Creek were developed. Embedding of ecological 
                                                            
209 For example, environmental zoning and tree preservation laws emerged within some local Portland councils during 
the mid-1980s – Gresham, PCC and Beaverton. 
210 A bond measure is a proposal to issue a government bond for public expenditure that is referred to voters for 
approval on an election ballot. The broad coalition of advocates included industry groups like the home owners 
association, local city councils. The Coalition for a Liveable Future was founded in part to support the 2040 Growth 
Concept the bond measure (an alliance of social and environmental community groups); Portland City Club also 
endorsed the bond measure. 
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governance was strengthened with biodiversity issues recognized within watershed 
planning for the first time.211 The federal listing of Oregon salmon species furthered the 
embedding process by triggering a cascade of changes. A range of local council compliance 
programs were implemented (1995–1997) and this accelerated the formation of urban 
watershed councils and in turn provided new forums for collaboration between local councils 
and environmental advocates.  
Transition 4: Embedding out from natural assets and property-rights pushback (1999–
2006) 
Soon after the 1996 floods, pressure increased on Metro to fulfil commitments called for by 
the 1995 bond measure for development of regional parks and trails system. This gave 
ecological governance the opportunity to embed further into the recreation arena and 
establish new collaboration with suburban councils. In tandem with this process, property-
rights’ advocates pushed back against further embedding of ecological governance into land 
use planning. A project212 to extend PCC’s environmental zoning received strong opposition 
from property-rights’ groups (2001). In response, environmental planners ‘deformalised’ 
their approach, and began to refine their data and planning over coming years. In addition, 
the methodology for this local PCC project was continued at the metropolitan level as Metro 
also worked towards improved protection for upland areas. This work was to become 
Metro’s Title 13, but as it neared completion, further property rights pushback against 
environmental planning effectively stalled the development of regulatory approaches to 
environmental governance in Oregon. ‘Measure 37’ passed in 2004 and required the 
reduction of property value from new environmental regulation to be compensated as a 
‘regulatory taking’.213 In response Metro reformed the draft Title 13 by reducing the 
regulatory component and increasing the voluntary programs involved. The adoption of the 
reformed Title 13 by voters (2006) completed the fourth transition in Portland. The bond 
measure associated with Title 13: provided a next instalment of acquisition funding; 
strengthened embedding into ‘social equity’ by requiring acquisition in poorer park deficient 
neighborhoods; and a grants program — Nature in Neighborhoods — partially compensated 
for the cessation of 14 years of federal greenspace funding.  
                                                            
211 For example: City of Portland Willing Seller acquisition program (1997); Johnson Creek Resources Management Plan 
(1995); and the first large watershed restoration projects in Johnson Creek (1995/1996).  
212 The Healthy Portland Streams project 1999–2001. 
213 Although Measure 49 (2007) amended some Measure 37 changes, the understanding that new environmental 
regulation is a form of environmental possession that requires compensation from government has remained. 
183 
 
Transition 5: Urban matrix and local co-benefits governance (2004–2012+) 
The embedding of ecological governance with other urban functions such as stormwater, 
transport and urban forestry continued to increase as environmental planning moved beyond 
natural and riparian areas to include the urban matrix. This trajectory was locked-in when 
engineers committed to a smaller and therefore more affordable, stormwater pipe diameter 
for the Big Pipe Project (2004). This meant that stormwater increases beyond those 
projected for 2011 capacity would require above ground management or green 
infrastructure. These water arena approaches carried the embedded ecological governance 
into new urban areas such as backyards, urban streets, and rooftops, and far beyond the 
earlier riparian and parks focus. To achieve this matrix focus required a high level of flexibility 
from ecological governance with respect to other urban concerns. Biodiversity was 
established as a co-benefit within an integrated approach to watershed management — e.g. 
the PCC Watershed Management Plan. This transition was accelerated in PCC by the Grey 
to Green Initiative (2008–2012) which operated as a flagship stressor. The fifth transition 
thus occurred as the embedded ecological governance was bundled into a whole of 
watershed approach to urban water. 
Transition 6: Landscape level governance and meso-regionalism (2007–2012+) 
At the close of the case period, urban ecological governance in Portland was party to new 
regional planning and a new organisational level of collaboration. The new regional planning 
has a 50-year horizon for urban which has framed the urban area within its broader 
landscape. This ‘urban and rural reserves process’ brings Metro into new collaboration with 
the county level of government (Seltzer 2009). The new level of collaboration is known as 
the Intertwine Alliance. The Intertwine has extended urban ecological governance beyond 
the Portland metropolitan area. The Intertwine was formed by Metro and three advocate 
partners (2007) and as of 2013, membership reached 100 members including local 
governments, private industry, and non-government groups. The Intertwine has developed 
a meso-regional conservation strategy (2011) that includes Portland-Metro, Vancouver-
Washington and their hinterlands. In 2010, the Intertwine joined a national coalition of similar 
organisations to lobby for federal funding. This sixth transition is therefore characterized by 
responses that establish landscape-level environmental governance. The following 
discussion examines structural responses to stressors in greater detail.  
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8.3.3 Shifts in governance in Portland 
The six developmental waves in Portland Metro have supported a long term transition from 
informal, advocacy-based and riparian-focused, to formalized, collaborative and watershed-
wide ecological governance (Table 8.2). Governance shifts within each of the six transitional 
stages corresponded with a general response to stressors at that stage (Table 8.2). A policy 
arena analysis as undertaken in Chapter 6 for the whole case period was trialled for the 
shorter transitional stage periods but only a minor correlation of governance shifts with 
transitional stages was found. This resulted from small sample sizes for this stratification 
and uneven power distribution across individual instruments and hence this approach was 
not taken at the transition scale. Instead, a critical instrument approach with special focus 
on arenas overlapping with ecological governance was effective for displaying structural 
interactions with stressors (Table 8.2). 
The following discussion explains the most significant findings for governance shifts —  i.e. 
instrument level responses to change — in Portland, namely: (1) instrument responses to 
stressors were primarily carried out via bundling with other arenas or by accessing the 
triggering mechanism for an institutional stressor — e.g. ballot measures; (2) procedural 
instruments provided opportunities for a low-level guiding of regime-related cascades of 
transformative change; (3) over time, the networks involved with instruments strengthened 
and became more complex; and (4) networks generally responded to unmanageable 
stressors by cleaving along interest-based lines. 
Responding to context-based stressors 
First, the response to context stressors was via bundling or triggering. Bundling involved 
the integration of ecological governance as a component of the responses from other 
arenas — e.g. planning processes. Examples of bundled responses included the response 
to the urban intensification stressor by joining with integrated planning efforts — e.g. 
RUGGOs — and the response to the flooding stressor via bundling riparian protection into 
Metro’s floodplain planning — e.g. Title 3. Each bundle required a meta-concept to provide 
the synergy or non-binary frame — see 2.1.2 and Neef (1991).
185 
 
Table 8.2 Shifts in ecological governance in Portland by transitional stage 
 Stage General Stressor (type) Actor responses & instrument adjustments Supporting structures (arena) 
M
o
re
 d
y
n
a
m
ic
 m
o
d
e
s
 Facilitative 
governance / 
legitimisation  
(mid 1980s–
1995) 
Via 
advocacy 
Urban intensification (planning)  
 
Metropolitan Greenspace Masterplan 
Participation in planning & FAUNA bond measure 
Portland City Club (civic) 
RUGGOs & 2040 Growth Concept (planning)  
Failed bond measure (funding) Metro takes organising role in next bond measure Ballot measure system (political), FAUNA (EG) 
CWA law suits (legal) Embedding via Watershed revegetation program Big pipe project (water) 
Metropolitan 
governance 
activation 
(94–95) 
Via 
authority 
Bond measure cascade 
(regime)  
 
Transfer of County parks to Metro 
Acquisition program 
Establishment of Metro Natural Areas Program 
FAUNA (EG) and Inter-Government 
Agreement (regulatory) 
Metropolitan Greenspace Masterplan (EG) 
M
o
re
 c
o
n
s
o
lid
a
te
d
 m
o
d
e
s
 
Embedding 
into the 
watershed 
arena 
(1993–2001) 
Via 
integrat’n 
Flood planning (regime) 
 
Watershed council revegetation projects 
Embedding into flood planning 
State watershed management program (water) 
Floodplain & riparian protection: Title 3 (water) 
Salmon listing (legal) and PCC 
aims to ‘restore’ salmon 
(regime) 
Strengthened embedding into flood planning Johnson Creek Restoration Plan, 2001 (water) 
 
Embedding 
out from 
natural 
assets and 
property-
rights 
pushback 
1999-2006 
Via 
content’n 
Project to extend e-zones is 
opposed  (EG) 
Internalisation of e-zone extension process 
Metro resource inventory for upland protection 
State planning goal 5, environment (planning) 
Measure 37, compensation for 
regulatory takings (regulatory) 
Measure 49 reverses some Measure 37 impacts 
Draft Title 13 increases voluntary component 
Ballot measure process (political) 
Implementation of regional 
trails system begins (regime) 
Strengthened embedding into recreation arena 
 
1995 bond measure conditions  
(political / regulatory) 
Federal grants end (funding) Offset federal funding loss via Title 13 grant program Ballot measure process (political) 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
 p
a
tt
e
rn
 o
f 
 m
o
d
e
s
 
Urban matrix 
and co-
benefit 
governance 
(2004–2012) 
 
Via 
embed- 
out 
Bird strikes (biophysical) Portland Urban Bird Treaty and TEES PWMP 2005 (water) and citizen science (EG) 
Limited storm-water pipe 
capacity is locked-in (regime) 
Embedding into green infrastructure, e.g. 
biodiversity eco-roofs, meadowscaping with natives 
tree corridors between natural areas 
PWMP 2005 & Green Infrastructure (water) 
New Portland Plan adopted (planning) 
Capacity build Meadowscape/’Depave’ (water) 
Temperature TMDLs 
(regulatory) 
Stronger embedding into water arena via trading 
systems and Clean Water Act compliance 
Tree-for-all program (water) 
Clean Water Act (regulatory) 
Grey to Green (flagship) Accelerated embedding into green infrastructure 
Extra co-benefits - flagship (e.g. acquisition) 
Storm-water pipe capacity is locked-in (water) 
PWMP (water) 
Complex regulations (regime) Advocacy for stronger tree protection PCC Tree Regulatory Improvement (legal) 
Perception of low regulatory 
protection in Title 13 (EG) 
Backyard Habitat Certification Program 
Regional Tree Code Survey 
Advocacy networks (EG) 
Landscape 
level 
governance  
(2007+) 
Via 
scaling 
up 
Conflict regarding UGB 
expansion (regime) 
Advocacy for regional level corridors (e.g. 
connectivity between Forest Park and rural areas 
Urban and rural reserves process;  UGB 
expansions consider biodiversity (planning) 
Jurisdictional divides;  access 
to funding (EG / funding) 
Intertwine Alliance  established 
Regional Conservation Strategy 
Regional trails system  
Urban and rural reserve process 
    Instrument mix modes (see. 8.5.2) – Key: Blue = tended towards dynamic mode, Purple = tended towards consolidated mode dynamic.  
Abbreviations in table: E-zone is Environmental zone; FAUNA is Friends and Advocates of Urban Natural Areas; PCC is Portland City Council; PWMP is Portland Watershed 
Management Plan; RUGGOs is Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives; TEES is Terrestrial Ecosystem Enhancement Strategy; UGB is Urban Growth Boundary  
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Bundling with more powerful but allied arenas was expected for ecological governance. 
However, bundling wasn’t the only option for responses. The institutional context of Oregon 
also enabled a certain amount of ‘triggering’. A triggering response required the ability for 
actors within ecological governance to access structures that could set institutional reform 
in motion — e.g. ballot measures. Funding and regulatory stressors were particularly linked 
to the Portland arena in ways that enabled governance actors to influence or trigger different 
stressor mechanisms. The ballot measure system was a prominent example. FAUNA piloted 
a ballot measure in 1993. The measure failed but managed to strengthen a funding stressor 
for greenspace acquisition within the metropolitan area. This then assisted Metro to take the 
lead on a new measure that succeeded in 1995. The ability to access these triggering 
mechanisms added resilience to ecological governance. For example, Metro put forward a 
ballot measure that partially compensated for the 2004 loss of federal funding for the 
Greenspaces program. As well as funding responses, there were significant regulatory 
stressors that were triggered by non-state actors using for example, the CWA and ESA. 
Although accessing trigger mechanisms could increase the resilience of ecological 
governance, if a network with differing interests accessed the same mechanisms it could 
increase the vulnerability of ecological governance. Hence, when Measure 37 was proposed 
by a property-rights’ group and passed in 2004, it required land owners to be compensated 
if new environmental regulations amounted to a ‘regulatory take’. This placed ecological 
governance in a vulnerable position in the long-term, because it decreased the feasibility of 
implementing new environmental regulations in the future — see Walker and Hurley 2011. 
Responding to very strong stressors 
Second, the response to unmanageable stressors and inadequate outcomes, from the 
actors’ perspective, saw networks cleave along interest-based lines. For example, when a 
property-rights’ pushback from environmental planning halted the PCC Healthy Portland 
Streams’ project, which aimed to extend environmental zoning areas, planners and 
managers in 2002 deformalized their response and internalised it amongst primarily state 
actors and some closely allied non-state actors. The deformalized work eventually re-
formalised at the metropolitan level as a methodology which provided the scientific 
underpinning of Metro’s Title 13 (2006). Environmental advocates showed a slightly different 
pattern of switching from collaboration — e.g. design of Title 13 and participation in advisory 
committees, to advocacy — e.g. FAUNA campaign for stronger Title 13, and public 
watchdog — e.g. review of tree codes and commitment from Metro to review the 
effectiveness of Title 13 after five years of operation. The examples of Healthy Portland 
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Streams and Title 13 both show a cleaving of cross-sectoral networks along interest-based 
lines, i.e. the cleaved networks still included state and non-state actors with a common 
interest in ecological governance. There is evidence that this cleaving of networks was 
partially coordinated by key actors in Portland. The coordination of responsive governance 
is the focus of Chapter 9.  
Responding to transformative cascades 
Third, a number of cascading changes occurred, often stemming from various regulatory 
and regime-related stressors. Responses to these transformative changes occurred through 
low level guiding that drew on capacity that existed before the cascade began, and 
implemented minimum standards during times of change — for retrofitting with best practice 
at a future time. Once a cascading change had begun, it could only be guided at a low level. 
To a great extent, a cascading change proceeded via its own internal logic. For example, 
the establishment of the greenspace masterplan, contributed to the success of the regional 
bond which required the establishment of an acquisition program and the natural areas’ 
program. Each change provided support or stimulus for the next change, however, in 
Portland these cascades were not completely beyond the influence of ecological 
governance actors. There were a range of opportunities to influence the change at each 
step of the cascade and this was closely related to, the capacities and structures that had 
been in place before the cascade began. For example, the strong public participation 
structures in Portland provided opportunities for community-based environmental groups to 
contribute to flood management planning. The end result was that ecological governance 
interests became increasingly embedded into urban water and other overlapping arenas — 
e.g. Johnson Creek Restoration Plan. The general tendency towards embedding as a 
response to transformative change is evidenced by the strength of supporting structures 
(Table 8.2) that were based in other arenas. The final aspect of responding to cascading 
change was ‘establishing minimum standards’. Unsurprisingly, managers sought to manage 
only the most urgent responsibilities and to streamline processes where possible during 
times of rapid change. 
As soon as [the funding] passed we had to hire a bunch of people and organize and 
go and get them…you have to respond quickly….People are looking at what you will 
do [with public funding]. You have to take some bold steps – so in the first 5 or 6 
years our [environmental] monitoring was very fundamental. 
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Responding within and across transitional stages 
Finally, response patterns within and across transitional stages were also observed. 
Prominent events often exemplified the general response pattern for each stage (Table 8.2), 
although of course not every event adhered to this pattern. Response patterns across 
transitional stages were often incremental changes that accumulated over time. For 
example, instruments became more precise as methods improved and a scientific 
knowledge base developed. Yet even as incremental change accumulated, the ability for 
transformative change became more difficult. For example, one participant related the 
difference between implementing the second regional bond funding compared with the first. 
I see that once a program becomes established you become risk adverse – cautious. 
The first time around we had a blank slate to experiment with, the second time around 
we were pretty much repeating ourselves and refining the same approach. You 
almost have to reinvent yourself [to get back] a fresh look.  
With reference to governance as a radial phenomenon, this path dependency highlighted 
by this participant tends to lock a program into a particular model of governance. Over time 
the governance arena in Portland strengthened its metropolitan level networks as evidenced 
by growth of the Intertwine alliance and Portland Audubon membership. In summary, the 
Portland arena generally displayed response structures that were highly networked. 
8.3.4 Disturbance events in Portland 
In Portland, the response to critical disturbance events was characterized by cross-sectoral 
collaboration, but also by high levels of advocacy and contention. To achieve this interplay 
between advocacy and collaboration, ecological governance in Portland has also exhibited 
structures that protect policy niches and cross-sector models from political interference and 
advocacy networks that are activated when issues arise. Actors that were both collaborators 
and advocates played a critical role and are further investigated in Chapter 9. 
8.4 Responding to change in Brisbane 
Responses to change in Brisbane proceeded from stressors that actors could rarely control. 
Institutional transitions were highly dependent on political change and sectors de-coupled 
over time. The findings for Brisbane are presented for stressors (8.4.1), institutional 
transitions (8.4.2), governance shifts (8.4.3) and disturbance events (8.4.4).  
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8.4.1 Stressors on Brisbane’s ecological governance 
As in Portland, a range of institutional, regime-related and environmental flagship stressors 
were active over time in Brisbane. Four institutional stressors were identified through the 
coding of interview participant responses: (1) flood recovery; (2) development; (3) the 
economy; and (4) funding issues. All except ‘development’ had equivalents in the Portland 
case.  First, ‘flood recovery’, was also mentioned in the Chapter 6 discussion about the 
biophysical context. However, the major flood in Brisbane in January 2011 was more an 
institutional than a biophysical stressor. As more powerful policy arenas responded to the 
flood, there were a range of implications for ecological governance. For example, 
A chap from council [waterways division] came to our working bees and said that 
some of our species weren’t appropriate for planting along the creek. Since the flood 
they are trying to keep the waterways a bit more open, so that they can have better 
flood flows and hydrology… He talked to us and coordinated the work… excavating 
and opening up the creek that sort of thing. And he’s concerned about planting right 
on the edge of the creek that might impede flow. That’s been a recent change [in the 
18 years I have worked here].  (Habitat group leader) 
Besides ‘flood recovery’, the other three institutional stressors were concerned with 
economic issues. This correlation implies that the arena in Brisbane is particularly exposed 
to economic systems. ‘Urban development’ was highlighted consistently as the greatest 
challenge for urban ecological governance in Brisbane. ‘The economy’ was also seen as a 
stressor, particularly in reference to the ‘global financial crisis’ (GFC) — as interviews were 
conducted in 2011 to 2012. Finally, ‘uncertain funding’ was identified as a more difficult 
stressor to manage than limited funding. 
It wasn’t working, because NHT [National Heritage Trust] funding gave you a 
coordinator for one year. You didn’t know what was happening for next year and by 
the time you embedded them in the system and given most of your intellectual capital, 
they were wondering about next year. A couple of times people left, while I had 
funding from the NHT because…they had no real prospects for the next year  
(Interview participant) 
Further analysis of these federal funding stressors is found in Chapter 5, however more 
immediate than these, were the ‘regime construction’ and ‘environmental flagship’ stressors. 
Regime related stressors in Brisbane included:  
 the implementation of performance based planning in the Brisbane City Plan 2000;  
 the reframing of ecological governance by statutory SEQ level planning (2004); and  
 the election of a majority conservative council (2007). 
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As with Portland, these stressors were embedded firmly in the broader context and 
overlapping arenas. Many were related to the development of strong vertical integration in 
the state planning framework. ‘Environmental flagships’, the final significant type of stressor 
was exemplified by the 2 Million Trees project. As with its parallel in Portland — Grey-to-
Green — the project was well-resourced, time bound and seeking politically motivated goals. 
Brisbane instruments exhibited a range of responses to these stressors as the following 
discussion explains. 
8.4.2 Institutional transitions in Brisbane’s ecological governance 
As in Portland, transitions in Brisbane’s ecological governance fell into a series of 
overlapping waves (Figure 8.4). These were: (1) nascent, informal and advocacy-led 
governance through advocates that were internal and external to Brisbane City Council 
(pre–1993); (2) institutional capacity building and new regime construction (1991–1997); (3) 
cross-sector governance and formalisation of non-state networks (1995–2004); (4) inter-
departmental governance and regionalism (2000–2008); and (5) ‘Decoupled’ governance 
and experimentation (2007–2012+). The following explores the defining events and trends 
for each of the governance periods. The following discussion summarises prominent events 
and governance responses for each wave of development. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4 Transitional stages in Brisbane’s ecological governance 
1: Nascent, informal and advocacy led governance (mid-1980s-92) 
2: Institutional capacity building and implementation (1991-‘97) 
3: Cross-sector governance and collaboration (1995-2004) 
4: Inter-departmental governance and integration (2000-2008) 
5. ‘De-coupled’ governance and divergent responses (2007-2012) 
 
Stars (Selected stressors and triggers) 
A: Election of progressive mayor 
B: Performance-based planning 
C: Statutory regional planning 
D: Majority conservative council 
E: 2 Million Trees project 
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Transition 1: Nascent, informal and advocacy-led governance (mid-1980s–1993) 
In response to the rapid loss of tree cover due to urbanisation in the mid-1980s, advocacy 
groups began to call for change in Brisbane. Key individuals linked local community-based 
resident action groups across the city. Public interest increased as rapid vegetation clearing 
and urbanisation became seen as a threat to the ‘South East Queensland lifestyle’. 
Environmental education with local communities and skill development amongst core 
members were key strategies. The BCC environmental officer was also playing an advocacy 
role from within the state actor. By 1990, this officer had examined biodiversity policy in 
neighboring councils before designing an environmental levy and acquisition program for 
Brisbane. This internal advocacy did not come to fruition until a new mayor was elected in 
1991, in part, on a platform of urban biodiversity protection. Advocates gave vocal support 
as BCC began its formal response.  
Transition 2: Institutional capacity building and implementation (1991–1997)  
In order to activate metropolitan level ecological governance, BCC collaborated with a range 
of partners with capacity to plan and manage biodiversity. Activities focused on 
implementing new policy instruments, often through collaborative partnerships with non-
government groups or resource investment from external programs. New BCC staff 
positions were established, and advocacy groups supported their work to implement 
biodiversity governance. Each new program brought a new set of lessons for those state 
and non-state actors involved in property acquisition, volunteer restoration groups, and 
council regulation on native vegetation. A number of interview participants saw this period 
as a ‘golden age’, due to the rapid addition of new policy instruments and the purchase of 
large ecological assets. The momentum in this period shows a cascade of transformative 
changes where each change built on the momentum of the last. By the mid-1990s, the initial 
wave of policy implementation was largely complete. The council reduced the number of 
local environmental staff positions. Reductions resulted from an economic downturn and the 
completion of vegetation inventories. The policy toolkit was seen by key BCC practitioners 
as largely complete, thus changes to policy instruments slowed down. 
Transition 3: Cross-sector governance & formalisation of non-state networks (1995–
2004) 
In response to a focus on watershed management, a new wave of governance structures 
began to emerge: watershed groups. At the same time, existing ecological governance 
became more refined and efficient. The costs for facilitating restoration groups were 
quantified, the acquisition program began purchasing koala habitat and in 1999, the 
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‘Brisbane Biodiversity Strategy’ was launched. The formalisation of watershed groups 
provided new opportunities for increased cross-sector collaboration, through for example, 
the Brisbane Catchments Network and the Biodiversity Advisory Committee. When federal 
funding for watershed groups ceased in 2002, some groups began to explore new grant 
funding and business enterprises. In 2004, the city council began to fund watershed group 
coordinators. Over time, this new funding arrangement reduced the political bargaining chip 
that these groups had formerly held. 
Transition 4: Inter-departmental governance and regionalism (2000–2008) 
By the new millennium, significant change at higher levels (regional and state) began to 
reframe environmental governance in Brisbane (Schmidt and Morrison 2012). Urban 
governance responded to these state and regional-level shifts. This period saw the 
emergence of integrated planning and regional planning across the broader region around 
Brisbane. The new city plan that was developed under this framework shifted metropolitan 
planning from a prescriptive to a performance based approach and was launched in 2000. 
Pre-existing ecological governance was redefined to align with the integrated approach. For 
example, the Vegetation Protection Orders were integrated with other concerns and 
consolidated to form the Natural Assets Local Law. Planning and policy now required a 
spatial definition, and codes for biodiversity and waterways were included in the new city 
plan. This was largely a technical process that increased collaboration and learning between 
council departments. However, community actors found it increasingly difficult to participate 
in the technical processes that helped to achieve integration across different government 
interests. These groups had similar trouble with the processes of regional planning. The 
fourth transition thus occurred as actors sought to align their activities with new state-level 
and regional-level planning frameworks.214 
Transition 5: Decoupled’ governance and experimentation (2007–2012) 
The final period encompassed a series of changes that saw state and non-state actors 
respond by shifting to less collaborative types of state/non-state relationships. In 2007, when 
the conservative mayor was returned with a majority of allied councillors, the council took a 
stronger ‘New Public Management’ approach to governing the city (Hood 1991).215 The role 
                                                            
214 State level—Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld); regional level—SEQ Regional Nature Conservation Strategy 2003–
2008, SEQ Regional Plan in 2004, regional NRM group established 2004. 
215 New Public Management is defined by Hood (1991, Table 1) as: delegated power so that key staff are ‘free to 
manage’; clear and preferably quantifiable goals and targets; a focus on results rather than procedures; corporatized 
management units; competitive contracts and tendering; the application of private sector management tools; 
minimized resource use in the public sector, i.e. ‘do more with less’.   
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of public participation pivoted accordingly towards the citizen as consumer (Pratchett 1999). 
The priority given by BCC to urban ecological governance began to decline and this was 
exacerbated by the advent of the global financial crisis of 2008. The interactions between 
non-state groups and the city council shifted from a partnership or collaborative approach to 
service provision or consultation. While this did provide some community actors with new 
opportunities to experiment with stakeholder consultation and commercial contracts, the 
resulting links with council were underpinned by a different institutional logic than the 
previous collaborative mode. For a time, this change was moderated by council staff, who 
played collaborative ‘boundary rider’ or watchdog roles, but these links between state and 
non-state actors waned as staff changed and environmental programs were restructured. 
The flagship stressor during this stage was the ‘2 Million Tree project’ (2008–2012). This 
iconic, politically driven program was reformed a number of times as governance actors 
sought to enhance the ecological benefits from the carbon bio-sequestration project. The 
coordination of these changes will be investigated in Chapter 9.    
There were signs that networks were adapting to this decoupled scenario by experimenting 
with new opportunities for sector-specific collaboration. Amongst council actors, this was 
shown by new interactions between staff after environmental programs were restructured 
(2012). In the community sector there were signs of a return to political bargaining. The 
Brisbane Catchment Network reformed with a community focus and local groups increased 
their participation in regional forums.  
8.4.3 Shifts in governance in Brisbane 
A strong set of ecological governance instruments were evident in Brisbane. Clear 
integration with formal planning and management processes was established. The five 
transitions in Brisbane supported trends from informal, advocacy-based and low state 
capacity, through collaboration and then into a stage of divergence between formalized state 
governance, and less formal community-based approaches (Table 8.3). The following 
discussion examines in greater detail key instrument responses to stressors. 
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Table 8.3 Shifts in ecological governance in Brisbane by transitional stage 
 Stage General Stressor (type) Actor responses & instrument adjustments Supporting structures (arena) 
M
o
re
 d
y
n
a
m
ic
 m
o
d
e
s
 
Nascent, informal 
and advocacy-led 
governance (mid-
80s–‘92) 
Via advocacy Urban expansion 
(development) & native 
vegetation clearing 
(biophysical) 
 
Campaigning from Resident Action Groups, e.g. 
proposed development of Boondall wetlands 
First BCC environmental officer (1988)  
SLATS studies begin (1989) 
Acquisition levy is designed and implemented 
SLATS study (regional EG) 
High scale events: e.g. Rio Summit, 
NSESD, Year of the tree (higher EG) 
Centre-left State Government (political) 
Adjacent councils (regional EG) 
Institutional 
capacity building 
and implementat’n  
(1991–1997) 
Via 
implementat’n 
Voters elect a progressive 
mayor who implements 
major environmental 
programs (regime) 
Acquisition program begins 
Restoration groups & environment centre —
coordinated by Greening Australia 
Council restoration teams 
Vegetation Protection Orders established (VPOs) 
Federal employment programs (social) 
Non-state actor capacity (EG) 
SEQ level regional planning, especially 
SEQ open space planning (planning) 
Centre-left state government (political) 
M
o
re
 c
o
n
s
o
lid
a
te
d
 m
o
d
e
s
 
Cross-sector 
governance and 
formalisation of 
non-state networks  
(1995–2004) 
Via 
collaborat’n 
Various stressors/partially to 
negotiate with BCC (political) 
Watershed groups form Federal/state NRM funding (funding) 
BRMG / HWP (water) 
Environment department 
funding cut, programs reach 
capacity (funding) 
Programs become more strategic, e.g. 
restoration groups are refined 
Acquisition program targets koala habitat 
State and SEQ level koala conservation 
instruments (state/regional EG) 
Federal/State watershed 
funding ceases, 2002 
(funding) 
Watershed groups experiment with income 
generation and new grant sources 
Watershed groups - stronger local horizontal links 
BCC begins funding watershed groups (2004) 
Local neighborhood networks (civic) 
Local councillors (political) 
instrument mix complexity – 
a need for coordination 
(regime) 
Brisbane Biodiversity Strategy (1999) 
Brisbane Catchment Network established 
Australian Local Government 
Biodiversity Strategy 1998 (federal EG) 
Inter-department 
governance / 
regionalisation 
(2000–2008) 
Via 
integration  
 
embedding in 
Brisbane City Plan, 2000 &         
SEQ Regional Plan, 2004 
(planning) 
Biodiversity code (new City Plan) 
Text policies translated into spatial definitions 
VPOs rolled into Natural Assets Local Law 
Integrated Planning Act 1997 (planning) 
SEQ RNCS (regional EG) 
Regional NRM group (regional EG) 
NHT2 ends, 2008 (funding) SEQ Catchments re-strategises and begins 
coordinating Land for Wildlife 
Land for Wildlife Program (regional EG) 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
 p
a
tt
e
rn
 
‘Decoupled’ 
governance & 
divergent 
responses 
(2007–2012) 
Via sectoral 
specialization 
(divergent) 
Majority conservative council 
increase New Public 
Management approach 
Brisbane Catchments Network dissolves and 
reforms as a non-government forum (2011) 
Local groups join regional forums (2012) 
SEQ NRM Plan (regional EG) 
Stronger New Public 
Management approach-BCC 
Environmental programs  consolidated (2010) 
Increased procurement of government services 
Watershed groups tender for contracts 
Conservative council (political) 
2 Million Trees Program 
(flagship) 
Reformation of project delivery and project goals 
Watershed group advocacy for biodiversity focus  
Potential ETS (funding) 
Environmental credentials (political) 
    Instrument mix modes (see. 8.5.2) – Key: Blue = tended towards dynamic mode, Purple = tended towards consolidated mode dynamic.  
Abbreviations in table: BCC is Brisbane City Council; BRMG is Brisbane River Management Group; EG is Ecological governance; ETS is Emissions Trading Scheme; 
HWP is Healthy Waterways Partnership; NCA is Nature Conservation Act; NHT is National Heritage Trust; NRM is Natural Resource Management; NSED is National 
Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development; RNCS is Regional Nature Conservation Strategy; SEQ is South East Queensland; SLATS is Statewide Landcover and 
Tree Study; VPO is Vegetation Protection Order 
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As with Portland, instruments in Brisbane exhibited a general response to stressors that 
roughly aligned with each transition (Table 8.3). The following discussion explains the critical 
findings from the analysis of Brisbane with respect to different stressor types and structural 
features of the Brisbane arena over time. As with Portland, biophysical stressors generally 
were responded to indirectly although the initial response to urban intensification occurred 
through political action that was only one step removed from the biophysical changes. There 
was, however, consistent evidence of response to biophysical changes at the 
implementation stage which was supported by the millennium drought. Responses to the 
2011 flood were too recent to observe institutional change, however initial shifts indicated 
that a flood management led response occurred with little embedding of biodiversity issues 
as of 2014. 
The following discussion explains critical findings for Brisbane: (1) instrument responses to 
contextual stressors were limited and bundled; (2) governance generally flexed with regime-
related cascades; (3) over time, instruments showed state-bundling and sectoral-
decoupling; and (4) governance networks responded to very strong stressors by cleaving 
along sector-based lines (e.g. clusters of state and non-state actors). 
Responding to context-based stressors 
The response to context-based stressors in Brisbane was limited. Ecological governance in 
Brisbane did not have strong access to triggering processes. There was some access to 
legal processes through Queensland’s Planning and Environment Court, but little ability to 
trigger change through this avenue in more than a case by case basis — i.e. incremental. 
Participants noted that it had become difficult to access legal advocacy groups due as state 
level changes related to a mineral resources boom, which was prioritized over smaller scale 
urban environmental issues. The 2011 flood in Brisbane illustrated the manner in which 
governance was bundled along with stronger policy arenas —  i.e. made to fit the needs of 
other arenas — and participants noted that this tendency had increased over time through 
changes in instruments and the application of instruments —  e.g. the Natural Assets Local 
Law.   
Responding to transformative cascades 
The general response to cascades of change was to flex with them, if possible. In most of 
the cascading change after the late 1990s, other interests tended to embed into urban 
ecological governance and an emphasis was placed on regional, non-urban ecological 
governance. The substantial ecological resources in non-urban Queensland, and their 
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vulnerability triggered this focus at the SEQ level.  This is evidenced in Table 8.3 by the 
number of supporting structures that are in the ecological governance arena, but located at 
the SEQ or state level. 
Responding to very strong stressors 
Very strong stressors were often transformative and context-based. This relates to the 
dependence of ecological governance on not only instruments operating beyond the 
metropolitan level, but also because of the strength of Brisbane City Council. Very strong 
stressors tended to strengthen intra-sector links — i.e. networks of state actors. An example 
of strengthened non-state links was the defunding of watershed groups when NHT1 funding 
ceased (see Chapter 5). Each watershed group had an individualized response to this 
funding stressor according to the particular aspects of each watershed. The Bulimba creek 
catchment group expanded their contracts with large infrastructure providers in their area 
and strengthened their advocacy networks. The Enoggera creek catchment group 
restructured around the numerous bushcare groups in their area, and developed a close 
relationship with the local councillor. The Oxley creek catchment group expanded a program 
in the large industrial area in their catchment.  
Responding within and across transitional stages 
Although each transitional stage had a general pattern of change, there was also a long 
term trend towards stronger coordination from state actors and decoupling between state 
and non-state groups. In particular, Natural Environment and Sustainability (NES) has 
strengthened its coordination of policy instruments, increased its efficiency and 
strengthened its networking with internal stakeholders — e.g. with compliance and 
development assessors. In contrast, levels of collaboration with watershed groups reduced. 
This was not only affected by conservative political administrations in the second half of the 
case period, but also resulted from interactions between hierarchical structures of the city 
council, broader urban governance and the need to consolidate growing amongst 
instruments as new programs were added.  
8.4.4 Disturbance events in Brisbane 
Brisbane has qualities that are seen as a challenge to textbook adaptive governance. 
Responses to disturbance events were affected by the metropolitan-wide, single-city 
council, which due to its size, has a strong hierarchical model. Local politics are shaped by 
the two major political parties in the state and elections were a major disturbance event in 
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the Brisbane case study. Non-state organisations assist government in the delivery of 
biodiversity programs, but there is little involvement with other parts of the policy cycle. 
Indeed, one of the unexpected negative side effects of the formalisation of community-based 
watershed groups was a certain amount of co-option of the agenda by Brisbane City Council 
which diminished the former political bargaining role of these groups (Cooke and Kothari, 
2001). This in turn reduced the scope for collaboration, learning, and cross-scale 
interactions in Brisbane.  
The discussion has analysed responses to change in Portland and Brisbane at levels of 
institutional transition, governance shift and disturbance event. The following section uses 
these findings to hone the conceptual lens into a more refined model of response to change 
within the ecological governance arena.  
8.5 A refined model of response to change within 
governance arenas 
The analysis has shown that in the governance arena, adjustment to change can be 
examined at three levels. Differing patterns were observed in terms of institutional 
transitions, governance shifts and response to disturbance. Although the levels can be 
placed on a scale from slow and transformative to rapid and incremental it is not possible to 
understand them as completely nested within each other. Instead there was evidence of 
partial nesting where adjustment to disturbance events were influenced, but not determined 
by the transitional stage of governance.  This section synthesises the findings from Brisbane 
and Portland to establish a more refined model of structural responses to change. Although 
the examination of ecological governance in this fashion is novel, the dynamics of each level 
have been studied extensively in public administration literature. Institutional transitions are 
studied within path dependency and institutional literature. Instrument change in terms of 
transformative and incremental responses is examined in the policy change literature and 
many of the disturbance event dynamics are explored in network analysis studies. The 
greater contribution to theory from this analysis and model is that the governance arena 
itself shows strong evidence of behaving like a complex adaptive system. This situation goes 
a long way towards explaining why more rational and intentional models of change such as 
adaptive management are challenged in complex governance settings. Not only is the 
managed resource an adaptive system, but the interactions between governance actors 
also shows complex characteristics.  
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8.5.1 Institutional transitions: pathways in governance 
With respect to institutional transitions, governance became increasingly strategic and 
technical over time. In both cities the arena became more integrated with land use planning 
but also more at risk from path dependence, loss of reflexive capacity, and lower public 
support in the longer term (Figure 8.5). The early stages of ecological governance were 
characterised by cascades of transformative change where each major change provided a 
catalyst — i.e. a stressor — for the next change. Policy change theory generally holds that 
transformative change is occasional and punctuates periods of incremental change. 
However, this period of serial transformative change occurred in both cities and was related 
to the establishment of a new policy regime. This was especially the case in Portland — e.g. 
for urban planning in the early 1990s and ecological governance instruments in both cities, 
following the establishment of acquisition programs. Transformative change involved the 
introduction of new institutional logic into the governance arena which then triggered a 
cascade of responses as the new logic spread out through the instrument mix (Figure 8.5, 
#1). Over time the instruments were refined as programs repeated funding cycles and 
accumulated information (#2). However, a path generation event (#3) could occur via 
embedding into a new policy arena or through a flagship stressor — e.g. Grey to Green 
initiative in Portland. Path generation tended to widen the institutional space for a time as 
new instruments became established and then refined. 
 
Figure 8.5 Institutional transitions and pathways in governance. Where: (1) is establishment of 
the policy regime; (2) is increasing formalisation, integration and path dependence; (3) is a path 
generation event; and (4) is a new institutional path.   
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Over time as transitional stages progressed there was a general shift from society-centric 
frames of governance — e.g. civil society and social movements — towards state-centric 
frames of governance. The institutional context in Portland constrained this shift through 
requirements for public participation (Stage planning goal 1). This had the effect of 
prolonging the use of cross-sector frames and a significant stressor could reactivate dormant 
advocacy networks and their associated society-centric frames of governance. This feature 
demonstrates the critical influence from patterns of embeddedness (3.3) on tendencies 
towards particular frames – i.e. radial categories of governance and hence patterns of 
adjustment to change. 
8.5.2 Instrument mix modes: shifts in governance 
Three interlinked modes of governance were identified at the instrument mix level (Figure 
8.6). Each instrument mix mode included internal processes that are summarised in Table 
8.4. In general the governance arena oscillated between ‘consolidated’ and ‘destabilised’ 
modes (see 8.5.3 disturbance event responses). However, if a stressor or opportunity was 
sufficient then governance could shift into a dynamic mode — e.g. innovation, refining and 
growth. In the dynamic mode many informal or peripheral activities were found to remain in 
an innovate-refining loop until a sufficient opportunity for growth and consolidation occurred. 
The ability to lock in an actor response at the instrument mix level was critical for the non-
core arena. State managers in Portland and Brisbane were adept at creating at least 
informal (and temporary) lock-in mechanisms. Similarly a number of key state and non-state 
actors spent time scanning the urban governance setting for new opportunities, and this 
often coincided with a destabilisation event. At the institutional transition level, particular 
instrument mix modes were more associated with particular transitional periods — as 
indicated by colour coding in Tables 8.1 and 8.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6 Instrument mix modes and adjustment to change 
Consolidated 
Dynamic 
Stabilise 
Disturbance 
Shift 
Dismantle 
Destabilised 
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Table 8.4 Response processes by instrument mix mode: Portland and Brisbane examples 
 Mode Internal process Examples from Portland and Brisbane participants 
 
D
y
n
a
m
ic
 
Innovation or 
implementation 
 Research/design/experiment 
 Policy transfer / apply knowledge  
 Mobilise 
 Link up previously disconnected actors 
 Build on current knowledge, established experience 
 Pilot 
Refining  Establish guidelines / codify 
 Monitor and evaluate 
 Overcome institutional barriers  
(e.g. start-up costs, fear of change)  
 Speed up processing 
 Develop ongoing permissions for the activity 
 Reduce ‘moving parts’ 
Expansion or growth  Roll out / scale up 
 Recruit 
 
C
o
n
s
o
lid
a
te
d
  
Stabilise or 
‘lock-in’ 
 Embed into more stable organisational level,  
(e.g. from strategy to plan, from policy to law) 
 Move from procedural to substantial instrument (e.g. from 
collaborative forum to a set program of action) 
 Compliance mechanisms (enforced) 
 Access recurrent funding source / revenue stream 
 Embed into another arena or process so that it is reliant 
on your instruments outputs 
 Acknowledge the need to maintain past investment of 
public funds 
Integrate or 
associate 
 New higher level framework 
 New bundling of instruments (e.g. biodiversity strategy) 
 New partnership or strengthened partnership 
 adapted institutional logic  
(e.g. NGO begins commercial arm) 
A
b
s
o
rb
e
d
 
(C
o
n
s
o
lid
a
te
d
 
le
v
e
l 
2
) 
Incorporate or 
amalgamate 
 Merge/rationalise (i.e. programs) 
 ‘Roll up into’ 
 Embedded new institutional logic 
(e.g. NGO reliance on new commercial arm) 
Enculturate or ‘Black 
boxing’ 
 Loss of organisational memory 
 Role specialisation 
 Legal precedents 
 
D
e
s
ta
b
ili
s
e
d
 
Temporary  Toggling  
 Triggering (i.e. the application of an Act) 
Incremental  Ratcheting 
 Review 
 Amendment 
Transformative  Sunset 
 Reframing 
 Decoupling (of integration between sectors/interests) 
 Cascading program (e.g. establishment of a strategic plan 
which calls for new management plans and programs) 
 Cascading logic (new regimes that fill out until there is a 
complete instrument mix) 
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8.5.3 Disturbance event responses: diverse interests in 
governance 
As expected, there was little evidence of feedback models such as adaptive management 
and triple-loop learning within formal governance arrangements (Allen et al. 2001), although 
some instrument types were more associated with responsive change than others (Howlett, 
2009). As was expected, public and private restoration/management exhibited higher levels 
of change and innovation, albeit incremental, while ‘protect’ and ‘purchase’ categories 
changed less frequently, but with more transformative outcomes. Some networks, actors, 
and even physical locations were more frequently associated with response processes over 
time. Response to disturbance events fell into three stages: engagement, shift, and 
reintegration, with each stage involving two interacting elements resulting from diversity 
amongst governance actors (Figure 8.7). This model is obviously expressed differently 
according to the governance setting — i.e. more networked as in Portland, or more 
hierarchical as in Brisbane, but also according to the particular governance mode and 
institutional transition that is taking place at higher levels. 
 
Key actors 
engage 
Facilitate 
change 
Engage 
with 
structures 
Respond 
respectively 
Advocate 
Collaborate 
Figure 8.7 Disturbance event responses  
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A disturbance began with a stressor impacting on the established governance arrangements 
(e.g. 8.4.1). Despite the stressor, networks and instruments absorbed most low level 
stressors or managers made an incremental adjustment. Higher level disturbance was 
needed to shift policy, not only because of institutional inertia, but also because, the design 
and implementation of policy requires enormous effort that cannot be mobilised easily in a 
non-core arena. However, if a stressor engaged with a key actor and that actor responded 
in its networks then a low level of decoupling occurred amongst actors as they responded 
differently to the stressor according to specific interests. This low level decoupling had 
important implications for responsive change if a shift did occur. These implications and the 
manner in which shifts were coordinated will be examined in Chapter 9. 
Following a shift, actors and networks reintegrated. Actors repositioned themselves in three 
important areas: formal involvement, informal responses, and metropolitan governance. 
Formal involvement concerns policy roles within the instrument mix. Informal responses 
include issue networks critiquing the new policy, partnerships to maximise benefits from the 
new policy, and new activities to compensate for perceived losses from the policy change. 
The embedded nature of ecological governance meant that a disturbance in an overlapping 
arena could trigger a shift in the ecological governance arena.  The reintegration process 
itself sometimes acted as a new stressor and catalysed further engagement from key actors. 
8.6 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter examined the response of governance structures to change at three levels: 
institutional transition, governance shift and disturbance event. There was strong evidence 
that change occurred in multiple overlapping transitions at the institutional level with more 
rapid change occurring amongst instruments and in response to disturbance events. Despite 
the initial critique of complex adaptive theory (Chapter 1), elements of this situation 
correspond with adaptive systems thinking, in that different variables change at different 
paces, with slow and fast changing variables interacting to generate ‘surprise’ (Holling and 
Gunderson 2002). However, in this research it was the governance arena itself which 
displayed features of complex adaptive systems. The analysis has established stagetwo of 
the responsive concept from the main research framework (Figure 3.1). Findings on actor 
responses and governance adjustments to change have been incorporated with earlier 
findings on the nature of embeddedness. The final analytical chapter will examine the 
manner in which actor responses to change were coordinated — or not coordinated — 
across diverse instruments and networks.   
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Chapter 9 
 
 
Metagovernance, legitimacy and collective action frames 
 
This chapter analyses the strategies taken by key actors for metagovernance of the arena. 
Metagovernance refers to the management of governance actors. The analysis examines 
the context and structures of responsive governance through the lens of actor agency 
(Figure 9.1). The chapter highlights key theory on metagovernance, action frames and 
legitimacy (Section 9.1). Then the approach to frame analysis is outlined (9.2) before results 
are presented (9.3 and 9.4). The synthesis presents a new understanding of 
metagovernance for the arena level (9.5) which, in terms of the main research framework 
(Figure 3.1) achieves the development of responsive governance 0.3 – the incorporation of 
coordination dynamics into the earlier 0.2 concept of embedded agency (Chapter 8). The 
chapter concludes by exploring the implications for enhancing responsive governance 
through metagovernance (9.6). The coordination of responsive change is a critical challenge 
for governance arenas with multiple instruments and networks. Furthermore the ‘non-core’ 
status of ecological governance is an extra layer of complexity to this challenge. 
 
 Figure 9.1 Interaction as a lens for viewing structure and context: 
analysis of collective action frames and the investigative framework  
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Ecological governance provides an important opportunity for analysing metagovernance 
because although state actors are in a position to manage most networks within the arena, 
the state actors in ecological governance are themselves marginal to many traditional urban 
state actors. In addition, the highly embedded nature of ecological governance and the 
broader paradigm of integrated planning and sustainable development mean that the 
management of governance actors for ecological governance outcomes can be complex. 
Therefore the aim of this chapter is to examine the role of state and non-state actors in the 
management of ecological governance networks. 
9.1 Metagovernance and responding to change 
The coordination of responsive change across networks is challenged by two opposing 
dynamics. First, the non-unitary structure of governance arenas frustrates efforts to direct 
management in a centralised fashion. Second, the embedded nature of ecological 
governance means that other governance arenas may also influence the management of 
ecological governance networks according to their own priorities. In order to analyse this 
situation, the following discussion highlights important theory on metagovernance, 
legitimacy and collective action frames. 
9.1.1 Metagovernance 
As governance settings have become more complex, the need to manage the networks 
involved has also become increasingly important. Metagovernance activities include: the 
‘steering’, rather than implementing,  of network processes (Meuleman 2006, Lund 2009); 
design of institutions; and some authors include value management or discursive framing 
as a higher order of metagovernance (Sørensen 2006, Kooiman and Jentoft 2009). 
Researchers have viewed the notion of metagovernance from state-centric, cross-sector 
and society-centric frames of governance. From state-centric frames the management of 
governance networks has been seen as a responsibility of the state and as a project to 
embed governance networks into state hierarchies (Jessop 2003). From cross-sector 
frames metagovernance has been viewed from positive and negative perspectives. 
Positively, metagovernance is an opportunity to mobilise principles and values that underpin 
networks (Kooiman and Jentoft 2009), while negatively, metagovernance is a ‘roll back’ of 
non-state actor participation (Whitehead 2003). Finally, society-centric frames see 
metagovernance as a way to maintain democratic accountability within governance 
networks (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). These perspectives are united by the common 
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assertion that metagovernance does not replace governance, but rather is an effort to 
balance and coordinate it (Lund 2009). 
9.1.2 Legitimacy  
The need for legitimacy increases in proportion with the power of other actors and their 
ability to organise (Mann 1986). Hence, a non-core arena such as ecological governance is 
dependent upon legitimacy in order to function and respond to change (Termeer et al. 2010, 
Cosens 2013). With this in mind it is important to consider legitimacy at both political and 
organisational levels. Political legitimacy is the endorsement of state actors by the public. At 
a higher level political legitimacy includes the endorsement of governance arrangements, 
where different governance arrangements are susceptible to different legitimacy crises 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2005, Bäckstrand 2010, Lindgren and Persson 2010). Political 
legitimacy is therefore concerned with the accountability of and outputs from governments. 
In comparison, organisational or actor-level legitimacy is the endorsement of an action by a 
governance actor. Therefore actor-level legitimacy also is concerned with the endorsement 
of response to change from various actors. This concept, developed in the field of 
organisational management had an initial focus on strategies to manage and elicit legitimacy 
from key stakeholders, but some authors also recognise that legitimacy is embodied within 
societal institutions to which the organisation must be aligned for legitimacy to be 
established (Suchman 1995). Different types of actor-level legitimacy are recognised and 
they form the basis for different responses from actors (Table 9.1), although in practice, the 
endorsement given by an actor is a multi-faceted, hybrid of different legitimacy types 
(Wallington et al. 2007). 
Table 9.1 Typology of legitimacy actions 
 Episodic Continual 
Pragmatic Legitimacy Exchange Influence 
Moral Legitimacy Consequential Procedural 
Cognitive Legitimacy Predictability 
(Comprehensible) 
Inevitability  
(Taken for granted) 
Source: adapted from Suchman 1995, p584 
Both political and actor-level legitimacy can be further divided into input and output 
legitimacy. Input legitimacy, is established when actors perceive options for contributing their 
views into decision-making processes, such as by voting or public participation in planning. 
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Output legitimacy is the endorsement of results or outcomes and is established when the 
actors are seen as achieving the right things in the right way (Lindgren and Persson 2010).  
9.1.3 Collective action frames 
‘Collective action frames’ is a component of broader theory on ‘contentious politics’ and 
social movements (see Section 2.2.3). The approach provides an important strategy for 
explaining the coordination of multiple actors through ‘framing’ — e.g. Benford and Snow 
2000. ‘Collective action frames’ investigate the generation of meaning amongst leaders, 
development into collective action frames, and efforts to align the frames of leaders and 
participants. This school of thought contributes to a number of society-centric models of 
governance (Table 2.1). Snow et al. (1986) identify four types of frame alignment: frame 
bridging, frame extension, frame amplification and frame transformation. These types are 
summarised by Schock (2005, p28): 
 Frame bridging is linking with unmobilised actors with similar sentiments on the issue 
 Frame extension is connecting primary frames with the priorities of potential allies 
 Frame amplification is the activation of “latent values or beliefs” 
 Frame transformation is the ascendance of the new beliefs over previous ones. 
Although collective action frames were developed for democratic contexts, Schock (2005) 
applies the approach to non-democracies and notes the importance of frame amplification 
and frame transformation in non-democratic contexts. Interestingly, this has implications for 
frame alignment processes at the governance arena level even within democratic settings. 
Professional, hierarchical and partnership interactions are not primarily democratic in nature 
and differ in their acceptance of dissent.   
9.2 Investigating metagovernance through collective 
action frames 
Taken together, the theory on metagovernance, legitimacy and collective action frames 
enables the analysis for this chapter. Metagovernance generally has a focus on the 
responsibilities and strategies of state actors.  For urban ecological governance this means 
a focus on environmental officers and the staff they report to. To better examine the 
governance arena, the metagovernance analysis in this chapter incorporates elements of 
collective action frames and legitimacy for the following reasons. First, the role of non-state 
actors involved in ecological governance is more extensive than in many alternative settings. 
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This means that attention needs to be given to the collective action by prominent non-state 
actors, as well as state-based officers in steering the responses of ecological governance 
to change. Second, urban environmental officers report to positions that are involved in 
urban governance but are almost certainly external to ecological governance. In addition to 
this, environmental officers are peripheral to the power structures in most urban governance 
settings. This means that urban environmental officers need to be investigated as 
metagovernors for ecological governance, and these officers themselves are 
‘metagoverned’ with respect to broader urban governance arrangements. From this semi-
pluralist perspective, urban ecological governance interacts to maintain legitimacy amongst 
a field of interests represented by different state actors. In order to investigate this situation 
the concepts of legitimacy and collective action frames are important for understanding how 
less powerful urban actors can govern the arena for which they are responsible.   
It was not practical to investigate all actor responses over the study’s 20 year timeline, 
therefore the adjustments in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 were used to sample key events from the 
different institutional transitions for each city. Governance was analysed as a radial concept 
(Table 3.1). This means that the primary governance frame – cross-sector, society-centric 
and state-centric – was identified for each frame alignment stage leading up to the 
adjustment in governance (Snow et al. 1986). Then the use of these frames for collective 
action was examined. In this analysis cross-sector refers to state-society interactions, rather 
than urban functions. Urban functions and their integration are indicated separately in the 
data presented. 
The following sections present the results for the collective frame analyses for Brisbane then 
Portland. For each city, an overview of urban governance and legitimacy is provided and 
then action frames are explained with a focus on critical cases of responding to change.  
9.3 Arena metagovernance in Brisbane 
The collective action analysis for Brisbane demonstrated an urban governance context with 
strong vertical integration and state hierarchy — i.e. state-centric frames (3.3). Legitimacy 
was achieved especially through output legitimacy — i.e. state-performance. The following 
section presents the details of this analysis, beginning with an overview of urban governance 
and legitimacy for the city.   
208 
 
Urban governance and legitimacy in Brisbane 
Earlier chapters have shown that the overarching urban governance for Brisbane is 
hierarchical and uses a ‘strong-mayor’ system (Chapter 4). This means that it is also a form 
of institutionalised heterarchy — i.e. through an institutional process, in this case the 
electoral process, priorities within the urban regime can be re-ordered. Ecological 
governance in Brisbane has a strong focus on biodiversity, but is not strongly embedded 
into related arenas, such as water management, in a manner that facilitates strong co-
benefits for biodiversity (Chapter 7). Governance actors do not have strong access to 
institutional triggers and generally have needed to flex with, rather than guide a 
transformative change within the arena (Chapter 8). This system is sensitive towards output 
legitimacy, especially criticisms about silos, not only because of the large size of BCC, but 
also because of the strong new public management model, which is focused on efficiency 
and outputs (Bevir et al. 2003). The large council hierarchy can create distance between 
council and community and engaged community groups assist councillors to make 
community connections. There is a strong compliance approach from council to community 
(state-legitimacy frame) and this has at times created a dialogue between BCC officers and 
watershed groups as a resolution is sought for landholder grievances — e.g. weed 
management (cross-sector-legitimacy). It can also create a trigger for conflict and change 
(society-legitimacy). In general, state actors who did not work directly with ‘the community’ 
perceived the need to consult with non-state actors as an obstacle, or even a risk to 
achieving their responsibilities. For example, state and non-state actors cited several past 
incidents where a program that was rumored to be altered and community groups, who were 
referred to as ‘powerful’, advocated for the programs to remain, or to be extended, and were 
supported by a local councillor in this endeavour — e.g. the appointment of a creek ranger 
to a watershed group that did not yet exist (state-centric disapproval of society-centric 
frames). However, environmental officers were also skilled at connecting with community 
energy and strengthening it, in situations where state actor goals could be furthered in some 
way (cross-sector-performance), as the following discussion highlights. 
Collective action frames and responding to change in Brisbane 
Table 9.2 displays seven key governance adjustments from the Brisbane frame analysis. 
The full frame analysis summary is included as Appendix 7. Rows one to four are the 
adjustments most frequently mentioned by interview respondents and rows five to seven are 
unique and critical cases. NES is the primary meta-governor for the arena, with LAS playing 
a specialized secondary role. Different adjustments in governance (column 1) were 
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associated with different frame strategies (column 3). Different types of legitimacy 
underpinned each action and had different sources (column 4). The following discussion 
illustrates features from the full frame-analysis Appendix 7 using Table 9.2 
Table 9.2 Brisbane action frame summary: significant examples 
1.Example 
adjustments 
2.Coordinat’n 
actors 
3.Frame alignment strategies a  4.Source instrument/resource 
   Types of legitimacy b  
Adjustments most commonly noted by participants 
1.Protection of 
Boondall Wetlands – 
acquisition starts 
(advocacy to protect 
iconic places) 
RAGs,  
Elected 
representatives, 
NES officers 
Bridge: soc-centric (advocacy) 
Extend: x-sector (state allies) 
Amplify: x-sector (state allies) 
Transform: soc-centric (election) 
From strong voter support 
  metropolitan input legitimacy; 
  pragmatic-continual (state  
  actors); moral-continual (RAGs  
  & voters)   
2.Sustained tree 
canopy targets  
(NES link BCC 
activities with strategic 
plan/target) 
NES Bridge: state-centric (actor level) 
Extend: state-centric (BCC actors 
Amplify: state-centric (weak) 
Transform: state-centric  
(underpinned by strategic plan) 
From strategic plan and canopy 
target 
  internal BCC-output legitimacy  
  pragmatic-continual / pragmatic- 
  episodic  
3.Shift of 2 million 
trees to include 
biodiversity goals 
(WSG advocates get  
  NES & BCC buy-in) 
NES,  
WSGs  
Bridge: soc-centric (ext.advocacy 
Extend: x-sector (int.advocacy 
Amplify: state-centric (BCC actors 
Transform: state-centric 
 (biodiversity goals added) 
From strategic plan, canopy 
target, investment protection 
  internal BCC-output legitimacy 
  pragmatic/moral-continual 
  pragmatic-episodic 
4.WSG links with 
infrastructure 
providers (WSG 
revenue stream     
  with LAS support) 
LAS-Creek 
Ranger 
WSGs 
Bridge: soc-centric (actor level) 
Extend: x-sector (creek ranger) 
Amplify: soc-centric (commercial) 
Transform: soc-centric-performnc 
(reduce state participation)   
From contracts and sponsors 
  NGO output legitimacy 
  pragmatic-episodic 
Critical cases of adjustment 
5.Compulsory 
acquisition 
(acquisition gets BCC  
  support due to 
strategy) 
NES Bridge: state-centric (actor level) 
Extend: state-centric (BCC actors 
Amplify: state-centric (weak) 
Transform: state-centric  
(underpinned by regulation) 
From core biodiversity network 
strategy 
  internal BCC-output legitimacy 
  moral-continual 
  pragmatic/cognitive episodic 
6.WSG Enterprise 
(WSG propose 
business, officers 
listen & enforce) 
Council officers, 
WSG 
Bridge: soc-centric (actor level) 
Extend: state-centric (compliance 
Amplify: state-centric (allow) 
Transform: state & soc-centric 
(negotiated permission) 
   
From economic argument, 
compliance 
  output and input legitimacy  
  (WSG); pragmatic (both),   
  moral (WSG)  
  & cognitive episodic (BCC) 
7.Quasi offset policy 
through NALL 
bargaining (buy-in 
from RaD pilots new 
policy informally) 
LAS 
WSGs 
Bridge: state-centric (actor level) 
Extend: state-centric (bargaining) 
Amplify: state-centric (agreement) 
Transform: state-centric 
 (underpinned by regulation) 
From bargaining, NALL, policy 
transfer 
  internal BCC-output legitimacy 
  moral-continual 
  pragmatic/cognitive episodic 
Key 
Frame alignment 
Bridging:             link with like-minded unmobilised  
Extension:          buy-in from potential allies 
Amplification:     activation of latent value/beliefs 
Transformation: new beliefs 
Legitimacy 
Input:           views are heard 
Output:        outcomes are satisfactory 
Pragmatic:   exchange and influence 
Moral:          consequential and procedural 
Cognitive:    comprehensible and inevitable 
Sources: a Schock (2005, p28); b adapted from Suchman (1995) and Lindgren and Persson (2010) 
Abbreviations in table: BCC is Brisbane City Council; Ext.advocacy is non-state advocacy; Int.advocacy is 
internal state advocacy; LAS is Local Asset Services; NALL is Natural Assets Local Law; NES is Natural 
Environment and Sustainability; RAG is Resident Action Group; soc-centric is Society-centric frames; WSG is 
‘watershed group’; x-sector is cross-sector frames 
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Most adjustments in governance were associated with output legitimacy (column 4), as was 
expected for a city with a strong new public management model (state-performance frame). 
However, the output legitimacy often was required from other BCC stakeholders, which 
highlights the internal power dynamics involved with responding to change in Brisbane. In 
addition this highlights the important of a disaggregated approach to government to 
understand state-state interactions in governance. 
Adjustments can be viewed according to their ‘bridging’ stage of frame alignment - the first 
stage. The full frame analysis sample (Appendix 7) contained roughly even proportions of 
cross-sector, society-centric and state-centric bridging — 8, 9 and 11 adjustments 
respectively. Cross-sector bridging virtually always involved significant input legitimacy and 
there were two types. ‘Pure’ cross-sector adjustments used a cross-sector frame for all four 
frame alignment stages – i.e. bridging, expanding, amplifying and transforming. In Brisbane, 
this type was associated with the formation of networks – i.e. Brisbane catchments network 
- and the regionalization of ecological governance to the South East Queensland level – i.e. 
membership of watershed councils in the SEQ Healthy Waterways Partnership. In contrast, 
cross/state adjustments also used state-centric framing for some stages of alignment. This 
type also involved output legitimacy and the adjustment of state-frame governance towards 
cross-sector priorities – i.e. the design and implementation of the Bushland Acquisition Levy. 
Hence this type provides evidence of functional integration.  
Adjustments that began with society-centric bridging at the arena level were a small group 
in the sample, but all were significant and unique. They were adjustments that displayed a 
penetration – or withdrawal - of society-based interests into state-structures – i.e. watershed 
group advocacy for biodiversity goals in the 2 Million Trees project and the removal of BCC 
from participation in the Brisbane catchments network. Society-centric bridging at the actor 
level were of two types. Type A was associated with the emergence of cross-sector 
governance (institutional transition #3) – i.e. strengthening of local community and business 
partnerships by watershed groups - while type B was associated with state-society 
decoupling (institutional transition #5) – i.e. watershed group business proposal (Table 9.2, 
example 6). They respectively represented community re-alignment with cross-sectoral 
governance and community realignment with the shift in governance towards new public 
management.  
Many of the examples of state-centric bridging were purely state-centric across all four 
stages of frame alignment. They divide into adjustments that displayed weak amplification 
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and those that did not. This demonstrates situations where the actor making the adjustment 
does not need other actors to buy-in in order to implement the adjustment – i.e. 
transformation stage. Most state-centric bridging at the actor level were of this ‘weak 
alignment’ type. The main actors were NES and LAS and they were able to draw on 
regulatory or functional authority to enable reform. Two examples of this are the 40% tree 
canopy target in the Brisbane Vision 2026 document and the Natural Assets Local Law. 
These instruments provided opportunity structures that enabled environmental governance 
actors to negotiate the hierarchical structure of BCC and leverage authority for the 
adjustment from elsewhere in the urban governance framework. Influence and 
consequential legitimacy (9.1.2) were rare, further emphasizing the importance for state 
actors to acquire procedural legitimacy and thereby leverage pragmatic exchanges when 
the opportunities arose 
The BCC city planning division played a reflexive role during the transition to the Brisbane 
City Plan that made significant contributions to metagovernance. A number of interview 
participants noted that debates with staff in the city planning division during this time helped 
to hone the arguments behind environmental planning and policy in Brisbane. The other 
main example of the reflexive role occurred when attempted innovation by watershed groups 
came into conflict with BCC policy. In these situations, if the group was sufficiently 
entrepreneurial, they repeatedly returned to BCC officers with an adapted proposal until an 
option acceptable to formal policy was found. This illustrates a key interaction between 
watershed groups and the general hierarchical structure of BCC where bargaining took 
place, innovations were honed and incremental change took place in formal policy or its real 
world implementation (see Lipsky 1980). In this fashion the watershed groups played a 
minor metagovernance role at the metropolitan level.  Watershed groups played a stronger 
metagovernance role within more local regimes. For example, they participated in multiple 
programs such as Habitat Brisbane and Creek Rangers, and some had a close relationship 
with the local councillor. In this fashion watershed groups were able to play a localised 
metagovernance role with political feedback into the hierarchy of council via the local 
councillor, although, it is important to note that not all watershed groups had the capacity 
needed to activate this potential role.  
The final key feature to note from Table 9.2 was an iconic advocacy campaign behind the 
launch of the acquisition program. This adjustment was supported by input as well as output 
legitimacy. There was strong moral-episodic legitimacy involved and the response was 
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legitimised by the electoral process — i.e. election of Mayor Jim Soorley 1991. Metropolitan 
level advocacy was rare in the Brisbane case study (8.4), but contributed to a major 
transformative shift in ecological governance — i.e. the launch of major policy instruments. 
The response was successful because the advocacy campaign was strong, but this also 
illustrates the potential for campaigns or initiatives to link different strategies to progress 
through the frame alignment process. Advocacy campaigns were more common in the 
Portland case as will now be discussed. 
9.4 Arena metagovernance in Portland 
The collective action analysis for Portland demonstrated an urban governance context that 
was networked and participatory. Input legitimacy was therefore strongly associated with 
adjustments in governance. This section presents the main findings of this analysis, 
beginning with an overview of urban governance and legitimacy for the city.   
Urban governance and legitimacy in Portland  
The overarching urban governance of Portland is networked and public participation is 
institutionalized into the Oregon planning goals (Chapters 4 and 7). Voters have direct 
access to budgeting and law making processes through the ballot measure system (Chapter 
8), and therefore the overarching governance arrangements are sensitive towards political 
legitimacy in general and input legitimacy in particular. In general state actors expected to 
consult with non-state actors in order to establish legitimacy for their actions. State actors 
and non-state actors referred to past situations where non-state actors were not consulted 
on issues that they perceived as important and that this affected the ability for state actors 
to fulfill their responsibilities until the resulting conflict was sufficiently resolved — e.g. 
transportation planning in the South West corridor, and the Healthy Streams program in 
Tualatin. This was emphasised by the commission style of government in PCC as the 
following quote demonstrates. 
The way things get done is through participation and negotiation and the commission 
form promotes this. It is a situation of dynamic negotiation. Different interests are 
involved in a number of ways. They sit on advisory committees and are involved in 
budget negotiations. But what you have to realize is that the government is not 
separate from the community. Every bureau is involving different interest groups 
within the community in their decision making. Bureaus also negotiate with each 
other. Increasingly elected officials are actively involved in the bureaus too. 
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As the above quote illustrates, state actors expected a strong need to consult with other 
state actors within their government unit (e.g. different bureaus in PCC) and between 
government units with overlapping or adjacent jurisdictions — although some local councils 
displayed this characteristic more than others. Portland Metro, although a higher level of 
government than local councils found its legitimacy challenged in situations where buy-in 
from local councils had not been established — e.g. the reticence to comply with Title 13 
from councils in Washington County and PCC. The development of Title 13 was identified 
as a process that tested the limits of Metro’s legitimacy in ecological governance. 
Collective action frames and responding to change in Portland 
Table 9.3 displays eight key governance adjustments from the Portland frame analysis 
(Appendix 7). Rows one to four were the responses most mentioned by interview 
respondents and rows five to eight were unique and critical cases. For simplicity, local level 
responses are selected from PCC. As with the Brisbane case, different adjustments in 
governance were associated with different frame strategies, which in turn were underpinned 
by different sources and types of legitimacy. In this analysis Metro, BES and Audubon are 
the primary meta-governors for the arena, with Metro having the more central role. The 
following discussion uses Table 9.2 to illustrate features from the full frame-analysis 
Appendix 7. 
Most adjustments in governance were associated with input legitimacy, which theory 
expected for governance with strong participation and bargaining approaches (Lindgren and 
Persson, 2010). However, output legitimacy was also important in many cases, probably 
because there was an expectation from actors involved that a suitable instrument would be 
produced. Healey (2008) noted the pragmatist tendencies of policy in general and US policy 
in particular. To achieve the high level of buy-in required from other actors a pragmatic 
approach was needed and yet the strong role of advocacy meant that moral legitimacy was 
also central. Metagovernors often linked their coordination with a metropolitan narrative that 
referred to history (e.g. Olmsted plan), risk (e.g. water pollution) and/or culture (e.g. public 
participation). This narrative contributed to cognitive legitimacy ( i.e. comprehensibility) and 
usually involved exchange legitimacy, to achieve buy-in from other actors, or general 
pragmatic legitimacy — i.e. the benefits of pitching a proposed change in a manner that 
attracted support from influential environmental advocates. 
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Table 9.3 Portland action frame summary: significant examples 
Example  
adjustments 
Coordinat’n 
actors 
Frame alignment strategies (9.1.3) a Sources of legitimacy 
   Types of legitimacy (9.1.2) b 
Adjustments most frequently noted by interview participants 
1, 1994 Bond 
measure 
(builds networks, 
plan, business 
case) 
Audubon-
collaboration, 
Metro  
Multnomah 
county  
Bridge: x-sector (core, p&r) 
Extend: state-centric (soft) 
Amplify: x-sector (civic-political 
Transform: soc-centric (election)   
From voter support 
  input and output legitimacy 
  pragmatic/moral-continual,  
  cognitive-episodic 
2.Greenspaces 
Masterplan 
 
Audubon-
collaboration, 
Metro 
Bridge: soc-centric (advocacy 
Extend: x-sector (advocates) 
Amplify: x-sector (in planning) 
Transform: soc-centric (election)  
From voter support, RUGGOs 
& 2040 growth concept 
  input and output legitimacy 
  pragmatic/moral/cognitive- 
  continual, cognitive-episodic 
3.Title 13  
(state-NGO 
partnership) 
Metro, 
Audubon –
advocacy 
Bridge: state-centric (regs) 
Extend: state-centric (+local interests 
Amplify: state-centric (lower regs) 
Transform: x-sector (+partnerships)    
From voter support & Measure 
37 
  input legitimacy 
  pragmatic/moral-continual 
4.The Intertwine 
Coalition  
 
Metro and 
partners 
Bridge: x-sector (core) 
Extend: x-sector (early adopters) 
Amplify: x-sector (+more state actors  
& urban interests) 
Transform: x-sector (+more state  
actors & urban interests)  
From collaborative tradition & 
potential funding 
  input legitimacy  
(some output)  
  pragmatic/moral-continual,  
  cognitive-episodic  
Critical cases of adjustment 
5.TEES (PWMP) BES-WS 
team,  
 Portland 
Parks 
Bridge: state-centric (WS+eg) 
Extend: state-centric (+int.stake) 
Amplify: state-centric (+int.stake) 
Transform: state-centric  
(+land managers) 
From collaborative tradition & 
PWMP 
  input and output legitimacy 
  pragmatic/moral-continual,  
  cognitive-episodic 
6.Acceleration of 
green 
infrastructure 
BES-WS 
team,  
BES-
engineers 
Bridge: state-centric (ws) 
Extend: state-centric (+engineers) 
Amplify: state-centric (+council) 
Transform: x-sector (+other interests) 
From Big-pipe capacity & 
Grey-to green initiative 
Output legitimacy 
Pragmatic/Cognitive-all 
7.FoT capacity 
build 
BES-WS 
team,  
PSU 
Bridge: soc-centric (actor level) 
Extend: soc-centric (+soc. partners 
Amplify: x-sector (BES support) 
Transform: x-sector (BES contract) 
output legitimacy 
pragmatic-continual 
cognitive-episodic 
 
8.Coalition for a 
Liveable Future 
Audubon  
(and other 
civil society) 
Bridge: soc-centric (core) 
Extend: soc-centric (early adopters) 
Amplify: soc-centric (+more actors) 
Transform: state-centric  
(planning for liveability) 
input legitimacy (values),  
pragmatic-moral continual  
cognitive-episodic?  
(insufficient data) 
Key 
Frame alignment 
Bridging:              link with like-minded but unmobilised  
Extension:           buy-in from potential allies 
Amplification:      activation of latent value/beliefs 
Transformation:  new beliefs 
Legitimacy 
Input:                        views are heard 
Output:                     outcomes are satisfactory 
General pragmatic: exchange and influence 
General moral:         consequential and procedural 
General cognitive:   comprehensible and inevitable 
Sources: a Schock (2005, p28); b adapted from Suchman (1995), and Lindgren and Persson (2010) 
Abbreviations in table: BES is ‘Bureau of Environmental Services’; FoT is ‘Friends of Trees’; int.stake is 
‘internal stakeholders’; P&R is parks and recreation interests; PSU is ‘Portland State University’; PWMP is 
Portland Watershed Management Plan; ‘Regs’ is regulations; Soc. is society; TEES is the Terrestrial 
Ecosystem Enhancement Strategy; ws is BES watershed team; X-sector is ‘cross-sector’  
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Adjustments can be viewed according to their ‘bridging’ stage of frame alignment - the first 
stage. The full frame analysis sample (Appendix 7) contained roughly even proportions of 
cross-sector and state-centric adjustments, while and society-centric bridging was a smaller 
group - 12, 12 and 7 adjustments respectively. Cross-sector bridging was evenly spread 
between input legitimacy, output legitimacy and those with both. They divide into 
adjustments that had an emphasis on actor buy-in – i.e. the 1994 regional bond measure - 
and adjustments with an emphasis functional integration – i.e. design and implementation 
of the regional trails system. In practice these adjustments showed a certain degree of 
overlap between the actor-buy-in and function integration. 
State-centric bridging displayed a range of legitimacy types that did not have a simple 
correlation with particular framings. They divide into three main types. Type A had ‘pure’ 
state framing and concerned the interplay between different government actors and their 
responsibilities – i.e. the Terrestrial Ecosystem Enhancement Strategy (Table 9.2, example 
5). All used roughly equal input and output legitimacy. Types B and C both involved state 
and cross-sector framings. They are differentiated by whether state-buy-in or cross-sector 
buy-in was more important for moving through the frame alignment process. Type B required 
a certain level of state buy-in, were mostly associated with function integration and used 
roughly equal input and output legitimacy i.e. the acceleration of green infrastructure in PCC 
with the Grey to Green initiative. Type C required cross-sector buy-in and displayed a 
diverse emphases on input and output legitimacy – i.e. the BES watershed revegetation 
program, which employs many community partnerships.  
Society-centric bridging was the smallest group. All of these adjustments used strong input 
legitimacy and progressed directly into cross-sector framing for the extension stage of frame 
alignment – i.e. the Backyard Habitat Certification Program. The one iconic exemption to 
this was the ‘Coalition for a Liveable Future’ campaign which used a society-centric framing 
for bridging, extension and amplification, before shifting to a state-centric framing for uptake 
into planning processes – i.e. transformation stage.     
The role of shared and non-state metagovernance was a key feature in Portland. Shared 
metagovernance meant that a primary metagovernor (e.g. Metro) was reliant on supporting 
metagovernors (e.g. local councils) to avoid a significant reduction in legitimacy. This relates 
to Mann’s (1986) observation that legitimacy becomes more important as a state actor’s 
relative power is reduced and the ability of other actors to organize is increased. This 
demonstrates the very strong role of legitimacy in metagoverning the Portland arena. In 
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addition, this shows how a larger set of actors can take stronger metagovernance roles as 
the need for legitimacy, especially input legitimacy, becomes more important.  
This metagovernance community in Portland also included non-state actors who played 
various roles. These roles included collaborators, advocates and quasi-actors. Audubon 
was the primary actor in the former two roles. State actors held contributions from Audubon 
in high regard because of extensive membership, commitment to the Portland ‘community’ 
and ecological knowledge. This included participation in 20 to 30 advisory committees 
across the Portland Metro area included consultancy to state actors on urban biodiversity 
issues — e.g. the Urban Biodiversity Institute, which technically is a separate organisation, 
but for these purposes is included as ‘Audubon’. However, Audubon also played an 
advocacy role which achieved metagovernance status. Taking Meuleman’s (2008) 
approach that the metagovernance role involves the ability to shift governance between 
modes such as network and hierarchy, Audubon demonstrated clear evidence of advocacy 
metagovernance. If, from Audubon’s perspective, collaboration lost legitimacy, the group 
would switch to a strategy of advocacy. This could involve a complete break with state 
collaboration — e.g. resign from advisory committee — or a partial maintenance — e.g. 
Urban Biodiversity Institute continued collaborating while FAUNA network undertook 
advocacy. Regardless, of the approach taken, there was often a general strategy of 
positioning the group closer to state actors than more litigious groups, thereby retaining 
higher levels of exchange and procedural legitimacy from a state actor perspective. The 
switch to advocacy involved moving from cross-sector governance to society-centric 
governance — i.e. civil society — and also involved an appeal to different types of legitimacy 
than those used during collaboration. In particular, pragmatic-exchange legitimacy was 
reduced and moral legitimacy was increased. It also involved new processes of frame 
alignment that sought to extend and amplify the advocate view for the particular issue. This 
shift was supported by informal institutional structures. Informal support was especially 
through mobilisation of the FAUNA network — which included key individuals from 
neighborhood associations — and most importantly a shared attitude amongst state and 
non-state actors that Audubon’s advocacy/collaboration role was legitimate — i.e. that 
Audubon was “just doing their job” and that advocacy was part of a healthy democratic 
culture. 
A final type of non-state metagovernor was more temporary. This was the reflexive role 
played by property-rights groups and those critical of bond measures for natural area 
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acquisition. Although an organisation was rarely identifiable, institutional processes 
surrounding ballot measures and advocacy transformed them into a quasi-actor. That is to 
say, the aggregate behavior of these individuals was understood by decision makers as if 
they were a unitary actor — i.e. a segment of the community acting in a unitary manner for 
its own interests. The reflexive metagovernor role, as in Brisbane, encouraged ecological 
governance to be refined because through opposition, key governance actors honed their 
policy arguments. For example, the property rights quasi-actor was significant in causing the 
1993 bond measure to fail. This then led to the transfer of county parks to Metro, the 
development of refined and more transparent acquisition targets and a lead role for Metro 
— instead of FAUNA — for the following successful bond measure in 1994.  
9.5 Arena level metagovernance: invoking legitimacy and 
summoning institutions through collective action frames 
In both Portland and Brisbane, a simple view of a single state metagovernor was not 
supported by the analysis. Instead metagovernance involved a set of prominent actors, 
different types of legitimacy and collective action frames. The set of metagovernance actors 
who played different roles, appealed to different types of legitimacy. Metagovernance actors 
negotiated amongst themselves and with the broader urban governance setting via 
collective action frames. The lead actor also changed over time, depending upon the 
particular response to change and metagovernance role involved (Table 9.4). The set of 
metagovernance actors has elements in common with the ‘community of enquiry’ as applied 
to public administration (Shields 2003). ‘Community of enquiry’ was first developed by 
classic pragmatists - e.g. Dewey (1938). Shields (2003) summarises the community as 
having: a focus on a problematic situation; a scientific attitude to that problem; and dynamics 
of deliberative democracy amongst community members. Furthermore the democratic 
elements are critical as without them the process is simply a rationalised enquiry for data 
collection (Shields 2003). Hence the set of metagovernors in Portland show strong 
alignment with this organising principle, however Brisbane misses some elements. The 
exploration of metagovernance in terms of ‘communities of enquiry’ is a fruitful area for 
further research.     
 In this setting, collective action frames supported important horizontal and vertical 
processes of metagovernance. Horizontally, collective action frames were used to manage 
legitimacy amongst the set of metagovernance actors. This also facilitated contributions 
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from reflexive metagovernance roles and shared roles — i.e. where ‘buy-in’ was required 
from supporting actors in order for a response to progress. Here were managers in both 
cities who matched the description of ‘policy entrepreneur’ used by researchers —e.g. 
Mintrom and Norman 2009. For example, these individuals emphasised the importance of 
moving outside beyond government silos to collaborate with whoever had knowledge and 
influence for the matter in hand. Vertically, collective action frames were used to negotiate 
a response from more powerful actors, often involved in more central urban interests. This 
process is vertical as it involves a ‘metagoverning up’ role. This role was usually played by 
state actors within the arena — most evident in Brisbane — although it could also occur 
when non-state actors played an advocacy role.     
Table 9.4 Metagovernance roles in Brisbane and Portland 
Role Brisbane Portland 
Primary state actor role Natural Environment and 
Sustainability 
Metro-natural areas 
Secondary state actor role * Local councils 
Supporting state actor role Local Asset Services Local legitimacy regimes  
(e.g. BES) 
Reflexive role City Planning Property-rights quasi-actor 
Non-state advocate role Watershed groups Audubon 
Non-state collaborative role * Audubon – and The Urban 
Biodiversity Institute 
*No clear actor identified in this role 
Abbreviations in table: BES is Portland City Bureau of Environmental Services 
 
Finally, it is important to note that metagovernance activities, action frames and therefore 
legitimacy management, also interacted with the particular transitional stage of the 
governance arena (Chapter 8). Earlier transitional stages involved higher levels of value 
management through non-state advocates and to a lesser extent, policy champions working 
within state organisations. Although transformative change was often forced by institutional 
change beyond the metropolitan scale, these processes combined with local level action 
frames for their implementation.  
9.6 Chapter conclusion 
These findings hold a range of practical and theoretical implications for responsive 
governance. The analysis shows that non-core governance arenas can coordinate 
responses to change from within their institutional structures. Metagoverning actors in both 
cities demonstrated a range of strategies to enhance stability within broader urban 
governance arrangements — e.g. linking with strategic plans. Stability then was used as 
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leverage for further responses. The findings of this chapter demonstrate basic principles for 
designing a frame alignment strategy that includes legitimacy management. When 
combined with findings from earlier chapters — especially Chapter 8 — regarding structural 
and contextual responses to change, the analytical chapters build a tool for governance 
actors to plan and implement a strategy for enhanced responsiveness to change within their 
governance arena.  
The most significant theoretical implications from this analysis are the set of 
metagovernance actors involved and the role of non-state metagovernors. The 
metagovernance set contrasts with much of the metagovernance literature which posits a 
state actor, usually a single actor, for this role (Bell and Hindmoor 2009). The various roles 
amongst this set of actors, the dynamics of legitimacy management and the frame alignment 
strategies present a situation that is responsive. The role of non-state metagovernors 
particularly challenges metagovernance theory in that, at the arena level at least, a non-
state actor was found to add responsiveness and resilience. Non-state metagovernors 
contributed capacity to the governance arena by, for example advocating for ecological 
governance interests in situations where environmental programs were defunded. 
Furthermore, non-state metagovernors attempted to maintain defunded programs as an 
informal community activity where possible. This was a critical example of redundancy within 
the arena. Redundancy is an important component of adaptive capacity (Wardekker et al. 
2010) and by sharing this quality between state and non-state sectors, adaptive capacity 
became a more feasible goal for governments.  
This final analytical chapter for the thesis focused on the metagovernance of responsive 
change across the instrument mix (Jessop 2003). The action frame analysis of significant 
actors showed the influence of broader urban governance and the manner in which the 
governance arena negotiates a role within it. The results showed that metagovernance 
occurred through a set of significant actors rather than as a simple role played by a single 
state actor. In Portland especially there was strong evidence of a non-state metagovernor, 
which is a situation that is under-theorised in the governance literature. Even in Brisbane, 
with a single large council, it was possible to identify a metagovernance community of state 
actors amongst hierarchical structures. Furthermore, assertive actors that were not involved 
in metagovernance also could influence the manner in which planning and management 
was coordinated through the use of ‘opportunity structures’ for engaging directly with 
metagovernors, or indirectly with more powerful actors who could then intervene on their 
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behalf (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). These findings are significant for understanding responsive 
governance in non-core arenas. They demonstrate that even in settings with high levels of 
vertical, top-down integration, a less powerful arena (through skilled leaders) can influence 
decision making and change over time. This is a critical component of responsive 
governance and will be emphasised further in the next and final chapter. The following 
chapter synthesises the findings within the analytical chapters around the main research 
questions and demonstrates how they have been answered.  
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Chapter 10 
 
 
Synthesis and conclusion 
 
This chapter concludes the thesis and synthesises the main findings from the research. This 
synthesis revisits the three main research questions through the main findings from each 
chapter. The challenge of responsive governance is significant for theorists and decision 
makers. As decision makers face contemporary challenges around climate change and 
sustaining cities into an uncertain future, the ability to respond to change has become highly 
valued. For an arena such as urban ecological governance this is especially important 
because control over contextual factors may be low, the influence from more central policy 
arenas is likely to be high and there is a risk of losing capacity during times of rapid change 
(Jänicke 1997). This situation is not limited to urban ecological governance, but has 
implications for many public efforts towards sustainability.  
While much of the attention on responsive governance has necessarily focused on specific 
adaptive models — e.g. Plummer 2009, Booher and Innes 2010 — there is an increasing 
need to go beyond the study of governance for adaptation and instead analyse, governance 
and adaptation, which means the study of policy mixes and their response to change over 
time. This research was therefore not concerned with how to implement a model such as 
adaptive governance in an urban setting, but in analysing how governance in an urban 
setting has actually responded to change over time. The focus on a non-core policy arena 
emphasised the uneven power distribution that many managers need to navigate in order 
to respond to change. The research was driven by three main research questions: (1) “How 
do actors in a ‘non-core’ urban policy arena interact with the broader institutional context 
over time?”; (2) “How and in what respects does policy arena governance across the 
metropolitan area adjust to change over time?”; and (3) “What are the implications for 
enhancing how this governance adjusts to change?” The study investigated how and in what 
respects, responsive change occurred within this policy arena over time. This resulted in a 
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broader understanding of adaptive responses in complex institutional settings and the 
research outcomes contribute to the discourse on resilience and governance. 
This chapter synthesises major findings in the following manner. First, the contributions to 
theory from the research are discussed according to the three main research questions for 
the research: interactions of ecological governance with the broader context; response of 
governance to change over time; and implications for enhanced responsiveness.  Second, 
the implications for practice are reviewed. For state managers, the findings provide support 
for analysis, planning, institutional design and communication with stakeholders.  Finally, 
future research opportunities in this area are discussed with a particular focus on the issue 
of coordinated responses to change in governance. 
10.1 Contributions to theory 
The central aim of this thesis was to analyse how responsive change occurred over time in 
an urban policy arena that was not a traditional urban concern. The need for governance to 
respond to change is increasingly emphasised (Djalante et al. 2011, Cosens and Williams 
2012, Termeer et al. 2013). Chapter 1 introduced this problem of responsive governance in 
urban policy arenas by surveying the contribution of resilience theorists towards more 
adaptive models of governance. Knowledge in this area has progressed rapidly from simpler 
models of intentional change through adaptive management (Gunderson 1999), towards 
governance level approaches that seek collaborative learning amongst diverse actors 
(Goldstein 2009). The goal is to design governance mechanisms that can respond to change 
and therefore achieve resilient societies.    
However, in urban settings, the implementation of a particular model for adaptive 
governance is difficult. Urban settings are institutionally complex. There are a range of 
established arrangements in place that increasingly have become interlinked through the 
sustainable development paradigm, and often in a contentious manner (Godschalk 2004). 
The research has shown that collaborative learning approaches in a network need to 
manage contention between actors as well as collaboration. The research focused on this 
issue by carrying out empirical analysis of the ecological governance arena in Portland and 
Brisbane. The aim was to study the manner in which the ‘non-core’ arena adjusted to change 
over time. 
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Accordingly, Chapter 2 examined theory on public governance and inter-actor responses to 
change. The literature showed that implemented governance arrangements involve a hybrid 
of state focused, cross-sector and society-centric frames. Hence, the extensive theory on 
governance was framed according to these three foci (state-centric, cross-sector and 
society-centric) and further bisected into sub-groups of effectiveness and legitimacy. To 
understand inter-actor responses to change, literature was surveyed on public policy, 
institutions and social movements. This enabled the research on different configurations of 
agency and structure to be reviewed for their influence on inter-actor responses to change. 
The broad framework that was developed has theoretical implications for recent efforts to 
theorise hybrid governance and metagovernance (Meuleman 2011) by moving beyond 
state-centric frames of governance to include non-state frames. The multiple frames 
approach showed how governance could be thought of as a complex of overlaid 
arrangements with different sectoral foci. The framing of theory in this way also engaged 
with theorising on the democratic anchorage of governance networks and illustrated an 
approach that was sufficiently broad to include the public within research on public 
governance (Sørensen and Torfing 2005, Zimmer et al. 2008).  
Chapter 3 applied the findings from the literature review to develop a case study 
methodology for empirical analysis of the urban ecological governance arena and its 
response to change over time. Brisbane (QLD), Australia and Portland (OR), USA were 
selected as two ‘most different’ cases in order to highlight the effect of the institutional 
context on responsive governance (Sellers 2005). Data was collected through: semi-
structured interviews; participant observation; key informant dialogue; organisational 
documents; public reports and media. The research and investigative frameworks, not only 
supported an inductive, but theoretically informed approach to the case study analysis. The 
multiple framing of governance in the literature was also harnessed within the methodology 
to avoid problems of concept stretching from the broad approach to governance (Collier and 
Mahon 1993).  
The investigative framework was applied to the case studies (Chapters 4 to 9) to examine 
the responses of governance to change over time in Portland and Brisbane. In Chapter 4 
the background to the cases was examined with respect to contextual — i.e. biophysical, 
institutional and temporal — facets from the investigative framework. The main purpose of 
this analysis was to frame later chapters within their temporal context. However, the 
temporal analysis (Chapter 4) in itself demonstrated the long history of local development 
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involved with many contemporary characteristics in each city. These characteristics were 
then shown, in later chapters to be significant for both institutional design and adaptive 
responses of ecological governance. 
10.1.1 Research question 1: ‘Non-core’ policy arenas and the 
broader institutional context 
With respect to research question (1) “How do actors in a ‘non-core’ urban policy arena 
interact with the broader institutional context over time?” the results demonstrated the strong 
effect that the broader context has on urban ecological governance. Chapter 5 piloted the 
governance analysis in one watershed of Brisbane — Oxley Creek. While Chapter 7 
examined the manner in which the governance arena was embedded within the broader 
institutional context. 
The analysis of Oxley Creek (Chapter 5) showed that institutional change in the broader 
context had a strong effect on the manner in which urban ecological governance was 
implemented. Transformative changes in urban ecological governance were observed as 
regional and integrated planning was implemented in Queensland, causing a cascade of 
change. These shifts triggered a loss of capacity in the urban watershed group, but also 
encouraged the city council to step into the funding gap and take up a strong ecological 
governance role. Chapter 5 also gave a glimpse into the processes that took place at the 
watershed level. Space did not permit a full presentation of watershed level responses for 
the three focal watersheds in each city, but this data was a major component of the 
metropolitan level findings.   
The analysis in Chapter 7 examined the contextual interactions as a problem of 
embeddedness (Granovetter 1992). Increased embeddedness meant that governance had 
stronger links with its surrounds, and was hence more legitimate. However, increased 
embeddedness also meant that governance was more dependent on changes within the 
context and hence less efficient and able to respond to priorities that were specific to 
ecological governance. Embeddedness was found to occur both in terms of levels of 
processes that have different levels of stability — e.g. management, policy and law — and 
overlapping policy arenas — e.g. urban planning, water management and greenspace 
planning. Furthermore, the embeddedness analysis demonstrated that the three contextual 
facets within the investigative framework were significant — i.e. biophysical, institutional and 
temporal). However, the nature of embeddedness differed across policy roles, instruments 
and case settings. In addition, the arena became more embedded within its formal context 
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over time and hence more divergent between Portland and Brisbane. The results implied 
that actors within policy networks were likely to respond differently to change according to 
the nature of their embeddedness, which also changed over time as the actor and the 
governance arena developed.   
10.1.2 Research question 2: Urban ecological governance and 
response to change over time  
With respect to research question (2) “How and in what respects does governance of this 
urban policy arena across the metropolitan area adjust to change over time?” the analyses 
in Chapters 6 and 8 were especially important. Chapter 6 opened the ‘black box’ of policy in 
order to analyse the policy instruments involved in ecological governance in Portland and 
Brisbane. Chapter 8 focused on the shift in these instruments over time, with a focus at the 
governance level.  
The Chapter 6 analysis found that patterns of inter-linkage between political arenas (Lowi 
1972), policy roles (Bridgman and Davis 2003) and actor networks were significant for 
determining responsive change within the policy arena. The findings demonstrate 
differences between Brisbane and Portland that could be explained by their differing 
institutional contexts. However, unexpectedly strong patterns of commonality were also 
identified between the two cities. These commonalities provided a glimpse into the 
underlying phenomenon of urban ecological governance. The results show that the 
ecological governance arena contains aspects that are only partially embedded in context 
and could therefore be used for institutional design in other contexts (See Section 10.2). The 
political arena analysis in Chapter 6 presents a theoretical contribution for investigating 
governance arenas. As far as the author could determine, the application of the political 
arena model at the policy instrument level was a novel approach. This enabled the internal 
anatomy of the governance arena to be investigated in terms of the governance resource 
drawn upon — i.e. authority, nodality, organisation and treasure — political dynamics 
generated within each instrument — i.e. regulatory and distributive, redistributive and 
constituent — and the linkages to other policy arenas, which provided useful detail about 
the arena in general and its embeddedness within the broader context.      
Chapter 8 analysed the relationship between structural aspects of governance and change 
over time. In doing so it synthesised and progressed the findings from Chapters 6 and 7. 
This chapter developed a basic model of arena response to change over time. It found that 
over time ecological governance progressed through a number of overlapping transitional 
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stages. This was particularly the case in Portland and was contributed to by higher levels of 
complexity and embedding out from ecological governance into other arenas. This analysis 
showed that embeddedness could operate not only as a constraint on responding to change, 
but also as a resource. In Portland the institutional structure provided governance actors 
with access to trigger mechanisms for legal and financial stressors, while in Brisbane, there 
was little scope to trigger institutional stressors. At the instrument level, certain instrument 
types responded to change in differing ways, however, only some actor roles and 
instruments — usually procedural instruments — had a clear link between governance level 
dynamics and those internal to the policy instrument. This result aligned with the general 
finding that actors operating with management, policy and planning often did not have strong 
connections, especially in Brisbane.   
The final analytical chapter focused on the metagovernance of responsive change across 
the instrument mix (Jessop 2003). Chapter 9 undertook a frame analysis of significant actors 
involved in change and examined the role of ‘legitimacy’ (Suchman 1995), ‘institutional logic’ 
(Reay and Hinings 2009) and ‘heterarchy’ (Crumley 1995) in steering the responses to 
change that occurred. The results showed that metagovernance occurred through a set of 
significant actors rather than as a simple role played by the state. In Portland there was 
strong evidence of a non-state meta-governor, which is a situation that is not well examined 
in the governance literature. Even in Brisbane, by analysing the large state actor as 
comprised of a set of internal stakeholders, it was possible to see a metagovernance 
community at work even amongst hierarchical structures. Furthermore, assertive actors that 
were not involved in metagovernance could also influence the manner in which planning 
and management was coordinated through the use of ‘opportunity structures’ for engaging 
directly with metagovernors, or indirectly with more powerful actors who could then intervene 
on their behalf (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). These findings are significant for understanding 
responsive governance in non-core arenas. They demonstrate that even in settings with 
high levels of vertical, top-down integration, a less powerful arena (through skilled leaders) 
can influence decision making and change over time.  
10.1.3 Research question 3: Implications for enhancing responsive 
governance 
The final research question (3) “What are the implications for enhancing how this 
governance adjusts to change?” was answered from findings across the thesis chapters. 
Firstly, a non-core governance arena is constrained in its responses by a lack of control over 
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contextual and regime-related factors, and because more powerful arenas are embedded 
into it. Chapters 4, 5 and 7 demonstrated many ways that embedded governance is 
dependent upon its context. Even the structure of the political arenas (identified in Chapter 
6), showed a strong contextual influence — e.g. the strength of legal instruments). However, 
the notion of heterarchy helps to explain that genuine responses to change can occur and 
these also have the potential to be enhanced. Opportunities for change result from the ability 
to use context embeddedness as a resource rather than simply a constraint. Actors, 
networks and instruments are embedded in multiple ways within its context and amongst 
other instruments. Chapter 9 demonstrated that a response can be generated, even 
temporarily when these different types of embeddedness are reordered for particular 
purposes.  
However, despite this general potential, metagovernance strategies need to have 
expectations that are set firmly by the context that the arena is embedded within. For a city 
such as Brisbane, the notion of collaborative, adaptive and cross-sectoral governance may 
be one stage within a broader process rather than an end in itself. This situation has 
important implications for efforts to make governance arrangements more responsive; 
namely, that strategies investing in collaborative and participatory governance will be most 
effective when aligned with the broader sequence of governance change. Collaborative 
governance arrangements did not endure the transitions in the broader process of 
governance change in Brisbane. Actors that over-invested or were rigidly committed to 
collaborative approaches were seriously affected by the shift to decoupled governance. 
There are opportunities to increase the adaptive capacity of both state and non-state actors 
in order to achieve a more effective transition between styles of governance. It is important 
to note that for Brisbane, the integration of ecological governance into a large state actor is 
critical, and it is this primary need which has driven much of the behaviour from influential 
state actors involved in ecological governance. 
10.2 Practical implications 
This section reviews the major practical implications from the research, which are of interest 
for both state and community based actors. The theoretical language of responsive 
governance was not found to be common amongst practitioners in the two case studies, 
although those with a biological science background had an awareness of resilience thinking 
and complex adaptive systems. In many cases, key actors did not have a clear way to 
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articulate responsive governance or a metagovernance role. However, the most skilled 
managers undertook this work, often — at least temporarily — outside their strict position 
descriptions. However, this situation is changing rapidly. Just as governance is commonly 
understood by managers today, but was a virtually unknown term a decade ago, so too is 
adaptation and resilience emerging as the language of the future for public administrators. 
For state-based practitioners, the framework in this research identified potential instruments, 
from a metagovernance approach that may not be intentionally recognised and employed, 
particularly in cases where state and non-state networks have diverged, or advocacy is 
strongly discouraged. Furthermore the approach in Chapter 6 can be used as a tool for 
analysis of a governance arena and the interlinkages between political arenas. It also 
provides avenues for communication with other state actors and prominent non-state actors, 
and the inventory of policy instruments provides opportunities for communicating the 
governance assets involved with non-core governance arenas.  
The nature of public participation in western societies has been shifting for a number of 
years. There has been a general reduction in this participation, or a concentration into a 
particular stage of the policy cycle. This is particularly the case in sustainability-related 
arenas such as ecological governance, which are undergoing a process of formalisation and 
an increase in technical procedures. The new understandings of responsive governance 
that are supported by this research allow the changing role of public participation to be 
explored within its institutional and temporal context. It encourages actors to become aware 
of broader transitional changes and to develop efficient strategies in response to these 
shifts.  
Finally, this research demonstrates the value of advocacy to managers and vice versa. 
Particularly across state/non-state interfaces, there is a tendency in arenas such as 
ecological governance for particular governance roles to be perceived as more important. 
However, this research showed that advocacy and management, contention and 
collaboration are important for the long term responsiveness of a governance arena. While 
in some settings, state managers may be cautious about non-state advocates, this research 
demonstrated that advocates are a resource for state managers when interests align, a 
reservoir of alternative approaches that may be suitable for piloting in a more formal sense, 
and a safety net for instruments that are dismantled in a formal sense, but continue on in an 
informal fashion amongst non-state actors.   
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10.3 Future work in this area 
The research provides a platform for further research and policy advice in these case study 
areas. Actors in both cities expressed interest in the research findings. The broad nature of 
this research meant that a high level view on some processes had to be taken (Chapter 8). 
There are opportunities now to investigate critical processes in far greater detail through a 
process tracing methodology (Checkel 2006). This also includes the potential for watershed-
focused research to examine differing responses within the same city according to local level 
factors. For Brisbane, there are also opportunities to analyse the higher scale processes 
that the city increasingly is nested within, for example the SEQ Healthy Waterways 
Partnership, regional NRM and the SEQ regional planning process. A range of interesting 
processes have taken place as these SEQ level processes have strengthened. For example, 
the water governance transition to the regional level, and the scale up of metropolitan level 
actors to a broader SEQ level — e.g. Healthy Waterways Partnership and Greening 
Australia. In Portland recent developments with respect to urban and rural reserves, a 
successful regional ballot for natural area maintenance and the New Portland Plan provide 
opportunities to update data and findings. Finally, the failed ballot that proposed for the 
Bureau of Environmental Services to be disbanded provides a very interesting case of how 
far the process of embedding out can go, even in a progressive setting such as PCC.  
Case study research is regularly critiqued as difficult to replicate in other settings and 
although there are limits to the application of findings in other settings, this research has 
identified a range of characteristics that are partially independent of context and can be used 
for institutional analysis and design elsewhere. This could begin in cases that are similar to 
either Portland or Brisbane to further test and extend the findings of this research. For 
example, Melbourne, Australia has a number of institutional parallels with Portland, and 
Chicago is a city-wide municipality as in the case of Brisbane.  
10.4 Conclusion 
In the initial phases of this research the examination of ecological governance, at first 
appeared to be concerned with management, monitoring and environment resources. These 
elements are of course important, but with a focus on responsive governance it was issues 
of politics, public participation and ‘sense of place’ that participants continually foregrounded 
as important. For state actors in particular there is an ongoing tension between the need for 
efficient and effective outcomes — i.e. output legitimacy — and representative processes 
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— i.e. input legitimacy. For non-state actors there is a tension between collaboration — input 
legitimacy — and advocacy — output legitimacy. 
In conclusion, the cases of Brisbane and Portland demonstrate that the divide between 
adaptive approaches and conventional governance is not absolute. This is a very hopeful 
finding with respect to the uncertainties and challenges that are expected in the future as 
most settings are not amenable to an intentional model of adaptive governance. Theoretical 
models of adaptation continue to examine institutions, political and other social dynamics. 
The developments in these areas hold great potential for governance approaches, for public 
decision making and for designing evidence based policy.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Glossary  
  
Actor: A state organisation, non-government group or key individual that 
participates formally or informally, directly or indirectly in policy design, 
implementation, and management. (Ch5) 
(Actor) Network: Formal or informal assemblies of actors with a common function, concern 
or capacity 
Adaptive 
Management: 
A management model that incorporates monitoring, evaluation, and active 
experimentation into management and policy processes (Ch5) 
Agency: The ability to act and interact with social structures 
Biodiversity: The diversity of life ‘native’ to an area, with respect to genetics, species, 
ecosystems and landscapes 
Bond measure A type of ballot measure in Oregon. It is a proposal to issue a government 
bond for public expenditure that is referred to voters for approval on an 
election ballot. 
Change, 
Incremental: 
Frequent small scale adjustments to an instrument and/or network in which 
governance may become further refined and integrated 
Change,  
Transformative: 
Infrequent dramatic change to the instrument mix and/or networks resulting 
from large-scale shifts in biodiversity policy or adjacent policy arenas (see 
Baumgartner & Jones). 
Concept 
Stretching 
The loss of explanatory power that occurs if a concept is applied into more 
settings (Chapter 3) 
Embeddedness The connections of an actor with its context (Chapter 7) 
Floating Signifier A term that is virtually empty of meaning until interpreted by key actors for 
a particular situation (Chapter 3) – also known as a ‘empty signifier’  
Governance 
Arrangements: 
Formal (e.g. inter-organisational contracts) or informal inter-relationships 
(e.g. advocacy movements) between actors, networks and institutions. 
They aim to produce new outcomes by inhibiting certain aspects of existing 
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institutional patterns or reordering the relative influence between them. 
Synonymous term with ‘institutional arrangements’ 
Governance, 
change to: 
Virtually always associated with factors within the broader context for 
governance and to biodiversity governance arrangements, but external 
factors also combine with internal characteristics to influence the change 
that occurs. Change in significant instruments and their networks can 
trigger adjustments in other instruments and networks, although, networks 
are far more responsive to policy change than instruments. (Ch.5) 
Governance, 
Environmental: 
The structures and processes of environmental planning and management 
that involve multiple state agencies, and/or different levels of government, 
and non-state organisations. (adapted from Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh 
2012) 
Heterarchy Heterarchy is defined by Crumley (1995, p3) as, “the relation of elements 
to one another where they are unranked or where they possess the 
potential for being ranked in a number of different ways”. For example, a 
democratic election is a formalised heterarchical process. 
Instruments The tools of government (Hood 2007) for the implementation of policy and 
planning. Primary strategies for instruments include: command and control, 
market-based and information dissemination. Instruments sit within a 
broader policy development process 
Instrument mix: A set of instruments focused on a particular policy problem 
Instruments for 
biodiversity 
governance: 
Fall into categories of purchase, protect, public restore/manage, private 
restore manage and coordination (Ch.4). 
Institution An enduring [formal or informal] pattern of behaviour between state or non-
state actors that participate directly or indirectly in policy processes (see 
Goodin 1996). 
ICM See ‘Watershed Management’ 
Metagovernance: The management of governance networks 
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Organisation: A non-state organisation or a government department or division  
Political Arena 
 
 A set of political processes and structures that develop on the basis of 
what participants hope to achieve from a particular policy. Different types 
of political arenas have different dynamics, which are strongly influenced 
by the type of policy shaping the arena (Ch6) 
Policy Cycle: A heuristic tool that envisages the process of policy and planning 
development as a cycle. These cycles theoretically move from design and 
implementation to management and evaluation (see Bridgman and Davis 
2004). – Ch.6 
Quasi-actor 
 
A group of individuals or organisations that respond similarly to a situation 
and the aggregate of their response have the emergent characteristics of 
an actor – e.g. rejection of a policy change by the ‘public’.  Quasi-actors 
emerge in response to particular circumstances and participate in 
governance. They are usually transient in nature. (Chapter 9) 
Stressor: An environmental event or social change that pressures the established 
governance interactions to change. Stressors are partially internal to the 
governance setting, or more commonly, an external factor such as state-
level policy change (Ch.4). 
Special Service 
District 
A unit of government in the USA with an elected board that provides a 
specific service such as water, sewerage or parks. They often span a 
number of small local councils. Prominent examples in the Portland case 
study are: Tualatin Hills Parks and Recreation District; and Clean Water 
Services. 
Trigger (for 
policy change): 
An interacting cluster of factors sometimes dominated by a key stressor 
and harnessed by a call for change amongst key actors. (Ch.5) 
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Appendix 2 – Interview participant summary 
Table A1: Brisbane interview participant summary 
Organisational affiliation Number of interview 
participants 
Brisbane City Council – policy focused roles 4  
Brisbane City Council – program focused roles 9  
Catchment Groups (i.e. Watershed Groups) 6  
Community-based programs (e.g. Habitat Brisbane) 5  
Greening Australia 2  
Queensland Museum 1 
Resident Action Groups 2  
SEQ Catchments 2  
World Wildlife Fund for Nature 1  
Total 32 
 
Table A2: Portland interview participant summary 
Organisational affiliation Number of interview 
participants 
Audubon Society of Portland / Riverkeeper Groups 4 
Cornelius City Council 1 
Friends Groups / Neighborhood Associations 2  
Gresham City Council 2 
Metro 10 
PCC - Bureau of Environmental Services 10 
PCC - Portland Parks & Recreation 2 
PCC - Portland Planning & Sustainability 3 
Portland State University 1  
Tualatin Hills Parks and Recreation District 1 
Washington County 2 
Watershed  Councils 6 
Urban Environment Resource Consortium 1 
Total 45* 
Abbreviations: PCC = Portland City Council 
*The organisational complexity of the Portland case required a greater number of interview participants to 
establish comparable information with Brisbane for policy roles and policy instruments. 
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Appendix 3 – Questions to frame semi-structured interviews 
Participant Name: 
Organisation:      Position: 
Division/Section:      Location: 
Specific role:      Length of time in this role:  
PART A: BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE AND YOUR ORGANISATION  
1. Concerning the involvement your organisation has had with biodiversity programs in the urban area over the 
last 20 years, please list 3 or 4 most significant milestones. How have the programs, in your experience have 
changed over time?  
Discussion Checklist: 
The greatest challenge to effective outcomes (protection/management/restoration) 
The most significant obstacle for managing this challenge 
The most effective change to programs to engage with this challenge 
The most effective/significant program for biodiversity outcomes over the last 20 years 
Are there any other significant events that have impacted biodiversity protection, management and    
        restoration in the urban area? If yes, please give an example  
2. In what situations have you found these programs to be most flexible? i.e. able to adapt or innovate, respond 
to environmental or socio-political change. Please give an example 
3. What 2 partnerships are most important for your organisation?  
4. What ideas or concepts come to mind when thinking about the term ‘Biodiversity’ and the urban area? 
5. What level of involvement has your organisation had with vehicles for protection, restoration and 
management of biodiversity in the urban area? (Instrument mix participation) 
             High  Some  None            Don’t Know 
a.  Land Acquisition Programs             
b.  Regulation (zoning, codes, laws)              
c.  Conservation Easements               
d.  Landholder agreements/partnerships        
e.  Revegetation and Tree Planting              
f.  Impact Management               
   (e.g. weeds, recreation, feral animals)  
g.  Watershed Management               
h.  Other Important Involvement             
For ‘high involvements’ above - when and in what capacity? (If not already mentioned) 
6. Please nominate a ‘program’ that best illustrates your highest level involvements from the list above over the 
last 20years 
Use this program to answer the remaining questions on that basis. From here on your selection is referred to 
as ‘the program’.  
 
7. Concerning ‘the program’ you have selected, please describe the involvement your organisation has had and 
how this may have changed? How has your organisation changed as a result of being involved?  
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Checklist: 
Why/how did your organisation get involved?  
How has your organisation’s involvement and interests changed over time?   
How has involvement in the program changed your organisation? (e.g. partnerships, capacities, interests?) 
8. If the program were to finish unexpectedly what impacts would it have on your organisation?  
9. Please rank the following to describe the program. 
    Very  5  4  3  2  1       Not at all  
a. Effective        
b. Resource Efficient       
c. Popular        
d. Flexible        
Comments:  
 
The following questions are grouped into stages on the policy cycle in order to examine flexibility and 
responsiveness in more detail. 
PART B: GOVERNANCE & INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
Continuing with the program you described in the previous questions.  
1. What circumstances led to the proposal, development and launch of the program? Was it a spin-off from a 
previous program? What previously learnt lessons were involved?  
2. Who are the stakeholders in the program? (E.g. Groups or individuals who are significantly involved or 
impacted, have a strong interest in or influence over program activities) Which of these groups has had the 
greatest influence and why? 
3. Please describe the way the program is coordinated. To what extent could coordination and objectives be 
described as flexible? Please give an example 
4. What gives the program stability? 
5. How has the ability to adapt the program been affected by ‘higher level’ plans or policy, regulation or 
departments? (whether in response to environmental or socio-political change)  Has this changed over the 
life of the program? 
Checklist:   Supports  Constrains 
6. Is the program coordinated, monitored or evaluated with other programs? If yes, how is this done, with 
which programs and since when?  
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7. Have any of the following changed over the lifetime of the program? If yes, please give an example. 
      Yes  No     Don’t Know  Example 
a. Coordination, goals or objectives     ........................................................... 
b. The regulatory framework      ........................................................... 
c. The administering agency       ........................................................... 
d. Funding packages      .......................................................... 
e. Key responsibilities or important stakeholders    
    ........................................................... 
f. The number or diversity of stakeholders     
    ........................................................... 
g. The way the program is put into action     
    ........................................................... 
h. Monitoring and evaluation of the program and its outcomes 
    ........................................................... 
i. ‘Spin off’ programs  (or likely ‘spin offs)    
    ........................................................... 
8. Please choose a significant example of change from the above list and outline the issues or opportunities 
involved. What/who enabled the change? How was it put into action?  
What issues or opportunities was the shift in response to?  
What/who enabled the response to these issues/opportunities?  Using what information? 
How would you describe the way these responses were put into action? What factors supported or    
        inhibited the transition?  
 
PART C: POLICY AND PLAN FORMATION 
1. What has been the 2 most important strategies or plans developed by/for the program? (formal or informal)  
Please select one of the above to answer the following questions.  
2. What types of information were most important for development of the plan/strategy?  
E.g. scientific, social, environmental, economic. 
3. Concerning the development of effective policy and plans: What factors are most challenging? What 
important lessons have been learnt and how have these lessons been applied? Please give an example 
 
PART D: IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT 
(For this research ‘implementation’ is the way a program is put into action) 
1. What are the main activities and management priorities of the program? 
2. What ‘ingredient’ has been most important for actually putting those activities into practice?  
3. Who undertakes the day to day decisions in the activities of the program and to what extent can they use 
their discretion in decision-making?  
4. Which situation has been the greatest test to the ‘normal’ management of the program? How was this dealt 
with?  
PART E: MONITORING & EVALUATION 
(Monitoring & Evaluation is the collection and interpretation of data from/about the program) 
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1. Is data routinely collected by the program?  
a. If yes, why? What type of data is collected and how frequently?  
b. If no, why isn’t data collected? 
2. What needs to be done to enhance monitoring and evaluation? ......................................................  
PART F: REVISION & ADJUSTMENT 
(‘Revision and Adjustment’ are changes that are based on results from monitoring and evaluation) 
1. How are the results from monitoring used? If used to adjust the activities of the program how often?  Please 
give an example 
2. Have results from monitoring contributed to adjust ‘higher level’ plans, policy or regulation behind the 
program? If yes, please give an example? 
Did important stakeholders respond to / participate in that change, and if so, how?  
3. What has been the most important adjustment with respect to environmental outcomes from the program, 
whether positive or negative. What factors were most significant? E.g. efficiency, popularity or stakeholders, 
monitoring results or other scientific data  
4. Where have the most innovative ideas come from for the program? 
5. Are there important lessons learnt from the program that have not (yet) been acted on? If yes why not? 
Please give an example 
6. What is the most important behavioural change that the program has achieved in those beyond the 
program? How significant was this change?  
PART G: FEEDBACK 
1. Any other issues that should be addressed in this study? Any further comments? 
2. Referrals 
a. Which other people are important to talk to about these matters 
b. Are there available documents concerning these matters, your organisation’s goals, structure and history? 
If yes, who is best to ask? 
 
  
269 
 
Appendix 4 – Ethics approval letter 
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Appendix 5: Portland instrument table 
Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
constituent (constituent) Advisory Committee - Cross-sector - JC Corridor Committee authority effector 
constituent (constituent) Advisory Committee - SW Tree Committee authority effector 
constituent (constituent) Forum - Formation - Intertwine 1: Connecting green authority effector 
constituent (constituent) Forum - Tualatin Basin Partners for Clean Water forms authority effector 
constituent (constituent) Forum - Formation - watershed council authority effector 
constituent (constituent) Forum - legal structure change -  Intertwine authority effector 
constituent (constituent) Law - general obligation bonds - SWCDs authorised authority effector 
constituent (constituent) Law - SWCDs authorised to hold conservation easements authority effector 
constituent (constituent) Law - Watershed Council Formation by local government authority effector 
constituent (constituent) System development charge authorised for PCC authority effector 
constituent (constituent) Tree City USA authority effector 
constituent (constituent) Actor - Legal structure change - Auspice - SWCD authority procedural 
constituent (constituent) Johnson Creek Corridor Committee authority procedural 
constituent (constituent) SW Tree committee authority procedural 
constituent (constituent) Watersheds 2000 IGAs to study riparian corridors to support 
Metro Streamside CPR Program (Cities in Washington County, 
Unified Sewerage District, THPRD) 
authority procedural 
constituent (constituent) Eco-roof program nodality detector 
constituent (constituent) NMFS review of  Portland's development plan for the North 
Macadam District - river setbacks & eco-roofs 
nodality detector 
constituent (constituent) PCC urban tree canopy study nodality detector 
constituent (constituent) Research (Xerces-Friends of TidemanJohnson Partnership) nodality detector 
constituent (constituent) The Oregonian Newspaper nodality detector 
constituent (constituent) TWRC Annual reports nodality detector 
constituent (constituent) urban natural resources directory nodality detector 
constituent (constituent) guidelines: bird friendly building nodality effector 
constituent (constituent) Inter-governmental Agreement - study coordination nodality effector 
constituent (constituent) Metro greentrails guidelines nodality effector 
constituent (constituent) Protocol - bird survey protocol - Gresham nodality effector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
constituent (constituent) UERC nodality effector 
constituent (constituent) REIN conservation registry - government nodality procedural 
constituent (constituent) REIN conservation registry - public nodality procedural 
constituent (constituent) Tideman-Johnson Corridor committee nodality procedural 
constituent (constituent) UERC (Urban Ecological Research Consortium) nodality procedural 
constituent (constituent) Urban natural resources directory nodality procedural 
constituent (constituent) Wild in the City nodality procedural 
constituent (constituent) Wild in the city (2nd ed) nodality procedural 
constituent (constituent) Floodplain restoration - BES - Ramsey refuge restoration project organisation effector 
constituent (constituent) Forum - Formation - Collaboration - West Willamette 
Restoration Partnership (launch) 
organisation effector 
constituent (constituent) Watershed Wide Event – JCWC organisation effector 
constituent (constituent) Wetland Education Center - Jackson Bottom organisation effector 
constituent (constituent) Audubon partnership with Friends of Trees (delivery of Gift Tree 
Program) 
organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Auspicing MOU - SWCD for TRWC organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Bureau-community partnership (PPR, BES and NGOsP organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) City Nature (PPR) - formation process organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Ecological indicators of sustainability - Urban forest canopy, 
portland Sustainable Development Commission 
organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Formation of Connecting green - which became Connecting 
Green Alliance and then Intertwine Alliance. 
organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Formation of CSWC - adoption of by-laws (state and non-state 
forum) 
organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Formation of TRWC - Washington Council recognition organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Formation of TRWC - Washington Council recognition organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Formation of West Willamette Restoration Partnership organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Legal structure change - Intertwine becomes a 501c3 organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Legal structure change from auspiced to 501c3 - JCWC organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Legal structure change from auspiced to 501c3 - TRWC organisation procedural 
272 
 
Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
constituent (constituent) Legal structure change from 'friends group' to conservancy - 
Forest park conservancy 
organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Metro Regional Parks and Greenspaces Department - formation 
process 
organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Partnership Friends of Trees-BES pilot organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Position creation - Natural Resources Manager (Hillsboro Parks 
& Rec dept) 
organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Scale Up - Friends of Trees opens an office in Eugene organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Tree regulatory improvement project organisation procedural 
constituent (constiuent) Original Portland Planning vision (40 mile loop etc.  authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) City of Hillsboro Strategic Plan authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Columbia Slough Sediment Watershed Action Plan 2003 authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Columbia Slough Watershed Action Plan 2011 authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Cooper Mountain Masterplan- Regional Park authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Fanno and Tryon Creeks Watershed Management Plan – BES authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Greenspaces Master Plan authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Healthy Streams Plan – CWS authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Hillsboro Parks & Recreation Department Strategic Plan, 2011-
2016 (1st) 
authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Invasive species management plan authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Invasive species management strategy - PCC authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Jackson Bottom Wetland Preserve Strategic Plan authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Johnson Creek Action Plan 2002 authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Johnson Creek Resource Management Plan authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Johnson Creek Restoration Plan authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Master Plan - Corridor - Springwater corridor authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Master Plan - Hillsboro1 - "Parks and trail plan"  (updated from 
2003 one) 
authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Master Plan - Parks Master Plan Hillsboro2 -  2003 authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Master Plan - Recreation, Trails and Natural Areas, Gresham authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Master Plan - regional park - Cooper Mountain authority effector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
constituent (distributive) Master Plan - Site - Jackson Bottom authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Master Plan - System - Parks System authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Masterplan - Parks & Trails Master Plan & Natural Resource 
Analysis – Hillsboro 
authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Metro Greenspaces Master Plan - regional trails plan 2 authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Metro Refinement Plan - acquisition - Cooper Mountain authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Metro Refinement Plan - acquisition - East Buttes authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Portland watershed management plan - BES authority effector 
constituent (distributive) PP&R 2010 Restoration Plan authority effector 
constituent (distributive) PPR Ecosystem Management Plans authority effector 
constituent (distributive) PPR inventory and survey of ecological health authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Strategic Plan - Westwillamette Restoration Partnership authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Strategic Plan - PP&R Strategic Plan1 2008-2011 authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Strategic Plan - PP&R Strategic Plan2 2012-2015 authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Tualatin River Watershed Council - strategic plan 1 authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Tualatin River Watershed Council - strategic plan 2 authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Tualatin river watershed council action plan authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Urban Forest Action Plan authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Urban forestry management plan - Gresham authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Urban Forestry Management Plan - Gresham (adoption) authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Urban forestry management plan - portland 1 authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Urban forestry Management Plan - Portland 2 authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Watershed framework and management plan - PCC authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Advisory committee for "Pacific NW Urban Meadowscaping 
Collaboration 
authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) BES - Expert panel on ecosystem services benefits authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) Citizen oversight committee - 2006 natural areas bond measure authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) Forest Park feasibility committee authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) GPAC 1: Greenspace Policy Advisory Committee - Metro authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) GPAC 2: Greenspace Policy Advisory Committee - Metro authority procedural 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
constituent (distributive) Greenspaces Blue Ribbon Committee authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) Inter-agency agreement: BES, PPR & US Army corps of engineers 
interagency agreement on design & construction of ecological 
restoration projects 
authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) Inter-bureau collaboration: BES, PPR & Urban Forestry 
Commission to restart the tree stewardship program 
authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) Inter-bureau committee on reduction of invasive plants – PCC authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) Intra-team collaboration - weekly meeting between head of 
watershed group & chief engineer. 
authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) Joint Management IGA - THPRD & Metro joint management of 
Cooper Mountain 
authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) Metro Environmental action team authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) Metro Green ribbon committee - Open Space development authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) metropolitan conservation strategy planning group - Informal 
but recognised group 
authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) MPAC Parks sub-committee authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) PPR Board  (to carry out Parks 2020 vision) authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) Smith & Bybee advisory committee authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) TEES - Technical advisory group authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) TWRC - Technical advisory committee authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) Urban forestry management plan - Gresham (design process) authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) 2008 State of the Watershed Report - JCWC nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Audubon birdstrike predawn surveys nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Biodiversity Eco-roof research project nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Campaign in Gresham to protect upland habitat nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) campaign to establish a permanent fund for regional natural 
areas management, 
nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Forest Park feasibility report - Portland City Club 2 nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Grassroots campaign for Meaure 26-1 lead by FAUNA nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Grassroots campaign for Title 13 - lead by FAUNA nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Independent study of Portland Parks - Portland city club1 nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Johnson Creek Restoration Project Census nodality detector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
constituent (distributive) Lower Willamette Salmon study - BES-ESA team & ODFW nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Mapping project - Terrestrial ecology mapping nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Metro Portfolio project on greenspaces program nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Report - "Forest Park a call for action" - City Club 3 nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Urban greenspaces movement nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Zehren Report - MPAC Parks Committee nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) TEES - Habitat enhancement guidelines nodality effector 
constituent (distributive) TEES guidelines - Guidelines: Avoiding Impacts on Nesting Birds 
During Construction and Revegetation Projects 
nodality effector 
constituent (distributive) County in the City Symposia nodality procedural 
constituent (distributive) Gresham amphibian survey process nodality procedural 
constituent (distributive) Johnson Creek Summits nodality procedural 
constituent (distributive) Metro volunteer monitoring process nodality procedural 
constituent (distributive) New communication between engineers and watershed group 
brokered by taking an new asset management approach – BES 
nodality procedural 
constituent (distributive) No Ivy League monitoring process nodality procedural 
constituent (distributive) Gresham amphibian survey program organisation effector 
constituent (distributive) Invasive species management work plan - PCC organisation effector 
constituent (distributive) Johnson Creek Restoration Project to implement the Resources 
Management Plan 
organisation effector 
constituent (distributive) Meadowscaping Pilot organisation effector 
constituent (distributive) Meadowscaping Program organisation effector 
constituent (distributive) Metro Monitoring program organisation effector 
constituent (distributive) No ivy league program organisation effector 
constituent (distributive) peregrine watch – Audubon organisation effector 
constituent (distributive) Rapid reponse program – PPR organisation effector 
constituent (distributive) Regional Greenspace System planning program - Metro organisation effector 
constituent (distributive) regional parks, trails, and  greenspace system - Metro organisation effector 
constituent (distributive)  Green asset capitalisation (BES) organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive)  PCC - willing seller program - Restoration Plan organisation procedural 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
constituent (distributive)  Portland Urban Meadowscaping Pilot Project organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Asset management approach to watershed planning (BES) organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Asset management group (PPR) organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) FAUNA 'friends group' formation strategy organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) FAUNA 'friends group' formation strategy - Friends of Beaverton 
Creek 
organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Formation – CSWC organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) formation - Fans of Fanno Creek organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) formation - Friends of Ross Island organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) formation - friends of Springwater corridor organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) formation - friends of Tideman Johnson organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) formation - Smith & Bybee Lakes organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Formation of Coalition for a liveable future organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Formation of FAUNA organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Friends of Tideman Johnson partnered with Xerces Society to 
collect and count macroinvertebrate species 
organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) greenspace masterplan planning program organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Greenspace Vision organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Invasive plant strategy (BES Invasive Species program) organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Johnson Creek Acquisition Strategy organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Johnson Creek Land Acquisition Partnership and Implementation 
Strategy 
organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Johnson Creek Resource Management Plan organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Johnson Creek Vision organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Master Plan - Olmstead (Vision) organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Metro Parks and Natural Areas Planning program organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Parks 2020 Vision – PCC organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Partnership Friends of Trees-BES scale up organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) PCC Natural Area Aquisition Strategy 2006 organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Portland parks vision1 organisation procedural 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
constituent (distributive) Portland Parks Vision2 "Vision 2020" organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Portland Watershed Management Plan Monitoring Strategy organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Public master planning process - Cooper Mountain organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Regional Conservation Strategy Project (launched) organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Springwater corridor master planning organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Terrestrial Ecological Enhancement Strategy organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) BES capital improvement program - and criteria for selecting 
natural systems projects 
Treasure effector 
constituent (redistributive) Inter-bureau collaboration: BES & PPR Elk Island Oak release 
project 
authority procedural 
constituent (redistributive) Management transfer IGA - management of properties in Fanno 
Creek Greenway Target area from Metro to THPRD 
authority procedural 
constituent (redistributive) Management transfer IGA - Masden property from metro to 
Jackson Bottom Wetlands Preserve 
authority procedural 
constituent (redistributive) Management transfer IGA - Multnomah parks and greenspace 
from Multnomah county to Metro 
authority procedural 
constituent (redistributive) Regional Equity Atlas (Coalition for a liveable future) nodality procedural 
constituent (redistributive) Healthy Portland Streams Strategy organisation procedural 
constituent (regulative) CWS Healthy Streams plan for Tualatin Basin authority effector 
constituent (regulative) Migratory Bird Park Certification authority effector 
constituent (regulative) Urban Conservation Treaty for Migratory Birds - Portland 
signatory 
authority effector 
constituent (regulative) Airport Futures Committee authority procedural 
constituent (regulative) Committee IGA to form Tualatin Basin Natural Resources 
Coordinating Committee 
authority procedural 
constituent (regulative) GPAC Expert panel on high priorty landscapes for acquisition authority procedural 
constituent (regulative) MPAC: Metro Policy Advisory Committee authority procedural 
constituent (regulative) Pleasant Valley Concept Plan Steering Committee authority procedural 
constituent (regulative) Reserves steering committee (for SB1101) authority procedural 
constituent (regulative) Columbia Slough - Watershed Characterization study nodality detector 
constituent (regulative) draft riparian corridor and wildlife habitat inventory - Metro nodality detector 
constituent (regulative) Habitat Inventory for Fanno creek - PCC nodality Detector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
constituent (regulative) Invasive Plant Policy Review and Regulatory Improvement 
Project - Planning Bureau & BES 
nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Inventory - Significant natural areas - Cornelius nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Inventory - Significant natural areas - Local/County - Forest 
Grove 
nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Inventory - Significant natural areas - Metro - approval nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Inventory - Significant Natural Areas - Metro Resolution 89-1189 nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Inventory - Significant natural areas - Washington County 1990 nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Inventory 2001 - Significant natural areas - Hillsboro nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) mapping project - Higher resolution mapping project USFWS nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Mapping project 1990 - Natural areas - Audubon, PSU, Metro nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Metro - preliminary maps of inventory working towards Title 13 nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Metro regional parks study 1992 nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Metro’s Riparian Corridor and Wildlife Habitat Inventories 2005 nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Partial Inventory 1991 - Significant natural areas - Local/County 
– Hillsboro 
nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Portland Plan background reports nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Priority Landscapes map - from expert panel nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Regional Attitudes Toward Population Growth and Land Use 
Issues - Metro report 
nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Regional Urban Forestry Assessment report - Report - 
independent policy assessment - Audubin & PSU 
nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Significant natural areas  Inventory - Beaverton nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) State of the watershed monitoring report - Metro nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) stream mapping project 2002-2004 - significant natural areas - 
local/county – PCC 
nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) Streamside CPR Program - Research program - Metro nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) vegetation mapping project 2002-2004  - significant natural 
areas - local/county – PCC 
nodality Detector 
constituent (regulative) PCC & Ducks unlimited salmonid survey nodality Procedural 
constituent (regulative) Airport Futures project organisation Effector 
constituent (regulative) Columbia Slough Salmonid Monitoring - PCc & Ducks unlimited organisation Effector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
constituent (regulative) Metro - Watershed Monitoring Program organisation Effector 
constituent (regulative) Street Tree inventory Project - PCC organisation Effector 
constituent (regulative) framework for integrated watershed management health (PCC) organisation Procedural 
constituent (regulative) Function plan amendment - inclusion of title 13 - Nature in 
Neighborhoods 
organisation Procedural 
constituent (regulative) ESA Program 1 (Housed in BoP) Treasure Procedural 
constituent (regulative) ESA Program 2 (transferred to BES) Treasure Procedural 
constituent (regulative) ESA Program 3 (becomes Science fish & Wildlife Division) Treasure Procedural 
distributive (constituent) Metro 2006 regional bond measure authority Procedural 
distributive (constituent) Public Meetings re. Regional Bond 2 & Local Share planning - 
Metro & PPR 
nodality Detector 
distributive (constituent) 5000 acres initiative - Tualatin Riverkeeps organisation Effector 
distributive (constituent) Campaign - tree planting - seed the future - FoT organisation Effector 
distributive (constituent) Depave program organisation Effector 
distributive (constituent) Plant it portland – FoT organisation Effector 
distributive (constituent) Urban naturalists program - Audubon organisation Effector 
distributive (constituent) BES Watershed grant program organisation Procedural 
distributive (constituent) Depave capacity build partnership - through watershed grant 
program 
organisation Procedural 
distributive (constituent) Capital Grants Program - Social Equity-Access to Nature Program 
– Metro 
Treasure Effector 
distributive (constituent) Watershed grant program - BES Treasure Effector 
distributive (constituent) Watershed grant program - BES funding depave Treasure Effector 
distributive (constituent) Watershed grant program - BES funding Friends of Trees Treasure Effector 
distributive (constituent) Friends  of trees capacity build partnership - through watershed 
grant program 
Treasure Procedural 
distributive (constituent) Meadowscaping research parterships Treasure Procedural 
distributive (distributive) Backyard Habitat Certification Program - iteration 1 - Pilot authority Effector 
distributive (distributive) Backyard Habitat Certification Program - iteration 2 - Lake 
Oswego 
authority Effector 
distributive (distributive) Backyard Habitat Certification Program - iteration 3 - PCC authority Effector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
distributive (distributive) Backyard Habitat Certification Program - iteration 4 - Metro authority Effector 
distributive (distributive) Exise tax 3 - undedication of solid waste tax - metro authority Effector 
distributive (distributive) Exise tax1 established - to help fund parks - Metro authority Effector 
distributive (distributive) Exise tax2 - metro increases and extends the solid waste tax authority effector 
distributive (distributive) Ezone amendment to streamline environmental review in 
exchange for site improvements or fee-in-lieu of site 
improvements 
authority effector 
distributive (distributive) Flood and landslide Mitigation plan - recommendation to 
establish local acquisition program - PCC 
authority effector 
distributive (distributive) Mult county natural area protection fund authority effector 
distributive (distributive) Oregon plan - Steelhead supplement authority effector 
distributive (distributive) Portland recovery plan for salmon and trout - PCC authority effector 
distributive (distributive) System development charge - PPR land acquisition authority effector 
distributive (distributive) Tax base EMSWCD authority effector 
distributive (distributive) Tax base THPRD authority effector 
distributive (distributive) Tax base WMSWCD authority effector 
distributive (distributive) Watershed investment fund - PCC authority effector 
Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
distributive (distributive) Watershed revegetation fund - PCC authority effector 
distributive (distributive) 1993 failed regional bond measure authority procedural 
distributive (distributive) East Mulnomah SWCD ballot measure - tax base for 
conservation planning programs 
authority procedural 
distributive (distributive) Metro 1995 regional bond measure authority procedural 
distributive (distributive) Restoration IGA for Beggars Tick Marsh - BES & Multnomah 
County 
authority procedural 
distributive (distributive) State ballot measure 76 - permanent lottery funding for parks 
and natural resources 
authority procedural 
distributive (distributive) West Mulnomah SWCD ballot measure - tax base for 
conservation planning programs 
authority procedural 
distributive (distributive) FoT Training nodality effector 
distributive (distributive) PP&R Tree Steward Training nodality effector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
distributive (distributive) Adopt a Park Program - PPR (& Tree Liason program) organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Americorps conservation volunteer program organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Clean river program - PCC - early 90s organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Council-led stream channel restoration project on private land - 
Johnson Creek 
organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Friends of Trees plantings organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Mount Tabor Weed Warrior Program organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Mt. Tabor Invasive Plant Control and Revegetation Project organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Neighborhood Tree Liason Program - PP&R organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Protect the best - PP&R organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Restoration - Local - BES - Oak release project organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Restoration project - reed college organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Restoration team - Local - Gresham Parks operation team organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Restoration team - WSC - Johnson Creek organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) System development charge - Tabor to the River organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Backyard habitat certification program - cross-jurisdiction roll 
out. 
organisation procedural 
distributive (distributive) Backyard Habitat Certification Program - local roll out organisation procedural 
distributive (distributive) Backyard Habitat Certification Program - nested program - 
within Tabor to the river project 
organisation procedural 
distributive (distributive) Backyard Habitat Certification Program - Pilot organisation procedural 
distributive (distributive) Network expansion - Friends of Trees new partnerships - ODOT, 
Verde etc, 
organisation procedural 
distributive (distributive) Protect the Best program (weed management program PPR) organisation procedural 
Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
distributive (distributive) Undedication of solid waste excise tax organisation procedural 
distributive (distributive) Community watershed grant program - BES Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Development density bonuses for Eco-roofs Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) EMSWCD grant programs: Small Projects and Community Events 
Program, Watershed Council Support Grants, Conservation 
Landowners, Inctive Program, Partners in Conservation Program 
Treasure effector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
distributive (distributive) EMSWCD grants for Backyard Certification program Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Exise tax dispersed for park funding Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Exise tax2 for nature parks dispersed by Metro Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Fee for Service Program - Gresham, streamside landowner 
restoration program 
Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Land Donation - Natural Area Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Metro greenspace (grants) program Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Meyer memorial trust grants Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Multnomah county natural area protection fund Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Nature in Neighborhood grants I-205 Multi-Use Path Project - 
ODOT Fot, Metro 
Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Nature in Neighborhoods Funding Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Nature in neighborhoods grants Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) OWEB funding - restoration grants Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Permanent funding for WSCs parks and natural areas (via ballot 
measure 76) 
Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Wild Heritage Fund - maintenance funding - Metro and the 
National Fish and Wildlife Foundation 
Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) WMSWCD funding Treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Grey to green funding (other than protect the best) Treasure procedural 
distributive (distributive) Nature In Neighborhoods Initiative Treasure procedural 
distributive (distributive) Oregon Plan for Salmon and Watersheds Treasure procedural 
distributive (distributive) Protect the Best funding Treasure procedural 
distributive (redistributive) Acquistion IGA for Gabbert Hill - Metro & Gresham City authority procedural 
distributive (redistributive) Acquistion IGA for Orenco Woods Golf Course - Metro & 
Gresham City 
authority procedural 
distributive (redistributive) Acquistion IGA for Riverview natural area (Metro, BES, PPR, 
Trust for public land) 
authority procedural 
distributive (redistributive) Gresham local bond measure (1990 as above?) authority procedural 
distributive (redistributive) Inter-bureau agreement: BES & PPR contribution to PCC 
acquisition 
authority procedural 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
distributive (redistributive) Local bond measures authority procedural 
distributive (redistributive) PPR Local bond Bond measure 1 authority procedural 
distributive (redistributive) THPRD Bond measure 1 authority procedural 
distributive (redistributive) THPRD Bond measure 2 authority procedural 
distributive (redistributive) Advocacy - internal champions nodality detector 
distributive (redistributive) Acquisition goal amendment - Cooper Mountain organisation procedural 
distributive (redistributive) Regional Bond 2 Local Share planning, PCC organisation procedural 
distributive (redistributive) Scale up - Legal structure change - Land trust to Land 
Conservancy 
organisation procedural 
distributive (redistributive) Scale up / Merger - Conservancy & Landtrust into Landtrust organisation procedural 
distributive (redistributive) Acquisition program - local - Gresham Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Acquisition Program - Local - PCC - Willing Seller Program Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) acquisition program - local - PP&R Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Acquisition Program - Local Share Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Acquisition Program - Metro1 Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) acquisition program - Metro1 Witaker Pond Nature Park Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) acquisition program - Metro2 - Ballot Measure Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Acquisition program - Metro2 - Chehelam Ridge acquired Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Acquisition Program - Metro2 - East Butte purchase Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) acquisition program - Metro2 - resolution Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Acquisition Program - Metro2 & Gresham Local Share - Gabbert 
Hill 
Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) acquisition program - Metro2, Cooper Mountain Acquisition 
goals amended 
Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Acquisition program - Multnomah County Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Aquisition program - nongovt - lake oswego land trust Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Acquisition program - nongovt - three rivers land conservancy 
acquisition program 
Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) acquisition program - nongovt -columbia land trust Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) acquisition program - nongovt -columbia land trust (merger) Treasure effector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
distributive (redistributive) acquisition program - THPRD1 Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) acquisition program - THPRD1 - ballot measure Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) acquisition program - THPRD2 Treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) acquisition programs - local Treasure effector 
distributive (regulative) Lower Columbia Steelhead Recovery Plan authority effector 
distributive (regulative) Tabor to the River program authority effector 
distributive (regulative) State ballot measure 66 - lottery funding for parks and natural 
resources (2014 sunset clause) 
authority procedural 
distributive (regulative) Forest park neighborhood association community survey nodality detector 
distributive (regulative) Boeing Green Infrastructure facility project organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Columbia Slough Confluence Restoration Project: organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Contracts with FoT & SOLVE for tree planting in Columbia 
Sloughwatershed revegetation program 
organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) East Lents Floodplain restoration/Foster Floodplain Natural 
Areal - BES 
organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) First big Johnson Creek restoration project - BES organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Floodplain Restoration - Local - PCC - Water Control Structures organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Floodplain restoration - Metro1 - Water Control Structures organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Floodplain restoration - Metro2 - Water Control Structures organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Floodplain restoration project - BES Team - Powell Butte project 
is completed - creating 100 acre-feet of flood storage 
organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Floodplain restoration project - Foster Floodplain organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Metro - restoration team program organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Nature in Neighborhood program (incorporated local programs) organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Oregon’s local watershed management program organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) PCC planting teams - 26,000 trees and shrubs throughout the 
Slough watershed - Watershed management program 
organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Restoration - Local - PCC - Restore then Steward organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Shade plantings - Clean River Plan - BES organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Shade plantings - Clean River Plan - BES organisation effector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
distributive (regulative) SOLV’s Team Up for Watershed Health program (Columbia 
Slough) 
organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Stephens Creek Confluence Habitat Enhancement Project - PCC - 
Restore then Steward 
organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Tree for all challenge - CWS organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Tree Stewardship Program -PP&R organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) watershed revegetation program - colombia slough - scale up  
from CS &  Johnson Creek.to whole of PCC 
organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Watershed revegetation program - contract out organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Watershed revegetation program - johnson creek organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Watershed revegetation program = revegetated site 
management actitivites 
organisation effector 
distributive (regulative) Partnership-CSWC & Boeing. organisation procedural 
distributive (regulative) Pre-approved Project list - BES organisation procedural 
distributive (regulative) Watershed Investment Fund - institutionalised within BES capital 
improvement program 
organisation procedural 
distributive (regulative) Acquisition Program - local - Grey to Green Treasure effector 
distributive (regulative) Acquisition Program - Local - PCC - Willing Seller Program Treasure effector 
distributive (regulative) Boeing Land Donation - Green Infrastructure Treasure effector 
distributive (regulative) Salmon and watershed funding (via Ballot Measure 66) Treasure effector 
redistributive (constituent) Management regime transfer - categorisation of some parks into 
natural areas 
organisation procedural 
redistributive (constituent) Management regime transfer - Oaks Bottom from park to 
wildlife refuge 
organisation procedural 
redistributive (constituent) Program management transfer - local watershed councils 
brough under GWEB guidance. 
organisation procedural 
redistributive (distributive) Land transfer IGA - Beggars tick from Metro to BES authority procedural 
redistributive (distributive) Land transfer IGA - Parks from Multnomah County to Metro authority procedural 
redistributive (distributive) Transfer of springwater corridor (disused rail)  to City of Portland 
Parks Bureau 
authority procedural 
redistributive (regulative) NPDES Permit - Water Quality Trading (Tree shading) Treasure procedural 
redistributive (regulative) Wetland credit trading Treasure procedural 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
regulative (distributive) E-zone amended to better integrate e-zone and erosion control 
with exemptions 
authority effector 
regulative (distributive) Surface vegetated facilitiers for management of stormwater 
(PCC)   
authority effector 
regulative (distributive) Binding City Policy - Stormwater Management using Onsite 
Surface Vegetated Facilities 
organisation procedural 
regulative (distributive) E-zone amendment - integrate e-zone & erosion control 
exemptions (PCC) 
organisation procedural 
regulative (distributive) E-zone amendments - from tree-regulatory improvement 
project 
organisation procedural 
regulative (distributive) Ezone amendment to streamline environmental review in 
exchange for site improvements or fee-in-lieu of site 
improvements 
Treasure effector 
regulative (redistributive) Clean Water Act law suits authority detector 
regulative (redistributive) ESA law suits authority detector 
regulative (redistributive)  Environmental Zone Streamline Project Advisory committee authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Airport Futures Project - Mapping authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Approval of environmental codes (p-zone protection- siginificant 
resource) and c-zone, conservation- high qualityreousource) - 
PCC 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) City of Tigard City Code - post title 3 compliance authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) East Buttes, Terracts and Wetlands Conservation Plan & zoning 
maps 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Ezone amendment - Environmental Code Improvement (ECI 
)project 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) E-zone amendment to clarify stormwater outfalls in an E-zone authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Ezone ammendment to modify setbacks so that buildings can be 
brought closer to the street and outside of the e-zone 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Fanno Creek & Tributaries Conservation plan & zoning maps authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Gresham comprehensive plan - post title 13 model ordinance 
regulations 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Hillsboro - Signficant natural resource inventory, iteration 1 authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Hillsboro comprehensive plan -  post title 13 - Habitat benefit 
areas 
authority effector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
regulative (redistributive) Hillsboro comprehensive plan - regulation of development 
within Significant Natural resources Overlay (inc. mitigation) 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Hillsboro Comprehensive plan - significant natural resources 
overlay, iteration 2 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Hillsboro adopted a Goal 5 Natural Resources Management Plan authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Inclusion of Pleasant valley district to apply portland zoning over 
annexed area from UGB expansion -  update portland plan, Ord. 
No. 178961, effective 6/13/05; 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Lot size-conservation exchange - PCC E-zone amendment authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Metro - title 3 - Stream and Floodplain protection plan - Stream 
and Floodplain protection plan 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Metro (Title 3) fish and wildlife habitat plan authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Metro Fish and Wildlife Habitat Plan authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Metro Title 13 authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Natural Resource Protection Plan - Cornelius authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) New Portland Plan authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) North west Hills Natural Area Protection Plan and zoning maps authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) NRM Plan - PCC - Smith and Bybee2 - NEW Comp NRM Plan authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) NRM Plan - PCC - Smith and Bybee2 - NEW Comp NRM Plan authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) NRM plan - THPRD authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) NRM plan - THPRD2 - 2005 update authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) NRM plans - comprehensive NRM plan mechanism authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) NRM program - Hillsboro (State goal 5 compliance) - 2003 authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Ordinance for Vanport NRM plan - PCC authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) PCC Comprehensive plan -post Goal 8 expansion authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) portland ezones -  Environmental Zone Streamline Project. authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) portland Fanno Creek ezones - defined resource area in places 
where it would normally hav been zoned transition area 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Portland Plan - post alignment with state goal 5. authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Significant Environmental Concern overlay zone as a temporary 
measure until new environmental zone regulations could be 
adopted - PCC" 
authority effector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
regulative (redistributive) Skyline West Conservation Plan & zoning maps authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Southwest hills resource protection plan & zoning maps authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Strengthen invasive plant management by amending E-zones 
with respect to the invasive plant strategy 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) The Balch Creek Watershed Protection Plan & Zoning Maps authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) the Significant natural Resources Overlay map for North Bethany authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Tree code - local - gresham1 authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Tree regulatory improvement project: amends E-zones to 
require the replacement of non-native non-nuisance trees if 
they are removed (recognition of their functions, a bi-product of 
invasive plant strategy?, would not trigger environmental review 
as long as they are replaced, ) 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) ugb 4 (law) - allows Portland metro region to consider a range of 
factors when dciding where to urbanise (not just soil) - includes 
significant nature resources/habitat etc. 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) UGB 4 (proposal) -  development of a performance based UGB authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) UGB1 -  Urban growth boundary law - state planning goal 14 
(wikipedia), and other state wide land conservation policies 
(goals 5-7) adopted under Governor Tom McCall 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) UGB2 authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Urban and rural reserves - The Core 4 approved a map of 
proposed urban reserves 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) urban and rural reserves designation - Multnomah county authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) urban and rural reserves system authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) US Endangered Species Act Listing - Chinook authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) US Endangered Species Act Listing - Steelhead authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Washington County plan - post Metro title 13 - habitat friendly 
development practices 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Washington county plan - post Metro title 3 - protect fish and 
wildlife habitat & coordinate with CWS 
authority effector 
regulative (redistributive) Land transfer IGA - Area 93 from PCC-Multnomah County to 
Washington County 
authority procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Land transfer IGA - Parks from THPRD to Hillsboro City Council authority procedural 
regulative (redistributive) adoption of inventory - significant natural areas - regional - 
Metro (Habitat Conservation Area Map) 
nodality detector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
regulative (redistributive) Community Advocacy - e.g. Forest Park Neighborhood 
Association writes to Mult County rejecting their "West Forest 
Park Concept Planning Area" 
nodality detector 
regulative (redistributive) Community Advocacy - e.g. Mike Houck addresses a letter to the 
core 4 re. urban natural resources in the reserve process 
nodality detector 
regulative (redistributive) Community Advocacy - Forest Park Neighborhood Association: 
renew and clarify our request for a Rural Reserve in this area 
[west hills] 
nodality detector 
regulative (redistributive) Community Advocacy - the Forest Park Neighborhood 
Association (FPNA) wrote to the Metro Council to explain why 
the portions of our neighborhood outside the Urban Growth 
Boundary (UGB) together with the “Coastal Corridor” at the 
north end of Forest Park should be designated as important 
natural resources that should not be urbanized (2008 letter on 
file) 
nodality detector 
regulative (redistributive) Inventory 2012- Significant natural areas  - PCC nodality detector 
regulative (redistributive) Metro Technical report for fish and wildlife habitat nodality detector 
regulative (redistributive) Nth Bethany - final wetland inventory - Significant natural areas - 
Greenfield design - Washingtin county 
nodality detector 
regulative (redistributive) public hearings - various types of hearings. nodality detector 
regulative (redistributive) City of Cornelius Natural Resource Protection Plan organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Environmental code improvement project (PCC) organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) E-zone amendment - clarified requirements for removal of 
nuisance plants (PCC) - doubled up with above? 
organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) E-zone amendment - clarify e-zones and improve public 
acceptance (PCC) 
organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) E-zone amendment - clarify stormwater outfalls in an E-zone 
(PCC) 
organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) E-zone amendment - exemption of review for removal of 
invasive trees (PCC) 
organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) E-zone amendment - failed work to expand e-zones as per the 
Healthy Portland Streams strategy. 
organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) E-zone amendment - Fanno creek e-zone area amendments organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) E-zone amendment - FEMA mapping alignment (PCC) organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Ezone amendment to modify setbacks so that buildings can be 
brought closer to the street and outside of the e-zone (PCC 
organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) E-Zone Streamline project advisory committee organisation procedural 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
regulative (redistributive) E-zone streamline project amendments - clear and objective 
development standards. 
organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Function plan amendment - title 3 adopted into functional plan organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Gresham Title 13 Model ordinance adoption - compliance with 
Metro title 13. 
organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Hillsboro comprehensive plan - Habiotat Benefit areas 
(compliance with Metro Title 13) 
organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Hillsboro List of Significant Goal 5 Natural Resource Sites (Metro 
Title 3 compliance) 
organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Hillsboro Significant Natural Resources Overlay (Metro title 3 
compliance) 
organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Hillsboro Zoning amendment to comply with Metro Title 13. organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Land Division Code Rewrite Project organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) PCC - Significant Environmental Concern overlay zone (a 
temporary measure until new environmental zone regulations 
could be adopted) 
organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Portland Comprehensive plan - goal 8 expansion organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Portland plan - goal 5 alignment (Clarfiy) organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Tigard City Code amendment to comply with Metro Title 13 organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Washing County Comprehensive plan amendment - to comply 
with Metro title 13. 
organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive) Washington County plan amendment to comply with Metro title 
3 
organisation procedural 
regulative (regulative) Beggars Tick NRM plan - PCC authority effector 
regulative (regulative) Forest Park NRM plan - PCC authority effector 
regulative (regulative) Habitat Friendly Development Practices - Gresham  (Title 13 
compliance) 
authority effector 
regulative (regulative) Multnomah natural areas protection and management plan - 
county 
authority effector 
regulative (regulative) NRM plan - PCC - Smith & Bybee1 authority effector 
regulative (regulative) Permits  - tree removal for large developments - PCC authority effector 
regulative (regulative) Policy - Trees First - Gresham authority effector 
regulative (regulative) portland ezone iteration - exempt from environmental review 
the removal of trees in e zones that are listed on the Nuisance or 
Prohibited Plant Lists 
authority effector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name Governce 
Resource 
Resource 
category 
regulative (regulative) portland ezones - Amendments to E-zone codes to align with 
new FEMA mapping 
authority effector 
regulative (regulative) THPRD Comprehensive plan 1997 - iteration 1 (1998 THPRD 
Trails Master Plan) 
authority effector 
regulative (regulative) THPRD Comprensive plan -  assets inventory authority effector 
regulative (regulative) THPRD Comprensive plan - iteration 2, authority effector 
regulative (regulative) tree code - Local - Beaverton authority effector 
regulative (regulative) Tree code - Local - Gresham2 authority effector 
regulative (regulative) UGB - Metro authority effector 
regulative (regulative) Code amendments - remove regulatory barriers to green enrgy 
technologies (PCC) 
organisation procedural 
regulative (regulative) UGB expansion - brings in Pleasant Valley (headwaters of 
Johnson Creek) 
organisation procedural 
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Appendix 6: Brisbane instrument sample 
Arena and linkage Instrument name – Brisbane governance 
resource 
resource 
category 
constituent (constituent) Healthy Waterway Awards authority effector 
constituent (constituent) Landcare Awards authority effector 
constituent (constituent) Collaborative policy development forum - GA with BCC (2 
million trees program) 
authority procedural 
constituent (constituent) Local (resident) management committees - for natural 
areas 
authority procedural 
constituent (constituent) Habitat Officers / Creek Rangers nodality detector 
constituent (constituent) State of the Environment Reports nodality detector 
constituent (constituent) Annual Reports nodality detector 
constituent (constituent) Bat box monitoring program nodality procedural 
constituent (constituent) Water quality monitoring program nodality procedural 
constituent (constituent) Annual THECA forum at The Hut nodality procedural 
constituent (constituent) Know your creek - OCEG publication nodality procedural 
constituent (constituent) The Creek in Your Backyard - SOWN publication nodality procedural 
constituent (constituent) Sustainability centre - B4C Sustainability centre organisation effector 
constituent (constituent) Peaks to Point Festival organisation effector 
constituent (constituent) BCN Iteration 1 - auspice  organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) BCN Iteration 2 - facilitated by BCC organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) BCN Iteration 3 - non-state  facilitation organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Environment Committee Minutes organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Community Biodiversity Strategy organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) Brisbane Rainforest Information Network (BRAIN) organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) SEQ Catchments organisation procedural 
constituent (constituent) SOWN Catchment Management committee organisation Procedural 
constituent (constituent) OCCA Catchment Management committee organisation Procedural 
constituent (constituent) B4C Catchment Management committee organisation Procedural 
constituent (constituent) City in the bush organisation Procedural 
constituent (distributive) Resident Action Groups authority Detector 
constituent (distributive) Ecosystem Services Projects authority Detector 
constituent (distributive) Complaints-Watershed groups - 2 million trees authority Detector 
constituent (distributive) Complaints-Watershed groups - attempted HB Shutdown authority Detector 
constituent (distributive) Brisbane River Plan authority effector 
constituent (distributive) BCP - Strategic Plan authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Strategic Planning targets e.g. canopy targets authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Oxley Creek Catchment Management Plan authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Ramsar listing – Boondall authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Ramsar listing – Moreton authority effector 
constituent (distributive) SEQ NRM plan authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Natural area management plan  (for large sites) authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Standard Voluntary Conservation Agreement authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Higher Voluntary Conservation Agreement authority effector 
constituent (distributive) mayoral decree - doubling 1 million to 2 million trees authority effector 
constituent (distributive) Biodiversity Advisory Committee authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) Brisbane River Management Group authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) BCC Parks and Environment Committee authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) Development of Strategic Planning targets e.g. canopy 
targets 
authority procedural 
constituent (distributive) District Open Space Studies nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Brisbane Biodiversity and Climate change reports (Low) nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) GIS Canopy Survey – biannual nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Inventory of Rare and Threatened Species nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) WWF Subregional biodiversity analysis nodality detector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name – Brisbane governance 
resource 
resource 
category 
constituent (distributive) Bushland Taskforce Reports, 1992 nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Healthy Waterway report cards nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Ward Councillor access nodality detector 
constituent (distributive) Toohey Forest Roundtables nodality procedural 
constituent (distributive) SEQNRM Atlas nodality procedural 
constituent (distributive) Creek Care program – Oxley organisation effector 
constituent (distributive) Backyard Habitat program - B4C organisation effector 
constituent (distributive) Open Space / Natural Area Network organisation effector 
constituent (distributive) Healthy Waterways network organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Healthy Waterways partnership inc organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Healthy Waterways organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) BCP - Vision Statement organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) SEQ Waterway strategy organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) 2010 Watersmart Strategy organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Natural area conservation strategy for Brisbane City organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Mountains to Mangroves 'strategy' organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) BCC green team - sustainability strategy organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Biodiversity Research Framework (under the BDS) organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) BCC Environmental Management Strategy organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Bushland and Wetland Protection Strategy organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Brisbane Biodiversity Strategy (brought together existing 
instruments) 
organisation procedural 
constituent (distributive) Conservation action statements organisation procedural 
constituent (redistributive) Oxley Creek taskforce authority procedural 
constituent (redistributive) Core Biodiversity Network  organisation procedural 
constituent (redistributive) SEQ Nature Conservation Strategy organisation procedural 
constituent (regulative) Koala Coast Policy authority effector 
constituent (regulative) Regional Biodiversity significance map (RNCS) authority effector 
constituent (regulative) Vegetation Protection Advisory committee authority procedural 
constituent (regulative) Neighborhood Planning Committees authority procedural 
constituent (regulative) Corinda Neighborhood Planning authority procedural 
constituent (regulative) Lower Oxley Neighborhood Planning authority procedural 
constituent (regulative) Rochdale Neighborhood Planning process authority procedural 
constituent (regulative) SLATS - Statewide Landcover and Trees Study 2 nodality detector 
constituent (regulative) SLATS - Statewide Landcover and Trees Study 1 nodality detector 
constituent (regulative) Common Nature Classification System nodality detector 
constituent (regulative) Brisbane City Council Ecological Assessment Guidelines nodality effector 
constituent (regulative) Woody Weed Tree enterprise (SOWN) organisation effector 
constituent (regulative) Community Nurseries organisation effector 
constituent (regulative) Brisbane Waterway Strategy organisation procedural 
distributive (constituent) 2 million trees program - outsourcing of delivery & mgmt authority procedural 
distributive (constituent) HB volunteer training nodality effector 
distributive (constituent) HB: bushland care program (old name for habitat 
brisbane) – iteration 1 
organisation effector 
distributive (constituent) HB: Habitat Brisbane – iteration 2 organisation effector 
distributive (constituent) Ithaca Intact (SOWn project) organisation effector 
distributive (constituent) Land for Wildlife agreement organisation effector 
distributive (constituent) Land for Wildlife program organisation procedural 
distributive (distributive) Bushland Levy authority effector 
distributive (distributive) 2 million trees program - outsourced management authority procedural 
distributive (distributive) 2 million trees program - delivery & mgmt authority procedural  
distributive (distributive) 2 million trees - delivery - outsourced delivery organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) 2 million trees program - government delivery organisation effector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name – Brisbane governance 
resource 
resource 
category 
distributive (distributive) Creek Rangers (BCC catchment coordinators) organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Creek Rangers (current name) organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Catchment Care-team OCCA organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Conservation Volunteers –volunteer programs organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Fire Management Program organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Weed Management organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Bush Rehabilitation Unit organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Ward teams program organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Contracted Regeneration Contractors organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Wipe Out weeds organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Wildlife Movement Solutions organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) OCCA Biodiversity Services Unit - Granards Wetlands 
Restoration 
organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Catchment group contracts - e.g. Powerlink organisation effector 
distributive (distributive) Creek Rangers (catchment coordinators) treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Caring for Our Country grants treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Natural Heritage Trust 1 treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) BCC Environment Grants (BDS) treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Community Benefit Fund treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Community Bushland Care Grants treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Landcare funding treasure effector 
distributive (distributive) Local Councillor Park Funds treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Bushland Acquisition Program – iteration 5 authority effector 
distributive (redistributive) Bushland Acquisition Program – iteration 1 treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Bushland Acquisition Program – iteration 2 treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Bushland Acquisition Program – iteration 3 treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Bushland Acquisition Program – iteration 4 treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Defacto habitat funding - using  weed management 
funding 
treasure effector 
distributive (redistributive) Bushland Acquisition Program - defacto consolidation 
funding (by using 2 million tree to connect patches 
treasure effector 
redistributive (constituent) employment programs - jobskills program (not sure 
when started and finished) 
organisation effector 
redistributive (constituent) Roll up of Brisbane River Plan into BCP 2000 organisation procedural 
redistributive (distributive) Creek rangers (BCC creek rangers) organisation effector 
redistributive (distributive) Creek rangers (BCC creek rangers) organisation effector 
redistributive (distributive) Creek rangers (BCC creek rangers) organisation effector 
redistributive (distributive) RNCS regional biodiversity significance map organisation procedural 
redistributive (distributive) HB mid 90s reform process organisation procedural 
redistributive (distributive) HB post VPO restructure process organisation procedural 
redistributive (distributive) HB 2010 reform process organisation procedural 
regulative (distributive) Covenant on Title (local) authority effector 
regulative (distributive) NCA Iteration 2 (Newman reforms) authority effector 
regulative (distributive) Natural Assets Local Law – iteration 2 (NALL) authority effector 
regulative (distributive) Covenant on Title (regional nested) authority effector 
regulative (distributive) Planning Act Iteration 3 – Sustainable Planning Act 2010 authority effector 
regulative (distributive) Planning Act 2 – Integrated Planning Act 1997 authority effector 
regulative (distributive) Planning Act 1 - Local Government (Planning and 
Environment) Act 1990 
authority effector 
regulative (distributive) De Facto Offset Policy authority effector 
regulative (distributive) Voluntary Conservation covenants authority effector 
regulative (distributive) FGK corridor Memorandum of Understanding authority procedural 
regulative (distributive) Construction and Establishment Guidelines: Swales, 
Bioretention Systems and Wetlands Version 1.1. (HWP) 
nodality effector 
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Arena and linkage Instrument name – Brisbane governance 
resource 
resource 
category 
regulative (distributive) Biodiversity Offset Policies organisation procedural 
regulative (distributive) BCP The "Green Space System" central to the Strategic 
Plan, including the creation of a "Conservation Areas",  
organisation procedural 
regulative (distributive) Bushland Acquisition Program - shifting the acquisition 
targets 
organisation procedural 
regulative (distributive) Bushland Acquisition Program treasure effector 
regulative (redistributive)  Nature Conservation Act – iteration 1 (pre-Newman) authority effector 
regulative (redistributive)  NALL 1 (Vegetation Protection Orders) authority effector 
regulative (redistributive)  Vegetation Management Act authority effector 
regulative (redistributive)  Environmental Overlays authority effector 
regulative (redistributive)  Urban Footprint authority effector 
regulative (redistributive)  1st conservation zone - old bris town plan authority effector 
regulative (redistributive)  conservation zone introduced to the town plan authority procedural 
regulative (redistributive)  Environmental Defenders Office legal advice nodality procedural 
regulative (redistributive)  Covenants organisation effector 
regulative (redistributive)  Statutory Koala planning organisation procedural 
regulative (redistributive)  Bushland Acquisition Program treasure effector 
regulative (redistributive)  Developer 'gifting'  treasure effector 
regulative (regulative) biodiversity code 1- BCP, updated 2014 in the new Bris 
Plan 
authority effector 
regulative (regulative) conservation zones – BCP authority effector 
regulative (regulative) waterway code – BCP authority effector 
regulative (regulative) Oxley Wedge organisation procedural 
regulative (regulative) BCP Biodiversity Code organisation procedural 
regulative (regulative) BCP Natural Assets Planning Scheme Policy establishes 
a"Natural Assets Register"  
organisation procedural 
regulative (regulative) HEC - High Ecological Significance organisation procedural 
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Appendix 7: Frame analysis tables: Brisbane and Portland 
A7.1 Brisbane frame analysis table 
Transition 
-see Fig 8.4 
# Responses / 
adjustments 
Bridging Extending Amplifying Transfor
-ming 
Input/ 
Output 
Type Who acts? Who is heard? (input) / 
Who is satisfied? (output) 
1.Nascent, 
informal 
and 
advocacy-
led  
(mid-80s–
1992) 
 
1.1 Resident Action Group 
campaigns, e.g. 
proposed 
development of 
Boondall wetlands 
society-
centric 
(linked with 
2.1) 
linked with 
#2.1 
    I moral-
episodic 
RAGS & civil 
society 
RAGs & civil society 
1.2 First BCC 
environmental officer 
(1988)  
cross-sector state-
centric 
state-
centric 
cross-
sector 
I ≈ O all-continual councillors all? - hard to say because 
high on pol agenda  
1.3 Acquisition levy is 
designed and 
implemented 
cross-sector state-
centric 
state-
centric 
cross-
sector 
I ≈ O all-continual councillors-
NES 
civil society & scientists, 
professional environmental 
policy networks 
2.Capacity 
building 
and 
implement-
ation   
 
(1991–
1997) 
 
2.1 Acquisition program 
begins 
society-
centric (links 
to 1.1) 
cross-
sector 
cross-
sector 
society-
centric 
(election 
I ≈ O all-continual councillors-
mayor 
civil society, NES 
2.2 Restoration groups & 
environment centre —
coordinated by 
Greening Australia 
cross-sector?  
(insuff. data) 
cross-
sector 
state-
centric 
cross-
sector 
I ≈ O all-continual,  NES BCC general, Greening 
Australia & allied 
environmental networks, 
RAGs 
2.3 Council restoration 
teams 
state-
centric? 
actor level? 
(insuffic. 
data) 
state-
centric 
state-
centric? or 
weak cross-
centric? 
(insuffic 
data) 
state-
centric 
(weak 
strength
) 
O all-continual LAS NES 
2.4 Vegetation Protection 
Orders established 
(VPOs) 
state-
centric? 
actor level? 
(insuffic. 
data) 
state-
centric 
state-
centric & 
civic 
(variable 
strength) 
 
cross-
sector 
O prag/moral 
continual, 
moral 
episodic 
NES NES, professional policy 
networks, environmental 
networks 
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Transition 
-see Fig 8.4 
# Responses / 
adjustments 
Bridging Extending Amplifying Transfor
-ming 
Input/ 
Output 
Type Who acts? Who is heard? (input) / 
Who is satisfied? (output) 
3.Cross-
sector 
governance 
and 
formalis-   -
ation of 
non-state 
networks 
(1995-
2004) 
 
3.1 Watershed groups 
form 
cross-sector cross-
sector 
cross-
sector 
(variable 
strength) 
cross-
sector 
I ≈ O prag/moral 
continual, 
cog episodic 
Habitat 
groups, RAGs 
and assoc 
networks. 
Professional watershed 
management networks, 
Habitat groups, RAGS 
3.2 Restoration groups 
are refined 
state-centric state-
centric 
state-
centric 
(weak 
strength) 
state-
centric 
O prag/cog 
continual 
NES BCC budget actors 
3.3 Acquisition program 
targets koala habitat 
state-
centric? 
actor level? 
(insuffic. 
data) 
cross-
sector & 
civic 
cross-
sector & 
civic 
state-
centric 
(actor 
level) 
I < O all-continual NES ecologists, environmental 
networks, "koala national 
icon' people 
3.4 Watershed groups 
experiment with 
income generation 
and new grant sources 
society-
centric (actor 
level) 
cross-
sector 
society-
centric 
(actor 
level) 
society-
centric 
(actor 
level) 
O prag/cog 
continual 
WSGs WSGs-membership, BCC-
general, BCC-budget actors 
3.5 Watershed groups - 
stronger local 
horizontal links 
society-
centric (actor 
level) 
cross-
sector 
cross-
sector 
cross-
sector 
I < O prag-
continual, 
prag/cog-
episodic 
WSGs WSGs-leadership, local 
actors and networks 
3.5 BCC begins funding 
watershed groups 
(2004) 
society-
centric? 
(insuffic. 
data) 
state-
centric 
cross-
sector 
cross-
sector 
I > O prag-
continual? 
(insuff. data) 
BCC-budget 
actors 
WSGs -membership & allies, 
Councillors 
3.7 Brisbane Biodiversity 
Strategy (1999) 
cross-sector state-
centric 
cross-
sector 
cross-
sector 
O prag/moral 
continual, 
cog episodic 
NES NES, WSGs, environmental 
netwrks inc. RAGs, 
professional networks, Local 
govt association 
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Transition 
-see Fig 8.4 
# Responses / 
adjustments 
Bridging Extending Amplifying Transfor
-ming 
Input/ 
Output 
Type Who acts? Who is heard? (input) / 
Who is satisfied? (output) 
Transition 3 
continued 
3.8 Brisbane Catchment 
Network established 
cross-sector cross-
sector 
cross-
sector 
(variable 
strength) 
cross-
sector 
I prag-
continual, 
cog-episodic 
WSGs WSGs, NES, environmental 
networks 
4.Inter-
division 
governnce 
/ 
regionalis-
ation  
 
(2000-
2008) 
4.1 Biodiversity code (new 
City Plan) 
state-centric state-
centric 
state-
centric 
state-
centric 
I < O prag/cog 
continual 
NES, BCC-
planners 
BCC-planners, professional 
planning networks, 
institutional-context actors 
4.2 Text policies 
translated into spatial 
definitions 
state-centric state-
centric 
state-
centric 
state-
centric 
O prag/cog 
continual 
NES, BCC-
planners 
BCC-planners, professional 
planning networks, 
institutional-context actors 
4.3 VPOs rolled into NALL state-centric state-
centric 
state-
centric 
state-
centric 
O prag/cog 
continual 
NES, LAS BCC-general, "integrated 
policy" people 
4.4 SEQ Catchments  
re-strategises and 
begins coordinating 
Land for Wildlife 
cross-sector cross-
sector 
(actor 
level) 
cross-
sector 
(actor 
level) 
cross-
sector 
I < O prag/moral-
continual, 
cog-episodic 
SEQ 
Catchments 
SEQ local councils, LFW 
members & allies 
5.‘Decoup--
led’ 
governnce 
& divergent 
responses 
(2007-
2012) 
5.1 Brisbane Catchments 
Network dissolves and 
reforms as a non-
government forum 
(2011) 
society-
centric 
society-
centric 
society-
centric 
society-
centric 
I prag/moral-
continual, 
cog-episodic 
WSGs WSGs-subactors,  
5.2 Local WSGs join 
regional forums 
(2012) 
cross-sector cross-
sector 
cross-
sector 
cross-
sector 
(variable
) 
I prag-
continual, 
cog-episodic 
SEQ 
Catchments, 
Healthy 
Waterways, 
WSGs 
SEQ Catchments, Healthy 
Waterways, WSGs 
5.3 Environmental 
programs  
consolidated (2010) 
state-centric state-
centric 
state-
centric 
(weak 
strength) 
state-
centric 
O prag/cog 
continual 
BCC-general BCC-budget people 
5.4 WSG enterprise 
proposal (critical case) 
society-
centric (actor 
level) 
state-
centric 
state-
centric 
state-
centric & 
society 
centric 
I ≈ O all-episodic WSG WSG sub-actors, LAS, BCC-
compliance 
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Transition 
-see Fig 8.4 
# Responses / 
adjustments 
Bridging Extending Amplifying Transfor
-ming 
Input/ 
Output 
Type Who acts? Who is heard? (input) / 
Who is satisfied? (output) 
5.‘Decoup--
led’ 
governnce 
& divergent 
responses 
(2007-
2012) 
5.5 Watershed groups 
tender for 
procurement 
contracts 
society-
centric (actor 
level) 
state-
centric 
state-
centric 
state-
centric & 
society 
centric 
I < O cognitive-
continual, 
prag-
episodic 
WSGs BCC-budget people, NES, 
WSGs 
5.6 Reformation of 
project delivery and 
project goals 
state-centric state-
centric 
state-
centric 
(weak 
strength) 
state-
centric 
O cognitive-
continual, 
prag-
episodic 
NES &  
BCC-procure-
ment 
BCC-procurement, Mayor, 
NES 
5.7 Watershed group 
advocacy for 
biodiversity focus  
society-
centric 
cross-
sector 
state-
centric 
state-
centric 
O prag/moral-
continuous, 
cog-episodic 
WSGs WSGs, environmental 
networks, NES 
5.8 compulsory 
acquisition (critical 
case) 
state-centric 
(actor level) 
state-
centric 
state-
centric 
(weak 
strength) 
state-
centric 
(actor 
level) 
O prag/cog-
episodic 
NES NES 
5.9 quasi-offset policy 
(critical case) 
state-centric 
(actor level) 
state-
centric 
state-
centric 
state-
centric 
O moral-
procedural, 
prag/cog-
episodic 
LAS-officer LAS 
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A7.2 Portland frame analysis table 
Transition 
-See Fig 8.4 
# response / 
adjustment 
Bridging Extending Amplifying Transform-
ing 
Input/ 
Output 
Type Who acts? Who is heard? /  
Who is satisfied? 
1.Facilitative 
governance / 
legitimisation  
(mid-80s-
1995) 
1.1 Metropolitan 
Greenspaces 
Masterplan 
society-
centric 
cross-
sector 
cross-sector 
(+ P&R) 
cross-sector 
(+ P&R) 
I ≈ O prag/moral 
continual, 
cog episodic 
civil society, 
Audubon, 
FAUNA 
civil society 
(Audubon, Fauna 
and allies) 
1.2 Participation in 
planning & 
FAUNA bond 
measure 
society-
centric 
cross-
sector 
cross-sector 
(+civic-
political) 
society-centric 
(election) 
I prag/moral-
continual, 
cog- episodic 
civil society, 
Audubon, 
FAUNA 
civil society 
(Audubon, Fauna 
and allies) 
1.3 Next bond 
measure 
(Metro takes a 
role in 
organising) 
cross-
sector 
(core 
+parks, 
rec) 
state-
centric: 
soft 
(metropol-
itan) 
cross-sector 
(+civic-
political) 
society-centric 
(election) 
I ≈ O prag/moral-
continual,  
  cognitive-
episodic 
Metro Metro sub-actors 
(O), civil society (I), 
other government 
actors (I&O) 
1.4 Embedding via 
Watershed 
revegetation 
program 
state-
centric 
(actor-
level) 
cross-
sector  
(+ WS) 
cross-sector 
(+ WS) 
cross-sector 
(+WS & more 
state actors) 
I ≈ O prag/moral-
continual, 
cog-episodic 
BES watershed councils, 
Fauna, Audubon, 
other Portland 
governments 
2.Metropolitn 
governance 
activation  
(94–95) 
 
2.1 Transfer of 
County parks 
to Metro 
cross-
sector 
(core) 
state-
centric  
state-centric  state-centric 
(metropolitan
) 
O prag-
episodic 
Metro & 
Multnomah 
county 
general public, 
Audubon, FAUNA 
2.2 Acquisition 
program 
state-
centric: 
soft (actor 
level) 
state-
centric 
(metropoli
tan) 
state-centric 
(metropolita
n) 
state-centric: 
soft 
(metropolitan
) 
I ≈ O prag/moral 
continual, 
cog episodic 
Metro-Natural 
areas 
Audubon, FAUNA 
and allies 
2.3 Establishment 
of Metro 
Natural Areas 
Program 
state-
centric: 
soft (actor 
level) 
state-
centric 
(metropoli
tan) 
state-centric 
(metropolita
n) 
state-centric: 
soft (actor 
level) 
I ≈ O all-continual Metro Audubon, FAUNA 
and allies 
301 
 
Transition 
-See fig 8.4 
# response / 
adjustment 
Bridging Extending Amplifying Transform-
ing 
Input/ 
Output 
Type Who acts? Who is heard? /  
Who is satisfied? 
3.Embedding 
into the 
watershed 
arena  
 
(1993-2001) 
 
3.1 Watershed 
council 
revegetation 
projects 
cross-
sector  
(+ WS) 
cross-
sector (+ 
WS, local 
interests) 
cross-sector 
(+ WS, local 
interests) 
cross-sector  
(+ WS, local 
interests) 
I all-
continual, 
cognitive-
episodic 
BES Audubon, FAUNA, 
Watershed Councils 
& allies, institutional 
context actors 
3.2 Embedding 
into flood 
planning 
state-
centric 
cross-
sector  
(+ local 
public) 
cross-sector 
(+ local 
public) 
cross-sector 
(WS) - links to 
3.3 
I ≈ O prag/moral 
continual, 
cog episodic 
Metro watershed council, 
council actors, 
Audubon, FAUNA 
and allies, 
institutional context 
actors 
3.3 Strengthened 
embedding 
into flood 
planning 
cross-
sector 
(WS) - 
linked to 
3.2 
cross-
sector 
(WS+BD) 
cross-sector 
(WS 
+BD+more 
state actors) 
cross-sector 
(WS 
+BD+more 
state actors) 
I ≈ O prag/moral 
continual, 
cog episodic 
BES watershed councils, 
government actors 
in Johnson creek, 
Audubon, FAUNA & 
allies, institutional-
context actors 
4.Embedding 
out from 
natural assets 
and property-
rights 
pushback 
(1999-2006) 
 
4.1 Internalisation 
of e-zone 
extension 
process 
state-
centric: 
soft 
state-
centric:soft 
(+ local 
interests) 
state-centric 
(core) 
state-centric 
(core) 
I ≈ O moral-
episodic 
property rights 
movement, BoP, 
Metro 
EG-state actors, 
Audubon 
4.2 Metro resource 
inventory for 
upland 
protection 
state-
centric 
(core) 
cross-
sector 
cross-sector state-centric 
(metropolitan
) 
I ≈ O cognitive-
continual 
Metro, PCC Audubon, FAUNA, 
PCC, Watershed 
councils and allies, 
institutional context 
actors 
4.3 Measure 49 
reverses some 
Measure 37 
impacts 
cross-
sector 
(civic-
political) 
cross-
sector 
(civic-
political) 
 
 
 
cross-sector 
(+civic-
political) 
society-centric 
(election) 
I ≈ O all-episodic Metro? 
(insuffic. Data) 
general public, 
environmental 
advocates e.g. 
Audubon, FAUNA 
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Transition 
-See fig 8.4 
# response / 
adjustment 
Bridging Extending Amplifying Transform-
ing 
Input/ 
Output 
Type Who acts? Who is heard? /  
Who is satisfied? 
4.Embedding 
out from 
natural assets 
and property-
rights 
pushback  
(1999-2006) 
 
4.4 Draft Title 13 
increases 
voluntary 
component 
state-
centric 
(standard 
regulatory
) 
state-
centric 
(regulator
y +local 
interests) 
state-centric 
(less-
regulatory) 
cross-sector  
(+ local 
interests) 
O pragmatic-
continual 
Metro property rights 
movement 
4.5 Strengthened 
embedding 
into recreation 
arena 
cross-
sector 
cross-
sector  
(+ P&R) 
cross-sector 
(+ P&R) 
cross-sector 
(+P&R, more 
state actors) 
O pragmatic-
continual 
Metro general public, 
environmental 
networks, allied 
networks 
4.6 Offset federal 
funding loss via 
Title 13 grant 
program 
cross-
sector 
(core) 
cross-
centric 
(former 
MGS 
partners) 
cross-sector 
(+civic-
political) 
society-centric 
(election) 
O pragmatic-
continual 
Metro/voters environmental 
networks - including 
Audubon, & FAUNA 
5.Urban 
matrix and co-
benefit 
governance 
(2004-2012) 
 
5.1 Portland Urban 
Bird Treaty 
cross-
sector 
cross-
sector 
(+more 
state 
actors) 
cross-sector 
(+more state 
actors) 
state-centric I ≈ O moral-
continual 
PCC Audubon, Bureaus 
5.2 TEES (critical 
case) 
state-
centric: 
(WS actor 
level +BD) 
state-
centric 
(WS+BD  
+internal 
stake-
holders) 
state-centric 
(WS+BD 
+internal 
stakeholders 
state-centric 
(WS+BD 
+internal 
stakeholders 
+land 
managers) 
I ≈ O prag/moral-
continual; 
cog-episodic 
PCC Audubon, PCC-
Bureaus 
5.3 Embedding 
into green 
infrastructure, 
e.g. 
meadowscape 
with natives 
cross-
sector 
(core) 
cross-
sector 
(+WS, local 
interests) 
cross-sector 
(+WS, LGA 
interests) 
cross-sector 
(+WS, 
metropolitan 
interests) 
I ≈ O prag/moral-
continual; 
cog-episodic 
BES, Audubon & 
coalition of 
partners 
BES, Audubon, 
environmental 
networks 
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Transition 
-See fig 8.4 
# response / 
adjustment 
Bridging Extending Amplifying Transform-
ing 
Input/ 
Output 
Type Who acts? Who is heard? /  
Who is satisfied? 
5.Urban 
matrix and co-
benefit 
governance 
(2004-2012) 
5.4 Embedding 
into green 
infrastructure, 
e.g. 
biodiversity 
eco-roofs 
society-
centric 
(actor 
level) 
cross-
sector 
(research) 
cross-sector 
(research 
partnership) 
X I prag/moral-
continual; 
cog-episodic 
PSU 
researchers, 
Metro 
monitoring 
Audubon, FAUNA, 
environmental 
advocates 
5.5 Embedding 
into green 
infrastructure, 
e.g.  tree 
corridors 
between 
natural areas 
state-
centric 
(WS actor 
level) 
state-
centric 
(WS+BD 
+internal 
stake-
holders) 
state-centric 
(WS+BD 
+internal 
stake- 
Holder 
cross-sector 
(WS+BD 
+internal 
stakeholders) 
I ≈ O prag/moral-
continual; 
cog-episodic 
BES, CWS and 
government 
allies 
Audubon, FAUNA, 
environmental 
advocates, Federal 
EPA, institutional 
context actors 
5.6 Stronger 
embedding 
into water 
arena via 
trading 
systems  
state-
centric 
(actor 
level) 
state-
centric 
(Basin 
wide, +BD) 
cross-sector 
(+BD. 
developers) 
cross-sector 
(+BD. 
Developers, 
local 
interests) 
O prag/moral-
continual; 
cog/prag-
episodic 
CWS, Jackson 
Bottom 
Preserve 
Audubon, FAUNA, 
environmental 
advocates, 
institutional context 
actors (e.g. Federal 
EPA), potential 
trading partners 
5.7 Accelerated 
embedding 
into green 
infrastructure 
(critical case) 
state-
centric:soft 
(actor-
level) 
state-
centric:soft 
(WS 
+elected 
represent-
ative) 
state-
centric:soft 
(WS 
+elected 
represent-
ative) 
cross-sector 
(WS+elected 
representative 
+other 
bundled 
interests) 
I < O all-
continual, all 
episodic? 
BES-engineers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BES watershed 
team, Audubon, 
environmental 
advocates 
 
 
 
5.8 Extra co-
benefits - 
flagship (e.g. 
acquisition) 
state-
centric:soft 
(actor-
level) 
state-
centric:soft 
(WS 
+elected 
represent-
ative) 
state-centric 
(WS+elected 
represent-
ative, BD, 
P&R) 
state-centric 
(WS+P&R) 
I > O prag/moral-
continual; 
cog/prag-
episodic 
BES PPR, environmental 
advocates 
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Transition 
-See fig 8.4 
# response / 
adjustment 
Bridging Extending Amplifying Transform-
ing 
Input/ 
Output 
Type Who acts? Who is heard? /  
Who is satisfied? 
5.Urban 
matrix and co-
benefit 
governance 
(2004-2012) 
 
5.9 Regional Tree 
Code Survey 
society-
centric 
(core) 
cross-
sector 
(core 
+Metro) 
cross-sector 
(core+Metro
+local govts) 
cross-sector 
(core+Metro) 
I ≈ O prag/moral 
continual, 
cog episodic 
Audubon, PSU Audubon, Fauna, 
environmental 
advocates 
5. 
10 
Backyard 
Habitat 
Certification 
Program 
society-
centric 
(core) 
cross-
sector 
(+Local 
govt) 
cross-sector 
(+Local 
govt) 
cross-sector 
(metropolitan
) 
I all-moral, 
cog-episodic 
Audubon, Land 
trust and allies 
Audubon members, 
environmental 
voters, 
environmental 
advocates 
5. 
11 
Fot capacity 
build (critical 
case) 
society-
centric 
society-
centric 
+civil 
groups 
cross-sector 
(BES grants) 
cross-sector 
(contract) 
O prag-
continual, 
cog-episodic 
FoT, BES BES 
5. 
12 
Coalition for a 
liveable future 
(critical case) 
society-
centric 
(core) 
society-
centric 
(early 
adopters) 
society-
centric(+mo
re actors) 
state-centric 
(planning for 
liveability) 
I moral-
continual 
Audubon & 
partners 
Audubon & partners 
6.Landscape 
level 
governance  
(2007+) 
6.1 Advocacy for 
regional level 
corridors (e.g. 
connectivity 
between Forest 
Park and rural 
areas 
cross-
sector 
cross-
sector 
(+local 
 interests, 
state actor 
committee 
cross-sector 
(+local 
interests, 
state actor 
committees) 
cross-sector 
(+planning) 
I all-moral, 
cog-episodic 
Metro-Science, 
Forest park 
conservatory, 
Audubon, Fauna 
and allies 
 
Audubon, FAUNA 
and environmental 
networks 
6.2 Intertwine 
Alliance  
established 
cross-
sector 
(core) 
cross-
sector 
(early 
adopters) 
cross-sector 
(early 
adopters + 
other state 
actors, other 
interests) 
cross-sector 
(early 
adopters + 
other state 
actors, other 
interests) 
I prag/moral 
continual, 
cog episodic 
Metro and 
partners 
actors involved in 
bond measures, 
greenspace program 
actors (temporal 
embedded) 
6.3 Regional 
Conservation 
Strategy 
cross-
sector 
(core) 
cross-
sector 
(core+mor
e state 
actors) 
cross-sector 
(core+more 
state actors) 
cross-sector 
(core + other 
state actors, 
other 
interests) 
I prag/moral 
continual, 
cog episodic 
Metro and 
partners, 
including 
Audubon 
environmental 
advocates - 
Audubon, FAUNA 
etc. 
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Appendix 8: Example Portion of Case Study Database – Portland timeline 1996 & 1997 
 
